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AB3TRA0T 
The revival of Bruneip after oenturies of seemiugly- 
irreversible deoline, dates from January 1906, when Mr USE 
MoArthnr assumed offioe as the first British Resident in the 
Sultanate. In this study it will be shown hoer a moribund, 
bankrupt and isolated baokrraterg troubled bfr internal 
disatfeotion and living under a Brooke 'sword of Damooles', 
was regenerated by more enlightened British administration, 
ooapled later with the fortuitous dieoovery of petroleum, into 
a peaoefal, flourishing and prosperous little State, the 
Shanari-la of the East' (i Abdal Rabman, 1958). 
Originally the initiative rested firmly with the imperial powers 
but after the Second World War the balance shifted towards an 
increasingly literate and healtb7 local population. British 
adminietratore, instead of initiating PolioT (as formerl7) found 
themselves obliged inoreasingly to reaot to demands made upon 
them by an emerging Brunei nationalist movement led by the 
oharismatio Sheikh Azabari. In the end, however, it was the 
monarohy whioh was most strengthened during the Residential 
Era; and it was overwhelaingly to the orownt rather than to the 
people, that power was transferred when Brunei regained 
internal antonom* on 29 September 1959" 
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adat customary lax, 
ax` will (i. e. final testament). 
amok ran amok. 
atap roofing, especially of thatch. 
Bariran Pemuda Brunei Youth Movement (political party founded just 
Brunei after the Second World War). 
Batu Tersilah genealogical tablet. 
be an type of timber* 
beri `beri disease oansed through lack of vitamin Be 
lal muezzin (man who makes the call to prayer)* 
blukar secondary jungle. 
bubm cage (type of fishing method)* 
bamipatra indigene. 
Capstan China Headman of the Chinese part of the population. 
ohandn prepared opiume 
ohegu form of address (abbreviation of inohe Mr., and guru, 
teacher). 
ohe t eria "a major order of traditional noble officials ranking 
beneath the wazirs". 
ohe; tiar money-lender. 
daerah district. 
daaang serah forced trade tax (abolished 1906). 
dato da` "an element in traditional titles; also used modernly 
as an equivalent to 'Sir'". * 
In this work dato is used to indicate a Brunei 
honour, datuk an honour from one of the Malaysian 
states. 
Dato Di-Gadong Resident headman of Putong district. 
* Definitions marked with an asterisk are derived from DZ Brom, Brunei: 
The Struoture and History of a Bornean l'4aley Sultanate (Brunei 1970), 
pp 206-10. 
zv 
Dato Hakim Malay judge. 
fir ah Muslim religions poll tax payable, subject to 
exemptions on the grounds of poverty, at the rate 
of one any tg of rice for every two members of 
each household. 
bra child of Sultan, wazirs or oheteria when the mother 
is of e ran (noble) ranke, 
antan "a antan of rice is equivalent to about 8 lbs" (An 
Economic Survey of the Colonial Territories, Vol. s 
The Par East (ALSO 1955), P 109" 
eý rubber latex. 
ha i ijah one who has made the pilgrimage to Meooas, 
bakim judge., 
haedba servant, follower, slaves, 
hokum kanun Muslim administrative law. * 
hokum aharia Muslim religious laws, 
ilmas. consensus (of Muslim scholars). 
imam leader of prayer in a mosque. 
in ohe (or ate) Mr. 
ia tana palace. 
Jawatan Abu Bakar one of the pehin (see Brown, op. oit., pp 114-5) 
Blut Ong "a kind of wild rubber tree" (its robber is used in 
making chewing gum, the timber is valuable). 
u at a method of fishing. 
ka a palm frond used in roofing, baskets, mats and bags. 
Kalimantan Utara 'Northern Borneo' (title used by the Partai RaMat to 
designate Brunei, Sarawak and North Borneo). 
k village. 
gamPan9 Lyer 'River Village' (Brunei Town)* 
ka t? _ Muslim religious judge. 
kati catty (16 tahils or 1.33 ibs). 
kelekati elekatu flying ants. 
Kempeitsii Japanese Military Police, 
kern aan appanagea (land and serfs) of the crown (abolished 
1906). 
xvi 
Kesatuan Mela7u Brunei Brunei Malay Union. 
ketua village elder. 
khatib reader and preacher in a mosque, 
kid type of fishing equipment (deep water trap). 
Koran 'Recital' (of Allah to the Prophet Muhammad). 
kuripan appanages (land and serfs) of a wazir (abolished 
1906). 
la au Sultan's audience hall. 
lank materials cooked for oonsumption with rice. 
makan tahan the annual feast of the Kedayanse 
masuk Melayu to 'enter the Malay race'. 
Mentri Besar Chief Minister. 
merdeka independence, 
mudim muezzing 
mukim parish; area served by one mosque. 
mui tsai (Ch) "little sister"t Chinese household 'slave'. 
nig tall tufted palm* 
nobat diraia royal orchestra. 
ondong-ondong traditional written law of Brunei. 
Orates Bukit ' Hill People' 
Orana Kaya "literally "rioh mang a oommon element in non- 
noble titles of offioe". * 
adan plain, playing field. 
pads paddy, rioe in the bask. 
adian traditional fish market in Brunei Town, dating 
at least as far back as 1521 and having died oat 
only in the past deoade. The women hawkers, who 
operated from their boats, were characterised by 
their broad-rimmed hate. 
Partai Rakyat Brunei Brunei People's Party. (founded 1956; won 90% 
of poll in August 1962 election; outlawed 
following revolt of December 1962). 
shin "a non-noble of saffioiently high rank to have 
been inaugurated with chin, sacred formula", 
pen bulu headman. 
e ran a 'noble'. 
xvii 
Pengiran Anak "the title of non-Sahara sons of Saltans, of 
Sultan's daughters, of all children of the 
Pengiran Di-Gadong other than his eldest abara 
son and at least of all remaining gebare child- 
ren of wazirs" (i. e. other than those just 
mentioned and those children entitled Pe ran 
1Kuda). Brown, op. oit., p 24. 
Pengiran Bendahara highest-ranking wazir. 
Pengiran Di-Gadong seoond-ranking wasir (post vacant 1900-68). 
Pengiran )(uda "title used for sons of the Sultan and Pa ran 
Bendahara and for the eldest son of the Pe ran 
Di-ßadong if their mothers are noble (i. e. if 
the sons are gahara)". Browny . oit., p 24. 
Pengiran Pemanoha third-ranking wasir. 
Pengiiran Shahbandar, highest-ranking oheteria, but of similar status 
de faoto as a wazir. 
Pengiran Temenggong fourth-ranking wazir (post vacant 1885-1967). 
pengkalan landing place* 
port an tax imposed on the occasion of a birth, marriage 
or death in an overlord's family (abolished 1906). 
pikul 100 Icatis (133 ibs). 
rahu ep rabn boat. 
uff lai an inferior wild rubbere 
lau pulo island. 
nP nkah fan. 
ui as analogical reasoning. 
ra a ruler, noble. 
Rajah Isteri Consort of a Sultan. 
Rajah Muda heir to the throne (Sarawak)o 
r at people. 
Ranee Consort of a Rajah of Sarawak. 
rongeng "danoe with einging in pairs"o 
r= rattan (cane). 
rumba Lg o palm. 
Sago/gaga sago. 
Sahabat Pena "Penpal F'riendship' (friendli sooiety, 19300). 
aaieat political aotivity. 
xviii 
sarong skirt. 
sel e lh genealogy. 
sha'er a poetio formo 
sheikh a Muslim title, 
silat traditional sword dance.. 
sireh betel vine. 
Surma Way of the Prophet Muhammad. 
thil 1* ounces. 
tahan hijrat Muslim calendar year (Irmo Hegirae, AH). The 
months are as foil owes Muharram, Safar, Rabiul- 
a`9 Babiula]chir; Jamadilawall Jamadilakhir, 
Re abq aaban Ramadan. Zulkaidah & ZulhiUah, 
ta nah land, soil. n 
Tengkn Amman title of Sultan Abmad Tajuddin's mother, 
Teetara Nasional National Araly of 'Northern Borneo'. 
Kalimantan Utara 
tee an channel. 
t png'kan, near-going barge, 
towk Chinese businessman. 
Tua___nMuda Second son of a Rajah of Sarawak. 
tug`, a type of fishing net. 
. 
tulin private hereditary property, land and serfs 
(abolished 1906). 
t, uaku prince, 
lama theologians. 
Ulu upriver district. 
;a domestic servant/slave. 
. was_ir 
"the foar highest noble officials beneath the 
Sultan". * 
Yang Dipertuan 'Overlord' (crowned Sultan). 
Eaakat 'purification' (l1uslim religious tax) -a 
tithe paid by padi-growers and when collected 
applies to people who grow more than 400 
gantangs of rice (per annum, presumably). 
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PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEI iTS 
1. Introduction 
This attempted thesis comprises an enquirer into the development 
of Brunei during the British Residential Erap which lasted from 2 January 
1906 until 29 September 1959. There was an interlude between Deoember 
1941 and June 19459 when the ooantry name under illegal Japanese wartime 
oooapation, followed bj thirteen months (June 1945 to July 1946) of 
British military' administration, 
The installation of 1är XSH MoArthur (1872-1934) as the first 
British Resident in 1906 remains, a fundamental point of departure in 
the historg of modern Bruneig marking the ooaolnaion of a prolonged 
Period of deoline whioh bad begun in the sixteenth oentury and seemed 
certain to culminate in Brunei's disappearance from the nap of nations. 
Having at one time oontrollecl the ooastal areas of north-west Borneo 
and the southern Philippines (inoluding Sulu), Brunei on the eve of 
the Residential Bra had been reduoed to a small, rump State entirely 
surrounded br Sarawak ezoept along the ooaet. The oonatry's subsequent 
regeneration under British administration in the eabjsot of this work. 
2. Souroes 
Already available are several exoelleut studies of Brunei's 
virtual partition before 1906; 
1 
and essential to any understanding of 
I* See bibliograpib (p 657ff, below), espeoially the work of CN Criss- 
well, 0 Irwin, N Tarling and LR Wright. 
modern Brunei is DP Brown, Braneis The Struoture and History of a B` 
Malay Sultanate (1970). There iss however, no study dealing speoifioally 
with the Residential Era. 
The present writer has beau denied permission to use the 
Brunei museum's arohives. 
2 
This thesis, therefore, is based principally 
upon the original departmental files available in the Public Record Office, 
Kew. Farther s ouroe material of a primary nature has been Found in a 
number of libraries, namely Rhodes House (Oxford), the National News- 
Paper Library (Colindale), the Royal Commonwealth Sooiety, the Foreign 
Offioe Library, the Imperial War Museum, and the BBC Written Arohives 
Centre (Caveraham). A third quarry of informatics was provided by the 
living testimony of people oonneoted with the Residential Bra. Fourthly, 
there are various published eye-witness aoooaats, saoh as Peter Blundell, 
The City of Many Waters (1923). The autborg properly called Mr Frank 
Butterworth (1875-1952), was engineer and then manager of the oatoh 
factory in Brunei Town (1901-13). Finally, there are items in fictional 
form, notably Mr A Burgess, Devil of a State (1961). 
There are, on the other handy certain difficulties with regard 
to soaroe materials whioh leave some blank spaoes. First, almost all 
eouroes are of British origin. 8eoondl7, onl7 the more important matters 
were referred to Whitehall; henoe even those files are not so oomplete 
as the student would wish. (The prinoipal reason for this, howevert is 
Z, PA Haji Awang Chuohit (for State Seoretary, Brunei) to Ihs DK Bassett, 
/BR"44/51, I 2,17 November 1983. Permission to oonsult the Brunei 
Museum's arohives was denied "in view of the Government polio at the 
moment. 
xxi 
that little of internal political importance occurred in the Sultanate 
until the last few years of the Residenoy; before then there was mostly 
routine administration unhampered by vooiferoas nationalist agitation). 
Nor were there any newspapers in Brunei until the appearance, in late 
1953, of the weekly Borneo Bulletin. In addition, the Nalay population 
long remained overwhelmingly illiterate, so that their opinions have not 
been recorded (at leant before the advent of the Partai Rakyat in 1956). 
Fiaally, much remains to be disoovered about the Japanese interlude. 
(1941-5). The student of bist ory, however, oan learn only so muoh as 
the past is willing to yield up. 
_3. 
Aoknowledgemente. 
Although this thesis has been researohed, written, typewritten 
and photostated by the present writer; and although responsibility, for 
all errors - whether of faot, interpretationp'typewriting or photo- 
oopping - remains mine alone; nevertheless I am delighted now to pay 
tribute to many people for their assistance whilst the work was in 
progress. 
I am grateful to the British Social Soieuoe Researoh Council 
for the finanoial support whioh made this reeearoh possible. 
A great number of individuals have been kind enough to offer 
their aoademio expertise, or personal reoolleotions of the Residential 
Era, or personal papers, or photographs (or various oombinations of all 
four)s air AF Abell KCria MOP (SCS), Haji Zaini Abmad (FRB), Mr 3 Baske 
(sC8)ý Mr ER Bevington CMG (EMOS), Mr Ja Blaok (MC$), Professor DE Brown, 
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Mrs Carrie 0 Brown, Rev AS Badgett, Major CS Carter DSO (SOL/SRD), Mr L 
Chin PBS AM PPB (Curators Sarawak Museum), the late Dr LJ Clapham CBE 
(Colonial Medioal Servioe), Mr J Cook CBE (Colonial Agricultural Service), 
Datuk RJF Curtis PJK (MCS), Mrs DPI Daubeny, Mr LEN Davis CMG (MCS), PW 
Ellis, Dr OE Fisher MD (Malayan Medical Service), Mr HL Fountain (SOL), 
Mr JO Gilbert CMG (SCS), Mrs P Gilbertp Mr A Gilmour CKG (MCS), JT Hay- 
ward, the late Professor R Heussler, Tan Sri Datuk ARP Humphrey PMN CMG 
OBE (MCS), Mr WM Johnson (SOL)D Professor AR Maxwell, Sir JC MoPetrie 
KCMG OBE (co), Sir WBL Monson KCM(3 OB (co), Mr R Nioholl MA (Brunei 
Museum), Dato Sir WZ Peel Kt DSLJ DSNB. (MCS), Datin Lady R Peel, Mr EE 
Pengilley ED (MCS), Rev DR Rawlinsp Mr AJN Richards (SCS), Rev Fr J 
Rooney (MBM), Mr P Soanl on (SCS), Tan Sri Dato' Dr M Sheppard Pte! DJPD 
JMN, CMa MBE9 Mr BE Smythiee (Colonial Forestry Servioe), Dam RN Turner 
SPD CMß (MCS), Rev Pr P de Wit (MHM) - now deceased, and Mr Mii Wood 
(Nos). The present writer oertainly has several hefte files bulging 
with letters; and soy to all these people - some of whom, for no reward, 
have maintained a oontinuous oorrespondenoe for upwards of two years - 
and to one or two others who prefer not to be named, I remain especially 
grateful, As far as possible, every page in the text with a footnote 
marking a "letter to the author" has been seen and approved by the 
partioular oorrespoudent oonoerued. 
A number of organizations have assisted the present writer 
with sundry enquiriess the Brunei Shell Petroleum Company, the House of 
Commons Library, the Malaysian High Commission, the Quotations Department 
of the Stock Exohauge, and, finally, the Offioe of Whole Who. 
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I thank those who have granted permission to quote from 
oopyright material in their oontrols apart from the oorrespondents 
just named, Sir JD Boles Kt MBE (Mss Pao s52 in Rhodes House, Oxford), 
Mr EB Elam (RHO: Nos Pao s62)ß Mrs D Maoaskie (RHO: Mss Pao s71)ß Awang 
Matassim bin Haji Jibah (MA Thesis, University of Hull), Rev Fr AF Owen 
CJ (RHOS Mss Pao s103) and the Sarawak Foundation (RHOS Mss Pao s74 and 
Mae Pao s83). 
For permission to reprodaoe oopyrighted photographs,, I am 
indebted to the followings 
Number Copyright Holders 
(a) Between pp xzvi and 1t 
Unnumbered The Curators Photograph Colleotion, Windsor 
Castle. 
(b__) Between pp 556 and 557* 
2.1 and 9.2 Mr JO Blaok. 
2.3 Mr WM Johnson. 
2.4 Ihr ER Bevingt on CMG CEng. 
3.1, 3.2,3.3 and 4.1 H1 30. 
3.4, 4.2,4.3 and 5.1 Datin Lacy 8 Peel. 
4.4 Oxford University Press (N Taxiing, Sulu and 
Sabah - OUP, 1978 - faoing p 278). 
5.2 Mr LHN Davis CMG 
6.1 The British Library (no reply reoeived from 
the Borneo Bulletin itself). 
7.2 Dato Sir AF Abell KCMG IVDP. 
8.1 and 8.2 Mrs P Gilbert POAS. 
9.1 Sarawak Museum (negative number C0281). 
I am grateful, alsop to the University of Hull's photoggrapherp Mr A 
Marshall, and the staff of the Photocopying and Photographic Department 
of the Bryamor Jones Library, viz. Vivien Peverley,, Tilly Rogers, John 
Spenoer and Sheila Sutherland. 
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I thank Miss Tonn Aelbers of East Leake, who kindly translated 
a number of artioles from Dutoh to English for me. 
Finally, but by no means least, I am immensely indebted to Dr 
IC Bassett, who first suggested and then supervised this research 
project with meticulous thoroughness. 
4. Minor Points 
With regard to weights and measures, standard Malaysian and 
British imperial units are used in this teat. 
In footnotes, all documentary referenoes, unless otherwise 
stated, relate to arohives held in the Publio Reoord Offioe, Kew. For 
Foreign Offioe departmental reoorda only, the page number given usually 
indicates the first page of the letter concerned (or the first page of 
the covering despatch in which the letter is enolosed)p e. g. footnote 
27 on p 26s 
'27. F0 12/96 p 19ff, Mitohell to F0, No 4,16 November 1896, para' 4". 
This means paragraph 4 of a letter from Sir Charles Mitchell to the 
Foreign Office, dated 16 November 1896, which begins on page 19 of FO 
12/96. 
A few spellings have been standardized throughoat the texts 
e. g. Muhammad, Kedayan, Labu, Belait. Since 1970 Brunei Town has been 
known as "Bandar Seri Begawan". 
Finally, where a date is marked o (ciroa, i. e. approximately)9 
this refers only to the figure immediately following. Thus "o1866-1948" 
means "born about 1866, known definitely to have died in 1948". 
Ma 1s 
Brunei's Situation in South-East Asia 1906--59 
o 
oD 
ýO 
CVC 
0o aý Qty ýoQ 
r>1 
2e-U 
pC 
Q' 
a, N°c 10 
of c. c 
h`, 
iPPOo aN ýn 
c C. v ýýo 
at 
alp .C a) c oaCn 
001 Cp1 Zm v 
3 fLUý1 i 
`ý C 
p" 
ý to . 0- 
tr 
-17 
'N ZO'c 
o 
co %al 
° v' 
a 
jYQ 
0 Id 
Q0 tr o 
(Cl .ý oy i ý`7 c cý, 0 
1 .0S 
Jýr Q%v 
0- If) 
LJ ý`pýo 
ýo ýo 0 
00 
Xo vi 
Map 2t 
Brunei in the 19309 
ZI 
: av V) Co 
:) CO Hv 
tfýSG o R 
J 
ý 
Z Fý 
ý 
V ý' 
a ý 
1 
I 
1i 
v aö ö 
i 
w 
` a a. 
C. 
a 
Orue" 
C 
ä aý 
; i 
pd o" R po 5 
ö a i 
ö ýi 
+o 
o, cE 
U' Q 
as co " " 
ý' 
.0 Y L 
f0_ýM 
\ak T 
v 
Ö 
ý 
' 
LJmban9 0Y 
rn ý. 
0 ff. Ong / öö cqÜ tsý f1"" 
Y'Y Y` N '" 
Y " 
fJ ' 
" 
"ý ff, O 
º- 
ööD 
t 
j 
fdJ 
Ö 
y, 
y 
Q 
a 
mW 
m 
p 
o 
N 2 CO 
Z N. 
aý- Y 
bag 
m 
N Q aý 
co Ö 
O 
His Highness Sultan Ahmad Tajuddin in 1934 
FART Is A 'DYING KINGDOM' REPRIEVED 
2 
CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION (BRUNEI s LAND AND PEOPLE IN 1906) 
1. Zntroduoti on 
The installation of a British Resident in Brunei in 1906 
marked a major point of departure in the history of the Sultanate, 
preserving the existenoe of what had been a 'dying kingdom' and paving 
the way for its subsequent regeneration. In this opening ohapter it 
is neoessar7 to provide a general profile of Brunei on the eve of the 
Residential Bra. After desoribing the geography of the oomatry, I shall 
examine its population in terms of numbers and distributions, ethnio 
groups, religion and oooupation. Then, in the following ohapter (No 2), 
I shall account for the British deoision to aooept responsibility for 
the regeneration of the moribund Bornean Sultanate. 
2. Bruaei: Geographical 
The State of Brunei is a small, predominantly Muslim Malay 
Sultanate, situated on the north-went coast of Borneo between latitudes 
4°21 - 5°31 north and longitudes 114°4' - 115°220 east. Apart from 
minor adjustments, the State had been reduoed to these limits by the 
beginning of the Residential Era. 
' The oonntry is split by the Limbang 
1. The last major territorial loss was Limbang in 1890, but cession of 
interdigital 'rivers' (districts) within blooks alreacr oeded oontinned 
- until 1902 (Merapok) in the case of North Borneo and until 1905 
3 
distriot of Sarawak into two separate strips of territory (see Nap 19 
above), with a oombined area of 29226 square miles. The larger, western 
wing oontains three main riverine distriotes from went. to east, Belait 
(where an oilfield was disoovered in 1929), Rhtong and Brunei-Xuara. 
The isolated eastern enclave extends along the Tembaroug Valley to the 
interior mountain range. 
At the time of its foroible annexation by Sarawak (1890), Lim- 
bang diatriot2 - peopled by aboat one thousand families - had been the 
most valuable territory remaining to Brunei. Mr Xoirthur (the first Ree- 
ident) regarded the district an an "integral part" of the Sultanate. The 
River Limbang (be pointed out) was the true river of Brunei Town itself: 
"The waters of the so-called River Brunei are salt throughout their 
entire length. They are connected by a number of tee or channels 
with the Limbang, and the main part of the t aim of Brunei is situated on 
an island thus formed. The direct mouth of the Limbang is spoilt by 
rebfs and sand banker and the channel is a long and devious one. In 
consequence of thing small boats... enter and leave the river on the 
Brunei side of Pulau Berembang (the island opposite Brunei Town)". 3 
An earlier observer thought that "the valley of the Limbang is about as 
essential to the life of Brunei as the valley of the Nile is to that of 
Alexandria". 4 In short, Limbang was so olosely entwined with the fortunes 
of the oapital that no distinotion was drawn between the one or the 
others "Limbang in Brunei and Brunei Lirabang", ran a 1ooal phrase. But 
(Lawas) in the aase of Sarawak. 
2. This theme is developed on pp 18,19,32-5,389 43-4v 499 54P 76-829 
100-1,104,150,164,186,325,454 and 525 (below). 
3" TO 572/39 MSH XoArthnr, "Report on Brunei in 1904" (dated Singapore, 5 
Deoember 1904), paragraph 18 - my addition in parentheses. 
4. CO 144/64 (16254) Sir F Held (1823-91) to co, 20 June 1887, para- 
graph 6; also in FO 12/75 p 274ff. At this time Sir Frederiok was about 
to retire as Governor of the Straits Settlements. 
4 
all efforts to regain oontrol of Limbang have ended in failure; henoe 
Brunei is not a neat, oompaot country. 
In terms of physical relief, Brunei consists mainly of low, 
undulating hillsg the only flat areas being along the ooast and the 
major river valleys. The interior mountains vary from 1,000 to 3,000 
feet in the north and east, rising even higher in the south and south- 
east. The vegetation is almost entirely tropioal rain forest oomprising 
trees, mostly dipterooarpaoea, up to 120 feet high. Peat swamp oovers 
- large areas along the lower reaches of the main rivers, and is separated 
from the ooaet by a thin belt of mangrove forest. As late as 1955 only 
4% of the land area was used for agrioultural or residential purposes. 
The olimate is equatorial. Seasons are not olearly-defineds 
it is always hot (80-900 Fahrenheit) and humid during the day, with 
heavy rainfall, muoh of whioh oomee in thunderstorms# throughout the 
year. The oonntry possesses, however, 
"two great reoommendationsp in that there are steady winds throughout the 
day which help to temper the heat of the sung and that the nights are 
ooolg the temperature falling sometimes as low as 680 Fahrenheit". 5 
Pre-Residential Brunei had no roads or railway's, 
6 
only rough 
tracks used by the people in bringing their goods to markets held period- 
ioally at convenient pengkalans (landing places) near the oentree of 
population. As a result all travel had to be by boat along the rivers 
or on foot. Communioations between the Capital (Bi'anei Town) and the 
attatationa, therefore, was tedious and diffioulty requiring a trek of 
5. ý, Molrthur, "Report", paragraph 4. 
6. This theme in developed on pp 124,185-7,280-4,299,356-7,439-42, 
499,537-8,539 and 550 (below). 
5 
several days there and baok, for reasons explained thass 
"The configuration of the country is such that Brunei may be likened to 
a hand, the outstretched fingers of which represent more or less parallel 
ranges of hills, the spaces between them forming the basins of the Rivers 
Belait, Tatong and Brunei. Travelling across oountry from one river to 
another necessitates the crossing of these hills and the traversing of 
swamps at their feet. In dry weather these present no great difficulties 
but in wet weather the swamps are almost impassable and recourse is had 
to... boat-shaped sledges drawn by buffaloes... Communioation by sea, at 
least in small boats, from Brunei is equally unsatisfactory. The hundred 
or so miles of coast between Brunei and Lubok Pulai are most exposed. 
There is no shelter except the rivers, and, in a squall, their bars 
render them impassable. Were the Limbang, or even one bank of its still 
under Brunei oontroll it would be easy, as in the past, to go by boat up 
that river, cross a very narrow range of hills and drop down at once 
upon the headwaters of the Tutong or the Belait. Failing this the 
most convenient way is by ship from Labuan (an island commanding the 
entrance to Brunei Bay)". 7 
Contaots between the oapitai and the outlying areas, thereforep were 
rare; and the outstations tended to be oriented towards Labuan, then 
the natural trading oentre for the whole State. 
If there were oonsiderable handicape to internal travel, Brunei 
was equally, isolated internationally. The sole link with the outside 
world in 1906 was a weekly steamship servioe from neighbouring Labuan 
(a British oolong) to Singapore. Apart from a few ha ie the people were 
untravelleds Sultan Hashim (r 1885-1906), for example, had never ventured 
beyond Labuan; and he had no diplomatio representatives overseas. 
4. Brnneit Population 
The first eenene, taken in 1911,9 revealed a more 219718 
7. Ibid., paragraph 137 (with my addition in parentheses). 
8. This theme is developed on pp 251-3,307-9,525 and 537 (below). 
See also Appendix 6.1 (p 631). 
9. CO 531/3 (34002). 
6 
inhabitants, of whom almost three-quarters lived in the capital and 
eponymous district (see Map 2v above). An unusual feature of Brunei's 
demography (for a country, in SE Asia) was the high urban concentration. 
In 1911 Brunei Town contained 9,767 inhabitants, very nearly one in every 
two of the people then living in the oountry. This "malodo'otts, if 
pioturesque" Kampoug Ayer (River Village) lacy "in the centre of an 
ampitheatre of hills" and was built "entirely over the water wherever 
mud-banks make it possible to ereot a dwelling". 
10 
A variety of ethnio groups (whioh present ooasiderable diff- 
ioaltiee of olaaeifioation)11 were represented in the ooantry. In 1911 
over half the people of Brunei were Malays, ooaoentrated in Kaapong Ayer, 
and a further quarter were Kedavana, found mainly in the surrounding area. 
Oatlying distriots were inhabited by various minority groups, sometimes 
oonfined -to particular rivers, as suggested by their namens 'Tatongs'. 
for instanoe. The uln Tembarong was inhabited by länruts, whose numbers 
had bees greatly reduced by disease and depredations. 
The Ialays formed the dominant politioal and oultural 
indigenous group. They appear largely to have been Borneans oonverted 
to Islam in the past half-milleninm rather than Muslim Malay immigrants 
from elsewhere in the Arohipelago. 
12 Professor AR Maxwell oomments that 
10. MoArthur, "Report"q paragraphs 4 and 23. 
11. DE Brown, Braneis The Struoture and Eistory of a Bornean Malay 
8a1ate (Brunei 1970), pp 3-10; and T Harrisson, "Origins and 
Attitudes eto" in SM. T 1 pp 293-321. 
12. AR Maxwell, Urans Darats An Ethnographin Study of the KadaYan of 
Labe Valley, Brunei (Ann Arbor 1981) pp 158-9. 
7 
Table 1 Brunets Population 1911-31 
Census Category 1911 1921 1931 
- 
Malays 11,554 13,734 14,835 
$eda, yans 4,931 4,641 59871 
Tut ongs 1,667 2091 2P733 
Du. suns 19069 1,115 2,118 
Belaits 1,097 449 446 
nay =its - 580 - 
Muruts 563 556 290 
Dayaks - 235 453 
Javanese - 150 165 
Baujarese - 38 40 
Chinese 736 1,434 2,683 
Indians 44 37 377 
1kropeans 20 35 70 
Others 
TOTAL 
37 
21,718 
59 
25,454 
54 
30,135 
Notes Dasans, Belaits and Oranx Bukits were referred to oolleotively 
as "Bisayas" by Mr MoArthur. Mr R Nicholl oommentes "Drang Bukit is 
really an 'umbrella term' meaning simply 'Nan of the Mountains', and 
could refer to quite a number of different groups. Bisayahs, Dusuns and 
Kadazans (the two latter really the same) all belong to the same familys 
they are the aboriginal inhabitants of north-west Borneo. They originally 
spread further inland, but were pressed towards the ooast by the Kayans 
and Kenyahe, who came over from Indonesia... " (letter to the author, 8 
July 1985, paragraph 4). Elsewhere Mr Nioholl adds "The use of the 
word Malay can be deceptive. The Brunei Malays are most certainly 
not Borneanss all their legends and the available facts confirm their 
belief that they came from outside Borneo. Islamized Borneans, however, 
such as the Kedayans, refer to themselves as Malays, meaning Muslims. 
The Sarawak Malays trace their descent back to Sumatra, and are quite 
different again" (letter to the author, 27 May 1985, paragraph 5). 
Souroes: 1.00 824/1 Brunei Annual Report 1911, p 11. 
2.00 824/1 Brunei Annual Report 1921, pp 7-8. 
3. CA Vlielandq A Report on the 1931 Census and on Certain 
Probleme of Vital Statistios (? London, ? 1932), paragraphs 143 and 272; 
and CO 824/2 Brunei Annual Report 1931+ p 7" 
* 
8 
"Over the last several oenturies there has been a more or less steady 
flow of individuals out of the non-Islamic ethnio groups in areas 
surrounding Brunei Bay into the Malay ethnic category". 13 
Kedayans, too, have expanded in numbers through intermarriage 
with non-Muslim Marais. Today they have two fooi of ethnioitys the more 
apeoifio 'bei Ke ' 14 'being dayan and the more general 'being Malay, Their 
strong group identity as Kedayans was noted in 1904; 
15 
but today "any 
16 Kedayan will ob jeot to being excluded from the oategory 'Malay'". 
Malays, however, are less likely to conoede the points in their view 
Kedayans are "not really Malays"; and even in 1969 PM Shariffuddin 
could comment that Kedayans were characterized by a disposition to 
"keep to themselves and notioeably to (retain) their own vooabulary, 
oustoms and oulture... (Their) habits and oharacters are quite distinot 
from those of the Brunei Malays". 17 
To a oertain extent, however, this passage may symbolize lingering Malay 
13. Ibid., p 170. Going bank considerably further into the mists of 
time, Mr R Nioholl oontends that Brunei Malays "are emphatically not 
Borneans", but originated as Funanese driven out of the Mekong Delta by 
Sinners in the late seventh century (letter to the authors 12 February 
1985, paragraph 2). Presumably these people were converted to Islam 
much later on. In Mr Nioholl's opinion the Kedayans were the original 
inhabitants of Brunets "I think there can be little doubt that the 
Kedayans are native Borneans, who have been aooulturated by the Bruneis, 
who, being seamen and traders, needed somebody to grow their food. They 
were therefore associated with the Bruneis much more closely than any 
of the other native races. Their distinctive feature is that they do 
not use boats, but rafts aman in which they resemble a race in the 
Philippines. Their agriculture is swidden cultivation (not wet padi) 
like all other Borneans, but there are more effective and produce a 
surplus... They always olaimp and rightly, to be the original inhabitants 
of the country, as against the Bruneis, who are invaders" (letter to 
the author, 27 May 1985, paragraph 4)- 
14. Maxwell, op. oit., p 8. 
15" MoArthur, "Report", paragraph 33. 
16. Maxwell, op. oit., p 186; see also pp 158-9. 
17. PM Shariffuddin, "The Kedayans" in BMJ 1969, p 15. 
9 
disdain for a people formerly of subjeot status. 
18 
Similarly, the Brunei Malay term 'Murat' is a (not entirely 
oomplimentary) label for the "pre-Malay population onoe widespread 
throughout Tembarong dietriot". Usually their refer to themselves as 
Lun Bawang, 'people of the ooantry'. 
19 
Mr R Nioholl states, b7 oontrast, 
that the Lun Bawang "are repent arrivals: thel appear to have Dome down 
the Trusan valley from the highlands Daly about the eighteenth century". 
20 
These three gronpe - )[a]ase, Kedayane and Murute - are all 
linked symbolioally in a oomon onltural heritage by Awank Semaun, one 
of the eythioal founding fathers of liuelim Brunei as related in the 
epic poem, Shaer Awang Semaun. It in agreed that he was a Murat, the 
youngest of fourteen brothera, who (the mirth runs) oonquered and rendered 
tributary to Brunei most of ooastal Borneo. The brothersp originally 
pagan, were converted to Islam and their leader (Awang Alak Betatar) 
installed as the first Sultan. 
21 
18. CO 144/73 (34409) Mr AL Keyser (1856-1924) to Sir C Mitchell 
(d 1899), No 127,21 October 1899, paragraphs 9-10; and DE Brown, (M. 
o`., p 5. In an article Currently in the press, however, Professor 
Maxwell argues that Kedayans should not be considered to have been of 
subject status in traditional Brunei society (typescript, 1984, ooartesy 
of Professor Maxwell). By Contrast, Mr MoArthur commented in 1904 that 
"settlement outside the boundaries of Brunei means to Yedayans... freedom 
from the obligations of slavery" ("Report", paragraph 31)- 
19* Maxwell, Urang Darat, p 23; and information from Awang Eassoff *gaki. 
20. Mr R Nioholl, letter to the author, 27 May 1985, paragraph 5- 
21, Maaswell, . oil., p 221-2; and Brown, op. 'oit., p 135" Dr a Hose 
suggested that the first Sultan had been a Bisaya (Natural Man - London 
1926, p 22). Mr MoArthur argued in 1917 that the small remnant of Bru- 
nei had remained intact because the pre-Residential Government had 
recognized the four districts as integral parts of the State which should 
not be alienated. Such considerations (he added) had not existed in the 
oases of Baram, Trusan and Lawas, which were inhabited by 'foreign' 
10 
Islam has been the established religion in Brunei since the 
foundation of the Muslim Sultanate in the early sixteenth century. 
22 
Malays and Kedayans were (and are) orthodox Sunni Muslims of the Shafi'i 
aohool. 
23 
Although nowadays Brunei is referred to as "strongly Muslim", 
historioally-speaking the people had the reputation of being not very 
striot in the observanoe of their religion. 
24 When the first British 
Resident assumed his duties in 1906, he found only one mosque, a wooden 
struotaxe dating from 1902, whioh itself had been built with outside 
assiatartoe. 
25 
In the oase of Belaits and 'litonge, Islam was a "thin 
veneer" masking "essential paganism" as late as the 1930x. 
26 
Other 
inndigenoua groups were animists. 
Pre-Residential Brunei diverged in some respeots from the 
elements. (Bat Mr HoArthar included the Trusan Xurnts among these 
foreigners). Co 531/11 (10824) Sir A Young (1854,1938) to C0,29 
December 1917, paragraph 16. "The Shaer Awang Semaun", Mr R Nioholl 
comments, "is a Brunei adaptation of the Legend of Fourteen Brothers, 
which is found over most of Borneo down to the Barito. Henne the 
characters vary with different races but the stories are always the 
same. Alak Betatar is almost certainly an adaptation of Alaka Batara 
(the seventh century founder of Brunei). In Malay silsii it is normal 
to identify the founder of the State with the first Muslim ruler, hence 
wan Alak Betatar (flourished o680) becomes Sultan Muhammad (flourished 
1515)". Letter to the author, 27 May 1985, paragraph 6. 
22. Aspects of this theme are discussed on pp 106-7,128,132,136,140-1, 
145-6,251,325,444,474,476,500,513,514,517,519. and 542-5 (below). 
23. Al Shafi' i (o767-820) was the founder of one of the four schools of 
orthodox Sunni Islam. Ajº contrast, the distinguishing feature of the 
'heretical' Shia Muslims - as in contemporary Iran - is attaohment to an 
i_ as the infallible leader of an Islamic community. 
24. R Nioholl, "Relations between Brunei and Manila" in BMJ 1977 p 156; 
S Baring-Gould and CA Bampf; rl de, A History of Sarawak under its Two White 
Rajahs, 1839-1908 (London 1909), pp 443-5; P Blundell, The City of Many 
Waters (London 1923), pp 46,102-3,120 and 142. But of. J3 Carroll, 
"Beruunai in the Boxer Codex" in JMBRAS 1982, Part 2, pp 4-11. 
25. Fo 572/37, p 32; and MoArthur, "Report", paragraph 55" 
26. CO 824/2 Brunei Annual Report 1938, p 4. 
11 
orthodox Muslim pattern. The rigid stratifioation system desoribed by 
Professor DE Brown (inoluding the subjeot status of the Kedayans), for 
example, appears to be at varianoe with the egalitarianism of ideal 
Islam. Similarly, the obligatory tax for Muslimev called zakat (puri- 
fioation) was not paid by Malays, whereas the poll tax, meant to be 
reserved to non-Muslime, was imposed on the Muhammadan Kedayans. 
27 
As noted by Professor Brown, Malays and äedayans performed 
oomplementary eoonoanio funotion As. non agrioulturists and agrioult- 
wrists respeotive1y. 
28 
In 1906 matey Malays of Kampong Ayer and along 
the ooast were fishermen, their various teohniques having been refined 
over the oenturies. Fishing usually took plaoe olose to the shore of 
Brunei Bay, but sometimes Malays venture out to sea and it was a point 
of honour, despite the long pull against a strong ourrent, to be the 
first to land for the market, 
29 
The inhabitants of 8ampong Ayer oontinued their multifarious 
aotivities mach as if they were on land- 
. The capital was divided into 
several wards, eaoh with its own headmen. Each group lived as a separate 
community, marriages (for example) being oonfined ideally to 00UP1011 from 
the same ward. In 1906 there were at least eleven suoh kamponge, named 
usually after an eminent resident or by the trades of those oooupßring 
them. Most remarkable of all were the eilveremithe and brassfoanders. 
One aide of the River Kedayan (a tributary of the River Brunei) wall 
27. Fazl ur Rahman, "Islam" in Enoyolopaedia Britannioa Vol 12 (Chioago 
1972) pp 663-71. 
28. Browny . oit. v P 5- 
29o )IoArthur, "Report"p paragraph 35. 
30. CO 824/2 Brunei Annual Report 1938, p 1. 
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oooupied by Malay money-lenders (the Koranio prohibition on usury notwith- 
standing), 
31 the best-built and most flourishing quarter of the town. 
The women of Kampong Ayer ran a domeetio weaving industry. The trade 
of the oapital, which was mainly in Chinese hands, centred around a 
small island in the middle of the town, oa. whioh there were several 
"disreputable-looking plank, tin and ata shops". 
32 Boat-building was 
ubiquitous beoausep on the one hand, rivers were the principal arteries 
of oommunioation and fishing the main oooupationy whilstp on the other, 
salt water rednoed the useful life of crafts this neoessitated a ooutinual 
turnover. Malays generally disliked wage-labour, but auoh opportunities 
were available at the outoh works (1901-52) in the oapital and at the 
Rajah of Sarawak's ooal mines at Brooketon (1888-1924) and Buang Tawar 
(01900-17). 
The Malaya of Brunei had no agricultural tradition and, at the 
beginning of the twentieth oentury had little knowledge ofp and less 
interest ins the eubjeot. The bulk of the farming population, therefore, 
was provided by the Kedayane and, to a lesser extents the Bisayae and 
other pagans. They (the Kedayans) became "very influential in the 
oapital beoause they supplied large amounts of rioe and nearly all the 
fruit and vegetables oonsamed there". 
33 
In 1911 736 Chinese were enumerated in Brunsi. 
34 Trading links 
31. NJ Dawood (translator), The Koran (Harmondsworth 1974), pp 1949 363--4, 
and 419; and R Roberts, The Sooial Laws of the Koran (London 1971), p 56. 
32. MoArthur, "Report", paragraph 23. 
33" Maxwell, op. oit., p 107. For the Kedayans, see also, pp 30,39 
and 128-31 (below). 
34. For the Brunei Chinese, see pp 40-2,52,159-62,251-2,307-9,329- 
30,336,454,463,477-80,541,545-7 and 549 (below). 
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between the Celestial Empire and Borneo were of anoient origin; 
35 
and 
Chinese people had settled in Borneo sinne time immemorial. 
36 They were 
noted pepper planters; but politioal instability in Brunei during the 
nineteenth century drove them away. Those Chinese who remained in Brunei 
oa the eve of the Residential Era comprised many of the ohief traders, 
shopkeepers, money-lenders and revenue-farmers in the Sultanate. 
The three outlying districts - Belait, Tutong and Temburong, 
were sparsely-populated, largely unexplored and of little eoouomio 
importance. The inhabitants bartered their jungle produce (s Mo and 
eluton in particular) to Chinese traders who provided in return olothp 
brasswarej salt, tobacco and sundry goods. Tatong was unusual because 
it was a oattle-raising distriot. There were "extensive traots" of 
_a_di 
land in both Belait and Tlitong in 1904.37 
With regard to oharaoterp Mr MoArthur desoribed the Bisayas 
as an Itindustrious and peaoeable raoe" of proverbial honesty, pleasant 
to meet and 
"free from that assumption of superiority whioh generally seems to 
aooompany a mixture of lluhaunmadaniem and ignoranoe and whioh makes it 
diffioult to more than tolerate a Brunei Malar or a Kedayan". 38 
It is true that the people laoked formal ednoatiotºs they were 
overwhelmingly illiterate (inoluding Sultan Haehim). 
39 They were also 
35. OW Wolters points out that indireot trade between NW Borneo and 
China via Indonesian ports had begun well before the seventh century AD 
(Early Indonesian Commerce - Ithaca, NY, 1967 - pp 175-6)- 
36* In about 1973 discovery was made in the capital of a Chinaman'e 
tombstone dated 1264 AD. 
37. F0 12A27 pp 148-9, MSH MoArthar, "Notes on a Visit to the Rivers 
Beiait and Tatong", 14 July 1904, paragraphs 8 and 10. 
38. MoArthur, "Report", paragraph 30. 
39. The education theme is developed on pp 13,197-8,292-8,325,350-19 
357-60,412-23,484. -5 and 548-9 (below). 
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susceptible to disease, suoh as the smallpox epidemio of 1904, whioh 
approximately decimated the population of the oapital. 
40 
In oultural 
terms, they were partionlarly skilled in working gold, brass and silver 
and in weaving brocaded oloth. 
4i' 
lfnsioally, Brunei was noted for its 
BonSst42 pipers and nobat diraja (royal 'oroheetra'). 
43 
The oountry's 
cultural development had been impeded, however, by two main factors. 
First, Muslim religious saaotions ruled out representational art, novels, 
drama and instrumental inusio (although the use of drums gras allowed on 
speoial festive oooaeions, auch as weddings). 
44 The. main permiaeable 
forme of fine art were arohiteoture and poetry. 
45 
But pre-Residential 
Brunei was too poor .- and this is the seoond faotor - to have any note- 
worib arohiteoture; nor were there aof publishing houses. There were 
extant, however, several epto poems eha'ers) - smoh as the Shaer Awang 
Semaump already mentioned, . of whioh there are several versions - and 
royal genealogies (selesilahs). Another literary form in Brunei is the 
antun "a rhyming quatrain with inner aesonanoe". 
In Brunei there were disoernable divisions between various 
seotions of sooietys Muslims versus non-[uslims and rulers versus ruled. 
But there were also sub-divisions, such as Muslim Malays versus lower 
40« The development of the Brunei health servioe after 1906 is dis- 
oussed on pp 192-6,286-92,331,337,344-5,360-2,432-35,535 and 
553 (below). 
41. Broxu, . oit., p 27. 
42. Blundell, The City of Many Watere, p 111. 
43. PM SShariffuddin and Abdul Latiff bin Haji Ibrahiury "h obat Di-Raja" 
in 13! J 1977 pp 7-21. For Bieaya musio, see CC Davis 8MJ 196Q, pp 496-8. 
44. Fail ur Rahman, loo. oit., p 669. 
45. But of. Dawood (translator), TheKoran p 208, where poetry appears 
to be outlawed. 
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status Muslim Xedayans; or Malay pengiran (noble) versus Malay r at 
(people). Another oontrast lay in the struoture of partioular ethnio 
groupas the Kedayanas for instanoes were more egalitarian than Malaya, 
not showing a similar oonoern for rank and status. 
46 
There were also 
incongruous similaritiess the pagan Bisayas, Muruts and Dusuns were all 
of subjeot status; but eo, too, were the Muslim Kedayane. 
3. Conolusion 
In the foregoing disoussion it has been seen that at the end 
of 1905 Brunei had been reduced to a small, bifurcated land of elender 
eoononio rseoaroes and few amenities, with a population unednoated and 
liable to be deoimated by epidemio disease. The roots of a threefold 
division of labour whioh persisted throughout the Residential Era were 
already visibles Halays formed the dominant group oulturally and sooially; 
the Kedayans (and Bi®ayas) formed the bulk of the agrioaltural population; 
whilst the Chinese dominated non-11iropean trade and business of the 
ooantry. Having introdnoed the reader to the Sultanate, I shall now 
(Chapter 2) deeoribeýthe politioal malaise in pre-Residential Brunei 
and aooount for the British deoision to reprieve the moribund oonntry; 
eudv in subsequent ohapters, I shall turn to the poet-1906 regeneration 
Of the state. 
4 69 Maxwell, o , oit., p 176. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
A$ DICING KINGDOM' RE PRIi D 
1. Brunei on the eve of the Residential Era 
In January 1888 the third Marquess of Saliebur7 Prime Minister 
of the United Kingdom, observed that Sarawak and British North Borneo 
were "crashing out" the Sultan between them and that the process was 
oontinniag "with some rapidity", I think, he added, "we had better let 
them finish it" and not stand in the way of a "ooneummation whioh is 
inevitable and, on the whole, desirable". 
1 This remained British policy 
until the eve of the Residential Era; but the United Kingdom was not 
prepared to impose this plan without the ooaeent of the smitan - and 
eaoh oonsents naturally, was never forthooming. 
Xau observers agreed that the Sultanate's dass were numbered 
if outside support oould not be obtained. In February 1886 it was being 
"freely remarked" that, were it not for British inflneuoe, the Brunei 
throne "would not be worth a mouth's purchase". 
2 
air Charles Mitohell, 
a deoade later, feared that "the existenoe as a State of this small 
remnant of the auoient... kingdom is drawing to its olose". 
3 
Consul 
Trevenen agreed that Brunei was !! hopelessl7 deoayed"; 
4 
whilst his 
1. FO 12/78 p 151, minute by Lord Salisbury (1830-1903), 1 January 1888. 
2. FO 12/69 p 38, Dir P Leys (1851-1922) to F0, No 6 (politioal), 6 
February 1886, paragraph 16; also in Co 144/62 (9840- 
3. Po 12/96 p 19ff, Sir C )Sitohell (d 1899) to F0, No 4,16 November 
1896, paragraph 7; also in Co 144/71 (1338). 
4. FO 12/97 p 160, NP Trevenen (o1853-1901) to llitohell, 29 November 
1897. 
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suooeseor added that if Brunei remained in its present oondition "it is 
only a question of time before it dies out from internal decay and 
oeaaesp as a separate kingdoms to eziet". 
5 
The aotual phrase, 'a dying 
kingdom', however, is taken from the title of an artiole published in 
1902 by Sir Hugh Clifford, who had just visited Brunei in what he 
supposed to be its "last disgraoethl momenta". 
6 
There are four main reasons for suggesting that pre-Residential 
Brunei was moribunds all but a small remnant of its territory had been 
lost; the ooantry was bankrupt; disaffeotion was general in the oat- 
distriots; and the powerful Rajah of Sarawak (Sir Charles Brooke acMa) 
was restrained from delivering the final blow only because the Sultanate 
enjoyed the status of a British Proteotorate. C. rtainly, the threat 
to Brunei$s oontianed existenoe was obvious to its own rulers. 
To disoass these points in greater detail, traditional Brunei 
had suffered massive losses of territory during the nineteenth oentury. 
The general impression was one of eoonomio and politioal deolinel although 
the extent to whioh Brunei had deolined or simply been overtaken by a 
more dynamio western world is debatable. ' In 1839 Nr James Brooke 
arrived in Borneo. No years later the Sultan of Brunei reoognized 
him as Rajah of Sarawak, then the westernmost provinos of his realm. 
üwing the remainder of the oentury Sarawak asserted Lie independenoe 
and expanded its territory north-eastwards along the ooaet towards and 
5.110 12/99! p 303, AL Keyser (1856-1924) to 70, No 4,25 Deoember 1898, 
paragraph 30; also in 00 144/73 (5120). 
6. Maomillan's Magazine (May-Oot 1902), p 106. 
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beyond Brunei Town. In Deoember 1846 the island of Labuan, whioh oommanded 
the entranoe to Brunei Bair, was oeded to the British Government. In 
1878-81, North B orne ov a block of territory north-east of Brunei-Town, 
Was aoquired by the foreranners of-the British North Borneo (Chartered) 
Company, the latter being founded in 1881. Rivalry between the seoond 
Rajah of Sarawak and the Chartered Compan7 (whioh administered North 
Borneo) led to a "soramble for Brauei": this was the rapid "orushing 
out" of the Sultan whioh had attraoted Lord Salisbury's attention in 
1888. The most grievous blow-to Brunei name in 1890, when the seoond 
Rajah foroibly. annexed Limbang, the true river of Brunei Town; the loss 
of this distriot was "the final step: -towards the rain, of Brunei". 
7 
The 
Sultanate - iaoreasingly °poor, laoking armed foroes of its own, and with 
a divided tribal populations sumo of whom weloomed the new European 
rulers -was unable to resist this prooess of partition. 
1, Conoomitaut with Brunei's territorial deoline was the oountry's 
approaohing bankraptop.: When Mr Molrthur first arrived there, the 
Sultanate appeared to be entering its final orisis. In return for 
ceding eaoh partioular dietriot, -the monarch and. nobles aooepted 
annual payments, oalled oession money. Being an easily negotiable form 
Of property, the pengirans did not hesitate to dispose of their annuities 
for many years in advanoe and often sold them outright for a lump sum, 
whioh was quiokly swallowed up by the chiefs' retainers. Inoome from 
trade monopolies and other soaroes having been mortgaged in the same way, 
7.70 572/39 NS$ MoArthar, "Report on Bernei in 1904", paragraph 83. 
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Sultan and pen_ ane had come "practically fade to face with beggar? "* 
As they beoame less oredit-worthy, moreover, money-lenders demanded 
iuoreasingly extortionate rates of interest. 
9 In the past starvation 
had been deferred by further oessions of territory; but by 1905 little 
remained to be alienated. 
This loss of territory had two main o0usegaenoes. First, 
Brunei lost its rioheat areasp euoh as Sarawak Proper (antimony), Muka 
(sago) and Limbang (whenoe the people of the oapital derived their 
subsistence). Seoondly, as territorial enoroaoim eats gathered momentum, 
taxation in Brunei's remaining distriots neoesearily beoame more oonoen- 
tratedq prompting popular dteaffeotion, for example in Belait and Rlitong, 
espeoially from 18991, hr XoArthar thought that approximately half the 
people of those diatriota had emigrated in the ten fears before 19049 
Whilst the remainder of the inhabitants were kept peaoeable only "br the 
idea which prevails among them that the oouatr7 is soon to be merged in 
Sarawak"* 10 (This issue in disau®eed in greater detail in the next 
aeoti ori). 
8. CO 144/77 (20118) Mr G Hewett (1859-1932) to P0p No 9 (confidential),, 
10 April 1903, paragraph 4. (NB. No cession money was received for 
Limbang. The occupation of this district by Sarawak was never recognized 
by Sultan Hashim). 
9" In March 1904, for example, the Jawatan Abu Bakar -a "non-noble" 
Malay official - in return for a loan to the Sultan of ; MOO - demanded 
and obtained a fall surrender of the Trusan oessi on money of 94500 
annually. The Sultan's sosst to whom the annuity should have eventually 
comes objected to the transaction; and a separate document was signed by 
the Jam agreeing that if in 24 months the Sultan repaid X1,705 
(representing the loan plus interest), the deed of surrender would be 
cull and void. (F0 12/126 p 163, XoArthur to Sir John Anderson, 1858- 
1918, No 31p 11 Angaet 19049 paragraph 4)- 
10* McArthur, "Report", paragraph 30. 
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Brunei was threatened, not only by its (mu internal deoay, but 
also by a far stronger outside power (Sarawak) poised to annex the Sal- 
tanate. Sir Charles Brooke's oooupation of Lirabang, coupled with his de 
taoto possession of various plaoee along the River Brunei (Nuara Damit, 
Berembang and Kota Batu), whioh he tended to treat as parts of Sarawak, 
already gave him a stranglehold on Brunei's oapital itaelfj and the 
British Protectorate over Brunei alone prevented him from delivering the 
02111 2-46 graoe, for it was often admitted that he "would only. have to send 
one ship to Brnnei to enforoe the aooeptanoe of any terms he ohose to 
offer, Unless His Xajestf's Government intervened to stop his aotion". 
11 
Even if the Sarawak threat had not existed, however, Brunei's internal 
deoay would have been "suffioient to deotrof it". 
12 
This was painfully obvious to the Brunei rulers themselves. In 
February 1885 thef had engaged to make to further oeseions of territory 
"as long as the sun and moon exist". 
13 
Their poverty, as well as the 
per®istenoe of their aogaisitive neighbours and. the lack of support 
from the United Kingdom, rendered it impossible for them to live up to 
their good intentions; but the aooeptanoe of a British Proteotorate in 
1888 was a further indioation that Sultan Hashim locked to the British 
Government to preserve his anoient Sultanate and dynasty. By 1904 it 
had beoome olearl, even to the people of Brunei, that a oountry "oannot 
long retain its independenoe When the maximum of taxation has been 
11. Ibid., paragraph 129. 
12. Ibid., paragraph 101. 
13. CO 14460 (6946) A*anat (Will) of Sultan Abdul Xumin, 20 February 
1885. 
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reaohed without satisfying the wants of the ruling olass". 
14 
The Brunei 
ohiefsl, for their part, feared that 
"the Rajah will not be satisfied until he has absorbed the whole of 
Brunei, and they would be willing to make substantial oonoession to 
any suggestion of oontrol by the British Government rather than that 
opportunity should be left to the Rajah to further extend his sphere 
of influenoe at their expense". 15 
As late as the 1960s the role of the British Government in 
preserving the Sultanate, albeit at the eleventh hour, was not totally 
unappreciated in Brunei. 
16 
It should be remembered, however, that 
without support from HM Government, Sarawak and British North Borneo 
ooald neither have beoome established nor survived. If uo British 
presenoe had been maintained in NW Borneo, on the other hand, Brunei 
might have fallen instead to the Datoh or another imperial powers it 
seems most unlikely that the Sultanate ooald have eeoaped entirely 
from oolonialism. 
If it is granted that pre-Residential Brunei had reached the 
final stage of degeneration and oould not baue survived as a separate 
State without outside assistanoe, the allegations of misrule may now be 
di5onneed; and, in the third section, I shall explain why the moribund 
Country was granted a reprieve in 1905-6. 
2. )Barale in the Wing Kingdom 
The prinoipal reason for the United Kingdom's deoisive inter- 
14. MoArthnr, "Report", paragraph 135. 
15. CO 273/310-(33426) NO Belfield MCS (1855-1923) to Anderson, 5 June 
1905, paragraph 32; also in FO 12A28 p 449. 
16. Information courtesy of Professor IS Brown. 
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veation in 1905-6 was a feeling that it had a daty to reform the unßatis- 
faotory administration existing in the Sultanate in order to ameliorate 
the lot of its people; and that the eolation least unaooeptable to the 
inhabitants was a Residential System. It is impossible to assess the 
allegations of misrule without an understanding of the traditional 
politioal system; and it is to this that I shall now turn. 
8rnnei'a politioal syitem in partioular and other Malay polit- 
ioal systems more generally have been treated respectively by DE Browa 
and JM Qulliok. 
17 
Henoe only a sketoh in neoessary here. The two most 
important features were (a) advioe of the moaaroh by pengirans; and (b) 
distriot administration based on river systems. 
The priaoipal role of the Sultanp an Head of State, was to 
ensure that the rights of others were not infringged. More positivelyl 
he was the "'pillar of the State', who oontrole the Government founded 
on Muslim and oustomary law%18 He exeroised the limited funotions, 
principally revenue-oolleotiout of oentral government, oondttoted foreign 
relations, symbolized the unity of the State and provided legitimacy for 
a politioal system whioh gave power to other!. The moaaroh was by no 
means a despot; although appointing most' offioiale, he was obliged not 
to take deoisions of State without first oousalting the four wazire 
(senior ministers), some of whose seals were neoessary to validate 
important documents. The wazirs oomprised, in desoending order of rank, 
17. DE Brom, Bruneis The Struoture and History of a Bornean Malay 
Sultanate (Brunei 1970); and JM Gulliok, Indigenous Politioal Systeme 
of Western Malaya (London 1965). 
18. Brown, o . oit., p 100. 
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the Pe rann) Bendahara (responsible for internal administration), Di- 
Gadong (treasurer), Pemanoha (mediator of the State Counoil, an advisory 
body to the sultan) and TemenRgoog (ohief judge and military leader). 
For some years before the Residential Era, these duties had been largely 
nominal. After 1900, moreoverg only the poets of P rang) Bendahara 
and Peha were filled; and their oooupante were deeoribed as old men 
who took no interest in their duties, 
19 
a refrain oommon throughout the 
Residential Bea. The other two posts were left vaoamt, partly beoause 
Sultan Hasbim ooald not afford to forego the ministerial revenues; and 
partly beoanse he wished to deny ministerial power to rivals. 
20 
Traditional. Brunei government was personal rather than bureau- 
oratio. The oouutry had uoae of those institutions assooiated usually 
with governments it had no regular armed toroes, no polioep no salaried 
officers, no publio buildings (except the wooden mosque), no coinage and 
only the "semblance" of a judicature. Pre-Residential Brunei consisted 
instead of an "aggregation of small and semi-independent fiefs 
acknowledging one head". There was "no Government in the usual aooeptanoe 
of the term - only ownership"* 
21 
Distriot administration (chiefly revenge-oolleotion) was based 
on the ownership of land and 'serfs' " There were three types of tenure: 
kera aan (crown), kuan (ministerial) and tnlin (private) property. 
Apart from the Chinese and most Malays, the people were "serfs# belonging 
19. MoArthar, "Report", paragraph 12. 
20. In fact Brunei had a complete hierarohy of traditional officials, 
described in detail by DE Brown, oitp pp 105-18. 
21.. MoArthur, "Report"f, paragraphs 89 54 and 55. 
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to the particular owner of the district in which they lived. gera aan 
and knripan lauds were appanages of office held respectively by the monarch 
and wa zira (kuripan property reverting to the crown during a ministerial 
vacancy). Tulin rights were held by nobles rather than by ordinary people; 
but the revenues had often been mortgaged to Chinese money-lenders. 
The monarohy was extremely weaks Sultan Hashim possessed "no 
real power except over his own districts and people" because he was 
unable "by constitution and custom" to interfere with the internal 
administration of other domains. In 1904, indeed, he himself admitted 
that he possessed insufficient power to compel obedience to his orders 
even in his own capital. 
22 
The sole prerogative which he retained over 
kuran and tulin owners was the right to veto any proposed oession of 
territory to a foreign power. His consent was rarely withheld, however, 
beoause suoh transaotions entitled him to olaim a fee (traditionally 
%2,000) for attaohing his ohop. 
Farther instability was oreated by the nature of the suooessi one 
whioh did not follow primogeniture, but was a matter in whioh many parties 
believed that they had some right to determine the outcome. 
23 
A reigning 
monarohp however, traditionally had the right both to nominate his own 
successor and to appoint the wazirs, although he might not remove them 
once they had been installed. The choice of successor also required the 
approval of the State Coanoil. Before a Sultan could be installed in 
office as yang Dipertnan (crowned Sultan) he had to prove his abilities 
22. CO 144/78 (33750) MoArthur to Anderson, No 32,14 August 1904, 
Paragraph 2. 
23. Brown, . cit., p 102. 
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to the satisfaotion of the wazirs and r at (people). Daring the nine- 
teenth century not all Sultans were able to aobieve such consensus; and 
even in the twentieth there were long delays, not explained entirely by 
the monarohs' minority., between suooession and ooronation. 
Sultan Hashim was in a particularly weak position. His smooees- 
ion in 1885 was disputed by his two leading ministers, the Pe raps 
Býendabsa a and Di-ßadong, who blamed his For the murder, during the 
rora1 faotion struggles of the 1840sß of their fatherv., P® ran Tajadia, 
and other members of the pro-Brooke faotion of that day. 
24 
His position 
was weakened further because these rivals, as powerful, as himself, had 
inherited. the personal wealth of the late Sultan Abdul Namia (r 1852-85). 
Ia addition, he was threatened by unrest in several rivers and by an 
unsympathetio British consul in Labuan, whop declaring him "praotioally 
helpless"$ devised a soheme.. adopted (as a plan) by Whitehall, whereby 
Brunei would have been partitioned oompletely by its two neighbours. 
25 
Finally, there was some doubt whether 81tan Haehim was really the son 
of Sultan Omar Ali Saifnddin II (r 1824-52). 
26 
Friction between Sultan Haahim and the wazirs persisted through- 
out his reign; and he was unable to impose his authority. Hence in 1896 
24. CO 273/154 (21539) Sir Hugh Lowe Joarnal entry for 15 September 1888; 
also in 70 12/78. See also CN Crisswell, "Pengiran Anak Hashim's Role 
in Brunei Affairs Prior to his Aooession to the Throne in 1885" in 
7, p 43. 
25" 70 12/69 p 38ff, Dr P Lets to FOB No 6 (politioal), 6 February 1886, 
Paragraph 15; also in CO 144/62 (9841)- 
26.8 Runoiman, The White Rajahs (Cambridge 1960), p 187. This story 
(that sultan Hashim was not really the son of Sultan Omar) is disoonnted 
by Mr Crisewells loo. ci_t. v P 42. 
University 
Library 
Hull 
26 
the High Commissioner argued that had His Highness been served by 
ministers of better quality and been less poor, his reign might have 
been less unfortunate. 
27 
In the absence of support from his ministers 
Sultan Haebi. m - nominal ruler of a oonntrf he was "unable to govern" - 
had to look elsewhere for advioep which further outraged the wazirs, who 
owed their position -to their birth. At first he turned to two Malay 
oommonersp Inohe Kohein and Inohe Buyongg28 and subsequently to the man- 
agar of the cutoh works, Ifrrr Roberta, whom he appointed Dato (Sir) with 
a seat on the State Coanoil. In 1905 it was reported that sinoe His 
Highness was "unwilling to trust any of his ohiefs", he had latterly 
depended "almost exolusively" upon the help of Mr Roberts. 
29 
An interest- 
ing clause in the Island Trading Syndioate"s (outoh) lease suggests that 
Sultan Hashim may have looked to the company itself to provide a ooanter- 
weight to the wasirs. 
30 
In 1899, indeed, Consul, AL Keyser had proposed 
to bolster Sultan Hashia'e authorMW by deposing the three existing 
wasirrs on the theory that the Sultan, had he possessed suffioient power, 
would have been a just ruler, whereas his fear of offending his ministers 
prevented him from following the ooarse whiob he knew to be right. The 
27. FO 12/96 p 19ff, Michell to F0t Nb 4P 16 November 18969 paragraph 4; 
also in CO 144/71 (1338)- 
28. Inohe Buyong (b ? 1861), Sultan Eashim's secretary, was a Singapore 
Malay, "refined in manner' and plausible of tongue"9 but he had spent some 
time (1883) in Labuan gaol for embezzlement (CO 144/571 7395 and 7961). 
He was described as a good servant to the illiterate Sultan. In= 
Mohsin (? 1875-? 1900/1), possessed of "a certain shrewd oanning", was the 
son of Irrohe Muhammad (d 1890), the former British consular agent in Brunei. 
29. CO 273/310 (33426) Beifield to Anderson, 5 June 1905; also in FO 12/ 
128, p 449. (Edmund Roberts, o1866-1948, manager of Brunei catch works, 
1900-5. Director of Public Works, Brunei and Labuan, 1906-21)o 
30. Clause 131 "... the ITS professes good friendship to the said Sultan 
... and... shall render (him)... all lawful assistance when required". 
27 
wazirs, the oonsul argued, needed to be replaoed by younger and more 
1o7a1 ohiefs. 
31 
Although the High Commissioner ruled this out as "quite 
unjustifiable" interferenoe in Brunei's internal affairs, it foreshadowed 
the polioy aotnally pursued by the Residents after 1906s first to 
establish an effeotive oentral authority; aady eeoondlyp to bolster 
the prestige of the monarch at the expense of the wazirs. 
Speoifio allegations of misrule, to whioh I shall now turn, 
may be divided into two oategories, viz. oases affeoting (i) indigenous 
inhabitants and (ii) oatsiders living (or working) in Brunei. 
(i) Brunei Taxation Methods and Indigenous Disaffeotion. The 
main grievanoes of the rakyat in the outdistriots inoluded the rapaoious 
aotions of tax oolleotors; ezoessive taxation; abduotion of women as 
Concubines; oonfisoation without good oause of agrioultural produce and 
plantations; and inability to obtain redress from the government. Of 
these Charges, those oonoerning taxation methods are most susoeptible to 
analysis; henoe I shall oonfine my remarks here to that topio. 
32 
Pre-Residential Brunei had no earmarked State revenue as such, 
the income from a particular district belonging to its owner. From a 
31. CO 144/73 (34409) Keyser to Mitohellp No 119,10 Ootober 1899. 
32. The, other oomplaints were not without foundation either. To give 
two examples: (1) in 1900 Sultan Hashim remarked that the loss of Limbang 
had impoverished his 'nobles' beoause they oould no longer take slaves 
from the distriot and sell them (CO 273/2571 25624); (2) oonfisoatioa 
of produce stifled inoentive to produotion; oonverselyt when Mr Keyser 
established himself in Brunei Towns his house became a magnet, people 
setting up market gardens in the immediate vioinityv knowing that the 
Brunei authorities would be more respectful of their property in such 
close proximity to a representative of HM Government. (See also, Brown, 
o. cit 9p 19). - 
28 
ohief's vie`rpoiat, the bulk of iaoone was used for the maintenance of 
personal followers from whom he derived his political strengths the 
greater his retinue, the greater the defereaoe whioh he might ezpeot to 
his opinions. Conversely, if a obief was too poor to support his followers 
he would experience a deoline in his influenoe. 
33 In these oiroumstanoes 
a ohief was limited in the amonat of wealth whioh he might lavish on 
himself. 34 It was noted, for example, that although Sultan Hashim was 
aooused frequently of exbravaganoe, he was always short of oasht his 
palace was "a mare oolleotio@ of ruinous hovels", his clothe, were always 
"poor and threadbare" and his furniture "sordid and mean". The large sums 
of money whioh passed through his hands were "squandered by... followers" 
who traded on "the supineness caused by bis great age". 
35 
Dr tktlliok 
Points out that the most valuable resource of a Malay chief was the 
People he oon]. d tax; henoe it was not in his interest to alienate theme 
and, sinoe the inhabitantsp as an ultimate sanction against over-harsh 
treatment, could migrate to another district where better conditions 
prevailed, a roagh and reacly balance existed between rulers and ruled. 
36 
In Brunei's oase maloontents either fled across the border to Sarawak or 
appealed to the Rajah to annex their home distriots. 
In the outlying areas the basin levy was an annual poll tax, 
theoretioally Only two dollars for every, adult male serf; but even 
33. An example in Pengiran Muda Muhammad Tajadin (d 1916), who was of 
royal deeoent on both sides and oonsidered by many to be the rightful 
heir to Sultan Hashim; but his followers were "few and aninfluential" 
and his pretensions to the throne were uurealiatio. 
34. Brown, . oit., p 66. - 35" MoArthur, "Report"v paragraphs 64-5. 
36. Gullioky . oit., pp 113 & 118-9. 
29 
a oomparatively sympathetic witness described this as "merely the 
irreducible minimum, and a convenient basis for every other kind of 
exaction that the ingenuity of the owners can conceive". 
37 
These 
included pertolongan (benevolence on the occasion of a birth, marriage 
or death in the overlord's family) and dagang serah (forced trade tax). 
In the capital, by contrast, these impositions did not apply; revenue 
there was derived ohiefly from monopolies, as disoussed in due course, 
Effeots of taxation. Limbang distriot had a tradition of 
discontent and several instances are on record of tax gatherers being 
set upon. In mid-1884, for example., Pengiran Temenggong Hashim sent 
two of his agents upriver to oolleot taxes, whioh the people refused to 
Par, killing the messengers for good measure. Later the pengiran himself 
was fired upon. Following this there was a panio in Brunei Town, the 
people fearing that the oapital was about to be saoked bar head-hunting 
Hunts. Aoting Consul Treacher, fearing that British trade via Labuan 
and Singapore) would be interrupted, offered his servioes as a mediator; 
and by April 1885 he had arranged a trnae and established a fairer 
prooednre for tax oolleoticra. 
The original objeot of the Limbang rebels was the elimination 
of abuses not the overthrow of Brunei sovereignty. ' Peaairans in the 
oapital, moreover, were not entirely to be blamed for the ezoesses 
committed in their name. First, mach of the difficulty had been that 
"lawless and rapaoioue" agents tended illegally, to oolleot as much for 
37. noArthur, Report", paragraph 93. 
30 
themselves as for their employers; 
38 
heaoe the Bisayas' insistenoe that 
taxes should be oolleoted instead by looal headmen who would forward the 
reoeipts to Brunei. (Headmen, being of the same rape as the 'serfs', 
tended to be less cruel). Secondly, the Kedayans, who suffered little, 
had nevertheless joined the rebellious Bisayas, who bore the brunt of 
the taxation, in the hope of arranging even easier terms for themselves. 
Finally, in 1884, there was an extraordinary factors the Pen ran 
Temenggong needed to raise extra oash to bolster his candidature to the 
throne. This explains why the Bisayas urged Mr Treaoher to seoure his 
immediate installation, thereby obviating the neoessity for saoh additional 
taxation. (The acting consul established the principle of taxation by 
local headmen; bat he declined to interfere with the suooession). 
39 
Similarly, a special exigency obtained in Belait and Tutong 
during the years 1899-1901. Unrest peaked at that time following 
increased exactions imposed to finance the long-lasting celebrations 
oonneoted with a royal wedding. This was desoribed as 
"a baneful influence,... the direot oause of two rebellions (in 1899 and 
1901), the pretext for robbery and extortion, the exouse for abduotion 
and outrage, the source of conspiracy and murder, and the foss at origo 
of all the grossest results of tyranny and misrule". 40 
The 1899 troubles broke out with the murder of the Pen ran 
38. Similarly, the oasis of Barams see Map 2 (above) and Runoiman, ON 
a9 p 177. 
39. CO 144/58 (20895) and CO 144/60 (10318)- 
40* PO 12/114 p 98, Hewett to (High Commissioner) Sir Frank Swettenham 
(1850--1946), No 31 (confidential), 10 April 1901, paragraph 5; also in 
CO 144/75 (24405). NBs Another observer suggested that the marriage 
(between the Pengiran Bendahara's daughter and Sultan Hashim's grandson) 
Was designed to heal long-standing rift within the royal family, 
mentioned on p 259 above (MoArthur, "Report", paragraph 64). 
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Bedahara's pertolongan tax-gatherers in Belait by the Bisayaa, who were 
joined in an appeal for Sarawak rule by the Dato Di-Gadong (resident 
headman of Tatong), who was protesting against foroed trade tax and 
demands for one hundred slaves and a boat of "almost impossible" 
dimensions. It was reported that both distriots were "praotioally 
independent" and that any attempt by Brunei nobles to re-assert their 
authority would have been met by foroe. 
41 
After oomparative oalm 
during 1900, a reorudeeoenoe of violenoe ooonrred in Tatong early in 
1901 following further attempts 
"to exact contributions, in the shape of girls, buffaloes and anything 
that is of value towards the monstrous extravagance which has gone on 
unchecked for some two years now in connection with the marriage". 42 
The "final strain" was the imposition of a tax on buffaloes of two 
dollars per head and the refusal of the people to pay. 
43 
In the capital, by contrast, the inhabitants (predominantly 
Muslim-Malay) suffered from "no direct oppression". They were undoubt- 
edl7 poor, their hoasee were often in disrepair and their surroundings 
squalid. The prinoipal reason for their poverty was the system of trade 
and oustoms revenue monopolies, leased mainly to Chinese traders, whioh 
pushed up retail prioes to such as extent that many goods sold in the 
oapital (whioh depended on imports for almost all neoessities) were "of 
an inferior quality" but oost "more than double what better kinds would 
41. CO 144/73 (24234) Keyser to Mitohellp No 88,17 July 1899) para- 
graph 3; and CO 144/73 (34409) geyser to Mitohell, No 127,21 Ootober 
1899, paragraph 18. 
42. IP0 12/114 p 68, Hewett to Sir F Swettenham, 7 Maroh 1901, para- 
graph 4; also in CO 144/75 (15738). 
43. FO 12/114 p 98ff, Hewett to Sir F Swettenham, No 31 (oonfidential), 
10 April 1901, paragraph 9; also in CO 144/75 (24405)" 
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fetch in Singapore0. « In 1900 Consul Keyser reported that the oolleot- 
Lou of these taxes was a souroe of "mnoh perseoution and injustioeý,. 
45 
Poverty, and how to relieve its indeed, was the keynote of all that was 
said and done in Brunei. 
What was the extent of the disaffeotion? In the aase of Lim- 
bang, Whitehall was under the impression that disoontent was universal. 
This was based on the aoocunts of British oonsuls and of the Rajah of 
Sarawak. In 1890 the latter proolaimed that 
"the principal chiefs of the Limbang River, after having for years 
suffered oppression from the Brunei Government and after having for the 
last five years maintained their independence against this oppression, 
have now decided to join the Sarawak Government and place themselves 
under its authority, in token of which they of their own free will and 
accord hoist the Sarawak flag in their river". 46 
Elsewhere he deolared that he based his annexation of the distriot 
"principally on the will of the inhabitants... and their right to choose 
a protecting and ruling power, these people having maintained their 
independence against the Brunei Government since 1884 on account of the 
oppression and villavq of various kinds of that Government". 47 
During the years 1884,90 the Government of Brunei had been powerless in 
Limbang; their rights then "oease to exist and are null and forfeited". 
44. Other faotors oontributing to this poverty inoluded large families, 
a preference for independenoe in earning a livelihood, and the loss of 
Limbang (whioh "pressed severely on those who depended on fishing and 
petty trading"). McArthur, "Report", paragraph 34- 
45. He oited the oase of Inohe Mohsin, the tobaooo farmer, who deliber- 
ately kept the article in short supply, so that he might fine the people 
who attempted to purohase it from a 'smuggler'. In this way, the tax 
farmer reaped a rich harvest from flues imposed for breaohes of his 
monopoly; but many inhabitants were driven out of the capital. 70 12/111 
P 58ff, Keyser to F0, No 23,30 April 1900; also in CO 144/74 (17694). 
46. F0 12/83 p 30, Rajah's Proclamation, 17 March 1890- 
47. PO 12/87 p 354, Rajah to (High Commissioner) Sir 0 Smith (1848- 
1916), 30 January 1891; also in CO 144/68 (12133). 
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If so, wby (in 1885) had Sir Charles described Dato Kiassi, the 
leader of the Limbang rebels, as the "culprit"; and wirr had he oomplaiued 
that the latter's release from gaol, negotiated by Mr Treaoher, had 
resulted in the loss of innooent Brunei lives? 
48 Why had no referenoe 
been made in 1884-5 to the "oppression and villany" of the Brunei 
authorities in Limbang? And if, during the years 1884 to 1890 the 
Brunei Government had been "powerless" in Lirabang, how could it have 
done anTthing to give the people there oause for ocmplaint, neoessitating 
the 1890 annexation by Sarawak? 
It was argued in support of the Rajah's aotioa that the Brunei 
Government had been unable to draw taxes from the distriot and that 
e rane would benefit by receiving instead a fixed annriitf from the 
Sarawak Government. In 1885, howeverp the first instalment of the rates, 
as revised by Mrr Treaoherf was sent to the oapital, but was refused by 
Sultan Hashim until the rebels submitted. A Brunei souroe suggests that 
taxes were remitted in the three years before the 1890 annexatioa. 
49 
The majority, of people,, 75% aooording to Inohe Muhammad (the British 
Consular agent), had not joined the rebels and favoured a Continuation 
Of the Sultane rule. 
50 After the annexation Sir Charlewhimself 
48. CO 144/60 (8340) Sir Charles Brooke to P0p 26 Maroh 1885- 
49* CO 273/166 (9843) minutes of an interview between Aoting High 
Commissioner J? Diokson and two Brunei envoys. 
50. Ibid. # Inobe Muhammad to Dickson, 31 March 1890. NB. At the time 
Whitehall rejected Inohe Muhammad's testimony, principally beoause it 
ooaflioted with reports from suooessive consuls and the Rajah; and 
Partly because the word of a Malay was oonsidered unreliable. In 1906 
Mr MoArthur agreed that the disturbances had been oonfined to "some 
isolated hamlets in the lower reaohes of the river"; it would have been 
quite sufficient, therefore, had the Rajah been authorized to oooupr the 
34 
conceded that 
"some others, poor oreatures, like to side with Brunei, perhaps to avoid 
paying revenue to Sarawak, others have of their own aooord brought it in. 
I shall be very patient and allow small things to pass". 51 
Even the Limbang headmen did not remain nnanimouely in favour of Sarawak 
for, in early 1888, it was reported that the pro-Brooke party had been 
rednoed "by Brunei intrigues"; and, in 1892, two years after the annex- 
ation, over forty Limbang headmen and their followers pledged allegianoe 
to Brunei. In 188TH indeed, the rebel headmen had requested a "queen's 
offioer" (to whioh Sultan Hashim also agreed) and only "failing that" 
one from Sarawak; bat at that stage the British Government was not 
Prepared to intervene for financial reasons. Nor is there any evidence 
that the 'feudal' owners intended to sell their rights to Sarawak. 
Pinally, the Sarawak flag was raised, not so muoh by the people of 
Limbang, as by the Rajah himself, who invaded the distriot on 17 Maroh 
1890, aooompanied by a foroo of five steamers. 
In 1884 the Rajah was in allianoe with the Pengiran Temenggonn 
in the hope that the latter would oede Limbang; but after his aooessioa 
Sultan Hashim refused to do so. Henoe he beoame a 'monster". 
52 By 1890 
there bad been two prinoipal developments: first, Sultan Hashim was 
Preparing, to launoh an expedition against the rebels; andp seoondly, the 
rebel headmen were beooming inoreasingly isolated, henoe their appeal to 
disturbed distriots only and "not reoeived as the prise of interferenoe 
a very large traot of peaceful territory as well". (CO 144/80$ 10206 
MOLrtbar to Anderson, 13 February 1906, paragraph 7). 
51. PO 12/91 p 82, Rajah to Sir C Smith, 1 September 1892, 
52. FO 12/79 p 149, Rajah to Sir J Paunoef of e, 25 Mary 1888. 
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the Rajah to extricate them from their' predicament. Dato Kiassi,, it was 
reported, "knows only too well that peaoe with Brunei means sooner or 
later his (own) ezeoution". 
53 In short, the Rajah had to aot quiokly 
or else forfeit his ohanoe of taking the distriot; whilst the rebels 
faded a ohoioe between bringing their revolt to a suooessful oonolusion 
or paying for failure with their lives. 
In the oase of Belait and . tong from 1899 the inflnenoe of 
Sarawak was added to the financial difficulties of the pengirans and the 
partioular need for extra oash to finanoe the royal wedding. First, the 
Brooke State provided a point of referenoe by whioh the people of Belait 
and ihtong ooald examine their own situation. There were, moreaverl in 
nearly every hamlet "men from Sarawak" who were oontinually oontrastiug 
Brunei and Sarawak methods (to the disoredit of the former) and stirring 
up disoontent. The real grievanoe was that each hansehold had to pay up 
to 920 annually in various unprediotable exaotions, whereas by oustom 
(as still praotised in neighbouring Sarawak) they should have paid only 
two dollars. 54 Sine oonditione in Sarawak were the yaxdstiok against 
whioh those in Brunei were oontrasted,, it should be remembered that 
taxation was exoeptionally low in the Brooke State and that the Rajahs, 
beoause of the smallness of their revenuesp did equally little for their 
people in return. 
55 
There were aooueatione, also, that Brooke influenoe 
53.70 12/74 p 145, Lays to F0, No 15 (politioal), 16 )taroh 1887, 
paragraph 7; also in CO 144/64 (8070)- 
54* P'0 12/126 pp 148 and 151-2, NSH KoArthur, "Notes on a Visit to the 
Rivers Belait and Tatong (June 1904)", paragraphs 9 and 14. 
55" Dr RN Pringle oouments that the court of justice offered "the only 
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in Brunei rivers was not purely passive. 
The impression of popular distress in Belait and Tatong, 
oonveyed by Mr Hewett's reports in 1901, did not matoh the situation 
which greeted Mr MoArthur three years later. Although the people 
oomplained bitterly of poverty and distress, and disoontent was general, 
the aotual oonditions under whioh they lived did not appear to justify 
their statements. There were no signs of great poverty; on the oontraryl, 
every house was well-furnished, the people had ample food, and oould even 
afford small luxuries. Either oonditions had ohanged sinne 1901, or the 
victims of the reported misgovernment were blessed with short memories. 
The pro-Sarawak Dato Di-Gadong had been killed "bf order of the Sultan"56 
in mid-1902, the buffalo tax had been allowed to lapse, and, after the 
wreck of his laanohg the Msterprise, the Sultan had no easy means of 
oommunioatiom with the two distriots. The Prang Bukits had no apeoial 
oomplaints (apart, presumably, from the extra poll tax). In Tatong, on 
the other hand, the sultan (in 1904) oolleoted head tax for three years 
in advanoe, enforoed a fine of 2,000 in reparation for the 1901 revolt, 
and oolleoted a further sam of (2950 a head for the expenses of his 
son's funeral. His Highness had also ordered a tongang to be built. 
Even 809 
"It might oertaialy be urged, in answer to aooueatioae of wanton oruelty 
so often made against the Sultan in respect of these people, that the 
River Tatong was admittedly in revolt four years ago; that the revolt was 
quelled - ors rather, died a natural death - after disorganizing the 
sOoial aervioe whioh the Brooke State ooursietently provided" (Rajahs 
and Rebels, London 1970, p 171). 
56. Sarawak casette, 1 Ootober 1902, p 203. 
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whole distriot for a year; and that the fine imposed by the Government 
on the re-establishment of authority is only now being paid. A wantonly 
oruel and rapaoious ruler would surely have been less oomplaisant". 57 
In other wordsg although there was justice in the Rajah's 
oontention that the people of Belait and Tutoog wished to be merged in 
Sarawak, then hadv perhaps, lese real grounds for oomplaint than 
aaggeeted by Mr Hewett. In the event, the Rajah failed to aoquire the 
two distriots; and, by a further iroarv Belait was disoovered later to 
oontain the balk of the lliri-Soria oilfield. 
Consul Hewett and the Rajah deolared that the remedy for dis- 
order in Brauei aas the transfer of the troubled districts to the Brooke 
State, It is neoessary, therefore, to examine the oredentiale of these 
Wituessee, is order to assess the oredibility of the proposed alternative. 
Before becoming oonsal in 1900, Mr Hewett had been a Chartered Company 
offioer in North Borneo. In this oapaoity he had been partially 
responsible for the Kinabatangan massaore (130 dead) in 189058 and the 
firing and looting of the Inanam valley in 1897. In these oiroumstanoes 
allegations about "wanton murder... robberl... and outrage" levelled 
against the Brunei authorities by Ur Hewett ring somewhat hollow. When 
dealing with troublesome tribesmen in Barawak, moreoverp the Rajah 
adopted taotics similar to those whioh he alleged were being employed 
by Sultan Hashim, viz., the laumohing of expeditions an& the . 
Aooting and 
burning of houses of rebels. Indeed, far more bloodshed ooourred in 
57. Yodrthor, "Report", paragraph 29. 
58. ID Blaok, A Gambling Style of Government (Kuala Lumpur 1983)! p 105; 
and AN Keith, Land Below The Wind Ord Ed. v London 1949)v pp 201-9, 
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Sarawak (where suoh expeditions persisted annually even in the 1930s) 
than in Sultan Hashim's Brunei. The Rajah's olaim that it was necessary 
for him to intervene in order "to prevent bloodshed"p therefore, is 
equally inadmissible. Suooessive British oonaulst however, applied a 
double standards rebellion in Sarawak was an internal matter for the 
Rajah and none of their oonoerng, whereas any disturbanoe in Brunei was 
followed by immediate demands that the Sultan should be relieved of 
oontrol of the distriots oonoerned. Sultan Hashim, for his part, asked 
"with inoonvenient insistenoe why, if rebellions are a proof of misrule, 
the rivers in Sarawak on which they occur are not foroibly taken from 
... (the Rajah's) oontrol". 59 
In the oases both of Limbang in 1884 and Belait-Tatong in 
1899-1901, it was claimed that the Brunei rulers were unable to exercise 
authority; yet when the Sultan proposed to lannoh expeditions to subdue 
the rebels, he was restrained from so doing either by the United Kingdom 
or by the Rajah in order to prevent loss of life. In short, Sultan 
Hashim oatld not win, as Sir Prank Swettenham justly observed$ 
"If the Sultan does nothing when some petty ohief makes trouble, His 
Highness is referred to as an effete and powerless ra a who has no 
authority and should be removed to make way for a more vigorous ruler. 
When, on the other hand,, the Sultan tries to please his neighbours by 
an exhibition of energy (no doubt very ill-direoted) he is oharged with 
being the cause of deplorable outrages". 60 
Sultan Hashim possessed no police; hence the only Way he could subdue a 
reoaloitrant tribe was by playing off another tribe against it. Sir 
Frank suggeeted. that the Foreign Offioe would have heard little about 
59. McArthur, "Report"q paragraph 80. 
60. FO 12/114 p 164, Sir F Swett enham -to F09 No 16 (ooafi dential ), 14 
October 1901, paragraph 3; also in CO 144/75 (41469). 
39 
Brunei "if it were not that Sarawak is on one sidep the BNBO on the other 
and the British oonsulp having little to do$ is inolined to dabble in 
matters whioh really do not oonoern him". 
61 
Similarly, another observer 
oommented 
"(It is argued that) Brunei to be improved must have the Sultan deposed 
and be entirely remodelled, and it is my opinion that this is neither 
neoessary nor desirable, asp although his Government does little to 
improve matters, he at the same time does but little harm and some 
things attributed to him are not true, or are at any rate doubtfal". 62 
The observer? Sir Charles Brooke, who, on this oooasion, having heard 
rumours that the British Government intended to appoint a Resident, was 
oonoerned to minimize the extent of misrule in Brunei in order to 
disoonrage this options henoe he tailored his arguments aooordingly. 
To summarisep disoontent with Brunei government ooinoided with 
times of peak taxatioa, but most people (oertainly, in Limbang) remained 
quiescent and not all rebels (e. g. Limbang Kedayans) had good reason for 
disoontent. The original aim of maloontents in Limbang was the 
elimination of ezoesses rather than (as in Belait and itong) the over- 
throw of Brauei sovereignty. Ironioally, whereas Limbang was annexed by 
Sarawak, Belait and Ttttoug were retained by Brunei. The contrast with 
conditions in Sarawak aroused discontent; and Brooke influence may have 
been aotive rather than purely passive. As a 'oontrol' oonsider those 
Provinoes of North Borneo visited by Mr MoArthur in 1904 where there was 
61. FO 12/122 p 56ff, Sir F Swettenham to P0p No 15 (seoret)v 6 August 
1903, paragraph 8. 
62. Co 14.4/72 (3777) Rajah to P0t 24 Ootober 1897. (Compare PO 12/105 
P 409 Rajah to POO 14 Maroh 1899: "I trust that something may shortly 
be done to depose and pension off the Sultan... "). 
40 
"far greater poverty and distress than in Brunei" and where the people 
were 
"full of regrets for the 'happy-go-lucky' times of Brunei rule, when... 
though they might in some years have heavy oalls made upon theme in 
others they were hardly, molested at all". 63 
Finally, it was suggested that the Sarawak takeover was equally 
unaooeptable and that the Rajah was an unreliable witness. 
Having assessed Brunei misrule as it affeoted the indigenous 
population, I shall now turn to the oomplaints of outsiders living or 
trading in the country. 
(ii) The ooaapleinte of outsiders. One of the main duties of 
the British consul was the proteotion of British traders' interests in 
Brunei. By Artiole II of the 1847 MC-Brunei Treaty the Sultan had 
undertaken that British traders should enjof "full and complete pro- 
teotion and ßeourity" for themeelvee and their property. The oonsuls, 
however, often reoeived ooaplainte about debts unpaid, goods seized, or 
shops looted; but the Sultan ignored their representatione, unless banked 
b7 the preeenoe of a gunboat. 
In some inetancee, however, Sultan Hashim was treated unfairly 
by aoasuls, who failed to appreoiate the limitations of his ooastitutional 
Position- In 1885, for examplep Sultan Abdul llwnin bad died owing X12200 
to a ldalaooa baba, 
64 
Soh Eng Gin. Sttooeaeive ooneals attempted to obtain 
the debt from the new Sultan but without euooeee. He refused to pa be- 
Danes he was not the late Sultan's heir and had no hand in the disposal 
63. )ioArthur, "Report"g paragraph 105- 
64* Babas "Chinese born in lialaya". 
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of the oession money on the security of whioh the loan had been given. 
Mr Hewett took advantage of the preeenoe of a gunboat to deduot the 
amount from oeaaion money due to Sultan Haehim, even though those properly 
liable were willing to pay the debt by degrees. Governor Birch of North 
Borneo desoribed the oonsul's prooeedings as "quite unjust", 
65 
In a 
similar oases the Sultan was made to pay a debt beoause he was unable 
to oompel the Pengiran Pemanoha to do so. Mr MoArthur oommenteds 
"The ourioas oonstitution of the oonntry makes the Sultan only supreme 
in name, and his position is so muoh a matter of aooommodation with 
ministers as strong as himself that it seems unfair to expeot him to 
risk an open breaoh with them". 66 
Although the treatment of Chinese traders, espeoially during 
the 1901 troubles in itong, beoame the sabjeot of muoh adverse oommentp 
little substantial evidenoe was adduoed to show that they had suffered 
"to any appreoiable extent". 
67 
The Brunei attitude in these matters 
seemed to be that Chinese traders were wealtby enough and that this was 
suffioient reason wb no attention should be paid to their oomplainte. 
68 
65. PO 12/120 p 160ff, EW Biroh (1857-1929; KCMG 1911) to Sir F 
Swettenhamp oonfidential, 11 September 1901. 
66. MoArthur, "Report", paragraph 42. 
67. CO 144/75 (24405) Sir P 2wettenham to Hewett, No 6 (oonfidential, 
Borneo), 3 May 1901, paragraph 5. In one instanoe $233.40 had been 
realized from the illegal anotion of goods seized from two traders. This 
sum was reooivered. subsequently. Mr Hewett mentioned, also, that goods 
had been stolen from two other shops; and that one man had been summarily 
executed for no apparent reason by Pe ran Tajudin. Further, because 
of the loss of goods and buffaloes, and the impoverishment of the people 
trade would be a oonsiderable time reoovering when the disturbances oeased. 
(In one of these oases Mr Hewett conceded subsequently that the shop did 
not belong to a British subject). Previous consuls had also oomplained 
that Sultan Hashim was dilatory in securing restitution of lost Chinese 
Property. Finally, there were oooasional murders of Chinese traders. 
68. CO 273/257 (25624) Sir Alexander Swettenham (1846-1933), Journal 
entry for Sunday, 17 June 1900. 
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SorneýBritish observers, such as Sir Frank Swettenham, took a similar 
views if British subjects, he ruled 
"choose to settle or trade in places which are notorious]. unsafe, or 
where the administration is conducted as it is in Brunei, they do so 
at their own risk". 69 
Another example of misrule, again arising out of poverty and 
deoentralization, was a tendeaoy to grant the same concession to several 
different people, leaving them to settle it among themselves. In most 
cases Brunei's rulers oould do this with impunity, but not when they time 
trioked Sir Charles Brookep the most powerful commercial speoulator in 
Brunei. In 1888, Mr WC Cowie, 
70 
then a minor British merohantp sold his 
monopoly of coal, mining throughout Brunei east of the River Tatong to 
the seoond Rajah. Despite the existenoe of these rights, Sultan Hashim 
issued coal concessions covering parts of the area already granted, first 
in 1896, and again in 1899. This oreated international tension. On the 
seoond oooasion, for example, the Rajah was determined to defend his 
rights and "failing to do so by fair means", he deolared, "I shall be 
obliged to resort to arms"* 
71 
A British warship had to be despatohed 
to the soene to preserve peaoe. Eventually Sultan Hashim baoked down 
and the Rajah opened a ooal works on the island in dispute (Berembang), 
whioh remained in operation until 1917. Meanwhile the inoident had been 
69.00 144/75 (33046) Sir Frank Swettenham to Hewett, No 799 30 April 
1901, paragraph 2. 
70. William Clarke Cowie (o1847-1910). 1870et petty trader operating 
out of Labuan. 1882-8: owner of Muara Damit ooal mine. Director (1894-), 
Managing Direotor (1897-) and Chairman:. (1909-10) of the BNBC. 
71. FO 12/102 p 60ff, Rajah to Keyser, 26 September 1899, encle in 
Mitchell to F0t No 43 (politioal)v 5 October 1899; also in CO 144/73 
(31524). 
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registered in Whitehall as "another flagrant example of Brunei misrule". 
72 
Another problem arising out of the oonstitutional set-up in 
Brunei was the Sultan's inability or unwillingness to punish serious 
offenoes. Two points need to be made. First, the Sultan had no polioe 
who oomld investigate orime. - Seoondlyp offenders were often sheltered 
by powerful chiefs whom the Sultan could not afford to alienate. in 
September 1896, for example, a Sikh was murdered and his shop pillaged. 
The subsequent trial, held only after repeated British representations 
had been made, was "a faroe" and the Sultan released the murderer partly 
"through fear of the ooneequenoes of punishing a man whose relations 
were sufficiently influential to retaliate". 
73 
Similar considerations 
prevented the bringing to justioe of the attempted murderers of a Dane, 
Mr Waterstradt, in 1899. Conversely, misoreaute sometimes returned to 
Brunei under the shelter of the Sarawak flag, so that Sultan Hashim 
dared not toaoh them for fear of provoking Brooke aggression* 
74 
Sultan Haehim's refusal to aoknowledge the Rajah's oooapation 
of Limbaag oreated farther oomplioations whioh added to the impression 
Of misrule. in the altanate. In 1899, for example, he was foroed to pay 
an indemnity to Sarawak for the murder in Brunei of two Brunei subjeote, 
who had, however, settled in Limbang. Sultan Hashim protested, in vain, 
72. CO 144/73 (31524) minute by Mr TG MoNaghten (1872-1944), 15 Novem- 
ber 1899" 
73. Fo 12/97 p 94, Mitchell to P0, No 9 (Borneo), 21 May 1897, para- 
graph 14; also in CO 144/71 (14740). For a contemporary American verdict 
on the Brunei 'judiciary', see P Bigelow, "The Last of a Great Sultan" in 
Harper's Monthly Magazine (1906), pp 721-2. 
74. MoArtimr, "Report", paragraph 57; and CO 144/80 (29740) McArthur to 
Anderson, No 148,27 June 1906, paragraph 8. 
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that this was "very unfair" and that it was "not at all right... to deal 
with us in this manner". 
75 
The two murdered 'serfs' had been engaged in cross-border buffalo 
raids when they met their deaths; and snob raids, often sponsored by needy 
Brunei 'nobles' (partioularly the Pengiran Bendahara) provoked oontinual 
complaints from the Sarawak authorities. The latter undoubtedly had 
justioe on their sides when Brunei distriot was sealed off during the 
1904 smallpox epidemiop for example, the raids oeased; but when the 
quarantine was lifted, they resamed. 
76 
Sometimes, however, the victims 
were people who had fled to Limbaug in order to avoid payment of their 
debts, their cattle being seized in redress by the injured party. 
77 
Cases were not always investigated impartially and not all were satis- 
faotoril7 proved, Onoe again the Sultan's efforts to investigate 
complaints were nullified "by the disloyalty of his leading ohiefe where 
their own followers are oonoerned" and although the Sarawak authorities 
were very insistent in their oornplainte, they made 
"no allowances for the difficulties of the Sultan's position, while they 
allow the Limbang to be made as asylum by those whom he desires to punish 
for offences committed under his jurisdiction". 78 
To sum ups the oomplainte of foreigners oonneoted with Brunei 
arose from two principal oausess first,, the chronic poverty of the rulers; 
75. ' FO 12/101 p 220ff, 9aitan to Keyser, 20 wuharram 1317 AH (28 Kay 
1899); also in CO 144/73 (20104). 
76. CO 604/1 Sarawak Gazette,. 1 December 1904, p 236- 
77. FO 12/106 p 65, Keyeer to Sir Alexander Swettenharo, No 13 (political), 
24 February 1900, paragraph 3. 
78. Ddokrthnr, "Report'", paragraph 39; geyser, place cited in note 779 
paragraph 3 (e); and Bigelow, 1 ooi . of t_ 
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and, seoondly, the Sultan's inability to stamp his authority on his 
senior ministers. A few Chinese traders were murdered; but there was 
little evidenoe to suggest that the majority had suffered finanoially to 
any great extent. Radioal measures had beoome neoessary, nevertheless, 
if the deoadent Sultanate were to be regenerated. In the next seotion 
I shall explain why EM Government decided to accept responsibility for 
this "daunting" task. 
3. A Dying Kingdom Reprieved 
Offioial UK-Branei ties oommenoed in 1846-7, long before the 
Residential Era. Earlier still, the East India Company had taken an 
interest in Borneo for trading purposes. Before examining the immediate 
oonsiderations whioh led to the appointment of a Resident, therefore, I 
shall plane British relations with Brunei in a longer-term ooatext. 
79 
The United Kingdom had never been muoh interested in Borneo 
Per se still less did it have any desire to aoquire territorial possess- 
ions there. ' In general, oolonies were undesirable beoause they were 
expensive to maintain and led to entanglement in indigenous affairs. 
The principal interest of the United Kingdom (and of England before 1707) 
was not territory, but trade. Even in this oases Borneo's prinoipal 
importanoe was its strategio position. During the seventeenth oentury, 
for example, the East India Company made intermittent but unsuooessful 
attempts to establish footholds in Borneo from whioh to oompete with the 
79"' The definitive aooount is N" Tarling, Britain, The Brookes and 
Brunei (Kuala Lumpur, 1971). 
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Netherlands in the Indonesian pepper trade. Having been ezoluded from 
this oommeroe by the Aatoh, the East India Company oonoentrated instead 
on India. After 1700, however, Borneo acquired "a new value for them 
as a possible site for a oommeroial entrepot on the way to China"-80 
Early attempts to establish settlements at Balambangan, Banjermasin 
and Labnan failed or were relinquished. The original problem was to 
find goods aooeptable to the Chinese is order to redaoe the Honourable 
Ccmpan' s defioit at Canton caused by heavy purohases, partioularly 
of tea. 
81 
By the and of the Napoleonio War this diffioulty had been 
resolved by the growing Chinese demand for Indian opium. 
During the later nineteenth oentur7 strategio oonsideratious 
dominated British thinking beoause the north-west ooast of Borneo lay on 
the flank of the inoreaeingly-important trade route between India and 
China and, to a lesser extent, between Sydney and Hong Song. It was 
feared that if a rival European power became established on this coast it 
World be able to threaten theme romtes. 
82 
The major British objeotives 
were inoorporated in the 1846-7 UK-Brunei Treaties. After gunboat 
diel omaoy,, the Saltan was obliged to oede Labuan (an island just outside 
Brunei Bar) in an agreement dated 24 Deoember 1846. A few months later 
a Treaty of Friendship, signed on 27 MaY 1847, oonfirmed this oession. 
Provision was made, also, for oollaboration to inorease trade and 
80. DQE Hall, A History of South-East Asia (London 1968), p 522. 
81. Dr IK Bassett, "The Historical Background 1500-1815" in Wang Gungwu 
(ed. ), Maas A Survey (Singapore 1964), pp 123-4. 
82. LR Wright, The Origins of British Borneo (Hong Kong 1970), P 291 
and G Irwin, Nineteenth Century Borneo (The Hague 1955), P 11. 
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suppress piracy (two sides of the same coin). Finally, Article X of the 
Treaty (in whioh the Brunei monaroh undertook to make no territorial 
cession without the oonsent of HI Government) provided the keystone of 
British polioy up to 1888.83 The essential British objeotive was to 
prevent any other power from beooming established in north-west Borneo, 
not to become involved in this area itself. 
84 
In fact neither Labuan nor the 1847 Treaty were auooeeeful 
from a British viewpoint. Sultans oonld not be relied upon not to oede 
territory without British oonsent. This, oonpled with internal political 
instability oonaeoted with rivalry for the sucoession and periodio 
Popular unrest, meant that Brunei remained susoeptible to foreign 
inoursions. Labuanp for its part, was a dismal failures the opal oompanies 
failed; it played no part in the suppression of piraoy; and its Government 
ran at a lose. Hence on 1 January 1890 the oolong was transferred to 
the BNBO, in whose hands it remained until the end of 1905. 
From the 1840s HX Goverment preferred indireotly to safegaard 
British interests in this region by giving support to unofficial enter- 
PMeess the Rajahs Brooke in Sarawak (lion 1841)85 and the 13NBC in North 
Borneo (from 1881).. This entailed, for Whitehallp a minima= of coat and 
direot involvement, Rivalry, between the Brookes and the Chartered Company 
left the United Kingdom in the position of referee as the 'soramble for 
83. Wright, o. oit. s pp 123-5 and. 203. 84. CD Cowan, Nineteenth Century Malaya (London 1961), p 269. 
85. The Rajahs were: 1841-1868: Sir James Brooke ICCB DCL (b 1803) 
1868-1917: Sir Charles Brooke GONG (b 1829) 
1917-1946: Sir Vyaer Brooke GCMG (1874-1963). 
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Brunei' gathered paoe. In oircumstanoes of heightened European imperial 
rivalry in the 1880sß however, it became necessary for a more definite 
British oontrol to be exeroised over north-west Borneo. In 1888, there- 
fore, Brunei, Sarawak and North Borneo beoame British Proteotorates. 
In Brunei's oases oontrol of foreign polioy was taken over by 
the United Kingdom, whose interests were supervised by the Governor of 
the Straits Settlements, now appointed eye-offioio 'Sigh Commissioner' for 
Brunei. Sultan Hashim sought in this agreement a means to prevent further 
territorial enoroaohmentep partionlarly by Sarawak. HM Government's 
preferred solution to the 'Brunei problem', on the other hand, was the 
Sultanate's partition between Sarawak and North Borneos the boundary to 
be the Trusan-Lawas watershed. In short, all the territory now (1985) 
oontrolled by Brunei had been earmarked for Sarawak; whilst, apart from 
interdigital rivers within its own block of territory, the Chartered 
Company stood to gain only Lawas dietriot. Henoe 'partition' meant 
really 'absorption by Sarawak'. 
The UK-Brunei Treaty, indeed. was worded speoifioally 80 as not to 
"stand in the war of such a consummation as the absorption, when the time 
arrives, of Brunei by Sarawak and the BNBC. It wonldv in faott enable 
EX Government to advise the Sultan to accept the inevitable on the best 
terms proonrable". 86 
In other words,, the ultimate fate of the Sultanate was a matter of 
indifference to London, so long as its territory remained within the 
British sphere of iafluenoe. Stiltau Hashimp naturally, was not informed 
of these intentions; and his request for two alterations in the Treaty 
86. PO 12/78 p 165, minute by Sir R Herbert. 31 January 1888. 
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was simply ignored, 
87 
It is not surprising, therefore, that in 1904 His 
Highness should have complained that "the Treaty has never fulfilled his 
hopes,, that no consul has ever helped him since it was made". 
88 
The whole of Sultan. Hashim's reign was overshadowed by the 
Limbang issue. After the loss of this district he feared that he would 
be reduoed to a Sultan in name only, and, taking British proteotion at 
its fade value, he expeoted the Rajah to be evioted; he was unwilling, 
therefore, to oonsider any other business until the distriot had been 
restored. 
89 
British oonsuls interpreted this 'monomania' as a sign of 
senility; but it refleoted, rather, a sound appreoiation of Limbang's 
crucial importanoe to Brunei at that time. 
During the 1890s Whitehall's polioy was to find, a way to 
ameliorate misrule in the Sultanate whilst at the same time oausiag as 
little distress as possible to the aged Sultan, after whose death Brunei 
would be taken over by Sarawak. Following the Belait-Tatong revolt of 
1899, however, the lieutenant High Commissioner was sent to Brunei (in 
mid-1900) to obtain the monaroh"s aooeptauoe of 'partition' (effeotively 
absorption by Sarawak); but, muoh to Whitehall's oonsternation, Sir 
87. Sultan Hasbim'a requests were (i) that the suooession should be 
guaranteed; and (ii) that the British Government should assist "with 
oomplete effioienoy" should the Sultan be threatened by internal disor&er. 
But, Sultan Hashim having signed the Treaty as it was presented to him, 
Whitehall assumed that no aotion was needed. (Co 273/154* 21539 Low to 
Smith, 22 September 1888, paragraph 6; also in P0 12/78 p 382ff). 
88. ' FO 12/126 p 68ff, MoArthur to Anderson, 2714ay 1904, paragraph 8- 
enol. -in Anderson to F09 No 6-(politioal),, 15 June 1904. 
89. Cf MoArthur, "Report", paragraph 72= "such poltoy as exists among 
them (Sultan and peagirans) hinges on this, subjeot". See also FO 12/104 
p 18, Keyser to F0ý No 11t 2 April 18990 paragraphs 3-4; also in CO 144/73 (13933). 
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Alexander Swettenham flouted his instruotions, failing even to raise the 
matter. The reoradesoenoe of violenoe in tong early in 1901 oonvinoed 
the Foreign Office that the time had oome for the adoption of a definite 
polioy with regard to the future of Brunei. It was eventually agreed 
that the new High Commissioner, Sir Frank Swettenham, should visit the 
Sultanate in the following April (1902) to prepare a report. In July 
1901, however, news of a worsening situation in Belait and Tatong 
rendered neoessary more immediate aotion. it Was agreed "for reasons of 
humanity"90 that Consul Hewett should open negotiations on behalf of the 
Rajah with Sultan Haehim for the transfer of Belait and Tatong (later 
the whole Sultanate) to Sarawak. These negotiations, however, ended in 
failure. 
ihr Hewett"s strategy having oollapsed, the United Kingdom 
reverted to its original plan of sending an offioer to Brunei to establish 
the faots and make recommendations for the future administration of the 
oountry. Sir Frank Swettenhare, realizing that he would not be able to 
visit the Sultanate before his impending retirement (as Governor/High 
Commissioner in Singapore), gathered the opinions of his senior 
colleagues and, in August 1903, his ooneidered oommsel to Government 
was not in favour of a Residential System: 
"I am more inolined... to advise you to leave Brunei alone, but to 
instruot the oonaul to live at Brunei (instead of Labuan) and to 
endeavour to seoure the sympathies of the Sultan and his people and give 
them good advioe, being strictly impartial in all his dealings whether 
those where British subjeots are oonoerned or otherwise". 91 
90. CO 144/75 (33046) minute by CP Luoas (1853-1931), 21 September 1901. 
91. FO 12A22 p 56, Sir Frank Swettenham to FOP No 15 (seoret), 6 August 
1903, paragraph 8. 
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Consul Hewett being reoalled in April 1904, Mr MoArthur was 
despatohed to Brunei to prepare the report whioh Sir Frank Swettenham 
originally had intended to prodnoe. Thus appeared on the soene the key 
figure in the history of modern Brunei. Pirstg following his "Report on 
Brunei in 1904" the British Government abandoned its preferred option 
(Brunei's inoorporation in Sarawak). It was deoided, instead, to appoint 
a Resident, thereby preserving the existence of the moribund Sultanate. 
Seoondly, during his term as Resident (1906-8) the former system of 
administration was swept aside and the foundations of modern Brunei laid. 
i)ISH )ioArthnr and the Creation of the British Residential System 
in Brunei, 1904-5. The son of a general, )(SH 'Stewart' MoArthnr joined 
the Straits' Civil Servioe in 1895. His onrrioninm vitae inoluded a 
saooeseion of increasingly important poets, mainly in Penang and Sing- 
aporep until, in April 1904, he was appointed Acting Consul in Brunei. 
Mr MoArthar"s seniors in the Colonial Servioe oertainly expressed great 
oonfidenoe in him, 92 a oonfidenoe whioh he justified by restoring (with- 
oat an eaorifioe of firmness) good diplomatio relations with the Brunei 
monaroh after the disastrous tenure (1900-4) of his predeoeasor, Pr 
Hewett. When Mr MoArthur was reoalled from Brunei in November 1904 His 
Highness appealed for him to be sent baok to Brunei "beoause I have 
great liking for him on aoooant of his disoretion, ooartesy and gentle 
disposition". 93 a remarkable reversal of Sultan Haehim's usual attitude 
92, For example, Sir F 3wettenham (CO 273/3001 645); Sir J Anderson 
(CO 273/309= 27211) and Sir WH Treaoher (FO 12/127 p 167). 
93. FO 12/126 p 224, Sultan to High Commieeioner, 9 November 1904. 
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towards British oonsuls. 
In his "Report" Mr MoArthur had two main targets. First, the 
British Chinese traders who, generally, were making large profits "oat 
of the inoompetenoy and extravaganoe of the present titular rulers" and 
as money-lenders, granting cash advances on the security or cession 
money paid annually. Their "oupidity" was "one of the main oauses of the 
distress and poverty prevalent in Brunei". They oontrolled virtually all 
the trade and most of the revenues of the ooantry; and in the past too 
muoh stress had been plaoed on their "oooasional losses". 
94 Seoondly, 
the Malay peugiranep who were "inoorrigibly idle and oonstitutionally 
dishonest"t "too lazy or too inoompetent to do an honest stroke of work" 
and "eking out an unjustifiable ezistenoe by what they oan extort from 
Kedayaus or Bisayas subjeot to them"* in short they were "largely 
responsible for the present hopeless oondition of the oountry and for 
most of the oruelty and rapine usually attributed to the Sultan". 
95 
T12S 
worst of the nobles was the Pe ran Bentahara96 - "greedy, Dunning, 
unsorupnloas and ornel" - onoe the largest owner of property in Brunei, 
but by 1904 reduoed to living on "what he oan extort as 'presents' from 
his äedayau serfs". 
97 
Allegedly "3arawak's hireliug", 
98 he was to Dause 
considerable trouble to the first British Residents in Brunei. 
94. MoArthur, "Report", paragraphs 41-3 and 66. 
95. Ibid., paragraph 37. 
96. Pengiran Anak Bazar (? 1829-1917), Pengiran Bendahara 1883-1917; Joint 
Regent 1906-17; illiterate. Died on 3 Ju17 1917. See below, pp 67ff. 
97. MoArthur,. "Report", paragraph 95- 
98- CO 531/1 (46522) minute by RE Stubbs, 22 Deoeaber 1908. 
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What were the aoting oonsul's reoommendatioas? 
99 
First, he 
warned that the Sultanate was deoaying through internal Dauses (baukruptoy, 
disaffection, territorial losses) and that if nothing was done by the 
United Kingdom to rescue the oowitry, this would be 
"only to postpone for a short time the final lose of Brunei independenoe 
and in the meantime to inorease the sufferings of the inhabitants of 
the State, while enoouraging the squandering of all its resouroes". 
Yet the United Kingdom, Mr MoArthar argued, had a olear obligation to 
aot deoisively, one way or another: 
"When it is remembered that these evils flourish under nominal British 
proteotion and that it is that proteotion alone whioh keeps Branei in 
existenoe as a separate State, it seems obligatory on BM Government to 
take some steps to ameliorate them, either by insisting on internal 
reform or by withdrawing all semblanoe of suzerainty, when Brunei would 
rapidly be absorbed, pieoemealp by its neighbours". 
One alternative was to trust to the personal influenoe of the 
oonsul on the spot, bat-this was "impraotioable" beoause he would have no 
means of enforoing his advioe and would, therefore, quiokly lose prestige. 
To transfer Brunei to North Borneo was equally unaooeptable beoause the 
Chartered Company was administratively-ineffioieat, ooimeroially-motivated 
and even worse than Brunei in taxation methods. The Company's Financial 
soundness was also in doubt. 
The British Government had long expeoted Brunei to fall to 
Sarawak and had framed its policies aooordingly; but this was "the only 
solution of the problem of which it may be said with certainty that it 
would not most with the approval of the rulers of Brunei". Mr MoArthurp, 
99. The following eeoti oo is based upon MoArthur, "Report"t paragraphs 
98-146. 
54 
indeed, was shocked by the antagonism towards Sarawak in Brunei (Town). 
Sir Charles Brooke was "generally disliked"p even among the Malays. The 
rulers opposed him beoause of his enoroaohments upon Brunei territory; 
the people feared him beoause his administration appeared to depend on 
Than military levies, of whom they had "a great terror". Mr McArthur 
invited attention to the faut that Sarawak was a personal despotism and 
that, although hitherto exeroised in auch a way as to win "universal 
admiration", there was "no guarantee" of its permanency. The Acting 
Consul agreed that if the Rajah ohose to impose his terms, the Brunei 
rulers had mo means to resists but the esistenoe of the 1888 Treaty 
Justified them "in olaiming sympathetio oonaideration of their views as 
to the future of their ooantry". 
It will be reoalled that the people of Belait and Tutong 
favoured the Sarawak settlement. But they formed only a minority of the 
total population; and Kr MoArthur suggested that they looked to Sarawak 
for relief only through ignoranoe of other Governments and that their 
interests oould be protected equally by offioial British oontrol. 
The Saltan and nobles - to whose opinions the British attaohed 
most weight - were not motivated solely by money, as had been supposed. 
Their principal objeotive gras the preservation of their anoient kingdom 
and dynasty. A British Residenoy, therefore, would be "less obnoxious" 
to them than the disappearance of Brunei and a lose of their identity 
as a mere part of Sarawak or North Borneo. The efficiency of a Residency 
Would be enhanoed (Hr XoArthur oontinued) if it was aseooiated with the 
reoovery either of Limbang or Labuan. Finally a loan would be neoessary 
55 
to set the administration on its feet (at least 50,000 plus interest 
would be required to buy out monopolists alone); but, antioipating good 
receipts from customs duties and poll tax, Mr McArthur concluded that 
"with a large and on the whole peaceably inolined population, a sub- 
stantial volume of trade, a fertile soil and natural and mineral 
resources hitherto hardly tapped, its future would ultimately be one 
of prosperity were present abuses abolished". 100 
Mr KoArthur"s "Report" was decisive in at least three was. 
Pirate bf revealing the depth of opposition to Sarawak in Brunei, it 
oonvinoed the British Goverment that it had beoome morally indefensible 
to transfer the Sultanate to the Rajah. Those in the Colonial Offios 
who had argued thus for some time101 were strengthened in their arguments; 
whilst the Foreign Offioe (formerly disposed strongly to the Rajah and 
most reluotant to install a Resident) finally oonoeded the point. 
Seooudly, the "Report" disolosed that Brunei was far more valuable than 
EM Government had supposed; 
102 
and by suggesting that, after an initial 
loan, the country might become eel! supportingp it removed the principal 
100. KoArthur, "Report"v paragraph 146. 
101. Particularly Mr CP Luoas, who had long regarded an extension of 
Sarawak territory as undesirable. In 1895 he desoribed the Rajah's offer 
to take over the whole of Brunei as "unjust and oppressive" (CO 144/70: 
19976). The Rajah, Mr Luoas minuted the following year, had "quite 
enough (territory) already" (CO 144/70,10680). Sir Charles was 
"oertainly a good ruler" of Borneans but Sarawak was "disappointing and 
unprogressive" (CO 144/73* 24234). Mr Lucas hoped for a larger British 
colony in British Borneo "for the benefit of the human beings concerned" 
(00 144/81: 45446); but there is no evidenoe that this idea oarried any 
weight in the Foreign Offioe when agreeing to appoint a Resident. 
102. CO 144/79 (1795) Sir F Swettenham to CP Luoasp 17 January 1905. 
There is no doubt that Brunei's aotual and potential value had been 
understated both by the Rajah (CO 144/70s 19976) and by Consul NP 
Trevenen (F0 12/97 p 160ff). 
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objeotion to a Residential System. 
103 
Finally, by highlighting the 
alleged mal-administration of Labuan by the BNBO, Mr MoArthur furnished 
Whitehall with a pretext for resuming oontrol of the island and amal- 
gamating its administration with that of Brunei. (When this proposal 
had been first mooted, in 1903, it was abandoned beoause of opposition 
from the BNBC. After the oompatW's mismanagement of Laboraa had been 
revealed, such resistance oould be disregarded by HK Government). 
104 
It may seem unsurprising that a Straits' offioer like Mr 
McArthur should have advised the extension of the Malayan model to 
Brunei, But this overlooks the faot that two previous oonsuls - Messrs 
Trevenen (1890-8) and Kayser (1898-1900) - also had Malayan baokgroands, 
Yet neither of them had reoommended a Residential System. Before 
reoeiviag hin "Report"v moreover, Mr MoArthurte immediate superiors-viz. 
Sir John Anderson (the High Commissioner) and the Foreign Offioe - had 
tended to prefer the Sarawak settlement. 
If the ornoial immediate oonoern behind the appointment of a 
Resident was a desire to inaugurate a more enlightened form: of_. admin- 
ietration and to ameliorate the lot of the Brunei people, there is no 
evidence to suggest that pressure from local business interests had the 
slightest effeot on the deoisi on. (The most important oapitalist in 
103. Henoe Sir Frank Swettenham - aoting as an adviser to the British 
Government in 1905 - now enthusiastioally endorsed a Residential System 
whereas formerly he had drawn baok beoause he oottld not see how the 
Country oomld be made self-supporting. (As events turned oat, i'lr MoArtbur 
was vastly over-optimiatios Brunei remained heavily indebted until the 
1930s. Cf. below, pp 166-7 and 179). 
104.70 12/128 p 408ffl, minute by )[r PH Villierat 3 June 1905. 
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Brunei, indeed, was Sir Charles Brooke himself. The other main European 
oonoern, the Island Trading Syndioate, also made representations to the 
Foreign Office on behalf of the Rajah. 
105 
In 1902, and again in 1906, 
Sir Charles received banking even from the BNBC). 
106 
Judging from 
subsequent events the oontrary was the oases if anythings there was the 
apeotaole of the inooming administration attempting, with soant suooessq 
to enooarage outside investors to risk oapital in the State so that 
Government revenue might be increased and a better standard of admin- 
istration provided. 
Daring 1905 negotiations prooeeded with the BNBC for the 
reoovery of Labuan, whioh reverted to Crown Colony status. In Deoember 
1905 sultan Hashim agreed (in a "Supplementary Agreement" of the 1888 
Treaty) to aooept a British Resident to run the administration of 
Branei. 107 Arrangements were made for the FMS to loan 200,000 to Bru- 
nei to redeem the mortgaged revenues; but "thereafter the administratioap 
whioh would be of a very simple character, should be self-supporting". 
108 
105. FO 12/127 pp 99-100; and of. P Blundellp The City of Marv Waters 
(London 1923) pp 203-4- 
106. PO 12/120 p 466 Martin to Biroh, 18 April 1902; and CO 144/81 
(27543) Sir C Jessel to F0v 20 July 1906. 
107. For further details, see bel owe Chapter 4v seotion 2. 
108. CO 144/79 (10323) Anderson to P0, No 3 (oonfidential)p 18 February 
1905, paragraph 10. 
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PART Its CONSOLIDATION 1906-1932 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE RECOVERY OF INTERNAL 80VERE EGNTT: BRUNEI AND SARAWAK 1906-1932 
19Introduoti on 
In this ohapter I shall examine how Brooke influence within 
Brunei was oontaiaed, and than eliminated, by the Residents. The 
inooming administratiou'i first priority was to regain for the Brunei 
Government full sovereignty within its own house. This led to confliot 
with Sarawak on politioal, territorial, finanoialp administrative and 
eoonomio grounds. 
1 
With one ezoeption. 9 the various disputes had been 
settled by 1932. Pranoi had failed, however, to recover Limbaag, whioh 
remains in Sarawak's possession, to this day, although olaimed as an 
integral part of Brunei as late a13.1970. Before examining these issues 
is greater detail it is neoessary to explain wby Sir Charles Brooke was 
80 antagonietio towards the new administration in Brunei. 
2. Rajah Sir Charles Brooke 0=0 (b 18291 r 1868-1917) 
The seoond Rajah was born in 1829 as Charles Johnsons his 
1. Brunei enjoyed far more cordial relations with the iBC. Whereas 
Brunei was almost surrounded by Sarawak it had no oommon frontier with 
North Borneo; whereas the Rajah sought to subvert the Residential arstem, 
the company did not; whereas the Rajah had various rights within the 
remnant of Brunei, the company had none; and whereas the Rajah tended to 
adopt a lofty moralistic) tons towards Brunei, the oompany was less Piously 
self-satisfied. Finally, Brunei appears not to have derived tribute from 
areas north of Brunei Bay (Brown, Struoture and Historyi p 77); hence the 
loss of this territory may have been less keenly felt by Brunei than those 
areas taken over by the Brookes. 
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father was a olergyman, his mother the sister of Sir James Brooke. 
After a grammar school ednoation and ten years in the Royal Navy 
("partioulariy useful as a preparatory sihool for adventurers seeking 
their fortunes in the world"), 
2 
Mr Johnson joined his unole in Sarawak 
(1852) and rapidly emerged as the real authority in the ooantry, at 
least insofar as the Ibans were oonoerned; it was fortunate, indeed, for 
the Infant State that he did sop because Iban levies played a decisive 
role in the suppression of the Chinese Rising in 1857. 
Assuming the surname Brooke on his aooession (1868), Sir 
Charles GGXG (as he became in 1888) remained an Than military leaderv 
who enjoyed ware leading upriver campaigns even in his 70x. 
3 
Although 
not quite 130 dieinterested4 and humanitarian as some have olaimed, he was 
oertainly an instinotive leader, a perspioaoious thinker, a oonsoientioas 
administrator, a disoiplinarian, and unsolioitons of offioial favour. 
In his deolining years (our prinoipal oonoern here) he beoame inoreasingly 
intolerant of the slightest opposition to his wishes, 
5 
and his own 
officers tended to be ryes'-men. 
6 
Sir Charles would not have dissented from the view that Brunei 
2, C Brooke, Ten Tears in Sarawak, Vol I (London 1866) p2 (my italios). 
3. R Nioholl, BXJ 1983. pp 236-7; and R Pringle, Rajahs and Rebelst p 178. 
4" Mention might be madep for example, of Chesterton House (Cirenoester), 
a Villa in Italy, a separate establishment for the Ranee, a palace in 
Kuohing, a publio sohool/Oxbridge ednoatioa for his heir (plus marriage 
into the aristooraoy), all this paid for by the people of Sarawak. How 
many other more sons of vioars oould boast likewise? 
5" CNtCrisswell, Rajah Charles Brooke (Kuala Lumpur 1978), p 220. 
6. Ranee I Brooke, Good Morning and Good Night (London 1934), p 41. 
Her verdiot is oonfirmed by a reading of S Baring-Gould and CA Bampfylde, 
A History of Sarawak under its two White Rajahs 1839-1908 (London 1909) 
and A33 Hard., Rajah's Servant (Cornell 1966), a title revealing in itself. 
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was "a blot on oivilization and a oanker in the heart of Sarawak".? 
The Sultanate, indeed, was "an abiding nuiaanoe, an anaohroniem to be 
eliminated if possible". 
$ 
Brunei monarohs oooapied a prominent position 
in Brooke demonology. In pro-Residential Brunei the Rajah saw nothing 
but unrest and friotion; Sarawak traders there were unsafe; and oppressed 
Brunei sabjeots ooatinuall7 appealed to him for proteotioa. In opposition 
to the ohaos existing in Brunei's (happilT shrinking) dominions, he 
oontrasted the peaoep stability, exoeptionall7 low taxation and moderate 
prosperitf in his cram Raj. 
9 The seo(nd Rajah (Dr Crisswell oomments) 
"did not share any lingering hopes that James Brooke may still have had 
of regenerating Brunei; to him it seamed logioal an& desirable that 
E=nei's remaining territory should ultimately pass under Brooke rule". 
10 
He Was most bitter about the British Governmeat'e deoieioe to install a 
Resident, therefore, because it blocked his läanifeet Deetinyll -and thwarted 
the oherished hope of his lifetime. 
12 
For many years before 1906 he had 
understood that, when the plum was ripe, it would fall into his lap; and 
he regarded the new departure, not only an unfortunate for the people of 
Brunei, but also as a British breaoh of faith towards himself. 
Sir Charles disapproved of offioial British imperialism on 
7. ` Wards . oit. pp 20. 8. Pringle, op. oit., p 126. 
9. Whilst it is true that 'unreformed' elements staged an obstinate 
rearguard aotion, peaoe reigned in most of Sarawak; and even Than robels 
were patronized as troublesome ohildren rather than feared as dangerous 
threats to the State. 
10. Crissweilp . 'oit., p 
80. 
11. LR Wright, The Origins of British Borneo (Hong Kong 1970), p 180. 
See, alsol Baring-Gould and Bampfjlde, off., p 363. 
12. Ward . oit., p 102 
("His dream... was shattered"). 
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ideological grounds, regarding his own methods of rule as infinitely 
superior; and he thought it would have been advantageous to the people 
of NW Borneo to be under one administration (bis okras naturally). Even 
after the establishment of the new order in Brunei (1906), Sir Charles 
olung obstinately to his gains within that oountry. The explanation 
is thatp if he regarded Brunei Malays as unregenerate and unable to 
show "one foot of oontentment"v he had soaroely more respeot for British 
officials sent from Malaya to administer the Sultanates they were 
inexperienoed, ignorant of Hornaas, woald introduoe a complicated 
system instead of one whioh was simple and just, and fail to rule in 
the people*s interests the result ooald be only bloodshed and disaster. 
British colonialism, moreover, would involve the imposition of alien 
legal and eduoational systems; and, worse stilly it would be aooompanied 
by large-scale capitalist enterprise which was sure to lead to the indig- 
enons population being swindled oat of their land and other possessions. 
The Rajah's own philosophy - "respeot for local custom and a gradual, 
seleotive approaoh to ohange" ors in his own words, "letting system and 
legislation wait upon oooasion"13 - was far better adapted to the needs 
of Borneo. The "honester part" of the Brunei people oontinued to look 
to Sarawak for proteotionp and Sir Charles felt obliged to support them. 
Furthermore, he and his predeoessor hade for over fifty pears, been the 
"sole workers towards oivilization"14 in north-west Borneo; and it was 
On17 just and proper that the British Government should enable him to 
13. Pringleop. cit., p 137- 
14. CO 144/81 (3460) Rajah to F09 23 February 1906. 
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round off his life's work by permitting him to absorb the rump of Brunei 
and. devote his final years to the establishment of peaoe, order and 
jastioe there. 15 The Rajah resented the impataticut implicit in the 
deoisioa to appoint a Resident, that his own rule was unsuitable for 
Brunei. Sir Charles, moreoverf was an absolute ruler wsaooustomed to 
oontradiotion; and as his aoticns beoame inoreasing1 questioned, he 
foaad the experienoe din-tasteful. Formerly the spotlight bad been con- 
oentrated on misrule in Brunei; after 1900 it shifted towards Sarawaky 
forcing the Rajah from an offensive into a defensive role. Finally, a 
epeoulätions given that the Rajah's favourite pastime was hunting, it 
 ay not be famoiful to suggest that, in the oaee of Bruaeiv he had been 
thwarted of a potential 'kill'. The prej having esoaped, "life in 
hinbang became rather a tame existence" (sir Ward oommented). 
16 
From 1906 the British Goverment, for its part, had to faoe the 
oonseagnenoes of its earlier failure adequately to protoot Brunei from 
enoroaohments br its neighbours, partionlarly after the signing Of the 
1888 Treaty. Polioy bad been based on the assnoptioa that Brunei would 
be absorbed by Sarawak. Whitehall had been gailt7 of critical geograph- 
ioal mieappreheasioaes it was not realised, for example, that the cession 
of Trusan district, instead of merely advancing the Sarawak frontier 
towards Brunei would in fact establish the Brooke State on the far side 
of the Sultanate (thereby placing Brunei "practically in the grip of 
Sarawak") nor that the annexation of Lisbang had oaueed a "eeveranoe" of 
15. For example,, FO 3.2/105 P 409 Rajah to F0.9 14 ldaroh 1899. 
16. Ward, o. oit., p 103" 
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Brunei territory, 
17 
It was agree& that the Rajah's annexation of Limbang 
was high-handed; but sine all Brunei (except Lanas) was earmarked for 
Sarawak, it did not seen to matter that the Rajah had antioipated the 
polioy of HM Government. When Whitehall ohanged ooaree in 1905, 
deoiding to ineta]Il a Resident, these earlier decisions oame to be 
regretted, beoauee they bad rednoed the viability of Brunei. 
Although the Rajah's renewed regnesto for a transfer of Brunei 
to Sarawak were dismissed by London in 1906 and 1907, be was reluo-taut 
to abandon hope that his wish might be granted; and if the Imperial 
Goverment would not allow him to have Brunet, he was in a strong 
position to inoonveaienoe its administration bT acyone else. The general 
aura attaohing to him as the most powerftl looal potentate, added to his 
Possession of various points along the River Brunei, made himialmost a 
State within the State. In order to heighten pressure on the British 
Government to grant his wish, the Rajah oampaigned to demonstrate that 
the Residential System was unpopatlar. 
Politioal Challenge 1906-7 
. 
3. The 
The Rajah's oampaign involved making oomplainte to the Colonial 
Offioe, attaoking British polioy in the Sarawak Gazette, getting questioats 
asked Lin the House of Commons, stirring up trouble in Brunei, and 
attempting to obtain signatures to petitions. But he woes only desultory 
aapport within the Sultanate. 
17. CO 144/60 (19461) FO to CO, 4 November 1885, paragraph 21 and 
miaute by Sir R Herbert, 12 November 1885. 
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Sir Charles was staying at his Cirencester mansion when word 
arrived that a new UK-Brunei Treaty had been signed,. He ocmplained to 
the Foreign Offioe that this development was unjust to him, adding that 
a Resident "ooald not really advanoe the plaoe and people, except perhaps 
in the more faut of keeping the Sultan from oanmitting, ag7 untoward or 
oppressive aots". 
18 One Whitehall clerk riposted that the decision of 
HI[ Government did not require the approval of Sir Charles Brooke. It 
was "essential", moreover, that the Rajah should not be given any 
grounds for supposing that the new order was likely to be reversed; he 
might try stirring up trouble in an attempt to show that the Resident was 
Unpopalar. 
19 
The Rajah's plea, therefore, was rejeoted and London 
looked "with oonfidenoe" to the oo-operation of the Sarawak Government 
in making the new system benefioial alike for Brunei and for the adjoin- 
in« British Yroteotorates. 
20 
This was a forlorn hopes the Rajah's 
disappointment was too bitter for him easily to aoquiesoe in the new 
situation. He blamed Xr Modrthar personallj for bis failure to 
incorporate Brunei Mithin Sarawak; and the High Commissioner feared that 
Sir Charles was a "vindictive old man" who desired to see the first 
Resident oome to grief in Bxnu"is 
"He (the Rajah) never has been a scrupulous person, and, surrounded as 
Brunei is by Sarawak territory (sio), there oan be no doubt if be gives 
the kink., we shall have trouble. 21 
Stir Charles, for his part, was "well aware that the Resident of Labnaa 
18.00 144/81 (3460) Rajah to F0p 23 Ja. 1906. 
19. Ibid., minute by RE Stubbs (1876-1947), 31 January 1906. 
20. CO 144/81 (3460 and 4722) PO to Rajah, 9 February 1906. 
21. CO 144/81 (16405) Anderson to Mr 0V Fiddes (1858-1936), private, 7 
May 1906. 
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is unfriendly to Sarawak and will not fail to find as muoh fault as he 
22 
can". 
One war of inoreaee pressure on the British Government was via 
Parliament. Sir Edward Sassoon, 
23 
the Rajah's spokesman in the House of 
Commons - who thought that Brunei was a State in the Malay Peninsula - 
tabled several sets of questions in the period 1906-89 often on the most 
frivoloas grounds. In April 1906, for example, a notioe had appeared in 
The Times under the headline "Inoident in Brunei". Sir Edward having 
demanded further information, it transpired that the episode had been 
trivial ands if anything, "proved the goodwill of the pengirans", a number 
of whom had oome to the Resident's aesistanoe. Sultan Hashim, moreover, 
oansed it to be notified publioly that he was ashamed that his aubjeots 
should have shown saoh disrespect to a representative of iii Government. 
24 
The death of the aged Sultan Haehim on 10 Jahr 1906 - before 
the now order had been consolidate& - offered the Rajah a more substantial 
OPPortunity. About one month before his demise, Sultan Haehim nominated 
22, CO 531/1 (1446) Rajah to CP Luoas, (o10) Jannarr 1907. 
23. Sir Edward Bassoon (1856-1912), Bart. (or. 1890, to which he succeeded 
in 1896). Liberal Unionist MP for l ythe, 1899-1912. (Courtesy of 
Gillian Howarth, House of Commons: letter to the author, 15 March 1984)" 
24. CO 144/80 (29740) McArthur to Anderson, No 148,27 June 1906. Mr 
McArthur complained of "certain persons outside Brunei disappointed at 
the recent course of events there, and only too anxious to misrepresent 
all that ooours". A Malay had been summoned to answer charges of attempt- 
ing to evade customs duties. The headman of his ward, whose mortgages on 
State revenues had been compulsorily redeemed by the new administration, 
instigated other inhabitants to intimidate the Government. A crowd 
which had gathered outside the Residency quickly dispersed after Mr 
McArthur threatened to ordbr the one policeman to open fire. The head- 
mang his part, was subsequently fined $500 bar the State Council, 
which had taken up the matter of its own accord. 
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his eldest legitimate son (Pengiran Muda Muhammad Jemalul Alam) to be 
his sucoessor, the two surviving wazirs to aot as Regents during his 
minority; and willed that the suocession "shall desoend in future in his 
line", 25 thereby definitely establishing the prinoiple of primogeniture 
if it had not been achieved already by the 1905-6 Treaty* 
26 
His Highness 
seemed "very relieved" by assurances that the United Kingdom intended to 
uphold his dynasty after his death; but the astouishmeut of the Pen ran 
Bendahara27 on finding that he was not to be sole Regent mag have had 
"the effeot of making him more willing to intrigue with others"9 partio- 
ularly since, as an adopted son of Sultan Abdul Mumm (r1852-85)p he had 
pretensions to the throne itseif. 
28 
This disgruntlement dovetailed 
neatly with the plans of the Rajah. 
Shortly after returning to Borneo, Sir Charles visited Brooke- 
ton, where he was greeted by a large flotilla of boats. Among his 
visitors were the Pengiran Bendahara and the Jawatan Abu Bakar. Although 
Sir Charles well knew that properly Brooketon (Mixara Damit) belonged to 
Brunei, 29 he informed another pengiran that it was to be regarded as part 
of Sarawak. Mr Deshon, the Rajah's aide, informed the Resident that Sir 
Charles considered that the Pen ran Bendahara should have been designated 
25" CO 144/80 (26871) 'Will' of Sultan Hashim, 20 Safar 1324 AH (14 
April 1906). 
26. See below, Chapter 4 (seotion 2) and Appendix 1.1 (pp 558-60). 
27. See above, p 52. 
28. CO 144/80 (26871) McArthur to Seoretary to High Commissioner, 
No 133,18 June 1906, paragraph 5. See also MoArthur, "Report-119 
Paragraph 69. 
29. (Rhodes House, Oxford) Mss Pao sl03s Rev Fr AF Owen CZy DA Owen 
1880-19521 A Memoir (1982), p 125. 
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as suooessor to the throne. Mr MoArthur replied that the Pengiran Muda 
had been nominated by Sultan Hashim and the choioe had won unanimous 
approval from the State Counoil, at whose decision the headmen evinoed 
"great pleasure". But on what basis did ? 4r Deshon suppose that a foreign 
potentate (the Rajah) was entitled to interfere with whom a Sultan of 
Brunei might or might not appoint to be his own suooessor? 
The Coloesial, Offioe, aware that an intrigue was in progress, 
was anxious to see Sir Charles leave Brunei, but refrained from actually 
ordering him to do so. Whilst there, he obtained a series of documents 
whioh he intended to use in an attempt to demonstrate that the Resident- 
ial System was unpopular. The Rajah's visit had an unsettling effeot 
within the Sultanate, beoause rumours of his intentions reaohed the 
Kedayaus who, in oonsequeuoe, withheld payment of poll tax until the 
oatoome should have beoome olear. 
The leading wazir, the Pengiran Bendahara, had several oomplaints 
to make against the Resident. After Sultan Hashim's death, for example, 
he and other nobles visited the Rajah, apparently in great distrese, 
olaiming that no money was available for the funeral. The Rajah made a 
gift of $500 to the wazir and then used the inoident in an attempt to 
disoredit the Resident. In faotp Mr MoRrthurg who was inoapaoitated 
himself at the time, had instruoted Dato Roberts to pay X500 immediately, 
with a further $500 to be held in reserve for any additional expenses. 
Renne there had been no used to seek monetary assistance from the Rajah. 
The wazir, attempted to oonoeal the Rajah's gift from the young Sultan; 
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but one of his own letters confirms that he was indeed the recipient. 
30 
Sir Charles Brookes prooeedings, therefore, were suspioious 
and unhelpful to the Resident. First, did he seriously believe that no 
provision had been made for the obsequies? Seoondlyp even if he did, 
why did he make no attempt to check the truth of the story with the 
Resident?; and why, having made the gift, did he and his offioers refuse 
to disolose to whom the money had been paid? Given the Rajah's opinion 
that Brunei nobles were "an aooomplished set of flatterers and liars", 
31 
his apparent gullibility on this oooasion is remarkable. 
The Pengi. ran Bendahara' s oomplaiat s were forwarded to HM Govern- 
went by the Rajah through the agency of Sir Edward Sassoon. For some 
grievances he had himself alone to blame (for example, "from the first 
we had kept this matter - the Rajah's payment - secret from the Sultan. 
We were shamed to have to acknowledge receipt of this money... (and) it 
has given occasion to Mr McArthur to find fault again"); whilst others 
were untruths (that no provision had been made for the obsequies). Mr 
McArthur admitted, however, that one charge - that the Resident never 
consulted the wazir - was partly true, but only because of the latter's 
"extraordinarily selfish views". 
32 
A covering commentary by Mr Bampfylde33 mostly repeated the 
30. CO 144/80 (40678) MoArthur to Secretary to High Commissioner, Brunei 
No 228 (confidential), 25 August 1906, paragraph 2 (vi); and CO 144/81 
(27240) Pengiran Bendahara to Mr OF Biokette, 22 May 1906. 
31. F0 12/127 pp 153-4, Rajah to F0,20 May 1904. 
32. CO 144/80 (35280) MoArthur to Seoretarg to High Commissioner, 
Confidential, 14 June 1904, paragraph 7- 
33. CO 144/81 (27240) memorandum by CA Bampfylde, 22 July 1906. 
(CA 
Bampfylde, 1856-1918. SCS 1875-1903 (BNBC 1882-4). 1888-96: Resident, 
Third Division. 1896-1903: Resident, First Division. 1903-12= Rajah's 
'Politioal Agent" in Ehgland. 1912-181 Member SSAC). 
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libels of the Pengiran Bendahara. He added that the actions of the Res- 
ident after the Rajah's gift had been made constituted "an unprecedented 
pieoe of bullying" and a "studied and wholly gratuitous insult to the 
Rajah emphasized by the uncalled-for despatch of a man-of-war". Mr Bamp- 
fylde coaoluded that Mr MoArthur, jealous of the Rajah, had seized upon 
the inoident "to impress upon the Bruneis his superior authority and to 
endeavour to weaken the Rajah's influenoe", a remarkable allegation 
given that the Sultan was treaty-bound to aooept the Resident's advioe 
whereas the Rajah was a foreign potentate. If the principle espoused by 
Mr Bampfylde (that the Rajah was entitled to exercise an influence rival 
to that of the Resident had been oonoeded, the latter's position would 
have been rendered utterly untenable. Furthermore, Mr Bampfylde had let 
slip the real reason for the Rajah's gift, viz., an attempt to maintain 
an influence with Brunei nobles at the expense of the Resident. 
34 
Con- 
oerning the "unoalled-for despatoh of a man-of-war"q Mr MoArthur related35 
that after Sultan Hashim's death, with himself indisposed, he had tele- 
graphed to Singapore that someone should take his place in Brunei during 
such a critical time. Mr McClelland of the FMS Service (newly-appointed 
Assistant Resident) was sent in EMS Thistle because there was no other 
ship available to take him from Singapore. The Resident thought it 
"an excellent opportunity to counterbalance the impression caused in 
Brunei by the visit of the Zahora (the Rajah's yaoht)p and therefore 
asked the commander of the Thistle to take Mr McClelland across to 
Brunei "t. (35) 
34. Ibid., minute by Stubbs, 25 July 1906. 
35. CO 144/80 (40678)-MoArthur to 'Secretary to High Commissioner', 
No 228 (Brunei), 24 September 1906, paragraph 2 (v). 
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The Zak, he reminded Singapore, was armed and was run on regular man- 
of-war lines; and it was advisable that the people of Brunei "should see 
that other (; over=eats have such ships". Furthermore a visit to Brunei 
was a "graceful act" towards the young Sultan on the occasion of his 
aooession. In short, EMS Thistle had not been despatched to bully the 
State Counoil into revealing to whom the Rajah's gift had been made, as 
alleged by Mr Bampfylde and the wazir. 
Sir Edward Bassoon presented two further doouments to the 
Foreign Offioe. The first dooument - the minutes of a meeting held in 
the Pengiran Bendahara's la au - contained an allegation that the 1905-6 
treaty had been imposed by force (see below, pp 111-2). The dozen 
Qengirans who were present added that their on1yr wish was "to ask the 
Rajah of Sarawak's help so that we may obtain tranquility". 
36 
The second document was a petition dated 11 May 1906, presented 
to the Rajah by oertain inhabitants of Brunei who did "not at all approve 
of being governed by the Resident" under whose rule nothing but trouble 
was experienoed. In Sarawak, by oontrast, people were prosperous and 
oontented, oommoditie8 were cheap, and trouble was not brought down upon 
the r at. In view of this "the people of Brunei" wished to be planed 
under Brooke administration. 
37 
It is clear that this petition, to which 
only 30 people gave their naamep hardly represented the views of the 
10,000 inhabitants of Kampong Aver; and, apart from four headmen in the 
36. CO 144/81 (27240) Translation of a memorandum by Haji Muhammad Ali, 
the Datu Hakim (Chief Malay Judge) of Sarawak. 
37. Ibidp petition dated 16. Rabiulawal 1324AH (11 May 1906). With 
regard to the prioe of oommodities, see above (pp 32-3 and 52) and 
below (pp 160-4). 
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oapitaly it was not signed by any of the known leaders of Brunei sooiety, 
Further,, as Sir Frederick Weld oommented in 1887, it is hardly in human 
nature "willingly" to aooept the extinotion of one's oountry. 
38 
The 
people of Brunei, moreoverv were "intensely patriotio and... very proud 
of their city"; 
39 
and, aooording to Mr Chevallierv writing in 1911, had 
"a greater pride of raoe and ooantry than any Malay I have come aoross 
so far", 
40 
If sol they can hardly have wished to see their country 
disappear within another. Confirmation of this is provided even by a 
Sarawak eoaroes when the Rajah visited Brooketon in 1913 
"Very few visits or messages were reoeived from the Brunei oapitalp where 
all at one time before the oooupation of the British Government used to 
be so friendly whenever a Sarawak flag or man appeared in their river". 41 
Par from discrediting the Resident, as Sir Charles had hoped, 
the Colonial Offioe oomplimented Mr MoArthar on his handling of a most 
delicate situation; and Sir Edward Bassoon was advised'that Whitehall 
had "no reason to suppose" that an administration "under the direot oon- 
trol of the Imperial Government as exeroised through the High Commissioner 
is likely to oontrast unfavourably with the administration of the 
adjoining State$". 
42 
If Brunei had been transferred to Sarawak, moreover, 
it is most unlikely that the Pengiran Bendahara Would have enjoyed 
"tranquility", For, when Mr McArthur came home on leave in 1907, the 
38. CO 144/64 (16254) Weld to CO, 20 June 1887, paragraph 8; also in 
PO 12/75 p 274ff. 
39. P Blundell (pen-name), The City of Mans Waters,, p 68. Mr Butter- 
worth's testimony is the more significant because he was known to 
favour the Rajah (op. cit., p 218). 
40. CO 824/1 H Chevallier, Brunei Annual Report 1911, p 11. 
41. CO 604/4 Sarawak Gazette, 1 July 1913, p 140. 
42. CO 144/81 (27240) CO to P09 27 July 1906. 
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Rajah took the opportunity to renew his request for permission to annex 
the remainder of Braneis his "only oonditions" were that a "thorough 
transfer" should be made in oonsideration of monthly allowances (paid by 
the Rajah) to the Sultan and his ohiefe and that the latter should have 
"no power or authority over the people other than I should deem fit and 
proper to invest them with". 
43 
This suggests that the wazir would have 
retained very few prerogatives or finanoial soaroes under a Brooke regime. 
Sir Charles was rebuffed by HM Government, whioh deolared that it oould 
not "reoonsider the matter or hold out hope that the polioy will be 
revised and the State of Brunei inoorporated with Sarawak". 
4 
If the Rajah had soant respect for the British Resident in 
Brunei, he adopted a similarly oavalier attitude towards the law of the 
aaantry and appeared to believe that there was no requirement on his part 
to oomply with its provisions. This may be illustrated by two examples: 
(i) the Kota Batu lands; and (ii) mining oonoessions. 
In the first oase, the Rajah failed to register hin title to 
a 39500 aores estate at Kota Batu (itself aoquired in an extremely 
dubiotts fashion in 1903) as required by the Brunei land legislation of 
1907 and 1909. In view of this failureq later British Residents were 
unaware that he olaimed this land; and, by 1912,143 acres had been 
alienated by the Brunei Government to indigenous smallholders. When the 
Rajah protested about the alienation of this small part of his estate, 
the Qolonial Offioe retorted that had he registered his title an required 
43. CO 531/1 (34640) Rajah to C0, n. d. (o29) September 1907- 
44. Ibid., CO to Rajah, 7 Ootober 1907. 
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by the law "there oould have been no misapprehension and, in default of 
its the whole of the lands were liable to forfeiture". In the oiroum- 
stanoes, the Brunei Government had done 
"all that could be expeoted in offering to oompenaate him for the small 
amount of land whidh has now been alienated to others, and in being 
prepared to register his title to the rest of the land without using 
the power of resumption under the law". 45 
This sharp reply, "quite staggered" Sir Charlee who demanded 
to know against whom he ooald take "law measures" and obtain "heavy 
damages" if the land was not "wholly restored". 
46 
Two observations 
might be made. First, note how the Rajah totally disregarded his own 
negleot to oomply with the law of Brunei; andp seoondly, how the Colonial 
Office failed to uphold the came law. The Rajah, having failed to 
register his 3,500 aores' estate within the time limits speoified by the 
Land Codes, should have forfeited it; yet the Colonial Offioe permitted 
hin to retain the entire estate, apart from the small area whioh had 
been inadvertently alienated to smallholders. 
47 
Another illustration of the Rajah's oontempt for the law of 
Brunei was provided when he olaimed exolunive rights to all minerals 
(other than ooal, the monopoly of whioh he held separately) in Brunei. 
The Brunei Mining Pkiaotment of 1908 required that a lessee should not 
fail, for a period of twelve ooneeoative moathap t o. oarry out prospeot- 
ing or mining operations. Yet in 1914 Sir Charles - who had done no 
45. CO 531/7 (6241) NCO to Sarawak State Advisory Coauoil (SSAC), 25 
February 1914. 
46. (RHO) Mee Pao. s83 (5), Rajah to Seoretary, SSAC, 8 Maroh 1913 
(siop 
1914) and 10 Maroh 1914 (Rajah's emphasis). 
47. In late 1917 Rajah Vyner Brooke, the third Rajah, abandoned the 
Kota Batu estate, aooepting instead 600 aoree on Berembang Island. 
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such work whatsoever - advauoed a wholly spurious olaim to exolusive 
mineral rights in Brunei (see below, pp 94-6 and 255)- 
After September 1907 Sir Charles made no further attempt to 
persuade the British Government to abandon the Residential System and to 
permit him to inoorporate Brunei within Sarawak. He was unacquainted 
with the new men in the Colonial Offioe who were, in arty oases<unfavour- 
ably disposed towards him* 
48 
Nr Bampfylde's History (published in 1909) 
oontains a length attaok on the British Government's polioy in Brunei; 
49 
but the Rajah made no attempt to exploit the UK-Brunei tension in 1909- 
109 arising out of the new land legislation (see chapter 4). Just asp 
however, the Colonial Offioe had deferred to the advanoed age of Sultan 
Hashim in the 1890sß so now they were equally unwilling to upset the aged 
Rajah. OP Luoas set the tone of the oonoiliatory polioy thus: 
"I. :: think that it is both right and expedient toAeal as gently as we 
can with this old ruler who is bitterly disappointed at not having been 
allowed to absorb the rest of Brunei, who has been given a reoognized 
position by the King and the Government,. and who, dating baok to more or 
less barbario times, hasp on the whole, done good work as a despot... 
Sir Charles Brooke should be treated with all ooartesy and indalgenoeg, 
hoping and believing that, after his time... Sarawak will beoome a 
possession of the Crown". 50 
The British Government, therefore, was unwilling to tackle the 
Rajah on behalf of Brunei. This had unfortunate oonsequenoes for the 
48. The Rajah himself oommented: "I regret much the course taken brr the 
British Government in and around Brunei; however, it is little use making 
complaints" (CO 144/81s 16405 -Rajah to Anderson, 12, April 1906). 
49. Baring-Gould and Bampfylde, o . cit., pp 362-72. Conversely, both 
the Rajah and Mr Bampfylde were not reluctant to quote the approval of 
the Colonial Office when the decision went in Sarawak!. s favors e. g. after 
the annexation of Limbang in 1890 (CO 531/4= 20919 - Rajah to Sir A Young, 25 May 1912). 
50. CO 531/1 (20552) minute by Luoasp 12 June 1907. 
76 
Sultanates the claim for the recovery of Limbang was shelved; the Rajah 
lived longer than expeoted (until 1917); and, oontrary to expeotationsy 
his suooessor proved no more amenable to the Colonial Offioe. The main 
issues Were territorial (Limbaug), finanoial-administrative (JKuara Damit) 
and sooaomio. At root, however, these disputes were also politioals the 
reformed administration in Brunei feared the politioal use to whioh the 
Rajah would put his alleged and-actual rights. Once the point had been 
established that liaara Damit, Kota Batu and Berembang were not to be 
treated as Sarawak territoryt their possession by the Rajah beoame 
irritants rather than threats to the now order in Brunei. 
4" Limbang 
The Lirabang remained the most important inane between Brunei 
and Sarawak after 1906, The district' a importance was summarised thee: 
"The territory is so geographically interwoven with Brunei Proper that 
its lose has not only crippled the resources of the Government, but 
also the trade and even the movements of the people, so that the actual 
area lost to the State is by no means the only factor by which the 
extent of the damage is to be assessed". 51 
The nominal River Brunei had no nln and was abut in almost throughout 
its length by low but steep hills, the soils of which were poor. In 
these oiroumetanoes, the people of the capital had relied on Limbang to 
obtain their subeistenoe. Food, as well as materials for olothing, housing 
and fishing were all derived therefrom. The imposition by Sarawak after 
1890 of export duties on these items oreated great hardship for the people 
51. CO 273/310 (33426) Belfield to Anderson, 5 June 1905, paragraph 28. 
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of Brunei Torn. In addition, the sago faotories in the oapital had all 
been foroed out of business. Sultan Hashim's pride had been sorely hurt 
"by the manner of (Limbang's) seizure and the disregard shown (by London) 
to his protests". 
52 Limbang should be returned, His Highness pleaded, 
because he was disgraced in the e7e84nf bis own people because of its 
loss and so that "the oit7 of Brunei may, not be oppressed by Rajah Brooke 
and the cottntr7 of Brunei and our Government not be destroyed by... 
Sarawak". 
53 
Iär MoArthnr olaimed that the strength of the Brunei monaroh's 
feelings on the subjeot were shown "by his refusal to aooept a Dent of 
the money for the distriot". Bat this ignores the faot that Sultan 
Hashim had enjoyed few rights in Limbang distriot and stood to gain 
oomparativelyy little from oompensation for its oession; and the offer 
of indemnifioation had long sinoe (1895) been withdrawn in any aase. 
In January 1905 Sir Frank Swettenham suggested that it woald be 
"a great advantage to Brunei and greatly facilitate negotiations with 
the Sultan, if Limbang could be restored to Brunei, paying the Rajah 
of Sarawak whatever (if anything) he can fairly claim". 54 
The Seoretary of State direoted that the restoration of the distriot 
ought to be borne in mind during negotiations for the 1905-6 Treaty; 
55 
but the envoys specifically refused to discuss the issue when it was 
raised by Sultan Hasbim. It may have been ooneidered that the point was 
52. TO 12/126 p 158, I[oArthur to Anderson, No 22/04,15 July 1904, 
Paragraph 4- 
53. Composite taken from To 12/83 p 1039 Sultan Hashim to Queen Viotoria, 
tel., 18 Deoember 1890; and CO 144/69 (4396) likewise, early 1893. 
54. CO 144/79 (1795) Sir P Swettenham to CP Luoae, 17 January 1905- 
55. CO 144/79 (10323) minute by Mr A Lyttelton (1857-1913), 28 April 
1905. 
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met sufficiently by taking baok Labnan from the Chartered Company, thereby 
affording the neoessar7 means of oommunioation with the outdistriots. 
(This might have been suffioient from a British point of view; but it did 
not meet Branei"s oase, beoause Labuan was not part of the 3ultanate). 
56 
Daring Mr OF Rioketts' term (1890-1909) as the Sarawak 
Government's Resident in Limbang, the distriot progressed steadily. A 
Government station 
"was established some fifteen miles from the river's mouth, and settlers, 
both Malay and Chinese, soon arrived and took up their quarters there; 
indeed, a good many quitted Brunei and applied for sites upon whioh to 
build shops and houses direotly the (Sarawak) flag was raised". 57 
By 1909 Pengkalan Tarap (Limbang Village) had become "a flourishing little 
plaoe..., the prettiest outstation in Sarawak" and "being another refuge 
for the oppressedp the Malay population is continually iuoreasing". 
(57) 
Mr MoArthur, was also impressed by the village, whioh gave "an impression 
of neatness, oleanliness and prosperity all the more striking by the 
oomparison with the squalor and filth of the town of Brunei". 
58 Distriot 
revenue from Limbang amounted to j11,665 in 1905 and $13,342 in 1915 
(ezolu&tng customs duties); and the value of trade rose from 106#687 to 
$282,277 during the years 1901 to 1906 alone. This gives an indication 
of the potential importance of the loss of the distriots compare the 
figures for Limbang with Brunei's total revenue of $51,777 in 1907, 
estimated total trade of %612,000 in 1904, and aotual trade of %777,711 
in 1915 (the first year for which national figures are available). 
56. Labuan reverted to Crown Colony status - see above, p 57- 
57. Baring-Gould and Bampfylde, o . oit., pp 355-6. 
58. F0 12A26 p 78, KoArthur to Anderson, No 15,2 June 1904, pare' 11. 
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In a despatch dated 13 Febraary 1906,59 Mr MoArthur reviewed 
the Limbang problem and argued that some arrangement would be neoessary 
if anything was to be made of Brunei in the future. Realizing that 
the resumption of the entire distriot was out of the question ("this 
reversal of roles, with the Rajah instead of the powerless Sultan of 
Brunei as victim, would no doubt rouse too great an outcry")y Mr McArthur 
urged that a border re-organization was a matter of vital importanoe for 
Brunei. It had been assumed that 'The Limbang' was a district with 
well-defined boundaries. This was not so, The Sultan, refusing to 
reoognize Brooke administration in Limbang, had not entered into any 
disoussion oonoerning borders, whilst the Sarawak authorities had grad- 
wally absorbed all they ooald on each side of the river, including the 
bill whioh dominated Brunei Town. It had beoome essential, therefore, to 
define the boundaries as quickly as possible in order to settle ownership 
of "all the land in the neighbourhood of Brunei Towns including the large 
and important island of Berembang and the oil-bearing distriot of Kele- 
masih to say nothing of the at present less important ulu", Seoondlyj, 
Limbang had alreacjy proved "a fruitful souroe of disagreement" with the 
Rajah. A settlement of the upper part of the river was less urgent, but 
Brunei control of ulu Limbang would afford a means of oommanicaticn with 
Belait and Tatong. It would also ensure a "more effeotual oontrol" over 
the export of jungle produce from Brunei territory whioh was being sent 
from ulu Tatong and exported via Limbang without duty being paid to the 
Brunei Government. The Sarawak authorities declined to take any action; 
59. CO 144/80 (10206) MoArtbar to Anderson, 13 February 1906. 
80 
and the establishment of a systems of customs within existing Brunei 
lands would have been very difficult, so Mr McArthur proposed that 
Brunei's interests would best be served by obtaining control of one 
bank of the river viz. Limbang) down which the goods were carried. 
The Sarawak authorities claimed the right to occupy the entire 
Limbang watershed. it since Brunei Town itself feil within this area, 
the Rajah had taken as much as he could with impunity. Mr McArthur urged 
that the watershed argument was an impossible basis for settling the 
boundary. Since what had been meant by 'The Limbang' had never been 
defined, he suggested that the river itself should be made the boundary 
between (West) Brunei and Sarawak administration from its mouth to the 
Madalam confluence. Since Pengkalan Tarap, where the Brooke district 
office was situatedg was on the right bank, the Sarawak buildings would 
not be disturbed, and the pads planters on the left bank would simply be 
required to pay their taxes to Brunei instead of to Sarawak. The River 
Lirabang might also serve as the frontier above the Madalam confluence, 
but this was of lesser importance. Some aotionp however, was essential 
since Limbang was indeed the "Life of Brunei" (at that time). 
Mr Stubbs had sympath7 with Mr McArthur's oasep believing the 
seizure of Limbang by Sarawak to have been "an outrage, in which EX 
Government would never have acquiesced if their representatives had 
kept them properly informed". The fact remained that gM Government 
had acquiesced and "to take back the territory now without oompen- 
cation would be an injustice to Sarawak"* 
60 
Mr Lucas, the Under- 
60. Ibid., minnte by Stubbs, 30 Maroh 1906. 
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Seoretary, thought that the matter oould be disoussed with Sir John 
Anderson when he came home on leave 
"but I would not do anything at present. There must be some suoh 
adjustment as is proposed but I think that it would be impolitio to 
attempt it directly we have taken over Brunei and while the Rajah of 
Sarawak is specially sore". 61 
It was agreed later to wait "until some definite oooasion is given for 
re-opening the question",, i. e. until the death of Sir Charles Brooke. 
62 
In August 1906, however, Sir John Anderson suggested63 that in 
the altered circumstances of a reformed administration in Bruneip the Rajah, 
who based his interference on the "alleged interest" of the population 
of Limbang, might be invited to withdraw from there, as his ooeupation 
was no longer neoessary for their proteotion. If the Rajah would not 
agree to do eon he should at least be called upon to pay the X6,000 annual 
oessioa money (although Mr MoArthur had already rejeoted this option as 
"in every way unsuitable" because it would have put "the new administration 
of Brunei on a lese dignified footing than the previous one"). 
64 
The 
Sultan's refusal to aooept the money had been purely "personal"; henoe 
the Rajah should now pay up. The British Government found it impossible 
to adopt either of the courses proposed by Sir Johns the first because HM 
Government had already acquiesced in the annexation; the second because, 
if it was ooaoeded that the Sultan's deoision had been "personal", iii 
Government might appear to be claiming a right to upset everything done 
61. Ibid., minute by CP Luoas, 2 April 1906. 
62. Ibid., CO to McArthur, 28 April 1906; and CO 531/3 (9856) memorandum 
by Stubbs, "The Recent History of Brunei"y 25 Meroh 1911- 
63. CO 144/80 (35282) Anderson to CO (Brunei, confidential), 30 August 
1906, paragraphs 3-4. 
64. CO 144/80 (10206) MoArthur to Anderson, 13 February 1906, paragraph 25. 
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by the late Sultan. The only possible option was to wait until some 
time in the future when a territorial exchange might be effeoted. 
65 
Other Brunei-Sarawak boundaries were less ooateatioue, for 
example the borders with Barani and Trusan. These distriotsp. despite 
the unmarked frontiers had been oeded voluntarily and oonsiated of little 
more than unexplored jungle. In the absenoe of a settled population, 
few questions arose as to oonflioting juriedioti oas. Even soy 
negotiations to define the exact borders could be prolonged. 
66 
These were two subsidiarf issues connoted with the main 
Limbang dispute, viz. (i) Paadaruan and (ii) Berembang Island. 
The Paadaruaß was a sparsely-populated district between Limbang 
and Temburong. Its main products were Jungle produce (including bark for 
the cutoh taotory in Brunei Town) and sago. In mid-1885 the Rajah bad 
8eoured the right to oolleot tulip revenues in Pandaruan; but to all 
intents and purposes he treated the distriot as part of Sarawak. In 1912 
Mr Chevallier (British Resident in Brunei) reminded the Sarawak Government 
that the Rajah's lease required "the people of Pandaruan"67 to obtain 
65" CO 144/80 (35282) minute by Stubbs, 29 September 1906 and 00 to TOS 
5 October 1906; and CO 144/81 (38449) TO to 00v 17 October 1906. 
66. The Trusan-Tembnrong boundary, for example# was settled in 1920, 
though a dispute broke out in 1923; an earlier attempt to settle this 
border had been made in 1911. (00 604/8 Sarawak Gazette, 2 October 
1923v p 322; and CO 604/3 Sarawak Gazette, 7 February 1911, p 61). 
67. A reading of this lease appears to suggest that the obligation to 
purchase the stipulated articles (such as opium, salt and tobacco) from 
Brunei rested, not with the people of Pandarnan, but with the Paudaraan 
revenue farmers (who were to purchase "the aforesaid articles from the 
persons holding the same farms in Brunei"). Nb such local farms had been 
established in Pandaruan; and, apart from the farms in Muara Damit, the 
opium farm was the only important farm still surviving in Brunei in 1912. 
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certain commodities in Brunei and that a failure to do so would oon- 
stitute a breaoh of the lease; and that the Brunei Government olaimed 
poll tax in the distriot as a sovereign right. Mr Chevallier gave notioe, 
therefore, that he intended to station a customs olerk at Rangaa (a village 
at the mouth of the Pandaruan) to issue boat passes and to see that the 
stipulated commodities were obtained from Brunei* 
68 
The Rajah protested 
that the Resident'e plans were likely to "drive the present population 
out of the river. 
69 
Ehthnsiastio supporters of Brunei in the Colonial 
Office, auch as Mr Lee-Warner, were keen to exploit the opening provided 
by the Pandaraan dispute to attempt to reoover Limbang for Brunei: 
`I feel sure",, Mr Lee-Karner minuted., "that while Sir Charles Brooke is 
still alive he will sooner lose his right hand than give up the Limbang 
for a fair prioep unless some fulorum is obtained - whioh now appears 
possible from the present Pandarnan aase". 70 
Sir John Anderson, then Permanent Under-8eoretar7 at the Colonial Office, 
wished to avoid auch a confrontation. Indeed, an amicable settlement had 
alreacbr been achieved 1ooa11y. It was agreed that the Brunei Government 
would colleot the import and half the export duties in Pandaruau district. 
The issue was settled finally co. 4 February 1920 when the River Pandaruan 
itself beoame the international frontier between Limbaag (Sarawak) and 
Temburong (Brunei). Given that the Brooke State had no olaim whatsoever 
to sovereign rights in the distriot,, this arrangement, whioh gave Sarawak 
68. CO 531/4 (20919) Chevallier to OAG Sarawak, 13 Karoh 1912, paras" 1-2. 
69. Ibid., Rajah to Sir AH Young, 25 May 1912. The original population 
of Kedayans had been swamped sinne 1885 bT Sarawak Ibans brought in by 
the Rajah. Sir Charles adopted a similar policy in all the rivers north 
of the Rejang because he was uncertain of the loyalty of the existing 
population (Crisswell, off. oit., pp 148-9)- 
70- CO 531/4 (20919) minute by Lee-Warner, 2 July 1912. 
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one bank of the river, represented a most favourable oatoome from 
Kuohing's point of view. 
If one half of Pandaruan district was surrendered, the incoming 
Brunei administration managed to retain control of the "large and 
important" Pulan Berembang. In 1904 the Sarawak Resident of Limbang 
visited the island regularly and it was being opened up on his 
instraoti ons. A considerable number of public works had been built or 
Were in the process of oonstruotion. hr McArthur feared 
"that with their usual supineness the (pro-Residential) Brunei Government 
will allow His Highness (the Rajah) to establish a station there and 
eventually exeroise jarisdiotion as if it were a part of Sarawak 
territory". 71 
The Rajah intended, indeed., to make Besang Tawar (the site of his coal mine 
and oil works on the island) his capital when, as he anticipated, Brunei 
fell to him. 
72 
Bat in July 1904, after Mr McArthur had made three visits 
to the island, Sir Charles abandoned his building programme. In 1906 
certain statements made by the Rajah, coupled with the fact that he was 
grazing cattle and making roads there, suggested to Mr McArthur that Sir 
Charles appeared to be "under a misapprehension" that the island was his 
own property. 
73 
Vigilance against Brooke encroachments could never be 
relaxed by Brunei. Sir Charles quietly oonoeded, however, that sovereignty 
over the island rested with Brunei. Similarly, in the case of the Kota 
Batu lands, it was made "perfectly clear" to the Rajah in 1905 that 
EM 
71. P0 12/126 p 70, MoArthnr to Anderson, No 15,2 June 1904, para. 
12. 
72, CO 604/4 Sarawak Gazette, 1 July 1913, P 140. 
73. CO 144/80 (35280) McArthur to 'Secretary to High Commnissioner', 
No 150/06,28 June 1906, paragraph 6. (The island was about eight miles 
by five in extent). 
85 
Government 
"consider that the land has only been transferred to him in his personal 
capacity and still forms part of Brunei (... Unless we do this Rajah 
Brooke is sure to try to treat it as part of Sarawak, as he appears to 
be doing in the Mara Damit - Brooketon - case)". 74 
5. Muara Damit 
'The Muaras' comprise Muara Besar, an island 3-1 miles long at 
the mouth of the River Brunei; and Miuara Damit, that part of the mainland 
opposite and the soene of the Rajah's mining operations. The harbour at 
Muara was one of the best along the NW ooast of Borneo. The inhabitants 
of the "substantial, well oared-for and thriving"75 settlement at Brooke- 
ton oomprised. almost entirely those who sought a livelihood by taking 
wages at the mine. There were also tens of Chinese shops. The Rajah 
olaimed a population of 4,000 to 5,000 in Muara Damit (but only 1,447 
were enumerated in the 1911 oensue); 
76 
"there have been no oomplaints"t 
he added, "and everything has worked well during these many years". 
77 
A distinction must be drawn between those rights held legally 
by the Rajah (the land and revenue farm rights in a concession 28 miles 
in circumference; and the coal monopoly) and those which had been usurped 
or were claimed to have been usurped (such as the exercise of jurisdiotion 
74. CO 144/79 (16183) minute by Stubbs, 19 May 1905- 
75. CO 144/80 (5578) Anderson to CO, No 1 (Labuan), 25 January 1906, 
Paragraph 20. 
76. CO 824/1 Brunei Annual Report 1911, p 4. Muara Besar was "unin- 
habited" at this time (CO 604/3 Sarawak Gazette, 1 June 1911, p 98), but 
the Rajah had the right to take up land on the island if it was required 
for the purpose of making coal sheds or houses for labourers 
(Co 531/3: 
14523). 
77. CO 144/81 (16405) memorandum by Sir C Brooke, 12 April 1906; and 
CO 144/81 (13408) Rajah to CO9 27 March 1906. 
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and the style 'Administrator of Brooketon' used by Mr Rioketts, the 
Sarawak Resident in Limbang). The Brunei Government wished to recover 
all these rights (except the ooal lease), whether held legally or other- 
wise: 
"It is olear", Mr Stubbs minuted in 1905, "that one of the first things 
for the Resident to do will be to harry Rajah Brooke out of the position 
he has usurped at Brooketon". 78 
The first step taken by the British Government was to require 
the Rajah to withdraw his 'Administrator' - it was "1udioroas"79 that he 
should appoint such an officer in territory whioh he admitted did not 
belong to him - and his magistrate. Sir Charles agreed to do so, but 
protested that some people undoubtedly wished to damage his reputation. 
He lamented that 
"after so many years of unquestioned administration in Borneo, he should 
now, for the first time, be met with an aoonsation of irregularity and 
that doubt should be thrown upon the justness of his aotions". 80 
It is an indication of the extreme deferenoe shown to the 
Rajah that Mr MoArtharp even after becoming Resident in Braaeiq did not 
feel free to visit the ]4aarae without Sarawak oonsents 
"I have carefully refrained" - thus Mr McArthur to Mr Ricketts - "from 
landing there or doing anything which night look like an act of dis- 
ooQrteey to the Sarawak Government and I think that it would probably 
look much better ifs in the first instance, I visited the place by 
arrangement and in company with yon... There are numerous questions of 
jurisdiction, police eto... to be settled". 81 
Sir Charles asked the Colonial Offioe whether the Resident had authority 
78. CO 273/310 (33426) minute by Stubbs, 29 September 1905. 
79. CO 144/81 (23939) minute by Stubbs, 3 July 1906. 
80. Ibid., CA Bampfylde to 70t 25 June 1906, paragraph 4. (RK Government 
refuted the allegation that Sir John Anderson and Mr MoArtbur sought to 
damage the Rajah's reputation. Ibid.; and 00 144/81: 26593). 
81. CO 144/81 (13408) MoArthur to Rioketts, 14 February 1906. 
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thus to prooeed. He deolared that the site of Brooketon led to nowhere 
that oould be of any use to the British Government, the oolliery settle- 
ment was peaceful and change could not be benefioial to anyone ooncerneds 
wby therefore should the present state of the place be disturbed? 
82 
The 
answer given was that it was not possible, now that a reformed admin- 
istration had been introdnoed in Brunei, to allow Muara distriot to be 
left outside the jurisdiotion of the State to whioh it belonged, or to 
permit the magistraoy there to be retained by the Rajah. 
83 
In another letter, this time to Sir John Andersonp the Rajah 
deolared that either the British Government should leave him to work the 
ooal as heretofore, or else they should purohase from him the ooal rights 
and deed of land oonoessiong but not one without the others "in this 
event I Would at once hand over and clear oat". 
84 
Sir Charles cannot 
have been unaware that Brunei was bankrupt; ooueequently there was little 
danger that the British Government would adopt the seoond option of 
buying him aut. It seemsp therefore, that this was a bid by the Rajah 
to obtain a free hand in Muara Damit. 
Sir John Anderson was anxious to reoover full oontrol in the 
district because the situation there was "extremely anomalous and ditf- 
ioult"t whereas the Rajah held virtually all the souroes of revenue, he 
was under no obligation to oontribute one oent towards the administration 
b7 Brunei of this territory,,, 
85 
Not only were the aotaal revenues of the 
82. Ibid., Rajah to CO, 27 Maroh 1906. 
83. Ibid., minute by Stubbs, 23 April 1906; and CO 144/81 (18467), CO 
to Rajah, 30 May 1906. 
84. CO 144/81 (16405) Rajah to Anderson,, 12 April 1906. 
85" CO 144/80 (35281) Anderson to CO, Brunei (Confidential), 30 August 
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distriot lost to Brunei, Mr McArthur added, but attempts to oollect 
taxes in the Brunei watershed were rendered hopeless by the esistenoe 
of a foreign power at the mouth of the river. Goods landed at Brooketon 
were being distributed over the countryside without paying any dues to 
a Government which was dependent upon customs revenue for much of its 
income. Similarly, the Brunei Government usually charged an export 
duty on buffaloes of one dollar a head. When suoh animals were taken 
from the neighbourhood of the capital, it was not difficult to oolleot 
this t air but, by the last trip of the Sarawak steamer from Broolceton, 
"forty buffaloes went down to ICuohing on whioh nothing has been paid. 
They name from the oountry-side round Muara. The monopoly of shipping 
them by Sarawak steamers (equivalent to the monopoly of export) is 
leased out by the Sarawak administration". 86 
Furthermore, monopolies held in other parts of Brunei were being 
oompulsorily expropriated by the Residential regimes it was most 
awkward, thereforet that speoial treatment was being aooorded to the 
Rajah in this oonneotion. Hence the Resident pressed strongly for the 
oanoellation of Sir Charles Brooke's fisoal rights is bfaara Damits 
"The question iss for the Brutei Government, not merely one of monetary 
profit or loss, but of effective administration of the State". 87 
The High Commissioner, oontendi. ng that the Rajah's lease did 
not preclude the Brunei Government from imposing export duties in Muara 
1906, paragraph 3. Earlier, in February 1906, Sir John Anderson asked 
the Colonial Office whether HM Government had ever accorded recognition 
to the 1887 lease under which the fiscal and land rights in Muara Damit 
were held by the Rajah. At length it was decided that whilst EM Govern- 
ment had never officially recognized the concession they had tacitly 
acknowledged its validity (CO 144/80s 9306; and CO 144/811 18467)- 
86. CO 144/80 (35281) McArthur to Secretary to High Commissioner, No 
151 (confidential), 28 June 1906, paragraph 6. 
87. Ibid., paragraph 7. 
89 
Damit, proposed that (beginning on 1 January 1907) a duty of twenty-five 
cents should be charged on every ton of ooal exported from Muara Damit 
and that the same export duties on other produoe as were levied in the 
rest of Brunei should be imposed on similar exports from Muara Damit. * In 
addition Sir Charles should be required to withdraw the Sarawak police 
stationed in the distriot. Another reason for resuming oontrol of Xuara 
Damit was that efforts to abolish slavery in Brunei would be undermined 
if the prohibition oould not be enforoed throughout the oountrys the 
Rajah oontinued to permit domestio slavery. 
88 (Following the establish- 
ment of a postal system in Brunei in Ootober 1906, notioe was given that 
the Sarawak post offioe in Brooketon would have to be olosed and the use 
of Sarawak stamps discontinued as from 1 January 1907. No dispute arose 
out of this new departure). 
89 
Sir Charles Brooke agreed to withdraw his police from Muara 
distriot but described the proposal to levy a ooal export duty as "quite 
oontrary" to the spirit of his oonoession. In view of the heavy losses 
he was sustaining at Brooketon, he threatened to olose down the mine. 
90 
The Colonial Office had still not reoeived a oopy of the 1887 lease 
(under 
which the fisoal and land rights in Muara Damit were hold by the Rajah); 
heuoe oivil servants there were in the dark oonoeruing its provisions. 
The Rajah was informed, therefore, that the issue would be referred back 
88. Ibid., Anderson to C0,30 August 1906, paragraph 11. 
89. CO 531/1 (7039) Anderson to Co, -25 January 1907, plus enclosures. 
90. Co 144/81 (41004) -Rajah to CO, 6 November 1906, paragraph 5. Once 
more the Rajah lamented "these and other serious complications, as they 
appear to be to me, that are now taking place around Brunei". 
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to the High Commissioner in Singapore. 
91 
Xeanwhile, the latter was prepared to oompromise to the extent 
that, if the Rajah would repay the aotual oost of the proposed Brunei 
polioing of Huara Damit, the export duty on ooal would be waived. If 
additional administrative expenses were sustained by Brunei, however, 
the ooal duty would have to be levied unless the Rajah Weed to oover 
an saoh extra oosts.. Alternatively, if Sir Charles would surrender all 
his fisoal rights in Brocket on, the Brunei Government would assume the 
entire oost of administration there92 (presumably without imposing the 
coal tax). 
Mr Stubbs complained that the High Commissioner had not quite 
grasped the situations if an export duty on ooal was imposed by Brunei 
and the Rajah olosed down the mines in ooneequenoe 
"Sir Charles Brooke will make oapital out of the inoident by using it in 
support of the intrigues in whioh he is now engaged with a view to 
swallowing up Brunei and we shall gain nothing - sinne if the mines are 
shut there will be no duties oolleoted. Moreover, (beoause the Rajah 
had protested against the proposal) it is not olear that we have any 
right to levy the duty"" 93 
Sir John Anderson's proposal that the Rajah should be required 
to pay for the policing (from 1907) by Brunei of Muara Damit was oon- 
sidered inexpedient both by Mr Stubbs and by Mr Fiddes. The latter 
warned that Hi Government 
"mast be prepared to pay a very large sum even if the Rajah is willing 
91, Ibid., CO to Rajah, 13 November 1906. It is not obvious wY the 
Colonial Office could not have searched its own archives for the 
relevant documents or consulted the Print of FO Correspondence 
(FO 572). 
Translations were also available in CO l44/80 (35281). 
92.00 144/80 (45588) Anderson to CO, tel., . 11 December 
1906. 
93. Ibid., minute by Stubbs, 11 December 1906. 
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to sell on any terms... Until we get rid of his concessions he has us in a 
cleft stick, and if we expropriate him and the matter goes to arbitration 
we should have to pay an altogether impossible price". 94 
Mr Piddes suggested that the Rajah might find a territorial exohange 
more attractive. 
In February 1907 a despatch was received from the High 
Commissioner refuting the Rajah's claim that the proposal to levy an 
export duty was "quite oontrary" to the spirit of his oonoession. 
95 
Mr 
Stubbs, although now oouvinoed that the Brunei Government had the right 
to levy the export duty, was satisfied that this oould not be justified 
"while the mines are worked at a loss". The alternative of asking the 
Rajah for a contribution to cover the oost of administration was "quite 
out of the question" beoause it oould only be demanded "in lieu of not 
imposing an export duty and it is not seemly for a Government to levy 
blackmail". Mr Stubbs oonsi dered, however, that it would be possible to 
buy out the Rajah (except the ooal rights). He took up the suggestion 
of an exchange involving the wild Temburoug district, believing this 
"would be the less of two evils and if, as seems likely enough, Sir 
Charles Brooke's sons hand over Sarawak to us when he is dead, the 
mischief will be only temporary". 96 
Mr MoArthur, by oontrastp vehemently opposed any exchange of Brooke rights 
in Muara Damit for the cession by Brunei of Temburong di striot. 
97 Sir 
94" Ibid., minute by Fiddes, 11 December 1906. 
95. CO 531/1 (5130) Anderson to CO, confidential, 12 January 1907- 
96. Ibid., minute by Stubbs, 23 February 1907. 
97. CO 531/1 (20553) McArthur to A, ndersony No 85,26 April 1907. Mr 
MoArthur's reasons included the opposition from the sultan and ohiefs 
to any suoh transfer and the fear that their apparently growing confid- 
ence in the British would be destroyed if such an exchange went ahead. 
Temburong also seemed to have good economic prospects; and it was 
comparatively accessible from the capital. 
92 
John Anderson oonceded reluotantly (in M$y 1907) that nothing further 
ooald be done for the time beings the "main diffioulty" with suoh a do- 
nothing approaoh lay in the oharaoter of the Rajah who had root at aban- 
doned hope of obtaining oontrol of Brunei" and was still intriguing there 
and using bis agents to gather signatures to petitions. 
98 
Mr Stubbs agreed 
that a scheme for settling all outstanding questions at once would now 
(June 1907) have to be abandoned. 
99 Thus Mr Lucas informed the Rajah 
that, while BM Government adhered to the view that Brunei was entitled 
to impose an export duty on ooa1, that right would not be exeroised for 
the 100 The Rajah, for his part, did not oonoede even the 
nominal right of the Brunei Government to introduce such a tax* 
101 
One of the "outstanding questions" was the Brooketon gambling 
farm, the existence of which came to Mr MoArthnr's attention only at the 
beginning of 1907, The Resident had no doubt that the Brunei Governmedt 
was entitled to olaim the revenue from this souroes and, "seeing how few 
rights we have left there, I do not think any should be allowed to 
lapse". 102 The Colonial Offioe was inolimed to agree, but the matter 
was shelved pending a oomprehensive settlement. When this fell through, 
advice was sought fron a Malay expert, and it was oonoeded that the Rajah 
had been within his rights in instituting such a farm. First, Sultan 
Hashim had raised no objeotion to it before 1906; and, seoondly, the 
98. Ibid., Anderson to i3runej (confidential), 16 May 1907- 
990 CO 531/1 (20552) minute by Stubbs, 11 June 1907. 
1004, Ibid., Lucas to Rajah, 19 June 1907. 
101. CO 531/1 (33215) Rajah to CO, 16 September 1907. 
102. CO 531/1 (5866) MoArthur to Anderson, 12 January 1907. 
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"really strong argument" was that, if he had believed himself to have 
retained a right to lease this farmq undoubtedly he would have sold it&103 
The lioenoe to gamble had deleterious sooial oonsequenoes in 
Brooketon, where (it was reported in 1910) the Brunei Government's offioer 
"has to spend most of his time in oourty there being more litigation in 
the Court of Requests (sio) at Brooketon than there is in Brunei (Town). 
This is probably due to indebtedness among Malays owing to the existence 
of a farm in which Malays are allowed to gamble". 104 
The Colonial Offioev however, was less interested in stamping out this 
evil than in deriving the revenue therefrom for the Brunei Government. 
Eventually, in 1919, gambling was outlawed in Brunei,. and, by threatening 
to extend the provisions of the enaotment to Mnara Damit (thereby 
rendering the gambling farm valueless), terms for the surrender of the 
gambling farm were arranged with the Sarawak authorities (see below, 
Appendix 1.29 PP 561-79)" 
Mr Stubbs believed (correctly) that the Huara concessions were 
oausiug the Rajah a very heavy finanoial loss 
"and it is only his pride and his hope that he may yet be allowed to 
absorb Brunei that prevents his abandoning them, I have great hopes 
that his sons will be more reasonable, and Sir C Brooks is over 
eighty". 105 
103. CO 531/1 (35898) minute by Stubbs, 10 Ootober 1907. The coal tax 
and 'gambling and araok' farm would have oontributed signifioantly, albeit 
in a diminishing ratio, to Brunei's meagre revenue. I estimate that they 
would have added 96,728 to the aotual income of %51,777 in 1907 and 
8,136 to the actual revenue of 9165,082 in 1913.. The ooal tax was 
eventually imposed in 1921 (see below, p 102). 
104. CO 531/2 (11169) memorandum by Mr Chevallier, 9 February 1910. 
Gambling was usually oonfined to adult male Chinese in British Malaya. 
105. Ibid., minute by Stubbs, 21 April 1910. Mr Stubbs hoped to use 
the Rajah's desire to lay an oil pipeline aoross Brunei as a lever to 
oblige him to abandon the gambling farm; but nothing oame of this (CO 
531/3: 4855, minute, 14 February 1911). 
94 
6. Eo on omi c 
In 1906 Sir Charles Brooke, apart from exercising considerable 
political influence within Brunei, was also the most powerful eoonomio 
speculator there. In 1888 he purohased from Mr WO Cowie the exolusive 
right to work coal in all Brunei east of the River 1 tongs he ran mines 
at Brooketon (from 1888) and at Buaag Tawar'(from o1900). In Maroh 1903 
Consul Hewett reported the disoovery of oil at the latter mine; and by 
the following month the Rajah had seoured a oonoession from Sultan 
Hashim, oovering Berembang Island. only, to work the mineral. Unfortunately 
this oil proved, if anything, to be a haadloap because it had little 
oommeroial value and interfered with, ooal-mining operations. 
In 1914 Sir Charles-oreated a oonsiderable stir by' advanoingg 
in the name of his youngest son, a olaim to exolusive mineral rights in 
Brunei (exoept ooal, the monopoly of which he held separately), adding 
that all oil-mining leases granted by the Brunei-Government sinoe 1906 
were invalid. This olaim was based on two ooncessionsg one granted 
Previously to a Mr Everett in 1883 and transferred to the Central Borneo 
Company (CBC) in 1887, and the other granted directly to the CBC in 1890. 
Although these oonaessioas had been cancelled finally by Sultan Hashim 
is 1897 (because of failure by the lessees to comply with their terms), 
they had been sold afterwards to Mr Cowie (1901) and resold to the Rajah's 
son (November 1904). The Rajah "appears to have been had", 
106 
lir Bamp_ 
fylde noted later. 
106. (Rhodes House Oxford) Mss Pao x83/6 CA Bampfylde to Mr C Willes- 
Johnson (Seoretaryv SSAC), 2 July 1915. 
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The Everett lease of 1883 was valid, at most, for thirty years. 
Even if it had not been oanoelled by Sultan Hashim, therefore, it would 
have expired in 1913. At the time the seoond lease, dated 1890, had been 
obtained by the CBC9 the Rajah deolared that it was "illegal by the law 
of Brunei" and he refused to reoognize the oompan"s rights in Limbang, 
whioh he annexed later the same year*107 Yet, in 1914, Sir Charles did 
not soraple, on the basis of this very dooament, to advanoe a olaim to 
exclusive mineral rights in Brunei. 
The 1890 lease had excluded oil; and the CHC had failed to 
oomply with oertain other oonditi ons. Yet even supposing it had been 
valid at the time of the Brunei Mining Enactment (1908), it had sinoe 
lapsed through failure (by the Rajah) to comply with the olause requiring 
that a lessee should not fail for a period of twelve months to oarry oat 
mining operations. (The Brookes had done none at all in the territory 
oovered 1V the two leases). 
1ý Note onoe again the Rajah's oontempt 
for the law of Brunei. The Mining Ehaotment would have rendered both 
107, PO 12/184 p 223, Rajah to Sir P Currie (1836-1906), 4 July 1890; 
and Crisswell, op. oit., p 182. 
108. One official suggested that in demanding and obtaining a mining 
lease for Berembang oil in 1903 Sir Charles must have assumed that there 
was no valid rival monopoly of Brunei oil in existence at this time. But 
this may not be sop because both the 1883 and the 1890 leases excluded 
Brunei distriott where Berembang Island is situated; alternatively, the 
Rajah tended to treat Berembang Island as part of Limbangj, which was 
included in the two leases.. (The 1883 lease covered Belait, Tutong, 
Limbang and Temburong, plus certain other rivers later ceded to either 
Sarawak or North Borneo. The 1890 lease dropped seven rivers which had 
been thus ceded, but retained a few others which were'oeded between 
1890 and 1905). HM Government argued that, in any oasep petroleum had 
been specifically excluded from the two leases. 
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leases null and void, even if they had not been oanoelled by Sultan 
Hashim. The oorrespondenoe dragged on until 1916, when the Rajah finally 
oonoeded that the CBC"s lease was invalid. The last word on this oases 
however, must surely rest with Mr AE Collins, Head of the Eastern 
Department at the Colonial Offioev who desoribed the claim as "monstroas" 
and added that 
"no (prospecting or mining) work has been doneq and the Brooke family 
must have been perfectly aware for years that the Government of Brunei 
were granting leases... for oil mining... To bring forward a claim in this 
manner ... is really indecent". 109 
Thrning to ooal, the Rajah's oolliery at Brooketon incurred 
heavy losses from the outset and it was not until 1917 that even a tiny 
surplus was achieved on a year's trading. Interim'losses sinoe 1888 
amounted to %l95009000. These deficits were borne, not by the Rajah 
personally, but by the Sarawak treasury. The Rajah's readiness to accept 
such losses is remarkable, given that he had the reputation of being an 
"austere" ruler who "abhored extravaganoe" and whose "only thought was 
the prosperity of Sarawak". 
110 
Mr Bampfylde explained that Broolceton 
without its coal mine "would be but a small fishing hamlet"v that the 
mine provided employment for a great many people and that it was "entirely 
on. this aooouat" that the Rajah kept open the industr7.111 The real 
reason was given by Sir Charles Brooke himself in 1886: 
"The position of Muara Damitq to sir mind, is of }great importanoe as being 
109. CO 531/6 (4620) minute by Mr AE Collins (1871-1926), 10 February 1914. 
110.3 Runoiman, op. oit., pp 166,168 and 216; and Ranee M Brooke, 
Good Morning and Good Night (London 1934), P 34.1- 
111. CO 144/81 (11990) Bampfylde to F'0p 6 April 1906. See also, 
Baring-Gould and Bampfylde, o . oit., P 358. 
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the key to the capital of Brunei... Z do not think that Muara Damit will 
be of any particular pecuniary importanoe... (bat) the Limbang trade will 
go direct out of that river when it is clear of Brunei-rule, either to 
Labnan, or by shipping vessels coming to the town which would naturally 
form itself inside the Limbang river. Brunei and its river would then 
sink considerably". 112 
In short, possession of Knara Damitp in oonjunotion with that of Lirabang, 
would give him a stranglehold on Brunei and bring oloser to fulfilment 
his ultimate ambition, viz. the inoorporation of Brunei within Sarawak. 
Mr Bampfylde deolared that before their transfer to the Rajah 
the Brooketon mines had been worked 
"in a band to mouth fashion by a few ooolies under a manager with but 
little experienoe, the output being oonfined to meeting the very limited 
local demand in Labuan. There was praotioally no plant, and only a small 
rioketty wharfp to which the surface ooal was conveyed in buffalo-drawn 
waggons over a roughly-constructed line". 113 
Sir Charles, on the other hand, "bought up to date equipment and installed 
ezperienoed managers". 
114 In fact, Mr Cowie had employed more labourers 
("nearly 300") in 1887 
115 than the Rajah was doing in 1908 (about 250). 
116 
Seoondly, the Rajah found it neoeseary to dismiss his "experienoed manager" 
in 1912.117 Thirdly, Mr Cowie increased annual production from scratch to 
perhaps 12,000 tons in the space of only five years (1882-6), whereas 
after a further twenty years under the Rajah's ownership, annual output 
had reached only 18,000 tons. The "appearance of prosperity" at Brooketon, 
finally, was "deceptive" since the plant was ran at a loss. The Sarawak 
112. FO 12/71p 51, Rajah to Consul P Leys, 22 January 1886 (any emphasis); 
also in CO 144/62 (9759). 
113. Baring-Gould and Bampfylde, o . oit., p 358. 
114. Rundiman, o . oit., pp 1933-4- 115. CO 144/64 (20250) wC Cowie (o1847-1910) to Leys, 30 April 1887" 
Perhaps Mr Cowie's claim needs to be treated with oautiono however. 
116. CO 824/1 Brunei Annual Report 1908, p 6. 
117. (RHO) Mss Pao 8103, p 143. (Sir Charles Brooke declared that it 
"certainly was a good thing getting rid of May", i. e. the manager). 
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Gazette itself oommenteds 
"... The unfortunate part of this industry is that a ready market is not 
always to be found at Labuan, so that when a quantity is turned out 
there is an insufficient sale, while, at other times, when there is none, 
or only very little ooal, there always seems an eager demand for it". 118 
Mr MoArthur olaimed that the Rajah's ooal monopoly was unfort- 
unate beoause he was able to prevent anyone else from working ooal. In 
1907, for ezample, a Chinese merohant based in Labnan proposed to 
exploit a seam at 5ubokq near Brunei Town. The Resident believed that 
the Chinaman's application was a bona fide one and that it would be a 
"matter for regret" if it was deoided to turn it down beoause of a ooal 
monopoly olaimed by the Rajah. Sir John Anderson raled that there were 
"no suffioieat grounds" for questioning the Rajah's monopoly. This was 
"unfortunate", in Mr Stubbs' opinion, beoause "Rajah Brooke, by oontrolling 
the coal supply, can prevent the establishment of any considerable 
industry in Brunei". 
119 In this instanoev the Rajah's oritios were being 
somewhat harsh. First, the Chinaman's proposal to exploit Subok ooal 
had arisen because or the Rajah's threat to olose his Brooketon mine 
should an export duty on ooal be imposed. Sinoe this right was not 
ezeroised for the time being: the mine remained open. Beoondly, even 
Mr Stubbs had admitted that, if the oolliery was olose1, it would be 
difficult to find anyone else to work it. Finallyg as Mr Chevallier 
himself reoognized., the mine provided employment for Brunei people and 
was being ran at a loss by the Rajah. 
118. CO 604/1 Sarawak Gazette, 2 July 1907, p 159- 
119- CO 531/1 (23334) minute t Stubbs, 23 JuIy 1907. 
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7. Rajah Vyner Brooke and Brunei (1917-32) 
At the time of the death of Sir Charles Brooke (1917) the 
situation was as follows. Pirstp Brooke political influence had been 
effectively neutralized in Brunei and Sarawak no longer posed a threat 
to the success of the Residential System there. The era of Brunei's 
territorial decline had come to an endq although there were some 
unfavourable boundary adjustments as in the case of Pandaruan. Secondly, 
Limbang had not been reoovered, but the incoming administration had 
managed to reassert Brunei's sovereignty over Berembang Island and half 
of'Pandaraan district. Thirdly, it bad been made clear to the Rajah by 
the British Government that the rights he held in Berembang, Kota Batu 
and nuara Damit were held in his personal capacity and these lands were 
not to be treated as belonging to Sarawak. In )Iuara Damit, the new regime 
in Brunei insisted that the Rajah should withdraw his 'administrator', 
Malas magistrate and police, cease exercising jurisdiotion, and close 
his post office. On the other hand, Sir Charles retained his fisoal and 
land rights in lluara Damit; in this respect, indeed, he was treated most 
favourably since other monopolists had been compulsorily expropriated. 
He had established, further, his right to institute a gambling 'farm' 
there and to thwart the imposition of an export duty on his coal. The 
British Government, for its part, deferred to the Rajah because of his 
advanced age, his status as an independent sovereign, and his r eoognized 
achievements as the ruler of Sarawak since 1868. 
The image of Sir Charles Brooke which emerges from his dealings 
with Brunei is not an attractive one. Time and again he showed himself 
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to be mendacioas, unscrupulous, arrogant and grasping. Yet in his final 
years he presented a somewhat sad aspeots unable to obtain "justioe" from 
the British Government; wishing to retire but unable consoientiously to 
do so; imagining plots by grasping outsiders (suoh as the "oity men" of 
the BNBC); and distrustful of his own son and heir. He fearedv also, 
the designs of the Colonial Offices when Mr Lee-Warner returned to Brunei 
at the beginning of 1913, Sir Charles warned his representative in 
Limbang that he (Mr Lee-Warner) "comes or is sent for a purpose, to shut 
up our Government as much as possible. So be guarded of him - he is a 
gentleman and very plausible", 
120 
It was "next to impossible to get a 
fair deal from the British authorities" but "might makes right and that 
I must submit to". 
121 
When the British authorities inadvertently alienated 
some of the Rajah's estate at Kota Batu, Sir Charles alleged that they 
had "overstepped the mark in their energy and hatred against Sarawak", 
122 
He could be surprisingly petty on oooasion. At the beginning of 1907, 
for example, he alleged that the Resident was suppressing the name Brooke- 
ton (merely another of the Rajah's "maliotous attempts" to disoredit the 
Resident, according to Mr Stubbs); 
123 
or when he gave the order (rescinded 
later) for Brooketon lighthouse to be demolished. 
124 
After the death of Sir Charles in 1917, the High Commissioner 
(Sir Artinn Young) was invited to suggest solutions to any outstanding 
issues between Brunei and Sarawak. After consulting Messrs MoArthur and 
120. (RHO) Mss Pao s103, p 162 (Rajah to DA Oren, 11 February 1913)- 
121. (RHO) Mss Pao s83 (6), Rajah to SSAC, 25 February 1915- 
122. (RHO) Mss Pao s103, p 157 (Rajah to Owen, 2 August 1913)- 
123. CO 531/1 (18527) minute by Stubbsv 23 May 1907- 
124. CO 531/1 (1027 and 1446; see also 10629). 
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Cator (past and present Residents), Sir Arthur oouoluded125 that the lose 
of Limbang had done "more than anything else to retard the progress of 
Brunei". Although oonsideration for the advanoed age and personality of 
the late Rajah had forbidden the re-opening of the issue, Sir Arthur had 
"no hesitation" is reoommending that the opportunity afforded by his 
death should be taken to make a more deoided effort to seoure the 
restitution of Limbang to Brauei. The new Rajah, Vyner Brooke, could 
not find "any adequate reason"p however, why the Sarawak Government 
should have been asked, still less expeotedp to return Limbang, which 
would damage Sarawak prestige; further the equivalent of what would have 
been paid in oession money had been devoted entirely to the development 
of the distriotp a loss of 120,000 having been incurred sinne 1890.126 
Sir Arthur, therefore, could not recommend 
"that any further steps should be taken in the matter; and in my opinion 
pressure should not be brought on the Rajah to force him to give up 
Limbang for a pecuniary consideration. Nor can I advise that he should 
be offered any Brunei territory in exchange". 127 
Kr Collins at the Colonial Office appreciated the new Rajah's 
reluctance to restore Limbang to Brunei, but hoped that the position 
might be "easier for him in a few years henoe"s 
"I would not abandon hope of getting Limbang baok... (L) more convenient 
Opportunity for arranging a settlement may occur in a few years' time". 128 
In fact such an ý opportanity did not arise, 
l9 
125. CO 531/11 (10824) Young to C0, Borneo (secret)., 29 December 1917. 
126, CO 537/839 (18354) Rajah Vyner to Young, 26 December 1918. 
127,1bk_i! 1., Young to CO, Borneo (secret), 19 February 1919, paragraph 3. 
128. Ibid. p minute by Collinst 14 April 1919. 129. In 1941, to coincide with the centenary of Brooke rule in Sarawak 
Rajah Yyner undertook to 'oompensate' the descendants of those who had 
owned 'feudal' rights in Limbang. In 1947 the new Colonial regime in 
Sarawak resolved to continue such annuities. 
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With regard to Muara Damit, Sir Arthur Young reported in 1917 
that 
"the private rights of the family of (the late) Sir Charles Brooke 
inside Brunei are not matters of urgenoy now that the State has a 
settled Government oapable of preventing their being used for politioal 
purposes". 130 
These rights were "an annoyanoe", certainly, beoause they hindered the 
full development of the ooantry, but they were not, in themselves, "of 
snob importanoe as to demand that any special effort should be made to 
arrive at a general settlement of them on bloo". 
(130) 
It will be reoalled that in 1907 the Colonial Offioej, although 
reserving the right to impose a duty on ooal exported fron Brunei, had 
refrained from imposing the tax beoause the Rajah's mine was running at 
a loss. In 1918 and 1919, however, the Brooketon mine had made substantial 
profits, whilst the oost of administration of the distriot by the Brunei 
authorities had also risen sharply. Henoe notioe was given that the ooal 
export duty would be imposed from the beginning of 1921.131 Rajah Vyner, 
moreover, was abomt to sell the Brooketon oolliery to a Mr Hatton Hall, 
desoribed as an "inveterate pinker-up of bargains in Borneo"q who would 
probably have caused the Brunei Government a lot of trouble if he got hold 
of the farms. 
132 (In the past, possession of the farms and the ooal mine 
130. CO 531 11 (10824) Young to C0, Borneo (secret), 29 December 1917, 
Paragraph 4. 
131. CO 531A4 (26853) Sir LN Guillemard to 00, confidential, 20 April 
1920. The Brooketon mine had made a profit of $118,369.06 in 1918 and 
0122,651.14 in 1919. The Buang Tawar oolliery had been olosed in 1917. 
132. CO 531A5 (21524) minute by Mr H Beokett, 10 May 1921. Mr Hall, 
for his part, preferred to describe himself as a "pioneer" in Brunei 
and British North Borneo (see Appendices 1.2 and 1.4). 
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had been in the same hands). Hence in August 1920 negotiations were 
opened with the Rajah's representatives for the resumption, by the Bru- 
net Government, of the ätuara rights. At length (Maroh 1924) agreement 
was reached whereby Rajah Vyner agreed to exchange all his tax farm 
rights (including the gambling farm) for a reduction of oertain annual 
payments made by Sarawak to Brunei. In September 1931, on the oooasion 
of Sultan Ahmad Tajuddin's oomiug of agep Sir Vyner Brooke f#CM4 annoanoed 
his intention to surrender his land rights in aara as well, retaining 
only a bungalow for his own use. The formal deed was signed by him on 
25 January 1932 and by the Brunei Sultan on 10 ; iaroh the same year. 
133 
After the First World War the prioe of coal fell drastioally 
and, beoause of inoreased posts of labour and materials, as well as the 
new tax on coal exports in 1921, the Brooketon mine fell into a deficit 
again in 1922, Other problems inoluded flooding of seams and fires 
resulting from spontaneous oombastion. Despite small profits in 1923 
and 1924, the ooliiery was eventually olosed in November 1924, and Sir 
Viper Brooke's mining oonoession lapsed at the end of 1925. The proposed 
sale of the oolliery to Mr Hall had been oanoelled in July 1921, though 
he made another, equally unsuooesafal, attempt in 1937 to aoquire the 
righte. 
134 
After the oloeure of the Brooketon mine in 1924 many of the 
inhabitants removed to Miri and Sadong in Sarawak, abandoning their 
houses and gardens. Brooketon village was gradually overrun by jungle; 
133. Co 717/91 (File 92359) Sir a Clementi to 00, UMS (Brunei), 
confidential, 3 May 1932, paragraphs 3.4" Cf. Appendix 1.2 (below). 
134. CO 786/11 (File 51987)" 
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and, bar the late 1950sß there was little to show where it had onoe stood. 
8. Conclusion 
In the foregoing ohapter it has been shown that at length the 
new administration managed to eliminate Brooke infinenoe within Brunei. 
The only major setback concerned Limbang, which remains in Sarawak's 
Possession to this day. But, as years passed, the loss of this distriot 
beoame of deoreasing signifioanoe. In the first half of the Residential 
Fra, the reooverr of Limbang had been seen as a matter of vital eooaomio 
importance for Brunei; but, after the discovery of the Seria oilfield in 
1929, the grievanoe beoame rather one of sentiment (injury to national 
pride) and irritation (beoause Limbang split Brunei up into two detaohed 
wiege). The issue resnrfaoed oooaeionally; 
135 but during the terms of 
most Residents the matter was not raised. 
136 By the 1950e the existenoe 
of the Lirabang oorrider appeared "to hamper administration oa17 to a 
small eztent". 
137 
Conoomitantly with their dealings with the Brookes the early 
British Residents in Brunei had been introduoing important administrative 
and financial reforms, which are treated in chapters four and five 
respectively. 
135" For example, in 1941,1947 and 1950- 
136. Mr Jo Blaok OR 1937-40)s "I was under no pressure to obtain the 
retrooession of the Limbang distriot. The question was never raised". 
(Letter to the author, 11 June 1983, paragraph 4). your other former 
Residents of Brunei have oommented similarly. 
137. RH Hiokling, Memorandum upon Brunei Constitutional History and 
Praotioe (January 1955), oonfidential and unpublished manusoript, 
Paragraph 7. Copy oourtesy of Awang Dassoff Agaki. 
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CHAPTER F JR 
TOWARDS 'A DECEIT ATh! flfISTRATION'1 1906-1932 
1. Introduction 
This ohapter will examine the administrative reorganization 
of Brunei after 1906. The former system of administration, taxation and 
land tenure based on kera aan kuripan and tulin rights was replaced by 
a new method of oentral government and distriot administration oontrolled 
by the Resident, The British laid the foundations for a new bureaucracy 
and modernized the dispensation of justioe. There was also an element of 
oontinuity beoauee British polioy aimed for the minimum of interferenoe 
with the rights of the rulers oonpled with the maximum of justioe for the 
subject. Brunei was a hierarohioally-straotured society and no attempt 
was made radioally to alter this struoture. Administration was oonduoted 
in the name of the_Sultan. It is important to remember that Brunei was 
never a British ool M as saoh. Heaoe there were serious oompiioatiooe in 
1909-10 when the young Sultan objeoted to oertain land legislation; and 
at one point he was threatened with deposition by the High Commissioner. 
But first let us examine the nature of the 1905-6 settlement. 
The 1905-6 Settlement 
The blueprint for the initial years of the British Residenoy 
1. CO 144/77 (16635) minute by Mr RE Stubbs (1876-1947), 8 May 1903. 
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is a document dated 9 November 1905,2 addressed by the High Commissioner 
to Messrs Campbell and MoArthur, 
3 
the envoys sent to Brunei to renegotiate 
the 1888 Treaty. In view of the "lawlessness" in Brunei (the direotive 
ran) Sultan Hashing was to be warned that if he refused to aooept the terms 
offered, the British Government would leave him, to his fate. Assuming 
that he desired assistanoe in averting the dissolution of his ooontry and 
dynasty, it was to be made clear to him that "the whole of the admia- 
istration and the whole powers of legislation and taxation were to be 
oonsidered on the advice of the British Resident". Instead of the 
irregular revenues whioh they had reoeived hitherto, the Sultan and wazirs 
were to aooept fixed annuities. 14i1ia rights, monopolies and cession 
monies were to be investigated oarefnlly by the envoys and bought up to 
provide a revenue for the new regime. Negotiations prooeeded smootbll. 
The Sultan and wazirs attaohed their seals to the new treaty on 3 Deoember 
1905; and on 2 January 1906 Sir John Anderson. arrived in Brunei to 
oomplete the agreement on behalf of HK Government. 
In the first artiole of the 1905-6 'Supplementary Agreement' 
(to the 1888 DK-Brunei Treaty) Sultan Hashim agreed to aooept a British 
offioerp to be styled Residents whose 
Hadvioe must be taken and acted upon on all questions in Brunei other 
than those affeotiig the Muhammadan religion, in order that a similar 
system may be established to that existing in other Malay States now 
under British Proteotion". 4 
The United Kingdom, for its part, undertook to ensure the 
2. PO 12/128 p 246, Anderson to Campbell and. MoArtbar, 9 November 1905. 
3. DG Campbell (1867-1918) CMG 1912.1883-1904: served in Selangor. 
1904: Resideatt Negri Sembilan. 1910-18s General Adviser, Johore. 
4. The full text of the 1905-6 Treaty appears in Appendix I. J. 
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"due sucoession" to the Brunei throne, thereby preserving the Brunei mon- 
arch if not definitely establishing the principle of primogeniture. 
After considering the claims of Mr H Chevallier ("about the 
best of the distriot offioers now left in the FMS" but "too good and too 
senior" to be sent to Borneo), 
5 
Sir John appointed Mr McArthur to be the 
first Resident of Labuan and Brunei, with his headquarters in the former. 
On 2 January 1906, after signing the Treaty, the High Commissioner 
reminded the assembled Malays that they knew Mr MoArthur 
"and knew that he understood and was a good friend of Malays and would 
work for their good. That he had my full oonfidenoe and they must 
remember that his words were my words, that the Sultan and his pengirans 
must listen to him and must help him in working for the good of the 
country. That above all they must remember that under the Treaty which 
they had signed, it was their duty to consider the advice Mr MoArthur 
would give them, not trying each man what he could get out of it for 
himself, but honestly trying to help forward what was best for the 
country. If they did this, I was sure of a prosperous future for its 
and hoped to come again and see how they were progressing". 6 
Sultan Hashim ootnstantly signified his approval of these remarks and gave 
Sir John Anderson the impression that he was very glad to be relieved 
of the burden of attempting to govern Brunei. His Highness then turned 
to the assembled pengirans, telling them that if they had anything to 
BAT this was the moment to do so. The only matter raised oonoerned the 
Position of their religion; and, on being reassured on this point, they 
had nothing further to bring forward. Finally, the Sultan shook the High 
Commissioner "warmly by the hand" as the latter took his departure. 
A permanent offioer on the spot in Brunei was deolared (by Sir 
5" CO 273/309 (27211) Sir F Swettenham to AI Harding, 5 August 1905. 
Mr Chevallier beoame Aoting Resident in 1907 and 1909-13. 
6. CO 144/80 (5578) Sir J Anderson to CO, No 1 (Labuan), 25 January 
1906, Paragraph 15. 
108 
John) to be neoessary, 
7 
The first such 'Assistant Resident' was Mr FAS 
MoClellaud, who arrived in May 1906. In view of his inflnenoe in Brunei, 
as well as his knowledge of engineering, Dato Roberts was appointed Dir- 
eotor of Publio Works in September 1906, a post he held until 1921.8 
In doouments subsidiary to the main 1905-6 Treaty it was 
agreed that Sultan Hashim and the two surviving wazirs would oontinue to 
receive any private cession money payments from Sarawak and North Borneo 
but all other revenues would go to the Government. In view of the 
strife which was to follow over land legislation one olause assumed 
partioular importanoes 
"5. A sufficient traot of land shall be reserved round the sites of the 
residenoes of our friend (i. e. the Sultan), PenRiran Bendahara and Pen- 
giran Pemanoha free of all rates, charges or rents". 9 
The oorollary of-this was that all other land was taken into State ownership 
and that the Government was entitled to obarge rent for its ooanpation. 
In oompensation for the surrender of kera aan and kar ipan 
rights, the monaroh reoeived an annuity of $12,000 and the wazirs 96,000 
eaoh: with a promise that, should the revenue a11owg these sums might 
"properly be raised in future". In order to "faoilitate" the signing of 
the treaty, Sultan Hashim was given a loan of %3,000 repayable in 
instalments as his allowance fell this mouthly. 
l0 
7. CO 273/309 (43669) Anderson to Co. (SS) o onfi denti a1,16 November 
1905; and CO 273/317 (5647) Anderson to co, (SS) oonfidential, 25 January 
1906, paragraph 2. 
8. CO 144/80 (40678) Anderson to 00,5 0otober 1906, paragraph 3; CO 824/1 
Brunei Annual Report 1921_, pp 5 and 8; and Co 273/517 (47019)- 
9. - CO 273/312 (691) Campbell and MoArthur to Sultan (enolosure B, 
clause 5). no date (03 December 1905). See p 559 (below). 
10. Ibid., clause 3; and Campbell and MoArthur to Anderson, 6 December 
1905, Paragraph 8. The "expenses" incurred during this mission (%5,984.23) 
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The resolution of tulin olaims was delayed beoause many 
alleged titles had been forged (with the assistanoe of the wazirs) during 
the final illness (Maroh to May 1906) of Sultan Hashim and thereafter. 
Many tulin rights, moreover, were mortgaged to Chinese traders who set 
enormous values on their land even when they were oompletely ignorant of 
where euoh land was to be found. In some oases the same rights had been 
sold several times over. A further difficulty was that several well- 
substantiated claims lay in areas provisionally granted (by the new 
administration) to Earopeans, who were indignant that the Government 
intended to uphold existing indigenous rights. The only distriot rel- 
atively-free from tulip property was Temburong (the isolated eastern wing 
of the ootantry).. It was not until 1910 that a thorough investigation 
into land holdings was launohed by the Assistant Resident, Mr Wß Lee- 
were charged to the Brunei revenue for 1906. (Co 824/1 Brunei Annual 
Report 1906, p 6). What had all this money been used for? (of. 1904 when 
Mr MoArthur, as oonsulg had an allowance of ten shillings or 
A. 3 a day). 
Sir Charles Brooke was particularly incensed on the subject of 
the annuities: "I see that they are paying the Sultan the exact amount 
that I offered"t he complained. This is true only superficially. Mr 
McArthur devoted a section of his "Report" to a consideration of the 
offer made by Sarawak for a takeover of Brunei and concluded that the 
Sultans even in his reduced oiroumstanoesp was already receiving a sum 
equivalent to the amount offered by Sarawak (admittedly only by mortgaging 
future revenues) and, therefore, had no inoentive even on financial 
grounds to accept the Rajah's terms; that Sir Charles had made no provision 
for tulin claims; and that the present needs of the rulers rather than 
the true value of the ooantry appeared to have been his (the Rajah's) 
criterion. The proposed Sarawak annuities, instead of increasing as the 
revenues of Brunei might allow, were to be halved at the death of the 
first recipients. By accepting the British Government's terms, by contrast, 
the Sultan and wazirs did not personally have to most subsidiary tu_ iu 
claims; they had the prospect of increased (rather than reduced) annuities; 
and, not least, they still had a country and a dynasty. The simple fact 
remains, moreoverv that whereas Sultan Hashim rejected the Brooke offer, 
he accepted the one made by the United Kingdom. 
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Warner, "a man of exceptional ability". 
11 The oomplexity of his task is 
indicated by the fact that 105 tulin 'claims in chief' and 500 sub-claims 
remained outstanding; but thanks to his energy the tulip issue was finally 
settled. The procedure, after transoription, was 
"to pall in the olaimants; to fix a date for visiting the land, there to 
verify b oundariesy or reoolleotion of b oundariesp on the spot; to verify 
the olaim itself; to note whether oonflioting or overlapping olaims exist; 
and finally to issue a title or redeem the claim if genuine; or rejeot it 
if (it is) olearly insupportable". 12 
The "greatest difficulty" was eaperienoed in persuading tulin owners to 
aocept the compensation offereds "most of them hoped to carry on with 
advances and to leave final settlement to a later date in the hope that 
some future Resident might assess their olaims at an enhanoed value"* 
13 
The Pengiran Bendahara alleged, in mid-1906, that the recent 
treaty was signed by the Sultan only under duress. This olaim was made 
at a time when the wazir was disgruntled beoause he had been passed over 
for the suooession by Sultan Hashim and when he was encouraged by the 
seoond Rajah, who gras bitterly disappointed beoause Bt Government had 
blocked his attempted takeover of Brunei. The word of the wazir was not 
entirely reliable, 
14 
and even a Sarawak offioer like Mr AB Ward believed 
that there was no evidence to rapport the contention of duress. 
15 
Further- 
11. CO 273/502 (59654) Sir L Guillemard as referee on Mr Lee-Warneros 
applioation for a transfer (November 1920). 
12. CO 824/1 Brunei Annual Report 1910, p 12. 
13. CO 531/2 (11169) memorandum by Mr H Chevallier, 9 February 1910. 
14. FO 572/39 MSR MoArthur, "Report on Brunei in 1904", paragraph 68; 
FO 12/126 p 201, MoArthur to Anderson, No 53,9 Ootober 1904, paragraph 
2; CO 144/81 (27240) minute by Stubbs, 25 July 1906; and Co 824/1 
Brunei Annual Report 1910, p 12. 
15. AB Ward, Rajah's Servant (Cornell, 1966), p 103. 
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more when Mr Hewett had used an (unauthorized) threat of force in an 
attempt to iadnoe Sultan Hashim to aooept Sarawak oontrol, the Brunei 
monaroh had not been overawed and did not give way. It is not possible, 
therefore, to substantiate the wazir's allegation. 
3. The British Resident 
Throughout the Residential Era twenty-two offioers held this 
post, giving an average tenure per Resident of approximately 26 months. 
This masks wide discrepancies, however: whereas four Residents were 
merely atop-gaps, serving for only a few months eaohq four others (viz. 
Messrs H Chevallier, GE Cator, EEF Pretty and JO Gilbert) oolleotively 
held the post for approaohing half the entire Residential Era. 
The background of the Residents, as suggested bg the timeohart 
overleaf, was very muoh as expeoted. Attendanoe at publio sohool was 
de rigaeur (but aotp generally, at the most prestigious establishments, 
auch as Eton, Harrow eta). At least twelve proceeded to University (10 
Oxbridge), but quite a high number (six) did not. 
16 Paternal oooupations 
included solioitor? vioarp professor and general, whilst other Residents 
followed their fathers into the Malay= Civil Service (MCS). 
From 1906 to 1936 Residents were junior offioers seoonded from 
Class 111 (1906-15) or Class IV (1915-36) of the MCS. As a type, they 
were young (early 30a) and single, and the Residency in Brunei - which 
was not, at that time, a particularly important post - was nothing like 
16. The statistios overleaf are not quite oomplete. Nineteen Residents 
attended publio sohool (3 n. a. ); whilst, with regard to higher eduoation, 
one attended the Royal Military Academy at Woolwioh (3 n. a. ). 
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the peak of their careers. Many subsequently achieved considerable dis- 
tinotion, most notably Sir RE 'tlirnbull (1905-60)9 who was Governor of 
North Borneo by the time of his retirement. When the Brunei Residency 
was regraded in 1937, a more senior offioer of Class II was appointed. 
The careers of the two each pre-war officers were interrupted by 
internment during the Japanese occupation. 
During the Residential Era Brunei was not a Polioe State, nor 
was any, garrison neoessary, nor did Residents tremble for their lives. 
On the oontrary, they were unarmed, did not require tight seourity and 
remained aooessible to those with a grievanoe. One Resident did meet an 
unfortunate end, howevers in May 1916 Mr EB Maundrell was shot dead when 
about to arrest a drunken Sikh polioeman for the attempted murder of a 
fellow oonstable. 
17 
The motive for the killing does not appear to have 
been politioal; ands if anything, the tragedy oonfirmed the stability of 
the Residential System, because, at the time, there had been no other 
British offioial in the ooiutry.. The Sultan himself was obliged to 
intervene to forestall panio. 
18 
Assistant Residents (see Appendix 2.5) were products of a back- 
ground similar to that of the Residents. Before the Great Warr the 
Assistant Resident was usually the only offioer stationed permanently 
in Brunei, the Resident having his base in neighbouring Labnan. At 
least one pre-War Assistant Resident found the post both attraotive and 
17. See Appendix 1.3. 
18" CO 273/44. (31085) report signed by Dato Roberts, from draft by GE 
Cator, 22 May 1916, paragraphs 6-7. 
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challenging; 
19 but, following Mr Lee-Warners departure in mid-1914, it was 
abolished as a wartime eoonomy measure and was not revived until 1931. 
In 1887 Sir Frederick Weld suggested that a Resident would 
"(require) a love of the work, he must understand natives and their lang- 
uages, he must have taut, temper, firmness and some oommand of money to 
start with. As he wins their... oonfidenoe and they see their true 
interest, they will oome to him for gaidanoe in everything... I do not 
believe that Brunei would be in the least diffioult to govern". 20 
Let us assess how far the offioers serving in Brunei oonformed to this 
model. 
As one of the Eastern Cadetships (1895-1932), to whioh entrance 
Was by competitive examination, the MCS attraoted Oxbridge oandidates of 
a oalibre not greatly inferior to those entering the Some and Indian 
Servioes. Morale, too, was higher than in India during the inter-war 
years beoause there was no serious nationalist ohallenge in Malaya until 
after the Japanese ooonpation. In 1932 the Eastern Cadetships-were 
abolished is an attempt to produce more uniformity in the selection of 
oandidatea to the Colonial Servioe. From 1933, therefore, MCS offioere 
19. "The post of Assistant Resident" - thus Mr Lee-Warner in 1910 - 
"will always prove a post of attraction to any of the junior members of 
the F1(S Civil Service. The unusual sphere and the greater scope afforded 
to an enthusiastio officer will always draw the ambitious worker; and the 
liberal remuneration will always compensate for the somewhat lonely 
situation in which the Assistant Resident may find himself. The lone- 
liness, however, decreases every year; European residents are being 
attracted to Brunei and European plantations are being opened. The 
fut- 
ure is bright... " (CO 824/1 Brunei Annual Report 1910, p 21). Mr Lee- 
Warner was most unusual among MCS officers if he found his salary level 
"liberal" (of* belowq pp 117-8). 
20. CC 144/64 (16254) Weld to CO, 20 June 1887, paragraph 21. Sir 
Frederick Weld (1823-91) was Governor of the Straits Settlements from 
1881-7 and an early advocate of a British Residential System in Brunei. 
He visited the Sultanate in 1887. 
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were ohoaen by rigorous interview (without written examination); but 
only one individual seleoted by this method (Mr WJ Peel, Resident 1946- 
8) served in Brunei. All other Residents up to 1951 had joined the MCS 
in 1932 or earlier (see above, p 112). 
When Mr MoArthnr arrived in Malaya (1895) oadets received an 
annual salary of 1,500 (t144) plus free quarters. 
21 
They then had to 
pass examinations in Malay and to master the colonial regulations and. 
the Indian Penal Code before they oonld beoome Passed Cadets (ý1,8001 
£172). Although officers were required to pass examinations in two of 
the Malayan languages (Malay, Chinese and Tamil), they tended to negleot 
to keep up a knowledge of those in whioh they had passed. Sir Frank 
Swettenha, m suggested that the requirement to learn two languages imposed 
too great a strain upon oadets, 
22 
It was deoidedv therefore, to restriot 
seoond languages to those who proved they would easily oope; in this way,, 
those unlikely to attain more than a superfioial knowledge of them were 
exempted from one. This praotioe does not appear to have been entirely 
suooessful, beoause, in 1905, Sir Frank oommented that Mr MoArthur was 
one of the few officers who had deepened his knowledge of Malay for its 
own sake. 
23 
The problem - apparently even among comparatively senior 
offioers - of linguistio inadequacy, Which reduoed administrative 
effioienoy and created tension with Malay Rulers, did not vanish; and, 
in the late 1920x, the High Commissioner insisted that cadets should 
21, CO 273/247 (16447) Eastern No 67 (1899)- 
22, CO 273/269 (25320) swettenham to 000 No 284 (Straits), 21 June 1901. 
23. CO 273/300 (645 04/05) Swettenham to JAr CP Luoas (1853-1931), 11 
January 1905. 
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receive a oourse of instraotion in Malay at London University, 
24 
The isolation, hot olinate, diffioult terrain, drawbaoks of 
life in an undeveloped oountry and a oonstant susceptibility to illness 
imposed extra strains (but permitted greater independence, whioh appealed 
to an enthusiast such as Mr Lee-Warner) upon British offioers serving in 
Brunei. In those days 
"work had to be done whether siok or not and we all did it. Dootors were 
few - naroes non-existent... (It) was a fan's work then - now (1923) it 
is more a olerk's". 25 
Modern oonvenienoes, suoh as gas and eleotrioity, did not beoome available 
until the late 1920e or 1930s. Brunei Town aoquired a purified water 
supply only, iin 1956.26 Offioers were often insuffioieutly remunerated 
and, oonsequently, had to defer marriage until a oomparatively late age. 
They had little oontaot with oompatriots; and even then oongeaiality 
was not guaranteed. 
27 
Opportunities for reoreatioa were limited and 
oinemay intr oduoed in May 1923, was probably the olosest approaoh Brunei 
24. CO 273/545 (File 52044) Sir Hugh Clifford (1866-1941) to Co, No 167 
(11S/SS), 23 March 1928. (Sir Hugh was Governor/High Commissioner, 1927- 
29). For further details about the MCS, see R Heussler, British Rule in 
Malaya: The Malayan Civil Service and its Predecessors, 1867-1942 (Oxford 
1981) and JG Butoher, The British in Malaya 1880-19411 The Social History_ 
Of a European Community in Colonial South-East Asia (Kuala Lumpur 1979)- 
25- CO 717/30 (19334) EA Dickson (1876-1956) to Sir CP Lucas, 7 May 1923 
and 28 April 1923, Mr Dickson (Assistant Resident 1911-13) suffered from 
malaria., septic sores, and dysentery in Brunei. The 'septio sores' resulted 
from "walking through swamps and not being able to lay up long enough for 
them to heal as I was the sole European official... ". If this was true 
in the 1910s, conditions had improved markedly by the following deoade. 
According to the annual reports of the Medical Department in the 1920s, 
European Government officers were rarely, if ever, ill (Co 824/1). 
260 See below, Chapter 9 (section 4). 
27. Da_ RN Turner SPDK CMG, letters to the author, 16 February 1983 
and 24 February 1983. 
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made to the arts and culture. 
28 
In 1911 a visitor to Malaya noted the 
emptiness of MCS officers' lives outside their work; 
29 
and, in view of 
the difficulty for an administrator to get away from the atmosphere of 
'shop', the prinoipal advantage of the oolonial servioe had to remain 
"the interest of the work itself"30 After the disoovery of the Seria 
oilfield, (1929) living oonditions in Brunei improved further. 
31 
MCS offioers had beoome dissatisfied with their sa, lariesq 
espeoially by the time of the Bucknill review of 1919.32 In Brunei, as 
elsewhere, oonditions worsened daring the Great Wars all leave was oan- 
celled and a severe staff shortage was created by officers volunteering 
for military servioe. 
33 High inflation drove prioes in 1918 to a level 
double that of 1913, creating further discontent* in 1919, therefore, 
a new Boheme of salaries, "whioh represented a oonsiderable advanoe on 
28, CO 824/1 Brunei Annual Report 1923, p 7. See also Brunei Annual 
Report 1 17, p 5; and GE Cat or, "I Remember" in British Malaya (February 
1941), p 160. 
29" CO 273/380 (4233) minute by Stubbs, 10 February 1911. 
30. Sir C Jeffries, The Colonial Empire and its Civil Service (Cambridge 
1938), p 125- 
31. Datuk Turner,, who arrived in Brunei as Assistant Resident in 1940, 
remembered that his official residence in Kuala Belait was less than 
five years old and was far more comfortable than the conditions to which 
he had become accustomed in Malaya. There was electric light, for example, 
"a relief after the pressure lamps of Kuala Pilah which had attracted the 
kelekatu (flying ants) in their thousands". (Letter to the author, 16 
February 1983, enclosing chapter of autobiography). 
32. Other grudges at the end of the nineteenth century included the 
'slowness' of promotion and the claim that many of the highest posts were 
occupied by outsiders. It was noticed that a large number of officers 
seemed to the immediately after retirement, which was fixed at the age 
of 55. 
33. In Brunei the post of Assistant Resident was abolished. Mr, later 
Captain, TS King (East Surrey Regiment), formerly Superintendent of 
Chandu Monopoly in Brunei was killed in action in 1917; whilst Mr C Hummel, 
a naturalized British citizen of Bavarian origin who had prepared the first 
report on Brunei forestry in 1914, was drummed out of the FMS service because of the attitude of his colleagues. 
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any previous oonoeption of remuneration in the oolonial servioe"p was 
introdnoed, providing a 22-tear timesoale, ranging from ß490 to L19400 
(with efficiency bars). 
34 In 1906 the Imperial treasury paid the 
Resident's salary of A600 (95,143). This fixed subsidy, was maintained 
until 1927, although the Resident's salary inoreased meanwhile. To put the 
matter into perspeotive, an unskilled labourer employed by the Brunei 
PWD in 1908 was paid 35 cents for an eight hoar shift. 
35 
4. The Residential. System 
The British Resident was the "agent and representative" of EX 
Government in Brunei. 
36 
Appointed by the High Commissioner without ref- 
erenoe to (or subsequent approval from) Londoa, 
37 
he held offioe (theor- 
etioally) "during the pleasure of His Majesty". 
38 Within Brunei the 
Resident was the ohief executive, judioial and legislative offioer. He 
eaeroised the "general funoti ons of administration"t sat in the highest 
oourt of justioev and drafted legislation. In the words of one Whitehall 
olerkv the Resident was "praotioally the Sultan's prime Minister and 
Chief Justioe oombined". 
39 
The Sultan was required by Treaty to aocept the Resident's 
"advioe" on all matters within Brunei exoept those affeoting the Muh- 
34. Jeffries, . oit., p 38. 
35. CO 824/1 Brunei Annual Report 1908, p 9. 
36. Brunei Annual Report 1946. p 82 (reproduoed in Appendix l. l, below). 
37. CO 144/81 (28124) Brunei Order in Council 1906, paragraph 31 and 
CO 537/1614 minute by Mr N Mayle (1899-? 1981), 12 March 1946.6. 
38. CO 144/81 (28124) Brunei Order in Council 1906, paragraph 
39. CO 531/1 (5867) minute by Risley, 27 February 1907" 
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ammadan religion. The power of enforoement had been obtained deliber- 
ately beoause, without it, advioe to the Brunei monaroh would have been 
"of little use". 
' Henoe the Resident was the ohief exeoutive officer 
in Brunei. Under the enaotments of 1906 and 1908, the new Court of the 
Resident was the highest in the land. It had been agreed in 1905, how- 
ever, that "no judioial powers may be exeroised and no deoision on any 
matter may be given in Brunei unless it purports to be with the approval 
of the Sultan and the Resident". 
41 
All legislation was drafted by the 
Resident, and the texts, based usually on enactments passed in Malaga, 
were soratinized by the law offioers of the Straits Settlements. 
Brunei questions referred from the Resident were dealt with in 
the first instanoe by the 'Seoretary to the High Commissioner' 
" 
who had 
an office and a small establishment in Singapores 
"His offioe is the High Commissioner's Seoretariat for the Unfederated 
Malay States (UMS) and oonduots any oorrespondenoe with the Colony 
(i. e. 
the Straits Settlements), the Federated Malay States (Fl(S) or any partio- 
ular UMS in matters affeoting the UMS as a whole or as a part". 43 
Brnnei, therefore, name to be regarded administratively as one of the 
UMS. 4 The post of 'Secretary' was one of the more responsible (Class II) 
in the MCS and its holder was expected to take decisions in the name of 
the High Commissioner. 
45 
40. FO 12/122 p 56ff, memorandum by Mr WH Treaoher (1849-1919) to Sir ? 
Swettenham, 6 July 1903, pare' 8; and XoArthur, "Report", pars' 104- 
41. See p 559 (below), Appendix 1.12 "Enclosure B"', clause 6. 
42. See p 610 (below), Appendix 2-3- 
43. Co 865/21 SW Jones CMG (1888-1962), "Motes on the Government and 
Administration of Malaya". 
44. CW Harrison, Some Notes on the Government Services in British Malaya 
(MSI A 1929), p 88. See also (below), p 268 (fn) and p 456. 
45. CO 717/137 (File 51670) Sir TSW Thomas (1879-1962) to C0, (Malayan 
Establishment), confidential, 29 March 1939, paragraph 4" 
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The High Commissionership itself was held ex-offioio by the 
Governor of the Straits Settlements until 1941.46 This officer, described 
in 1908 as "praotically Governor"47 of Brunei, was responsible to the 
Colonial Offioe for the proper administration of the Sultanate. Sir 
John Anderson (HC 1904.11) pointed out that in the east there was 
"no practical distinction between the powers of a High Commissioner and 
those of a Governor. As High Commissioner of the WS (the UMS did not 
yet have British Advisers in 1908) my authority and powers in those 
territories are as extensive, and my responsibility for the administration 
as oomplete, as within the Colony of which I am Governor". 48 
But Brunei's poverty and oomparative lack of importance, on the one hand, 
and the pressure upon the High Commissioner of more important business, 
on the other, restrioted the direot interference of High Commissioners 
in Brunei, as recalled by Mr GE Cator (Resident 1916-21) in 19411 
"Brunei was a delightful post for a young officer. The Resident was 
responsible direct (sic) to the High Commissioner, who had other fish to 
fry than meticulous attention to the small affairs of Brunei, so he left 
the Resident to his own devices in the comfortable assurance that lack of 
money would be a stopper on any exuberant or expensive schemes". 49 
It should not be supposed that Residents had a oompletely free 
hand. The High Commissioner scrutinized the budget estimates and 
legislation and aoted as an appellate authority from administrative 
deoisions by the Resident. The High Commissioner required to be kept 
informed of all important events in Brunei. One Resident reoaliss 
"I had to submit a monthly diary of things offioial and unofficial to 
46. See Appendix 2.2 (below, p 609). 
47. Co 531/1 (2916) minute by Stubbs, 27 January 1908. 
48. CO 144/79 (35852) Anderson to FOB 7 September 1905, paragraph 6. 
49. G113 Catorp "I Remember" in British Malsyat February 1941, p 160. one 
of Mr Cator's first duties as Resident was to superintend the execution 
of his predecessor's murderer. 
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the High Commissioner. From time to time he would oomment on them or 
ask for further information". 50 
The same Resident adds: 
"It was not mar experience that instructions were given on taking up any 
new appointment. There was always a period of overlap, during which 
one had the opportunity of meeting one's predecessor and discussing the 
current policy". 51 
The prinoipal objects of the Residents inoluded the maintenance 
of peace and law, the provision of honest, impartial and efficient admin- 
istration, the execution of justios without fear or favour, the maintea- 
anoe of sound finanoe, the fostering of economic development, and the 
Preservation of racial harmony. A cardinal principle of British policy 
was that administration should be run as inexpensively as possible and 
that the country should be self-supporting. Henne social progress (the 
provision of medioall and ednoational faoilities) did not beoome a priority 
until the 1930x, or, arguably, the 1950s, In general, the Resident was 
to run the country smoothly and competently, raising the least amount of 
difficulty for the High Commissioner. 
Ultimate responsibility rested with SM Government in London. 
The Colonial Offioe exeroised a broad overview. It examined the annual 
estimates, demanded annual reports of sooial and eoonomio oonditions 
(for presentation to Parliament) and quarterly reports on the oil 
industry, soratinized legislation, negotiated with oil oompanies, and 
supervised Brunei's relations with neighbouring British proteotorates. 
Although the Colonial Offioe laid down the broad direotion of policy, it 
50. Mr Ja Blaok, letter to the author, 12 April 1983, paragraph 2. 
51. Ibid., paragraph 3. 
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made no attempt to interfere with the detailed administration of Brunei. 
Distanoe alone made this as impraotioal propositions in 1906 the steam- 
ship took a few days to get from Labuan to Singapore; and from Singapore 
to London took about three weeks. Seoretaries of State personally min- 
uted papers relating to Brunei on rare oooasions and it was not until 
1955 that a Colonial Secretary actually visited the oountry. 
The best summary of the position appears to be that the Resident 
exeroised executive power (delegated from the High Commissioner) and that 
policy was deoided by the Resident subject to overrule by the High Comm- 
issioner, who in turn was subject to overrule by the Colonial Office. 
London never reaohed important deoieions, however, without prior referenoe 
to the High Commissionerp who, likewise, depended upon the Resident for 
information and guidanoe. The minutiae of day-today administration 
were left to the Resident; the more important matters were referred to 
the High Commissioner; and strategio planndng was the funotion of the 
Colonial Offioe. Although the Sultan and wazirs exeroised a deliberative 
role by virtue of their membership of the State Counoilq they took little 
Part or interest in the administration. 
The Residential Systeme initially, was indeed of a most simple 
oharaoter. As late as 1932 only, five Fluropean offioers were stationed 
in Brunei. At first the Resident, Director of Public Works, Chief Pol- 
ice Officer and doctor were shared with Labuan. The Assistant Resident 
(1906-14; reinstated 1931-) and Superintendent of Chanda Monopoly, later 
Treasurer (1913-19), were stationed in Brunei itself. From the 1920s the 
link with Labuan was gradually severed. A separate Resident for Brunei 
123 
was appointed, briefly in 1915-179 and permanently from 1921. Similarly, 
Brunei aoquired a resident State Medioal Officer'in 1929. A Brunei Pol- 
ioe Foroe was founded in 1921, although it oontiuued to be supervised 
from Labuan. Other departments were headed by non-British personnels in 
the mi. d-1920s, for example, a Malay headed the Public Works Department 
and from 1910/11 until 1929 a Chinese doubled as postmaster and ohief 
(medical) dresser. The Wireless Department, created in 1921, was run by 
British offioera until 1928, when a Malay was appointed instead. 
52 
When 
specialist advice aas required, partioularly for departments not led by 
British offioers, an expert is the field oonoerued woald be despatohed 
from Halaya. 
53 
In addition there were annual audits oonduoted by the 
Audit or-General of the Straits Settlements Until 1920, and annual inspeot- 
ions of the police by the Inspect or-General of the Straits Settlements' 
Foroe. 
The initial oombination of the Brunei Residenoy with that of 
Labaaa was a matter of administrative ooaveaienoe for the British. Bru- 
nei and Labuan remained entirely separate oountries, the former a Xalay 
Sultanate under British Proteotion, the latter a Crown Colony attaohed 
to the Straits Settlements. In September 1914, Mr RJ Wilkinson (1867- 
1941), the aoting High Commissioner, deoided that some re-organizatioa 
52. For lists of officials, see Appendices 2 and 3. 
53. The first such visits appear to have taken place in 1914, when Mr 
Hummel (of. fn. 33, above) made "a preliminary inspection of the timber 
resources of the State" and Mr JB Sorivenor (1877-1950) made a geological 
survey. Other such experts were FH Dupree (wireless, 1919-21), Br AL 
Hoops (health, 1921), Dr H Tempany (agriculture, 1932), CCL Durant 
(forestry, 1932), Es Willesbourn (mines, 1932), N Jones (labour, 1937), 
RFC Markham (education, 1938) and GD Boissier (water, 1938)" 
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was neoessary. The Resident in Labuan, it was olaimed, laoked the looal 
knowledge of the Assistant Resident on the spot in Brunei 
"and is apt either to trust too much to that officer or to interfere 
too much in Brunei affairs. The Assistant Resident has to visit out- 
stations and is liable to be absent from headquarters at inconvenient 
times. The Superintendent of Chandu Monopoly (an office created at the 
end of 1912) has too little to do and draws a salary which would not 
attract a man competent to be the Assistant Resident's Deputy during 
that officer's absences from Brunei (Town)". 54 
Mr Wilkinson decided that the beat solution would be to end Brunei's 
oonneotion with Labnan and to appoint a Resident for Brunei alone,, 
abolishing the Assistant Resident's post. The salary of the Assistant 
Resident would be sufficient "to ensure the services of a pinked junior 
offioer who would be able satisfaotorily to fill the position of Resident 
in Brunei".. A senior offioer was unsuitable for "a post involving tiring 
outdoor work and long journeys on foot", He suggested that the Superin- 
tendent of Chandu Monopoly might be replaoed by a Treasurer paid a higher 
aalarg. Certain other savings would be possible (in Labuan). 
This scheme, thought to have originated with Mr Lee-Warner, 
was approved beoause it was oonsidered to be "sound besides being eoon- 
amioal"". 
55 But in August 1915 Mr FW Douglas, who had jest oompleted 
his term as Resideatt suggested that the administrative separation of 
Brunei and Laboraa had been a mistake. It had led to a oertain dupli- 
cation of expenditure (e. g. separate launohee); and the "identity of 
interest" du. e to oee offioer oontrolling both planes was lost. Another 
argument for amalgamation was to improve the level of interest of British 
54. CO 531/6 (38332) RJ Wilkinson CMG to Colonial Offioe, No 8 (Brunei), 
2 September 1914, paragraph 3- 
55s ibid., minute by Mr JRW Robinson (1880-1918), 19 November 1914. 
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administratorss an offioer stationed in Labuan "soon gets slaok" through 
lack of work whereas his oolleague in Brunei "feels the effect of soli- 
tude". Mr Douglas reoommended that the proposed re-oombined unit should 
then be planed directly under the Colonial Office beoauae the existing 
praotioe of dealing with Sarawak and the oil oompanies via Singapore 
retarded progress. 
56 Mr Collins at the Colonial Offioe suspeoted that 
Mr Douglas himself was angling for the proposed post of Governor of 
Brunei-Labuant 
"but the prospeot of our having to find a grant-in-aid to make up the 
defioits is not attraotive and the idea is out of the question at 
present". 57 
Following the Labuan Resident's departure to serve in HM Foroes (1917), 
both Residenoies were held onoe again by the same offioer (Mr Cator). 
This situation persisted until the latter left in early 1921. The post 
of Treasurer, suggested in 1914, had been abolished in 1919, the Resident 
taking over the duties of Mr Goldfinoh, the original inoumbent. 
i5. 
Resident and Sultans "The Residents advioe must be promptly followed". 
One of the prinoipal responsibilities of the Resident was to 
maintain oordial relations with the Sultan. 
58 
In January 1906 Sir John 
56. CO 531/9 (37469) Mr Fit Douglas (1874-1953) to CO, 12 August 1915- 
57. Ibid., minute by Collins, 20 August 1915- 
589 During the Residential Era the Sultans of Brunei weres 
May 1885 - May 1906, Hashim Jalilul Ahamal-din (b ? 1820/5). 
May 1906 - Sep 1924, Sir Muhammad Jemalul Alam KCMG (b ? 1889) 
Sep 1924 - Jun 1950s Sir Ahmad Tajuddin KBE CMG (b 1913) 
Jun 1950 - 0ot 19671 Sir Omar Ali Saifuddin III GCVO KCMG (b 1914; 
abdicated 1967). 
NB. The two wazirs anted as Joint Regents from 1906 to 1918 and again 
from 1924 to 1931. 
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Anderson noted that Mr McArthur had "evidently won the oonfidenoe of 
(Sultan Hashim)"; 59 and the first Resident himself oommented that the 
weight of his (Sultan Hashim's) authority, when bolstered by that of the 
Resident, was of great assistance in the "peaoeable introduotion of 
reforms and changes". 
60 
Unfortunately, Sultan Hashim was already an 
ootogenarian and his death in May 1906 left no indigenous authority of 
suffioient influenoe to prevent intrigues against the Resident by the 
Pengiran Bendahara. Sir John Anderson reported that 
"Brunei Malays are far from trustworthy and are fond of intrigue, and 
would be only too glad if, by playing off the Rajah against HM Govern- 
ment, they could secure some personal gain". 61 
He was sure, however, "that the new order of things is aooeptable to all 
but those whose powers of extortion and oppression have been olipped and 
the few who live by intrigue". 
62 
This view was not unreasonable. 
In August 1906 the young Sultan, Muhammad Jemalul Alamo and the 
Regents presented a list of five demands to the High Commissioner, of 
which only one (that the Brunei flag should fly on Government buildings) 
was oonsi dered sufficiently reasonable to be accepted (see also, below, 
PP 145-7). Sir John Anderson insisted on the principle that "his friend" 
(the Sultan) should seek "advice and information, in accordance with the 
Treaty..., from the Resident only". 
63 
59. CO 144/80 (5578) Anderson to CO, No 1 (Labuan), 25 January 1906, 
Paragraph 18. 
60. CO 824/1 Brunei Annual Report 1906, p 15- 
61- CO 144/80 (35280) Anderson to CO, No 13 (Brunei), 27 August 1906, 
Paragraph 4. 
62. Ibid., paragraph 5- 
63. CO 144/80 (36822) Anderson to HH Sultan Jemal, 7 Ootober 1906, p 3. 
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After Mr McArthur's departure from Brunei in April 1908 oonsid- 
arable friotion arose between a new British Resident, Mr JF Owen (who had 
a good reputation for his dealings with Malaye)64 and the Sultan because 
of the new Laud Codes. Tension lasted during 1909 and 1910. The original 
Land Enaotment had been promulgated without inoident in 1907; but in 1908 
-9 Mr Owen wished to replace this with an entirely new law rendering the 
issue of titles less elaborate and oostly. 
65 
After a delay lasting a 
year (1908-9) the Sultan was "advised" to pass the proposed legislation. 
This he did, but only under protest. Subsequently, after he had hindered 
the implementation of the new law, his monthly allowanoe was halved 
(from August 1910) and he was warned that unless an improvement in his 
behaviour was "patently and swiftly assured" it would be necessary to 
remove him from his existing position* 
66 
Sultan Jenaal deolared that all State Land was his own property 
and that the Government was not empowered by the 1905-6 Treaty to alien- 
ate it. Upon being confronted with oontrary evidence - his father's 
aoceptanoe, as a personal entitlement, of a small area around bis own 
house free of oharges (of. p 108, above) - he deolared that Sultan Hashim"s 
oonsent to this olause (in the dooument subsidiary to the main treaty) was 
"improper". 
67 
Sultan Jema2 complained, Purthery that he was required to 
aooept diotation rather than advioe from the Resident. He requested that 
64. CO 531/2 (40185) minute by Stubbs, 14 Deoember 1909; and CO 531/1 
(30998) Anderson to CO, No 4 (Brunei), 30 July 1908, paragraph 7. 
65" CO 531/2 (34102) JF Owen (1868-1942) to 'Secretary to High Com- 
missioner", oonfidential, 10 September 1909, paragraph 2. 
66. CO 531/2 (26804) Chevallier to Anderson, oonfi dentialp 12 July 1910. 
67. As note 65, paragraph B. 
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he should receive an increase in his annuity, a share in the land revenue, 
and the rents paid by the Rajah for his two ooal mines. 
68 
Finally, it 
was feared that he intended to repudiate legislation (inoluding the Courts 
taotment of 1908) passed during Mr MoArthur's term of offioe. His High- 
ness, judging from his own words,, aoted purely out of finanoial greeds 
he made no objeotions to State ownership of land on Muslim religious 
grounds (as ooourred, for example, in Trengganu in the 19200). 
69 
The British authorities adopted a firm line with Sultan Jemal 
beoause the land issue raised a prinoiple oonsidered to be fundamental 
to the entire Residential System. Deoisive aotion was neoessart to make 
the Sultan realize that "the Resident's advice must be implicitly and 
promptly followed and acted upon". 
7° 
His Highness was informed that the 
Land Code could not be revoked nor could his allowance be increased or 
suppleinenteds it was paid, indeed, "only so long as my friend follows all 
the advioe given by the Resident who is empowered to oarry on the admin- 
istration of the Country of Brunei". 
71 
Mr Chevallier noted that 
"affairs (there) were in danger of slipping baokward rather than forward 
and that the sooner the Augean Stables are cleaned, the sooner we may 
look forward to a olear and progressive renaissanoe". 72 
The Sultan had inoited some Kedayans to resist the new land 
legislation. In 1909 the matter was brought to a head beoause approval 
was granted by the Resident to a number of Earopeaus to establish rubber 
68. Sir Charles paid annually, x$2,000 for his Broolceton mine and 
$1,200 
for the one at Buang Tawar. 
69. Cf. H Sutherland, "The Taming of the Trengganu Elite" in R McVey (ed. ), 
Booth East Asian Transitions (New Haven, Conn., 1978), esp. pp 73-80- 
70. CO 531/2 (34102) Owen to Anderson, 10 September 1909, paragraph 12. 
71. Ibid., Anderson to HH Sultan Jemal, 17 September 1909. 
72, CO 531/2 (28323) Chevallier to Anderson, confidential, 26 July 1910, 
Paragraph 9. 
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estates immediately outside Brunei Town and also in Temburong distriot. 
Some Kedayans, by oontrast, boasted that all the hinterland was theirs 
and that so long as they paid poll tax no man oould enter or oooupy areas 
over part of whioh they had strong olaims. A large majority of the head- 
men were reassured that the Government did not intend to permit them to 
lose their plantations of jungle fruit trees althoagh it was asserted at 
the same time that "wasteful methods" of shifting oultivation were grad- 
ually to be ourbed. A first attempt to settle the Zedayan issue was on 
the point of suooessp when it was undermined by the Sultan. At a State 
Council meeting in July 1910, attended by about 500 Kedayans73 and their 
ohiefs, Mr Chevallier advised the sultan to inform them that the Govern- 
went intended to safeguard their tenure of land under unusually favour- 
able terms. His Highness insisted - without any apparent foundation - 
that land rent equivalent toi or in plaoe of, poll tax would be a breach 
of the treaty. 
74 
Mr Chevallier replied that the Government meant to remit 
poll tax to all landowners who, if Kedayans, would reoeive fifteen aores 
on perpetual tenure per man for two dollars land rent annually, whereas 
at present each Sedayan paid two dollars poll tax annually with no return 
at all. The Resident feared that "His Highness endeavoured, by oonstant 
prevarioations, to set at naught my advioev whioh he does not oonsider 
oonduoive to his own aggrandizement and profit". 
T5 
The rednotion by half 
73. In 1911 4,931 Kedayans were enumerated in Brunei (of. P 7P above). 
Henoep about 10% of these people were present on this oooasion. 
74. In any oases poll tax, like land rent, would have had to be paid to 
the State rather than to the Sultan, so why did he make an issue of it? 
Presumably, he wanted poll tax to be paid to himself, though this is not 
stated in the papers. 
75. CO 531/2 (26804) Chevallier to Anderson, oonfidential, 12 July 1910. 
Cf, the objection made in note 74 (above). Mr Chevallier oontinued: 
130 
of his allowance from August 1910 was expected, therefore, to have a 
salutary effect. 
The Kedayans, for their part, appeared to have developed a 
"superstitious dread" of the word #demarcation#. 
76 
By the end of 1910, 
however, praotioally all the headmen were willing to follow the direot- 
ions of the Government. The line of antioa adopted was to mark out 
eeleoted tracts known as Kedayan Reservations of unspecified area for 
which no title was to be issued unless speoifioally requested. Mr 
Chevallier reported: 
"His Highness instigated the Kedayans to disobey orders. He then turned 
round upon them when he found that my intention to remind him of the 
treaty obligation was no longer to be trifled with. The Kedayans, 
naturally, looked upon His Highness as having betrayed them". 77 
Whatever the initial diffioultiea, the population (espeoially 
"... in agriculture and systematic land tenure, free from the exactions 
of His Highness and e rann, Brunei can find its one hope for future 
progress, and... if His Highness will not prove loyal in furthering our 
objects to this end, Brunei will not advance". 
76. "The root of the trouble", Mr Lee-Warner commented, "lay in this: 
to deal successfully with such auspicious natives, time was needed; and 
time, in the present instance, was not available. The European applicants 
had justice on their side to a large degree, when they claimed that their 
applications had been approved and that they were entitled to enter on the 
land. The Kedayan, suspicious by natures and accustomed to continued 
cruelty and oppression under the old regime in Brunei, feared that he was 
about to be driven out. Frightened by vague and untrue rumours 
disseminated by certain disloyal persons, he saw an enemy in everyone 
who approached him" (CO 824/1 Brunei Annual Report 1910, p 13). Earlier, 
Mr Lee-Warner had commented that the Bedayans had power, in the past, to 
"make or unmake" Sultans. The present writer is unable to reconcile 
these statements. Again, if Kedayans suffered "continued cruelty and 
oppression", why did some of them at least support the Sultan's 
opposition to land settlement? And why should the Sultan have looked 
to them for such backing in the first place? 
77. CO 531/3 (2874) 'Chevalli er to 'Secretary to High commissioner', 
confidential, 12 December 1910, paragraph 2 (i). 
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8edayans) began eagerly to take up land. 
78 
A change was notioed in the 
Sultans the Kedayan issue was settled, he no longer opposed land settle- 
meat, he pointed out his own tulin olaims, and he withdrew his buffaloes, 
whioh had been oausing damage to the property of other landholders. In 
the past the young Sultan had been dominated by the Regents. 
79 
His intro- 
duotioa of a subjeot oouveyed the impression that "it has been foroed 
upon him by others and his statements resemble the repetition of a lesson 
learnt by heart". 
80 
By Deoember 1910, however, his demeanour had ohanged 
oompletelys, he was now friendly and far more approachable. The Assistant 
Resident believed that 
"he is beginning to aot for himself, that he is less tied by his former 
evil counsellors and that he is beginning to believe in the honesty of 
purpose of the advisers sent to him". 81 
Mr Chevallier dedaoed that a "new era" had beguns the former distrust 
had been overcome, the r at were "entirely loyal"v most of the pew 
were learning to respect British motives and the Sultan, "just more than 
a lad"9 had "learnt his lesson". 
82 
Henoe his full allowanoey out in 
August 1910, was restored from January 1911. 
After the oonolusion of the land dispute, UK-Brunei relations 
78. See bel owe p 211. 
79. On 22 September 1909 Sir John Anderson had stated precisely the 
opposite. At that time the Sultan was "nominally still under the Regenoy 
of the Resident (sio) and of the (two wazirs) but his native guardians 
seldom see himiand appear to have little influence with him" (CO 531/2: 
34102). Sinoe Sir John supposed that the Resident was one of the Regents, 
his statement may safely be disregarded. 
80. CO 531/1 (46522) JF Owen to 'Secretary to High Commissioner', go 126 
(Branei), 13 November 1906, paragraph 3. 
81" CO 531/3 (2874) Chevallier to 'Seoretary to High Commissioner', 
confidential, 12 December 1910, paragraph 3. 
82. Ibid., paragraphs 4-5" 
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did indeed improve rapidly. Evidenoe of increasing oo-operation dates 
from as early as 1911, when the Sultan's "active and energetic" assistance 
alone made possible the taking of a oensus of population. 
83 
A further 
sign of improved relations came in March 1913, when the $2,500 which had 
been withheld from the Sultan's allowanoe for the period Augast-Deoember 
1910, was restored to him. The monarch's behaviour sinoe the autumn of 
1910 had been "exemplary"; and the High Commissioner, who visited Brunei 
in 1913, reoommended His Highness for the CMG to "show that iii Government 
reoognize and appreoiate this ohange"". 
84 
In aooepting the honour, Sultan 
Jemal pledged hin determination "not to separate myself from the Govern- 
meat of HM the Bing", 
85 
a pledge of friendship repeated on the outbreak 
of the First World War, and again on the oommenoement of hostilities 
between the United Kingdom and Muslim Tarkey. 
86 
The Regency had persisted long beyond Sultan Jemal's minority 
(he was born in 01889). Installation fully in offioe as Yang Dipertuan 
(Overlord, crowned Sultan) was delayed by custom, until approved by the 
people through certain of their major chiefs. 
87 
In the summer of 1917 
83. Mr Stubbs noted that "His Highness seems really to have turned over 
a new leaf" (CO 531/3,34002). A little earlier Sultan Jemal contributed 
%50 towards the celebrations in Labuan connected with the coronation of 
George Vs "an unusual sign of grace on the part of this undesirable young 
man", Mr Stubbs minuted (CO 531/38 20100). 
84. CO 447/91 (14293) Sir A Young to CO, 23 October 1913 (enclosed in 
Young to CO9 21 March 1914)- 
85. Co 447/91 (50400) Sultan to Acting High Commissioner, 21 August 
1914. See also Co 447/91 (67). 86. CO 824/1 Brunei Annual Report 1915, p 121 "Prayers for the triumph 
of the Allies are offered daily in the mosque" (in Brunei Town). Yet 
Mecca was still nominally part of the Ottoman Empire at that time. 
87. CO 717/143 (File 51908) Sir TSW Thomas to CO, UMS (Brunei) confident- 
ial, 13 January 1940, paragraph 1. 
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the State Council "spontaneously" suggested to the Resident that Sultan 
Jemal should be crowned. Mr Cator agreed that the Regency served no 
useful purpose beoause the Pengiran Bendahara, who died a few months 
later, was "blind, deaf and senile" whereas the new Pengiran Pemanoha 
possessed "the intelleot and attainments of a ohild". On the oontrary, 
Mr Cator argued, the Regenoy "derogates from the position of the Sultan 
and perpetuates the objeotionable tradition of the semi-regal dignities 
appertaining to the great ohiefs". 
88 
Mr Cator reoommended that, sinoe 
real power was then in the hands of the Resident, 
"it should I think be our polioy first to assure ourselves of the Sultan's 
loyalty and then to foster and support his prestige as against that of the 
great houses". 89 
The 1918 Coronation, whioh marked the oonolusion of the Regency, 
illustrated the revival of the Brunei monarobl. JLr MoArthur, who 
attended the ceremony as the High Commissioner's representative, reported 
that the enthusiasm and excitement were so intense that "no spectator 
could have failed to be thrilled by it". 
90 
It would not be enough to 
argue that Sir Muhammad Jemal ECMQ (as he besame in 1920) had simply 
become a more complete British puppet. Pirstv there had been a definite 
development in the Saltan's oharaoter, as Mr MoArthur noted in 1918t 
"When I left Brunei in 1908 he was a shy and rather olumsy youth whom it 
seemed impossible to interest in any matter brought before him. He has 
developed daring the last ten years into a young man of intelligence and 
the courtesy of his demeanour creates a most favourable impression". 91 
88. CO 531/11 (50598) GE Cator to High Commissioner, No 2 (ooafidential), 
30 April 1917, paragraph 5- 
89. Ibid. 9 paragraph 6. 90. CO 531/12 (38835) MSH NoArthur to Seoretar7 to High Commissioner,. 31 
Ka' 1918, paragraph 7- 
91* Ibid., paragraph 11. 
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The monarch now took the keenest interest in the country's advancement, 
as shown, for example, by his enooaragement of ednoation and his support 
for agricultural and vaccination campaigns. Secondly, alliance with the 
British strengthened the Sultan's position within Brunei, particularly 
relative to the wazirs. Sultan Hashim's ministers had been territorial 
magnates beyond effective royal ooutrol; His Highness himself was penni- 
less and a pawn of usurersv espeoially Jawatan Abu Bakar; and no-one, 
even in the capital, paid muoh attention to his ordere. By 1924, however, 
a completely new situation obtained. Sultan Jemal had a reliable source 
of itoome; a loan from the Government, at a reasonable rate of interest, 
92 
helped him to redeem cession monies and esoape from the olutohes of 
extortionate money-lenders (the Jawatan had died in 1912). In addition, 
territorial power having been removed from the wazirs, they had been 
rednoed to pensioners of the State and their relative power had diminished 
in proportion as that of the Sultan had been bolstered by the British. 
A suooession straggle was unthinkable (of. pp 473-6, below). The 
monaroh's prestige was enhanoed by his visit to Singapore in 1922 (the 
first modern Brunei monaroh to venture beyond Labnan); by the visit of 
the Prince of Wales to Brunei in Nay 1922; and by the move from the old 
palace in the River Village to a new one on dry land, also in 1922.93 
In short, a remarkable regeneration had ooourred einoe 1905 when it had 
seemed impossible for the Sultanate to survive at all. 
In 1924 malaria olaimed the lives of the Sultan's seoond wife 
92. The loan totalled $41,000 at 7% interest (of. p 20, fn 139 above). 
93. CO 824/1 Brunei Annual Report 1922, p 15 (paragraph 112). 
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and their two young children. The Sultan himself was said to have con- 
tasted the disease; certainly he died in September 1924. The late 
monaroh - formerly (1909) "an ignorant and selfish youth" quite unfitted 
to oooupy the position he held and without "ans single redeeming point 
in his oharaoter"94 - had beoome, by 1924, a "most loyal friend" of AM 
Government and by his premature death "the State has lost a dignified 
and enlightened raler". 
95 
It was during his reign that the regeneration 
of the Brunei monarchy began and the foundations for the present-day 
(1985) royal autooraoy were laid. 
6. The State Council 
In Brunei, the State Council, originally the Sultan's advisory 
body, was taken up and adapted by the British after 1906. In Perak the 
equivalent oounoil had been seen as "a great safety valve"; and it proved 
suoh a suooess that "similar ooanoils were instituted in each of the 
Malay States and the procedure in all is identioal". 
96 
The composition of the Brunei State Council fluotuated between 
a nadir of five members in 1913 and a peak of 23 in 1925. In 1927, at 
the request of the Resident, the oonstitution of the Council was altered 
and its numbers reduoed to tens97 these oomprised the Sultan (who pre- 
sided), the Resident, the two wazirs and three other Malay chiefs, the 
94. CO 531/2 (34102) JF Owen to Anderson, 10 September 1909, para. 13- 
95- CO 824/1 Brunei Annual Report 1924, p 15 
96. The following section is based upon RH Hickling, "Memorandum upon 
Brunei Constitutional History and Practice", unpublished manuscript, 
confidential, 2 January 1955 (oopy courtesy of Awang Fassoff Agaki). 
97. CO 824/1 Brunei Annual Report 1927, p 18. The following year the 
Council had only eight members (Brunei Annual Report 1928, p 24). 
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Capitan China ?a and two members appointed by the Sultan with the Res- 
ideat's approval. Dr Hiokling (then a law offioer) oommented in 1955 
that this format was not adhered to strictly (see fn. 97, above). 
The "supreme authority" in Brunei was vested in the Sultan-in- 
Counoil. Its assent was required for the enaotmeat of legislation and 
all important questions of poiioy affecting the administration of the 
State were supposed to be referred to it. Although the funotions of 
the State Council had never been olearly defined, 
99 its prinoipal role, 
undoubtedly, was as a legislatures all new laws were passed by the Sultan- 
ins-Council subjeot to the approval of the High Commissioner. The State 
Counoil also exeroised extremely minor judicial. and executive functions. 
In the judicial sphere, it heard appeals from the Court of the Kathi 
(Muslim religious judge) and its oonfirmation was required for the ezeo- 
ration of death sentenoes. The right to approve appointments in the *Bru- 
nei Administrative Service' carrying a salary above #150 a month in 1940 
is cited as an example of executive powers exercised by the State Coanoil. 
Special expenditure had always required the approval of the State Counoil. 
98. The first mention of the Capitan China as a member came on 14 July 
1921. Presumably this was Check Boon Sick (see Chapter 5). Mr JG Black 
comments that the Capstan China, the "foremost Chinese", acted as spokes- 
man and settled civil disputes among the Chinese, "which of course had 
no legal force" (letter to the authors 11 June 1983, paragraph 3)- 
99. In a letter to the Saiten dated 22 September 19521, the then Resident 
claimed at times to have been "perplexed to know whether a certain matter 
should or should not be referred to Council. The Council undoubtedly is 
an advisory body; as I see its it is there to advise (the Sultan) on 
matters of general policy amongst which, I suppose, must be included our 
legislation. I do not think it was intended, however, that Council 
should deal with detailed administration". (Letter quoted by Dr Hiokling, 
loch,, Paragraph 52). 
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There was no case on record of a Sultan acting contrary to the advice 
of the Council, Dr Hickling commented in 1955" 
Once the British Residential System had become fully estab- 
lished (i. e. by the end of 1910), the State Counoil beoame little more 
than a rubber stamp for the Resident. Mr JG Blaok, relying upon a memory 
of events 45 years earlier, stated that the financial and social policy 
which he devised in 1938 (see Chapter 79 below), was not a matter which 
would have been referred either to the Sultan or the State Coaaoil; 
100 
whilst Datuk RN Turner remembers: 
"The State Counoil was nothing more than a rubber stamp. It dealt with 
legislation, finanoial provision and matters of polioy, but in the only 
one I attended it was all over in ten minutes... ". 101 
Originally meetings of the State Counoil were held for the 
transaction of such business as there might be. Such oooasions were 
extremely rares and it was diffioult to get members to speak. In 1909 
the Resident oommented: 
"Meetings of the Council are but rarely necessary or advisable in the 
present state of Brunei. Their old age precludes the presence of the 
Pen rann, Bendahara and Pemanoha, and the attitude of the other leading 
nobles shows that as yet they are incapable of forming any opinion for 
themselves, the discussion of which might tend to the benefit of the 
country". 102 
BY 1924 matters had advaaaed somewhats 
"These meetings (of the State Counoil) are attended with a good deal of 
oerernony and hitherto it has been difficult to get the lesser ministers 
to voioe their opinions at all, though an improvement in this respect 
was noticeable during the more recent meetings". 103 
100. Mr JG Black, letter to the author, 28 September 1983, paragraph 1. 
(Mr Black could not recall drawing up the social and economic policy). 
101. P_uk RN Turner, letter to the author, 24 February 1983, p 4. 
102. CO 824/1 Brunei Annual Report 1909, p 6. 
103.00 824/1 Brunei Annual Report 1924, p 14" 
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The duties of the wazirs werep in the main, traditional and 
they were, of little assistanoe in the administration of the State 
because they were illiterate orp even in the 1950s, "praotioally 
illiterate", 
104 
Early in the Residential Era the wazirs were rather 
unfriendly towards the British Residents, who were only slightly less 
objectionable to them than the Rajah of Sarawak. If the Residential 
System was useful from Brunei's viewpoint in restraining its acquisitive 
neighbours and preserving the Sultanate, it had little else to reoominend 
it. Farther, if the Resident in Brunei ooald be played off against 
Sarawak to the profit of the wazirs, so =oh the better. When Pen ran 
Pem` anoha (Muhammad Salleh) died on 2 December 1912 he was desoribed as "a 
pen ran of the old olass and though he aoquiesoed in British Proteotiong 
he never oonformed more than outwardly to the new order of things ". 
105 
Reporting on his visit to Brunei in 1908 Sir John Anderson o rnnmentedi 
"The two men whose influenoe has been most adverse to any advance in Bru- 
nei and who would be glad to see the old state of things continue, viz. 
the Bendahara and Pemanoha... wrote that they were ill and therefore 
unable to meet me. I do not think any good result would Dome from an 
interview with them and I look to the rising generation of pengirans, 
several of whom are showing a desire to learn, for assistanoe in 
developing the ooaatry". 106 
About this time the Pengiran Bendahara (then Joint Regent), 
deolared in a letter to the Assistant Resident that the enforoement of 
any regulations whioh had not received the approval of himself and the 
Pengiran Pemanoha was a breach of the Treaty (of, p 119, above)- 
10T 
It 
104. -CO 1022/396 (item 12) Sir A Abell 
(b 1906) to CO9 No 54 (saving), 
13 May 1953, paragraph 4. For a full list of wazirs, see Appendix 4.2. 
105. CO 824/1 Brunei Annual Report 1912, p 6. 
106. CO 531/1 (30998) Anderson to 009 No 4 (Brunei), 30 Jaly 1908, para. 4. 
107. Co 531/x. (46522) Owea to Seoretary to High Commissioner, No 126 
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will be recalled that in 1906 the leading wazir complained that Mr McArthur 
never consulted hims the first Resident tacitly conceded that the wazir 
was. entitled to expeot such deference but complained of the latter's 
selfish demands. Mr Owen, the third Resident, olearly held that the 
Resident did not require the approval of the wazirs for his aotions. 
"(The Sultan) has rarely left the palaoe", he added, "... and takes 
little or no interest in affairs of State, declining to express opinion 
without previous referenoe to the wazirs.... 
Though the guidance of the existing triumvirate is not un- 
attended with difficulty, any alteration at present would only aggravate 
the position without providing any corresponding advantage. Moreover, 
the mental oapaoity of the Sultan renders alteration inadvisable and 
such a oourse would be contrary to the tradition of the State". 108 
Mr Stubbs, reflecting on the situation from the Colonial Office, thought 
that Mr Owen had found "some way of managing" the Pengiran Bendahara. 
109 
In 1910 the wazirs again were loonspioucus absentees" from the 
State Council, leaving the young Sultan to inour British displeasure for 
what they had put him up to iu the laud dispute. 
In short,, the wazirs simply became an irrelevances "They had 
become honorifios so far as the Government was concerned"p Dam Turner 
recalls. Deference was paid to the wazirs because of their standing in 
Brunei society; otherwise they were ignored. Yet if the wazirs had 
troubled to educate themselves and to take greater interest in their 
country., they might have played a significant role in the administration. 
Only their own temperament and personality prevented this. 
(Brunei), 13 November 1908, paragraph 2. ("The inoident whioh evoked the 
letter affected the writer's personal property and was doubtless prompted 
by his nephew, Pengiran Anak Munggu, to whose influenoe most of the 
Pen ran Bendahara'a ill-advised aotions are attributed"). 
108. Ibid., paragraphs 3 and Be 
109. Ibid., minute by Mr RE Stubbs, 22 Deoember 1908. 
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7. Law and Order 
In 1908 the very enaotment of legislation by the Sultan-in- 
Council was deolared to be an innovation "in a State where formerly the 
Sultan and chiefs were laws unto themselves". 
110 pre-Residential Brunei 
hadq theoretically at leaste three systems of laws hukum sharia 
(Muhammadan religious law); hukum kanun (Brunei traditional law); and 
adat (the customary law of the various tribes). 
The sharia ('path to the watering plaoe') is a total way of 
life as explicitly or implicitly commanded by Allah, based on the Koran 
(Recital of Allah), Sunna (Way of the Prophet), Ijma (the consensus of 
scholars) and ui as (analogical reasoning from the first three). The 
State itself is a religious institution having as its constitution the 
110. CO 824/1 Brunei Annual Report 19081, p 7. NB. In pre-Residential 
Brunei, Consul P Leys commented in 1883, pengirans who owned territory 
exercised the powers of "punishing the people by fine, placing in the 
stooks and moderate flogging. Persons charged with crimes the punishment 
for which would be death or mutilation are tried by the Temenggong in 
Brunei and the Sultan's approval has to be obtained before the punishment 
is inflicted. The Brunei authorities are extremely dilatory in examining 
into civil and criminal oases but once the case is taken ups it is gone 
into very thoroughly and usually a very sensible verdict is found. If 
ae ran of rank, however arbitrarily, causes one of his own People to 
be put to death for no sufficient reason, no notice is usually taken of 
its otherwise than that hei by repetition of such acts, acquires a 
reputation for cruelty. Possibly a remonstrance may be sent him by the 
Sultan, but such acts are comparatively rare. The real oppression, and 
it is great, exercised by the pengirans over their people exists in the 
... extent to which fines and taxes are imposed upon them. As all the 
rulers in Brunei are always impecunious... the power to punish the 
delinquinoies of their own people by the imposition of a pecuniary fine 
is very apt to be abused. Aa a matter of fact it is not unfrequently 
abused, and, by some pengirans, most heinously so". (Co 144/57: 12509= 
Leys to F0l No 12 consular, 5 May 1883, paragraph 15). British officers 
made similar comments about law in Trengganu; but Dr Leys has been 
described as an able reporter by a modern social scientist. 
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sharia, i. e. the religio-moral values of Islam. The sharia includes all 
that a westerner would term law, but maoh more besides, inoluding details 
of religious ritual and the ethics of sooial oonduot. 
ill 
The reign of Sultan Hassan (early seventeenth oentury) is the 
earliest period to which may be attributed the application of the 
traditional oode of laws known as the kanun, oomposed of some 50,000 
words which, until the introduction of the Residential System in 1906, 
"coastituted the entire penal and civil nodes of the State". 
112 
Each of the various tribes had their own oustomary law, or 
adat, which was upheld by the inooming Residential administration. 
113 
All legislation after 1906 was enacted by the Sultan-in-Coanoil. 
The bills so passed were called enactments and were published in English. 
Mr Lee-Warner commented in 1910 that "no elaborate legislation is required 
in Brunei. The fewer and simpler the laws are the better". 
114 
So it wass 
only three enactments were passed in 1906 and only six in 1908. In prao- 
tioe the Sultan was bound to follow the advioe of the British Resident, 
who presented him with legislation for preliminary observations and then 
for formal approval in the State Council. Brunei laws were drafted by 
the Resident (subjeot to modifioation by the High Commissioner's legal 
111. JND Anderson, "Islamic Law" in Encyolopaedia Britannioa (Chioago 
1972), Vol 12, pp, 679-80- 
112. HR Hughes-Hallett, "A Sketoh of the History of Brunei" in JM_ AS 
(19409 Part n), P 31. Mr Hughes-Hallett (Assistant Resident 1936-8) 
expressed an intention to publish the hukum kanun, but appears never to 
have done so. in 1842 Sir James Brooke undertook to uphold in Sarawak 
the ondong ondong, the 'traditional written law of Brunei's presumably 
this was the hukum kanun. 
113. For examples CO 824/1 Brunei Annual Report 1910, p 17. 
114. Ibid., p 21. 
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advisers). The Colonial Offioe was the ultimate authority but did not 
take =oh interest in Braaei'a legislation, deoiding in 1907 that the 
Sultanate's laws were merely to be 'acknowledged' by London rather than 
'approved', 115 This situation still existed in 1933 when another CO 
clerk, referring to the Brunei Labour Code of 1932, oommenteds 
"I do not think a detailed sorutiny of UMS legislation is oalled for. 
It is for the authorities in Malaya to see that UMS legislation follows 
FMS (legislati(n) as olosely as possible". 116 
On another oooasiou a Whitehall olerk observed that a law was "olamsily 
drawn in several respeots but I don't think there is anything suffioiently 
serious to call for observation". 
117 
In 1913 the High Commissioner was 
asked by the Colonial Office to repeal a particular provision of one 
Brunei enaotment: this xas executed in due ooarse. 
118 
The Colonial Offioe took a oloser interest, however, when Brunei 
legislation necessitated similar provisions in the United Kingdom itself. 
Conoerning the 1908 Courts Eaaotmentg for example, Yr Stubbs oomplaineds 
"I don't think this Enaotment ought to have been issued without further 
reference to us as it is awkward to have an Enaotment giving appeal to 
the Privy Counoil in foroe in the State before there is an Order in 
Council here giving the Privy Counoil power to hear saoh appeals". 119 
000asional4, Brunei legislations euch as the Mining F aotment (1920) and 
the Savings Bank Ftaotment (1939), were passed at the inatigatio: l of the 
Colonial Offi oe. 
120 
115- CO 531/1 (7040) minute by Mr JS Risley (1867-1957), 27 February 1907- 
116. CO 717/87 (File 92268) minute by Mr JA Calder, 2 February 1933. 
117. CO 531/4 (24473) minute by Mr GV Piddes, 13 August 1912. 
118. CO 531/5 (17487 and 2023). 
119. CO 531/1 (25183) minute by Mr RE Stubbs, 13 July 1908- 
120, The Mining Enaotment of 1920 was passed to enable the Colonial Offioe 
to award more liberal terms to a oertain mining oompany than were allowed 
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The enacted legislation of Brunei included laws to provide for 
the establishment of a currency (1906), courts (1906,1908), a police 
force (1920), sanitary boards (1920) and a savings bank (1934); laws to 
regulate customs duties (1906), mining (1908,1920), opium smoking (1912, 
1932)q labour conditions (19139 1932), friendly societies (1933) and 
forest working (1934); and laws to require attendance at sohool (1929) 
and to prohibit gambling (1919) and the mu i tsai system (1933). The 
external legislation applied to Brunei comprised, inter alia, the penal 
and prooedaral oodes of the Straits Settlements and the Law of Contraots 
of the Federated Malay States. Where no provision was made by the 
enaoted or adopted law of Brunei,, the Common Law of England had the 
foroe of law in the Sultanate (see p 462, below). 
In 1906 an enactment was passed "providing for the establishment 
Of civil and oriminal ooarts and for the administration of justice 
throughout the State as far as possible on the lines in force in 
the FMS". 
121 
Sir John Anderson suggested the abolition of the extra- 
territorial consular court; 
122 
and Whitehall agreed thatp with a Resident 
to try oases, there was no further need for extra-territorial jurisdiotion. 
In the past there had been a right of appeal from the oonsular oourt in 
Brunei to the Supreme Court of the Straits Settlements and then, in 
under the existing 1908 Enaotmeat (CO 531/13s 62532). The Savings Bank 
Enactment (1939) was passed to give effect "to the recommendations 
contained in the report of the committee appointed by the Secretary of 
State for the Colonies to examine the Savings Bank system in the 
colonies" (Co 717/137 File 51656). 
121. CO 824/1 Brunei Annual Report 1906, p 12; and CO 531/1 (5865) 
Anderson to CO, No 1 (Brunei), 24 January 1907, paragraph 1. 
122" Co 531/1 (5867) Anderson to CO, No 3 (Brunei), 24 January 1907, 
Paragraphs 1-4. 
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ordinary oourse, to the judicial committee of the Privy Council in Loa- 
don. Mr Risley, Legal Adviser at the Colonial Office, suggested that 
a similar provision should be made for the new Resident's Court. The 
Foreign Office disapproved of an arrangement which had the "somewhat 
anomalous result of allowing an appeal from the tribunals of a foreign 
ruling prinoe to one of EX'a Colonial Courts". 
123 Mr Fiddes at the 
Colonial Offioe disagreed and oommented that 
"We might as well put up the shutters at onoe if we are to put an end to 
all the 'somewhat anomalous' arrangements in the Empire. If the proposed 
arrangement is oonvenientp promotes the administration of justioe and is 
aooeptable to all parties, that is enough for us". 124 
A new Coarta Enaotment, in aooordanoe with Mr Fiddes' opinion, 
was passed in 19081, taking effeot on 1 April of that year. The Straits 
Settlements was given the right of original jurisdiction in capital 
oases beoause the offioer holding the post of British Resident would 
probably lack sufficient legal experience to make it desirable for bim 
to hear those oases*125 One suoh instance was the trial, before Sir John 
123. CO 531/1 (11769) F0 to CO, 30 March 1907. 
124. Ibid., minute by Fiddesp 8 April 1907. NB. Why was the appeal 
to the Straits Settlements? Mr Risley minuteds "In the FMS there is an 
appeal from a Judicial Commissioner's Court (equivalent to the new Res- 
ident's Court in Brunei) to the FMS Court of Appeal and thence by 
arrangement with the Sultans to the Judicial Committee of the Privy 
Council (in London) ... 
(In) this matter the FMS model is impossible for 
Brunei where there is no court equivalent to the FMS Court of Appeal 
and it would be undesirable to have appeals going direct from the 
Resident's Court to the Privy Coancil. Therefore I suggest that the 
present position should be maintained, i. e. that provision should be 
made for appeals from the Resident's Court to the Supreme Court of the 
Straits Settlements" (CO 531/1: 5865)- 
125- CO 531/1 (25183) Anderson to CO. No 3 (Brunei), 18 June 1908. The 
Colonial Office noted that whereas originally only civil oases were 
included, now there was to be an appeal also in criminal oases to the 
Straits Settlements and to the Privy Council in London. The necessary 
Orders in Council were passed on 26 September 19081 the first revoking 
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Bucknill (1873-1926), the Chief Justioe of the Straits Settlements, of 
the murderer of the British Resident in 1916.126 This right of original 
jurisdiotion by the Straits Settlements' oourt appears to have been 
surrendered by 1937, when the post of Resident had been, upgraded. 
The 1908 Eiaotment established several tiers of justices the 
Resident's Court, which exercised "original and appellate jurisdiction 
in all civil and criminal matters (excluding capital cases until not 
later than 1937) and might pass any sentenoe authorized by laws+; 
127 
Magistrates Courts of the first, second and third classes; and the 
Court of the Kathi (Islamio religious judge). 
8eferenoe was made earlier (p 126) to a list of five demands 
presented to the High Commissioner by the Sultan and Regents in August 
1906. Three of these petitions concerned the judicial system. 
128 
First, 
the Orders in Council of 1901 and 1906; the second allowing appeals to BM 
in Council from the decisions of the Straits Settlements Supreme Court 
sitting as a Court of Appeal from the courts having jurisdiction in 
Brunei (CO 531/18 36993). 
126. Note that Sir John Bucknill came to Brunei to judge the case be- 
cause it would have been prohibitively expensive to transport all the 
witnesses to Singapore (CO 144/80,40566). 
127. There was one instance of hanging in 1916 and two in 1927. In 1927 
an escaped prisoner was "shot dead resisting arrest" (Co 824/1 Brunei 
Annual Report 1927, p 12). 
Note. Datuk Turner thought that all oases in the Resident's 
Court were heard by the Resident (ors in his absence, the Acting Resident) 
in person. The Assistant Resident was a Magistrate, First Class. 
(let- 
ter to the author, 28 January 1985, paragraph 1). Mr JG Black adds, "As 
far as I can remember I sat in court only infrequently in serious of 
difficult oases. There was very little (grave) crime in the State... 
Oddly enough, I can remember in 1930, in my capacity as Resident, Labuan, 
I sat in Brunei as appeal judge in an appeal against the decision of the 
Resident in a civil case. This was a one-off oooasion, however". 
(Let- 
ter to the author, 25 January, 1985, paragraphs 4 and 6). 
128. This section is based upon CO 14480 (36822). 
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it was demanded that Islamic religious courts should be constituted for 
the hakim, who should sit with the Resident to try and determine cases. 
Mr McArthur pointed out that it was well known that HM Government had 
promised not to interfere in matters oonoerning breaohes of Muhammadan 
religious law. He believed that the real objeot was "to ensure the 
presence on the bench of a hakim... on the ground that what the Brunei 
authorities are pleased to oall... religious law provides penalties for all 
kinds of offences from murder to failure to attend Divine Service". He 
suggested that in reply it should be stated that provision was being made 
for the trial of offenoes against Islamio law by kathis to be appointed 
by the Sultan but that the Government did not intend to "invoke the 
assistanoe" of the former Brunei judges in the trial of offenders. 
The Sultan and Regents demanded, seoondly, that warrants against 
persons of standing were not to be issued or exeouted until after con- 
saltation with the Sultan and his Council. The adoption of this proposal 
was out of the question, Mr MoArthur deolared, because it would make the 
attempt to administer justioe a faroet by exempting privileged persona 
from the law. (But in fact no attempt was made to oharge the Regents for 
fraud, although it was well-known that they had forged tulip claims). 
It was demanded, thirdly, that the High Commissioner must 
uphold his (alleged) assurance that the customs and laws of Brunei were 
to be kept inviolate for ever. This demand, the Resident olaimedp was a 
aase of wilful misrepresentation. The answer might be that "ever, 
O entry has from time to time to alter and revise its laws, and that the 
ridiculous statement attributed to (the High Commissioner) was never made, 
147 
the whole object of intervention being the amendment of existing customs 
and so-oalled 'laws' whioh were ruining the oottutry". 
l29 (The High 
Commissioner replied to the Sultan along these lines). 
By 1916 a comprehensive scheme for the mutual rendition of 
offenders involving all British-oontrolled territories in the Far East 
from Hong long to India had been oonoluded. 
130 
Pre-Residential Brunei had no polioes, apart from the small 
contingent maintained illegally by the Rajah of Sarawak at Brooketon. 
There was "little to prevent crime should anyone be inclined to commit 
it". B' and large, however, the people were "mild and peaoe-laving". 
Petty thefts in the oapital tended to inorease and were looked upon as 
a matter of oourse, but were no worse than those of any European sea-port 
of oomparable size. In addition, "bad oharaoters" from neighbouring 
oountries used Brunei an an asylum. The rulers relied on headmen to 
preserve order; and would take 'O aotion exoept in oases where pressure 
(was) put upon them by HM Government", 
131 
129. Mr McArthur reminded the Pengiran Bendahara that, if the oustoms 
of Brunei were to remain inviolable, his (the wazir's) annuity would be 
the first oasualty beoause no provision for its payment existed under 
the pre-Residential oonstitution. 
The outstanding demand in the petition concerned slavery$ "As 
regards slaves, wherever they take refuge the Government of Brunei must 
help to reoover them. If the slaves do not wish to return, whoever 
shelters them must pay the just value to their owners". The Government 
could not ooantenance slavery in any form ands while it would refrain 
from freeing existing slaves, it oould give no assistance to those 
seeking to recover slaves who had absoonded. 
130. Co 144/80 (32631); Co 531/10; CO 874/800-1; and CO 273/347-434. 
131. Po 572/39 MSH MoArthur, "Report on Brunei in 1904", paragraph 36; 
CO 144/73 (5120) Keyser to TO, No 4 (politioal), 25 Deoember 1898, 
Paragraphs 28-9; and CO 144/74 (17694) Keyser to F0, No 23 
(political), 
30 April 1900. ("Notorious orime goes unpunished"). 
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During the first four months of 1906 Brunei was policed by one 
Pathan and one Sikh. Arrangements were made for the establishment of a 
oombined oonstabulary for Labuan and Brunei. As soon as aooommodatioa 
was ready, nine Sikhs were stationed in'Brunei Town. Later three 
Malays were engaged, "but the difficulty of recruiting and the lack of 
suitable oandidates made it impossible to bring the foroe up to reasonable 
limits". There were at this stage no polioe in the outstations; and the 
serviöes of existing policemen were oonfined to "routine guard duties", 
132 
The first Chief Constable, Mr HO Crummey, 
133 
remained in oontrol 
until 1917, when he was suooeeded by Mr GA MoAfee. They were based in 
Labuan, but made periodical visits of inspection or investigation to 
Brunei. The oonduot of the Sikhs was not good and discipline in the 
outstations was "extremely lax". 
134 
In 1918, however Inspector McAfee 
"worked a great ohange for the better in the Malay oontingent" who were 
gradually becoming "a smart and useful body of men". 
135 
A law of 1920' provided for the establishment of a separate 
Branei Constabulary from 1 January 1921. The Chief Inspector and non- 
oommisaioned officers continued to be seconded from Singapore but the 
Sikhs (and later the NCOs) were replaoed by looal Malays. (The murder 
of the British Resident by a Sikh polioeman in 1916 may have oontributed 
132. CO 824/1 Brunei Annual Report 1906, p 12. 
133. The unfortunate Mr Crummey, appointed in ? 01906, contracted leprosy 
whilst on servioe in Brunei and had to be invalided home. He appears to 
have survived into the 19300 (CO 273/4981 12660.. CO 273/5018 48543. CO 
273/549 File 52115. Co 273/558 File 62132 and CO 273/575 File 82133)- 
134. CO 824/1 Brunei Annual Report 1910, p 8. 
135. CO 824/1 Brunei Annual Report 1918, p 5. 
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to this decision). The new force had an initial strength of thirty nine 
men. A major problem was to instill a sense of disoipline and to oreate 
an esprit de corps. Breaches of discipline were "unacceptably high" 
and there was a large turnover of personnel due to defaulting or dis- 
missal. Constant efforts were made to improve standards, for example by 
the establishment in 1926 of a Jawi literacy olase for policemen; from 
1931 reornits were required to be literate in Malay and the aeoessity 
for striot adherenoe to the regulations was emphasized. Individuals were 
sent to Singapore for more advanoed training. A musketry oourse was 
started (1927) and a-sohool opened for all oonatables (1931). 
The prinoipal funotioaa of the police, naturally, were the 
maintenanoe of law and order and the detention of orime. The only 
felonies in 1906 were an amok, a murder and a gang robbery (inoluding 
murder) all of whioh ooourred in the Brooke-oontrolled Muara distriot. 
In sum, ten oriminal and eleven oivil owes oame to oourt in 1906, 
resulting in the gaoling of six offenders. 
The people of the oapital appear to have been remarkably law- 
abiding, a fast remarked in 1913,1919 and again as late as 1938. Murder 
was unoommon but not unknown in Brunei. Apart from the Resident in 1916, 
the Malay magistrate in ttong had been a victim five years earlier, and 
there were oooasionai amoks. Headmen in the various rivers improved yearly 
is their relations with the Government and rarely if ever failed to report 
misdeeds in their distriots. (It may bep however, that offenoes ooourred 
in Brunei Town of whioh the polioe remained oompletely unsuspioious). 
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The main problems were smuggling and buffalo-rustling, the 
latter described in 1911 as "rife" and something of a sport. This form 
of crime was particularly aoute in Tatoag, the main oattle district. An 
additional diffioulty lay in the reluotanoe of people to register their 
cattle and marks. Cattle thefts fluctuated in number, for in 1915 there 
were few reports of them, whereas in 1918 mention was made of a "plague" 
of buffalo-rustling. In 1917 at least 40% of all oomplaints received by 
the polioe related to the theft of buffaloes, but beoause these seldom 
reaohed the police till 5-6 days afterwards, the percentage of reooveries 
naturally was law. The chief receiver in uln Tatung was caught early in 
1918, whilst in Deoember a gang working on the Limbang border was broken 
up by the arrest and punishment of the leader and some of his followers. 
The lank of oommunioations made prompt dealing with this orime very 
difficult. A further success was soored in 1919. Inhabitants of Tatoag 
had formed a "oompany' with branohes in Limbang and Tdtong for purposes 
of buffalo stealing. The $manager$ was arrested with remarkable results: 
in 1918 there had been 313 reports of orimev of which 84 oonoerned buffalo 
theft, compared with 183 and 4 respectively in the following year. 
Apart from oattle-lifting, however, orime was rare. In 1920 
the registration of 'aliens' was introduoed "with the hope of perpetuating 
this happy state of affairs". 
136 It is oertainly true that Chinese and 
other immigrants oomprised a majority of prisoners held in the State. 
The more serious offenders were repatriated. The reported inoidenoe of 
136. CO 824/1 Brunei Annual Report 1920, p 4. 
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crime nearly tripled between 1920 and 19381P37 during which period the 
population had inoreased. by aboat half, but offenoes remained of a 
minor nature (and many reports revealed no offenoe at all). The value 
of property stolen averaged about $2,000 annually, of which the police 
sometimes managed to reoover up to one half. 
The "Drying need" of pre-Residential Brunei was a gaOlv138 
beoause the Sultan laoked the means't6 retain offenders in custody. 
Other offenders flouted the 'Sultan's authority by returning to Brunei 
under the proteotion of the Sarawak flag. In 1906, therefore, the former 
oonsular agent's house over the water was bought and adapted for a 
temporary police station and look-up. A new prison was built in the 
capital by 1914 and a seoond was established in Kuala Belait in 1929. 
The number of prisoners rose from six at the end of 1906 to 19 at the 
end of 1919, falling again to only five at the end of 1936. Most 
prisoners served short terms of less than one year, during whioh time 
they performed useful publio works, wbioh öould not otherwise have been 
done if wages had had to be paid. Prisoners regarded themselves, indeed, 
"lese as convicted felons than as valuable public servants". 
139 
The Dost of the oonstabulary was oomparatively high. But, apart 
from the maiateaauoe of law and order, the polioe were also responsible 
for the registration of aliens (from 1920), the'lioensing of firearms 
137. See Appendix 6 for an abstract of judicial statistics. 
138. MoArthur, "Report"q paragraph 55. But of, in 1900 one Dato Mandat 
of Kuala Lama and another man were reported to have died in Brunei 
'gaol' 
from the cruel manner of ironing them (Co 144/741 914); and one Sahid 
died in custody in 1904 (McArthur, "Report"9 paragraph 39)" 
139. CO 824/1 Brunei Annual Report 1920, P 4" 
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and dogs, the registration of motor vehioles and bioyoles (from 1924 and 
1925 respectively) and the supervision of weights and measures. In add- 
ition policemen manned the new Brunei telephone exchange in the 1930s. 
Finally,, they assumed the funotions of a 'fire brigade', oommenoing in 
Brunei Town in 1927, when fire-fighting applianoes first were purohased, 
and at Kuala Belait from 1932. 
The Malay and Chinese oommuni. ties settled civil oases aooording 
to their own oustoms. Nor were there an "lawyers or litigoasly-minded 
ohet____ tiara. an in Malaya, to keep one on one's toes" - thus Datuk RN 
Turner. 140 It was probably just as well that the orime rate was so 
low beoause the Brunei Polioe Foroe, in oommou with the entire governmental 
machine, was not very efficient, certainly by Malayan standards. 
ý. Distriot Administration 
The territorial power of the pengirans had been broken when 
all land was taken into State ownership and they were relieved of their 
former rights of administration and taxation. In due ooaree, this made 
possible the creation of an efficient oentral anthoritq, whose writ ran 
throughout the oountry. 
Indigenous ohiefs were plaoed in oharge of outlying areas as 
soon as the redemption of monopolies provided employment for Government 
servants (see Chapter 5). In 1907 there were six suoh offioere stationed 
in different plaoeß. The Resident olaimed that their "ignoranoe and 
inexperienoe" made it "impossible to hope that they will be of muoh 
140" Da tuk RN Turner, letter to the authors 16 February 1983, P 5" 
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assistanoe in the general development of the distriot of whioh they are 
in ohaxge". 
1 
No Government offioial at all was stationed in Belait 
until September 1907 beoause of the delay in ooming to terms with the 
previous tulip holders. In the oase of Temburong, a Malay magistrate 
was appointed early in 1907, but had to be proseouted and dismissed for 
extortion after a few mouths; and for the remainder of the year, the 
distriot was left without a Government representative beoause of the 
difficulty of finding a suitable replacement. Similarly the customs 
clerk at Limau Manis had been dismissed; and in 1908 the station there 
was abolished and the administration of the district oombined with that 
of Brunei. All revenue from Ttitong, other than customs, was collected 
in the State capital. Even so, the Native Offioer - "a Sarawak Malalt of 
advanoed age" - had to be retired, in 1908 beoause of "numerous and well- 
founded complaints regarding his administrative methods". 
142 
No doubts 
however, it took time for Malays to adjust to the new methods required 
of them; and Mr MoArthur's selection policy must also have been at fault. 
Other Malay officers, partioularly Pengiran Anak Hashim (twenty-five years, 
1907-32, a district officer, first in Belait and then in Brunei-Muara), 
were considered very worthy; 
143 
and. Mr Cat or commented upon the-fairness 
141. CO 824/1 Brunei Annual Report 1907, P 5- 
142- CO 824/1 Brunei Annual Report 1908, A 4- 
143. CO 824/1 BAR 1912, p5 and BAR 1918, p 5; and CO 824/2 BAR 1932 
P 35. PA Hashim was the son of the Pengiran Shahbandar, tulip owner of 
Padas Damitq who took on the BNBC in 1889-90 and died in 1921 PA Hashim 
was appointed Pendiran Shahbandar himself in 1918 and was a State Coun- 
oillor from 1921 until his death in 1949. Lady R Peel knew him in 1946-7 
as still a racy ootogenariari, Partial to tea and oakes, and lengthy 
visits to the Residency. He was "rather toothless and has a large family". 
Having lost two wives during the Japanese oocupation, he was on the point 
of remarriage. (Lady R Peel, letters home 1946-7; courtesy of Lady Peel). 
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and justioe of Malay magistrates during his tenure. Perhaps the most 
successful of the distriot offioers (as Malay magistrates were styled 
after 1932), was Inobe Ibrahim bin Muhammad Jahfar. Born in Labuan in 
1902, he was DO Brunei and Muara (1932-5)p then Seoretary to Resident 
(1935-41) and chief administrative affiger under the Japanese (1941-5)" 
After the war he beoame seoretary to Sultan Omar Ali Saifuddin III. It 
is significant (because indicative of royal dominance br 1959) that it 
was hei rather than one of the wazirs, who emerged as )lentri Besar when 
Brunei was granted internal autonomy at the end of the Residential Era. 
Awarded the titles pehin and dato, he ended his oareer as Speaker of 
the Legislative Assembly and died in 1971. 
The Residents exercised a much less ineffective ocutrol over 
distriot administration than Sultans had done before 1906. The four 
Malay distriot offioers, reoruited mainly from outside Brunei at first, 
were his appointees and were responsible to him alone. Their duties oon- 
sisted originally of little beyond the adjudioation of petty oivil oases 
and the oolleotion of oustoms duties and poll tax. In 1914 the Malay 
magistrates were urged "to iuduoe the people living in their distriots 
to plant pads in order to minimise any possible shortage due to the 
war". 
144 
Malay magistrates were also responsible for laud work- 
145 
144" CO 824/1 Brunei Annual Report 1914, p 4- 
145- Mr JG Black, letter to the author, 25 January 1985, paragraph 7. 
Also from Datuk Turner. Mr JO Gilbert oomments that there were no Malay 
DOS "in the real sense of the word"i they were more like the Native 
Offioers in Sarawak (see R Pringle, Rajahs and Rebels, espeoially pp 149- 
54). In the 1950sß Mr Gilbert adds, "appointment of these offioers would 
be made by recommendation from the Assistant Resident by the British 
155 
In 1924 it was reported that Belait had beoome the most 
important district in the State apart from Brunei itself. 
146 
Efficient 
administration of the river was rendered difficult by its inaccess- 
ibility and distance from headquarterss 
"This is felt most acutely now that the operations of the BMFC, with a 
staff of four Europeans, are becoming so extensive, while the Chinese 
immigrants are not of the most law-abiding class. If the oilfield 
develops as it is hoped and anticipated, it will be essential to station 
a European District Officer here". 147 
This aooounts for the eventual re-instatement of the Assistant Resident 
in 1931. The Malay Distriot Offioer at Kuala Belait then Dame under the 
supervision of the Assistant Resident. 
The lowest rank of administration was oooupied by the village 
headmen, whose duties were to report an crime and to collect poll tax. 
148 
They also relayed Government propaganda, for example to promote vaooination 
against smallpox or improved agricultural methods. (In 1915 buffalo 
straying was damaging roads, after "repeated interviews"t however,, 
Kedagan headmen were showing readiness to meet the wishes of the Govern- 
meat in this matter). In addition, they represented their villagers' 
interestss the administration olearly took these wishes into aooount 
Resident, who need not, but... would, oonsult the Sultan, before making 
the appointment" (letter to the author, 12 November 1983, paragraph 2). 
146. In May 1924 a transfer was effected whereby the officer in Ttong, 
Pehin Dato Shahbandar (d 1947), eaohanged places with his counterpart 
in Belait, Pengiran Anak Hai Muhammad (d 1926) - BAR 12, p 14. The 
Pehin Dato Shahbandar (Abang Seruji) was appointed to the title 
(with 
a seat on the State Council) in 1920. 
147. CO 824/1 Brunei Annual Report 1924, p 14- 
148- Mr JG Black reoallss "The village headmen (in 1937-40) had no 
legal powers. They acted as a link between the kampong people and the 
Government, for example, identifying the parties in transfers of land" 
(letter to the author, 25 January 1985, paragraph 8). 
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as is proved by their negotiations with the Kedayans in 1909-10 over 
the land issue. In 1931 penghnlus were appointed in the padi-growing 
districts. They had "certain powers as peace officers" in the areas 
for which they were responsible. 
149 
Sanitary Boards were oreated for Brunei Town in 1920 and for 
Kuala Belait and Tatoag in 1929. Comprising offioial and unoffioial 
members appointed by the Resident, they supervised sanitation, ooa- 
servanoy, street lighting, rating and munioipal matters generally. 
8. Conolusion 
In this ohapter it has been seen that the traditional system 
of administration, taxation and land tenure based upon kera aan kur 
and tulin rights was swept aside; a natural ooaoomitant was the abolition 
of serfdom and the posaibilit7, for the first time, of land ownership by 
the ordinary people. The British introdnoed a new straoture of oentral 
government and distriot administration ootxtrolled by the Resident (aot- 
ing in the name of the Sultan) whose writ was effeotive throughout the 
oOUntry. They laid the foundations for a new bureauoraoy and reformed 
the judioature. In the following chapter another important aepeot of 
the Eesid. ente" work, finanoial reform, is analysed. 
149. CO 824/2 Brunei Annual Report 1931, p 3. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
FINANCE 1906 - 1932 
I. Introduoti on 
This ohapter will examine the attempts of the early Residents 
to re-establish Brunei's finances on a sound basis. In 1906 the Sultan- 
ate was not only bankrupt but its future revenues had been antioipated 
for mans years ahead - as far as 1929 in one instanoe. The British 
relieved the pengiraas of the power of taxation and established a 
national treasury and a reformed system of taxation. A large bridging 
loan was obtained from the Federated Malay States to enable the Brunei 
Government to buy up mortgaged monopolies, oession monies and tulip 
rights. Before the disoovery of oil, however, Brunei remained a land 
of slender eoonomio resouroes, its prinoipal export produots being outoh, 
ooal and, later, rubber (see ohapter 6). Henne there was nothing to 
generate a substantial inoome for the Government and Brunei remained 
heavily indebted throughout the pre-oil era. This affeoted the quality 
of administration that ooald be offered: in 1911 the Brunei Government 
had only five dollars to spend in the year for each oitizeng in 1931 
less than twelve dollars. After essential administrative expenditure 
had been taken outs little remained for the provision of eooial eervioes, 
whioht. is oonaequenoe, remained rudimentary. 
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2. Establishment of a Currenoy 
Brunei has had a modern ourrenoy of its own only ainoe 1967. 
Although a mint may have existed in the Sultanate as early as the six- 
teenth oenturg, 
1 the prodnotion and use of ooins remained patoh7, the 1868 
tokens issued by Sultan Abdul Mumin being the first whioh may be dated 
preoisely. 
2 
Professor DE Brown points out that during the nineteenth 
oentury brass objects were widely used as a means of exohange. He adds 
that other media were in uses inoluding "measures of fabrioep standardized 
bits of it one Chinese oash... and, after oloser British oontaots, British 
and Straits Settlements' coinage and Dlexioan dollars". 
3 Much trade 
oontimued to be oonduoted by direot bartering. In 1887, however, Sultan 
Hashim decided that he ought to have a coinage of his own. Although his 
Coins remained in use as late as 1901, Hr MoArthur oommented in 1904 
that, among other deficienoiess, Brunei had , no ooinage". 
4 
In 1903 the Straits Settlements abandoned its silver onrrenoy, 
adopting instead the gold standard. One of Mr MoArthnr's firnt tasks as 
British Resident was to pass a Currency Enactment (1906) demonetizing 
British and Mexican dollars in Brunei and introducing instead the new 
Straits' dollar (worth £0.12) as the only legal tender in the Sultan- 
ate. Originally the former dollars were to be demonetised at a disooant 
of 1O%t is other words, the people of Brunei would reoeive nine new 
Straits' dollars for every ten British dollars. The Colonial Offioe 
1. JS Carroll, 'Berunai in the Boxer Codex" in JKBRAS (1982, Pt 2), p 19. 
2. JA Davidson, "Brunei Coinage" in BMJ 1977 p 48. 
3. DE Brown, Brunei: The Struoture and History of a Bornean Malay 
Sultanate (Brunei 1970), p 66. 
4. PO 572/39 MSH MoArthur, "Report on Brunei in 1904", paragraph 55" 
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insisted, therefore, that - to avoid hardship - debts and oontraots of 
date prior to demonetization must be subjeot to the same disoount of 10%s 
i. e. that a debt of ten old dollars must be repayable at nine new ones. 
It seems, in faot, that the Brunei Treasury exohanged the former ourrenoy 
for the new at a disoount of only 5% instead of the 10% originally 
intended. The Resident oommented that though this 5% rate 
"compared favourably with that charged by private traders in Labuan, 
where the prevailing rate was 10%y few of the (people of Brunei), some 
of whom possessed hoards of silver, took advantage of the facilities 
offered them, the general idea being apparently that the Government was 
not disinterested in its action and that they would be wiser to wait 
for a more favourable rate of exchange. Approximately $42,000 were 
received and exchanged during the three weeks fixed for the purpose. 
Probably as much remained in the country in private hands". 5 
ITTaxation Ref arms 
From 1906 (despite the delay in settling tulip olaims) all 
rights of administration and taxation in Brunei were vested in the Govern- 
meat alone. The previous irregular, arbitrary and exoessive taxation, 
whioh had aroused such disoontent in pre-Residential Brunei, was abolished, 
along with $serfdom'& The one exception was an annual po11 tax of two 
dollars for all non-Malay indigenous subjeote of Bransi who bad not taken 
up registered land. (The Government received various forms of land rev- 
anus from those who routed land from it or were lioensed to use State 
Land for eoonomio purposes, snob as tapping jelutong trees). At the 
beginning of 1933 poll tax was rednoed to fifty oents and four years 
later it was abolished altogether. In his 1904 "Report" )1r HoArthur had 
5. CO 824/1 Brunei Annual Report 1906, p 12. (There was no evidenoe 
that the Government did make any profit on this transaotion). 
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hoped for annual receipts of $15, Oß0 from this souroep but nothing even 
remotely approaohing such a yield was ever realized. The ammoant 
oolleoted, indeed, was so niggardly, and the oost of oolleoting it so 
greato that the poll tax woald have been discontinued earlier but for 
the Goverameut'e desire to hold out the possibility, of exemption there- 
from as an induoement to people to take up land for outtivation. 
6 
In 
the early years of the Residential Era it was dtsoovered, also, that 
Kedayan headmen had not been collecting the tax fullys the 1911 oensua 
materially assisted their honesty by making default more obvious. 
In 1906-9 97,045 of the P1(3 loan was used to purohase tulin 
revenues (see above, pp 109-10). Whilst the liquidation of suoh rights 
was essential if one anthority°was to be exeroised throughout the oountryp 
the redemption of monopolies was more signifioant in terms of providing 
an income for the new administration. At the beginning of 1906 most of 
Brunei's revenues were in the hands of monopolists, ohiefly Chinese, who 
had the right to oolleot them b7 payment of oafish in advanoe to the 
Sultan. In some oases the monopoly of trading in pertain artioles had 
been granted; in others the sole right of charging duties on imports or 
exports had been-sold outright, no limit being fixed for the rates to 
be charged by the monopolist. The only article not thus exploited was 
rise. 
6. In 1939erg the State Forest Officer pointed out that the cost 
of obtaininga title for the five acres of rice land neoeasary to suppULI 
an average family came oat at twelve dollars, so the people naturally did 
not avail themselves of the proffered exemption from poll tax 
(CO Flemmioh, 
"History of Shifting Cultivation in Brunei 1906-1939" in Malayan Agri- 
oultural Journal, lay 1940, p 236). Cf, p 129, above. 
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The more valuable monopolies were leased to only two Chinese 
traders, Chua Cheng Bee and Check Tn, who enjoyed the additional advantage 
of being able to import their own merchandise free of tax. To take the 
case of 'sundry goods's at the end of 1904 it was reported that Chua had 
aoquired the right to levy 5% duty on such imports from 1901 to 1929 (for 
which he had paid %15,000), plus the right to collect an additional 2% 
duty during the years 1904=-10 (for $8,800). On top of these 7% duties, 
his rival, Check, had purchased, for $7,500 in cash, the right to levy 5014# 
taxes on the same artioles from 1905 to 1910 (making duties of 12% in 
all). Mr MoArthar, writing in 1904, noted that the last-named lease (to 
Check) was already chopped and dated 1905.7 Bat these 12% duties were 
only a beginning. fors, as the Resident explained, it was in the interest 
of the original monopolist to sub-let the monopoly and so receive a fixed 
income from other traders rather than go to the trouble and expense of 
maintaining a private preventive staff. The profits of successive 
middlemen added sharply to retail prices (see above, pp 31-2). 
Since no administration was possible so long as these monopolies 
remained in existenoey a loan of 200,000 was secured from the Federated 
Malay States to enable the Brunei Government to bay them up. In the years 
1906 to l908' a sum of $72,009 was spent in the redemption of over thirty 
monopolies. The prooednre adopted was to offer monopolists their original 
Purchase money, less an amount proportionate to the number of years the 
7. McArthur, "Report"p Appendix III; of Belfield Report (FO 12/128 P 450)" 
The example given was the most extreme; but it provides a glimpse both 
of the financial plight of Brunei's rulers and of the task facing the 
new administration at the beginning of 1906. 
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monopoly had been held already. An exception to this rule was Sir Charles 
Brooke, who was allowed to retain his monopolies in Muara Damit. Another 
Briton, Mr James Hatton Hall, held the monopoly of tobaooo import into 
Brunei provided he paid the Sultan import duty of twelve dollars a ikul 
(i. e. a tax whioh he was legally bound to pay anyway); but sinne he had 
paid no oonsideration fee for exemption, he reoeived no compensation from 
the new regime. As a result he took his case to the Colonial Office; but 
enquiries disolosed that he was a slippery oharaoter "olearly engaged in 
something little short of swindling". 
$ 
His petition was dismissed, there- 
fore; and he did not pursue the matter further. Apart from his protests, 
the liquidation of monopolies was achieved without incident. 
After monopolies affeoting the import trade of the oapital 
had been eliminated, customs regulations were introdnoed (April 1906) 
substituting a "fixed and moderate" soale of import duties for the 
restriotions which had been enforoed previously. The "tentative and 
temporary" initial customs regulations were repealed at the end of the 
year when a Customs Enaotment was passed and made applicable to the 
entire State. 
9 
Sir John Anderson, the High Commissioner, reported: 
8.00 144/80 (40567) minute by Lucas, 10 November 1906. NB. Mr Hall 
exaggerated grossly the scale of his profits, existing and antioipated, 
the basis upon which he claimed compensation. He sold mouicly, third- 
rate tobacco as the price of the best grade. Finally, he imported his 
tobacco in cake form instead of "in twists" (his concession was for si e 
bilai. "tobacco in twists"). It was argued that b7 abandoning the 
"twist" form, Mr Hall had begun to import an article for which he had 
no concession. See Appendix 1.4, pp 589-606 (below). 
9. CO 824/1 Brunei Annual Report 1906, p 11. 
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"In April last (1906) I approved certain customs regulations for Brunei 
as it was found that the import rates hitherto charged by Chinese mono- 
polists were excessive and because, in some oases, the monopolies had 
been cancelled on payment of compensation, with the result that goods 
were being brought into the port of Brunei free of duty. 
In September last the Resident reported that these regulations 
(had), proved unsatisfactory in some respects; that retail prices in 
Brunei had been substantially reduced since their introduction and 
submitted a draft Customs Enactment with Rules made thereunder making 
some further reduction in the duties charged. 
In submitting the draft Enactment, the Resident reported that 
though these new duties were, in the maine lower than those in force in 
British North Borneo, some of the duties were higher than they should, 
theoretioally, be in a State under British proteotion, but that it had 
to be remembered that monopolies of import and export of the articles 
dealt with that had been granted by the late Sultan (Hashim) had had to 
be redeemed by cash payments and that it was necessary for the Govern- 
ment to make some effort to recover the sums so expended. 
After consulting the acting Attorney-General of the Straits 
Settlements I approved the draft Enactment and Rules and they were 
duly passed by His Highness in Council on 29 November last". 10 
The Colonial Office had "some doubts as to the polioy of 
imposing export duties" and requested the Resident to watoh their 
effeot on the trade of the State. 
11 
Sarawak aouroes reported that the tariff of taxation imposed 
sinoe the British flag sio) was hoisted in Brunei was very high indeed 
and "evidently not appreoiated by the Brunei people who have hitherto 
had so few of their neoessities or luxuries taxed by the State". 
12 Th9 
key phrase there is "by the State"t as explained by the first Residents 
"... the implication that they were not, therefore, taxed (hitherto) is 
not in aooordanoe with the faots. The new import duties do not oover 
many artioles previously taxed and in many oases impose a duty of 
instead of 10%. Retail prioes are going down and... this faot alone 
shows how inaoourate the Rajah's statements are". 13 
10. CO 531/1 (7040) Anderson to Co, Brunei oonfidential, 31 January 1907. 
11. Ibid., CO to Anderson, 1 Maroh 1907. 
12. CO 604 11 Sarawak Gazette, 5 June 1906, p 141. 
13. Co 144/80 (35280) McArthur to Seoretary to High Commissioner, No 150, 
28 June 1906, paragraph 3 (my, addition in parentheses). 
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The Resident invited attention, also, to the faot that exports from 
Sarawak-held Limbang to Brunei had to pay 10% duty and the export from 
there of nibong palms used in hoase-building in Brunei Town had been 
oompletely prohibited. In the light of this evidenoe, the Rajah'a 
oritioisms seemed due "leas to sympathy than to pique". The main point, 
indeed, is that the abolition of monopolies rednoed the `oost of living 
in Brunei and allowed greater freedom of trade; also, customs duties 
remained the prinoipal souroe of inoome there until the oil era (see 
below, p 168ff). 
Towards the end of 1908 the original Malayan loan to Brunei 
of X200,000 was already virtually exhausted. Ordinary revenue in Brunei 
amounted to only $51,777 in 1907 and %43,539 in the following year* 
14 
Of these sumsp the allowanoes payable -to the Sultan and wazirs alone 
absorbed %24,000 annually. It had beoome clear that a seoond loan was 
imperative; and, although Mr Churohill had assured the House of Commons 
in 1907 that it was not intended to make the FäS loan an annual ooour- 
renoe, 
15 
it was obvious that Brunei 
"must be finanoed for some time to oome and there appears to be no other 
oonrse bat'to apply again to the FMS for what is neoessary". 16 
Mr Stubbs argued that there was muoh to the said for the view 
"that Malay States whioh have flourished extraordinarily owing solely to 
14. Cf. Sir Charles Brooke's olaim in 1895 that "the looal revenue of 
the Sultan is only about 1000 a month", or X9,600 annually (CO 144/701 
19976 - Rajah to F0,4 November 1895). 
15. CO 531/1 (26381). Mr WS Chnrohill (1874-1965) was Parliamentary 
Under Secretary of State for the Colonies from 1905 until 1908. 
16. CO 531/2 (7111) Anderson to CO, Brunei (oonfidential), 3 February 
1909, Paragraph 6. 
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British Protection shouldv as a thanks offering, aid a kindred State to 
secure the same advantages. There is no visible alternative except to 
hand over the State to Sarawak,, which would... be a crime". 17 
By June 1911 a second and a third loan, both of '100,000 - making 
'400,000 in all - had been obtained and expended. Although a fourth 
loan had become necessary, the situation seemed to be improving: 
"It should be possible now to pay the FKS Government interest at the 
rate of 4% on the whole loan of %400,000 and during the next three years 
it may also be possible to pay the overdue interest for the years 1906- 
109 amounting to about %48,000. The unofficial members of the Federal 
Council were consulted as regards a further loan of XI00,000 (making 
$500,000 in all) and, with one dissentient, they approved it". 18 
Mr Stubbs was satisfied that the money had been spent "to good purpose" 
for Brunei, "and ifs as seems possible now, the FMS (? is) to get their 
interest as well (which I scarcely expected to happen in my time), the 
situation has resulted very satisfactorily". 
19 
By April 1914, when the. Colonial Offioe called a halt to any 
further borrowing by Brunei for the time being, 9399750 of the fourth 
loan had been drawn. Mr Griffin oommented that, if the oil business 
came to anything,, the Brunei Government "ought to be able to oarry on". 
20 
The loan mosey had been used as. shown in Table 3 (overleaf). 
In 1922 Brunei reoeived a further loan, this time of 
%209000 from 
the Straits Settlements, which was used for the purchase of oession monies 
and the capitalization of political pensions granted in compensation to 
former tulip holders. In the case of this particular loans repayment 
17. Ibid., minute by Stubbs, 6 March 1909. 
18" CO 531/3 (22583) Aoting High Commissioner, Mr (later Sir) FAG 
BrOokman (1865-1943) to Co, 12 June 1911, paragraph 4. 
19" Ibid., minute by Stubbs, 14 July 1911. 
20. CO 531/6 (28412) minute by RH Griffin (1879-1917), 6 August 1914. 
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Table 3. Broneis Loan Expenditure 1906-14 (in Straits 
Use 
1. Redemption of oession monies 174077 39.65 
2. General purposes 106,980 24.33 
3. Redemption of monopolies 72,009 16.37 
4. Loan to sultan Jemal - 419000 9.32 
5. Government buildings and launch 38,339 8.72 
6. Redemption of tulip rights 7,045 1.60 
T0TAL 439,750 100.00 
Sources CO 824/1 Brunei Annual Report 1926, p 24. 
* 
was made at the rate of %2,000 a year and was completed by 1933. 
Thus it will be seen, that the oost of establishing the finanoes 
of Brunei on a sound basis was rather more than had been anticipated 
by the British authorities on the eve of the Residential Eiaa (only 
one loan of x$200,000 was planned). Interest payments long remained a 
heavy burden; and, but for the fortuitous disoovery of oil, indebtedness 
Would have persisted for far longer than aotually transpired. 
In 1914 Brunei's national debt represented the equivalent of 
three and a half years' ordinary revenue (and, at one stage, it had been 
over Seven years' revenue). By the beginning of the oil era (1932) 
the defioit, although reduoed oomparatively little in absolute terms, 
represented barely one year's inoome beoause of the expansion, in the 
interval, of ordinary revenue. This is demonstrated in the following 
table. 
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Table 4. National Debt as a Percentage of Government Revenue (% Straits) 
Year Inoome Expenditure National (2) as %age 
(1) Debt (2) of (1) 
1906 28,173 145,245 200,000 710 
1910 77,051 73,513 300,000 389 
1915 129,529 114518 4399750 338 
1920 206,253 223,690 430,000 208 
1925 345,573 245,286 430,000 124 
1930 333,069 373,604 401,000 120 
1935 813,532 786,201 133,000 16 
1940 1.556.394 1,462,174 nil - 
Sonroes Compiled by author from it"unei Annual Reports 1906-46. 
4. Ordinary Revenue 
Ordinary revenue (as opposed to the FMS loan) rose steadily 
during the early years of the Residential Fora until further progress 
was interrupted by the Great War. In 1910 a surplus was aohieved for 
the first time, and in the following year an annual revenue of six 
figures 
, was attained, rising 
to a pre-war peak of 165,082 in 1913. 
Airing the Great War revenue slumped; bntp apart from_untypioal years 
(auch as 1914 and 1930), Brunei usually showed a surplus. In 1911 it 
beoame possible to begin paring interest on the ISIS loam; and repayment. 
Of the principal oommenoed in 1920K 
Although nearly 40% of loan ezpeuditure had. beeu devoted to 
the redemption of oeeeion monies, and }80,870 of ordinary revenue had 
been expended for the same purpose by 1928, net reoeipts from redeemed 
cession monies were slightly lese before 1932 than the sums aPPlied to 
redeem them. After the Seoond World War Brunei agreed to the Sarawak 
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Government's request for a compounding of annual oession money payments. 
21 
The redemption of monopolies was far more valuable, however, 
in permitting alternative forms of revenue oolleotion for the admin- 
istration thereafter. Customs duties, which replaced monopolies, 
remained the most signifioant source of inoome until the beginning of 
the oil era. in 1906 direct customs duties collected by the Government 
amounted to only X17,720 of the total revenue of %28,173. A further 
%12,210 was derived indirectly from the import duty farms for opium and 
spirits (%4,95o), tobacco (%6,050) and kerosene and matches (1,210). 
The tobaooo and opium farms were resumed bf the Government on 1 August 
1908. On the came date a ohandu farm was oonstituted and let to Cheok 
Boom Siok, who also held the pawabrokiug and gambling farms. At this 
time the Customs Department suffered from a number of disadvantages, 
including lank of etaffq and geographical and political factors made 
Brunei ideal smuggling oountry. The Brunei Government also had no power 
to impose duties in the Brooke-oontrolled Naara Damit distriot. Finally, 
many months elapsed before suitable Government offioials ooald be found 
for Belait and Temburong diatriota; and, as late as 1915, diffioaltiea of 
ooonmunioation made it impbgsible for the Resident to exeroise adequate 
22 
euPervisiou over these new Malay magistrates beoause of distanoe. 
21, After the Seoond World War the British Resident in Brunei was 
pressurised by Sarawak and North Borneo (which became British Crown 
colonies in 1946) into compounding cession monies on extremely favoar- 
able terms (ten years' annual payments). Private holders of cession 
monies in Brunei refused to settle on the same basis, which they regard- 
ed as inadequate (CO 537/3781 and CO 537/2242)- 
22, CO 531/9 (37469) Mr FW Douglas (1874-1953) to 00,12 August 1915. 
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In 1910 several attempts were made to improve the customs 
yield. Matters were helped by a rise in the prioe of jungle produoeq 
espeoially jelutong, whioh enoouraged trade and increased revenue from 
customs. Indeed, the Government found itself having to oaution people 
of the dangers of excessive reliance on one industry. Seoondlyp by this 
time Government supervision had improved somewhat. Two of the largest 
Brunei importers were fined in 1910 on the proseoution of the Assistant 
Resident for deolaring false values on dutiable artioles; whilst the 
leading Chinese trader at Tatong was charged with smuggling and fined 
heavily on conviction. Thirdly, in April 1910, a general codification 
of customs duties was introduced throughout Brunei. It was found that 
Chinese traders had been deolaring entirely false values on their getah 
and eluton exports - in some oases 50-60% below the true value. Henoe 
Customs sohednles were prepared, providing for a uniform duty throughout 
Brunei. 
Smuggling remained a perennial problems 
"Around Brunei Bay there are four different administrations ... all within 
a radius of fifteen miles and all with different tariffs -a perfeot 
Paradise for smugglers, with all the existing oreeks and islands... ". 23 
As late as 1924 there had to be a "oonsiderable tightening up" of oastoms 
snpervisi on. 
The increase in customs revenue (shown in the table overleaf) 
was taken as ". an adez of the rising prosperity of the ooaatry" but, 
initially oontinned to be too heavily dependent on jejutongg whioh 
23. CO 824/1 Brunei Annual Report 1924, p 4" 
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Table 5. Seleoted Souroes of Brunei ßovernment Revenue 1907-41 (in 
Straits). 
Year Total Customs Lioenoes Gov't Cession Poll Lands & 
Inoome Non's Money Tax Mines 
i*) 
1907 51,777 13,587 15,900 - n. a. 605 3,200 
1910 77,051 39,627 2,705 - 20,813a 4,266b 12,145 
1915 129,529 42,584 18,148o n. a. 21,646 5,164b 14,343 
1920 206,253 69,872 20,637 35,481 20,038 3,544 24,973 
1925 345,573 132,682 15,025 65,615 15,175 3,566 42,986 
1930 333,069 130,881 17,242 52,974 15,200 1,988 72,595 
1935 813,532 229,129 30,146 53,369 15,200 1,034 420,9244 
1941 1,325,913 335,963 53,761 84,344 15,200 nil 60398948. 
Notes: * Government Monopolies 
a 1911 (inoluding "repayment of loans"),, 
b inoludes market boat tax and launch freight tax 
o probably inoludes Government Monopolies (oreated 1913) 
d inoludes oil royalty. 
Sources oompiled by author from Brunei Annual Reports. 
Table 6: Seleoted Soaroe8 of Government Revenue as a Peroentage of the 
Total Revenue 
Year Total Customs Lioenoes Gov't Cession Poll ^ Landa & 
Inoome Mono's Money Tax Mines 
1907 51,777 26 31 - n. a. 1 6 
1910 77,051 51 4 - 27 6 8 
1915 129,529 33 4 n. a. 17 4 11 
1920 206,253 34 10 17 10 2 12 
1925 3459573 38 4 19 4 1 12 
1930 333,069 39 5 16 5 0.6 22 
1935 813032 28 4 6 2 0.1 52 
1941 1025,913 25 4 6 1 nil 46 
Sources compiled by author from the data in Table 5. 
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earned large sums for both dealers and oolleotors. 
24 
By way of oontrast to effective export duties, the imposition 
of customs duties on imports hit the poorer people, as the Government 
itself admitted in 1911s 
"As soon as the revenue permits, the import duties on everything exoept 
oil, tobaooo (whioh is one of the main faotors in the inoreased revenue), 
and spirits, should be rednoed and eventually abolished as their oolleot- 
ion does more than anything else to retard the progress of the oountry, 
espeoially with regard to an inorease (through immigration) of population, 
the orying need of the oountry". 25 
So long an the prioe of eluton remained high, the Government 
had no fears that the populaoe would be in actual want; 
26 but a warning 
was given that it was by no means oertain that elutoa would continue 
to provide profit and in that event Government expected to be oonfronted 
with a reduotion of at least $20,000 in annual revenue. 
The pre-war peak of customs duties - %57,816 - was achieved 
in 1913, but further growth was halted by the First World War, only 
%38,823 being oolleoted in 1918. This slide followed the enforoed removal 
of import duties from pertain foodstuffs and the general depression in 
trade beoause of war oonditions and shipping restriotions. The immediate 
24. CO 824/1 Brunei Annual Report 1911, p 3- 
25- Ibid. The Resident added that "taxation of imports as oolleoted in 
Brunei is a heavy fine on oapitalp while that of exports was a small 
charge on inoome"s i. e. import duties disoouraged new investment in 
Brunei from overseas. 
26. In 1912 repeated warnings were given "in Belait distriot eepeotally 
of the necessity for cultivation of oooonuts, as well as of the 
advisability of cleaning the sao plantations. The (people), however - 
with a blind trust in the unlimited wealth of Government now that British 
officers are employed in Brunei - elaborate that trust by a steady dis, 
iaoliuation for any sustained manual labour, a somewhat embarrassing 
condition of affairs in the light of what the future is almost sure to 
bring forth" (CO 824/1 Brunei Annual Report 1912, p 4). 
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aftermath of war was a time of extreme hardship because of the acute 
shortage' of rice which caused its price to soar but this increased cost 
was offset to some extent by inoreased demand for Brunei sago ý eluton 
and dried fish. India, whioh had substantial surpluses of rice, "bled 
Malaya shamelessly" at this time. 
27 
Tariffs on foodstuffs and other 
essentials were kept low or remitted in 1920-1. In the latter year a 
duty was levied on opal exported from Sir Vyner Brooke's mine at Brooke- 
ton; but the rapid increase in the, yieýd from oustoms duties during the 
1920s was due prinoipally to the rubber export boom and the importation 
of maohinerf by the British Malayan Petroleum Company. 
Chandu Monopoly. A seoond major souroe of Government inoome 
during the pre-oil era was "Government monopolies", meaning ohandu. 
28 
The 
ethioe of relying upon snob a profinot for revenue became a matter of in, - 
ternational oonoern. At the first International opium Coaferenoe held at 
The Hague in 1912, it was agreed that, in future, the manufacture and sale 
of opium would be monopolised by the State. Heroe, after 1 January, 1913, 
the Brunei administratioa reoeived all ohandn imported into the oo1121tr7 
from the Government faotorT in Singapore, and a Monopolsee Department, 
headed (1913-19) by Mr EG Goldfinohp was oreated. It was feared, however, 
27" CID 717/59 (File 52332) minute by Sir ä Grindle (1869-1934), 29 Jan- 
uar7 1928, See also CO 273/503 (2986 20/21) Sir LN Guillemard (1862-1951) 
to Cot SS oonfidentialp 18 December 1920; and enclosure, Ckaillemaxd to 
Lord Chelmsford (Viceroy of India), 18 December 1920. India had made a 
profit of $39,000,000 from rice sales to Malaya, Sir Laurence claimed. 
28. Before 1906 the monopoly of o_ import "1901-15" had been sold 
to Chas Chang Hee for %14,040 cash (MoArthur, "Report", Appendix III). 
"This represents $1,080 per annum (sio)", Mr McArthur added. "At Brooke- 
ton, where there is a smaller Chinese population, the farm fetches 5,760 
Per annum. The Limbang farm fetches %4,800 per annum". NB: 14,040 
divided by 1,080 equals only 13; therefore, either the dates "1901-15" 
or the annual reoeipte "11,080" given by Mr McArthur is inoorreot. 
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that the ease of smuggling would complicate the enforcement of the 
international opium policy. Finally, the Brunei Chandu Enactment of 
1912 oonfined the sale of ahandn in the Sultanate to adult male Chinese. 
Shops and customers had to be registered. 
During 1913 the total sale of opium is Brunei actually increased 
(by about 10%)p instead of tailing, and produced a net revenue for the 
Government of x$37,070 
(instead of only $12,000 the previous year, when 
the former system had been in operation). By 1924 this rose to X58075, 
which represented over 20% of total revenues compared with about 45-50% 
ire the Straits Settlements. It was found, also, that the amount spent 
by a labourer on opium tended to increase with his earnings. If the 
price of Government ohandu became too high, he simply turned to cheaper 
supplies of smuggled Persian opium, or to more dangerous drugs, suoh as 
heroin or oooaine, or to excessive consumption of alcohol. 
A commission of enquiry,, appointed in 1923, reported on opium 
in 'British Malaya', including Brunei. It was discovered that 80-85% of 
those who smoked opium had acquired the habit locally. About 60% of the 
sample smoked for pleasure and about 40% for relief from pains Chinese 
labourers looked upon opium: as possessing curative qualities. The dose 
taken was governed by two factors, tolerance and pocket, the latter 
being of increasing importance as the income scale descended. 
The Geneva Conference of 1924 envisaged the complete suppression 
of Opium, smoking within fifteen years of the date when smuggling had been 
completely suppressed. The date of the latterp which was to be announoed, 
was to be not later than 1935: hence total abolition was scheduled for 
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1950 at the latest. 
29 
The British Government remained sceptioal of suoh 
rapid progress. 
30 
Also deoided at Geneva and implemented in Brunei was, inter 
ail. ia, the oomplete oontrol by Government of opium retailing from 1 January 
1925" In Brunei Town there was a Government retail shop in the charge 
of a Government servant who gras paid a fixed wage, and in all the out- 
atatione, with one exoeptiong opium ooald be obtained only at Government 
cutlets. There were only eight, retail shops in Brunei on 1 November 1925 
and no smoking divans. Anti-opium inatraotion in sohools, as required 
by the Convention, was oonaidered undesirable and unneoessary in Brunei. 
A system of registration of smokers was prepared. 
31 
In order to make provision against the day when opium revenue 
would oeaeep all the Xalayan administrations introduoed Opium Revenue 
Replacement muds (ORR? ). In 1925 the Resident of Brunei proposed to 
earmark 20% of opium revenue until 1927, and thereafter the whole of suoh 
revenue, towards a replaoement fund. The Malayan opium funds were set 
up to demonstrate to a soeptioal publio opinion that the various Govern- 
mints, whioh derived up to 500 of their-revenue from opium, ßerionsly 
intended to stamp oat the habit. This was done ostensibly as a result 
of 1ooa1 initiative but in faot under pressure from here (Whitehall)". 
32 
It was deoided that the reserve funds should remain in effect until they 
29. Co 273/525 (18501) Sir LN Guillemard (1862-1951) to C0, oonfidential, 
18 Maroh 1924, enclosing the Opium Committee's report. 
30. CO 273/532 (17553) minute by Mr XT Parkin (1892-1972), 5 November 1926, paragraph 9. 
31. CO 273/531 (7462) memo by Mr EEF Pretty, 1 November 1925, paragraph 3. 
32. CO 717/66 (File 62427) minute by ßär 3 Caine, 26 August 1929. 
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reaohed the equivalent of three years' revenue from opium. The Brunei 
fund, standing at x$201,903 on 31 Deoember 1940, easily aohieved this 
objeotive; but by that time oil revenue rendered the replaoement of opium 
revenue lese urgent (but easier to do). The underlying objeotive was 
"to free Malayan administrations entirely from any embarrassment which 
their dependence upon opium revenue might cause in carrying out the 
policy of the ultimate suppression of opium-smoking". 33 
Although consumption of opium had been in deoline for some time 
beforehand, the Japanese oooupation (1941-5) indireotly and finally solved 
the evil of opium-smoking in Brunei "by killing off or ouring all ad . 
iota". 34 After 1946 the ohandu monopoly was not re-established. 
Lands and Mines. , Lands and mines provided a third major souroe 
of Brunei"a inoome. In 1908 land revenue was obtained ohiefly from pay- 
mente by the Rajah of Sarawak for coal rights and by the island Trading 
$yndioate for the area ooonpied byr their outoh faotory at Subok. At this 
stage it was not possible, in the abeenoe of the neoessary etaffv to 
carry out the survey of oooupied land., and no rents were as yet assessed. 
(The Rajah and ITS paid fixed sums speoified in their respeotive leases). 
After the introduotioa of land legislation (1907,1909) and the 
resolution of tulin olaime, many lots of land were taken np and several 
estates were established in Brunei. The Government then derived from 
these holdings, sometimes in lieu of poll tax in the oase of non-MalaT 
indigenona oultivatora, land rents and fees for survey, demaroation and 
33. I_ bid., CO to High Commissioner, 1 Ootober 1929, paragraph 70 
34. (RHO) Mss Pao s71 (8) CFC Maoaskie (1888-1969), "Notes for an Auto- 
biography of & -North Borneo Career" 
(1964), p 128. Consumption of ohandu 
fell from 12,660 tabus annually in 1926 to only 6,000 
tahils in 1938. 
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registration of title. Survey fees were not speoifioall7 inoluded as an 
item in land revenue, but were not inoonsiderable in themselves, reaohing 
a peak of P'583 in 1913. High laud prides (100-%400 per site) were 
obtained in Brunei Town as early as 1909, wbioh was taken as a sign that 
the Chinese had some faith in the oountry as a oommeroial oentre. The 
first rubber was exported in 1914 (whioh added to oust ans reoeipts and 
enabled the purohases of the new wage earners to be taxed). Local peoplle, 
partioularly Kedayans, began to take up land after their initial hostility 
and suspioion of Government intentions had been overoome by the taot of 
Mr Lee-Warner. A land-boom (by Brunei standards) followed in the mid- 
1920a when there was a rush, mainly by smallholders, to take up land for 
the purpose of rubber planting. 
There were hopes, also, that a substantial timber industry 
woald develop in. Brunei. The North Borneo Trading Company made such an 
attempt is 1909-11 but gave up in failure (see belowt p 209). Forest 
revenue also derived from lioenoes for jelutong tapping and the oolleotion 
of other jungle prodnos. With regard to mines, the main elements were 
prospeoting fees and mining rents, the latter often minimal. It was upon 
oil, however, that British Residents plaoed their only real hopes for a 
substantial mineral-based revenue. 
blisoellaneous souroes of inoome included posts, interest, 
muuioipal revenues fines and fees, poll tax and lioenoee. A postal 
system was introduoed in October 1906, when stamps were issued for the 
first time. This source of inoome was volatile, large inoreases 
ooourring after new issues of stamps, whioh were bought up by Earopean 
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philatelists. Hence, in 19079 postal revenue, standing at $1495879 
accounted for 28% of State income; and 1912 was an even better year 
(915,957). But, at other times, annual reoeipts fell below $2,000.35 
government 'interest' was derived from a 7% loan of 41,000 made to the 
Sultan in 01911 on the security of his private cession money receipts. 
A further loan of $20,000 was made to his son and suooessor in 1932 to en- 
able him to spend a year in the United Kingdom. Fines and fees of justioe 
remained constant at about $2-3,000 annually. This may seem small; but 
fees or a fine even of $10 would have stretobed severely the means of 
most Brunei people at this time. Manioipal revenue grew after the intro- 
duotion of Sanitary Boards for Brunei Town in 1920 and Kuala Belait and 
51tong in 1929. Rates were imposed to cover the cost of water supplies, 
soavengiug and sewage disposal, the latter being primitive. A regular 
sarplus was aohieved over the expenses of these servioes. Finally* the 
Government obtained inoreasing revenue from 'lioenoes'. Before 1912 
'lioenoes' meant the farming of the right to oolleot import duties, but 
later, lioenoes were imposed on everything and everybody, from arms to 
35. In 1910 the postal clerk, Mr S )luragasu, was arrested and charged 
with embezzlement of X448.879 not including sums sent by foreign stamp 
dealers in letters addressed to the postmaster. Mr Muragasu was appointed 
to the Brunei service on 18 May 1909 on a monthly salary of $50. He had 
worked in Pahang and for the Duff Syndicate in Kelantan. Later, in 1907, 
he had joined the Johore Medical Service, whenoe he had moved to Labuan. 
The man was suffering from alcoholism in 1910 and was thought to be unfit 
to stand trial (Co 531/2s 9625). Mr Stoney later minuted that Mr Murugasu 
had been convicted and sentenced to 5-6 years (sic) imprisonment, to be 
served in Labuan (CO 531/2s 26308). Foreign dealers flooded the Colonial 
Office with demands for reimbursement, but the latter denied liability 
(CO 531/2 items 29939,15751,26208,27278, and 26921). 
Mr Murugasu's replacement, Mr Leong Ah Ng, doubled up as 
medical dresser until his retirement in 1929. 
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aliens, dogs to fishing, and motor vehicles to warehouses. Many of these 
were introduced only after 1924, but produced $42013 by 1939" In 1923 
a licence fee was imposed even upon the Brunei Town padian (river hawkers), 
"an innovation sic) by which the river dwellers, comprising more than 
three quarters of the population of the town, were led to contribute 
something to the revenues of the State, whereas formerly they had been 
subject to no direct and practically no indirect taxation". 36 
5. "I have taken steps to ensure that the utmost eoonoW is exeroised" 
In view of Brunei's heavy indebtedness and low revenues before 
oil export oommenoed in 1932, the strictest oontrol had to be maintained 
over expenditure. The table (overleaf) shows that during the year 1911 the 
Brunei Government had onlg five dollars to spend for each citizen, whereas 
the National Debt stood at over eighteen dollars per head. Even as late 
as 1931 indebtedness remained higher than annual revenue. 
In the early years of the Residential Era, therefore, all 
unneoessary, and many neoessary.. items of expenditure had to be eliminated 
ruthlessly. Even sop Residents were oooasionally, provoked into defending 
their failure to make further cute: 
"I can find nothing" - thus Mr MoArthur in 1908 - "whioh I should venture 
36. CO 824/1 Brunei Annual Report 1923, p 7. Cf. MoArthurp. "Report"p 
Appendix III: "Market (monopoly)s - Leased to Chua Cheng Hee, 1900-20. 
No consideration stated. (This gives him the right to collect a fee from 
every boat trading in the awn -a market held daily in some one 
(sie) 
of the channels running through the town", Henne the imposition of 
adian licences in 1923 was not an innovation. The padian itself - women 
hawkers wearing broad-rimmed hats selling their goods from boats - existed 
at the time of Pigafetta (1521); but It understand that in the very last 
few years it has died out. See, also, the statement made in 1925 that 
"the present scale of import duties is very high and is felt by all 
classes" (CO 824/1 Brunei Annual Report 1925, P 5)" 
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Table 7. Bruneis Revenue per Head of Population 1911-59 (o Straits) 
Year Census Revenue Revenue National Debts 
of Total Per Head Total Per Head 
Population (in 0 Straits) 
1911 21,718 109,430 5.04 400,000 18.42 
1921 259454 165,890 6.49 427017 16.79 
1931 30,135 342,011 11.35 395,000 13.11 
1947 40,670 4,389,974 107.94 nil nil 
1959 83,877a 129,568,762 1,544.75 nil nil 
Notes as 1960 figure. 
Souroess oompiled by the author from Brunei Annual Reports. 
* 
to out out as unnecessary. On the contrary there are numerous omissions 
whioh I would gladly see rectified if only I were sure that funds would 
be available. Among suoh I would mention provision for vernacular ed- 
uoation in Brunei, Brooketoal, Tatong and Belait, a dresser and dispensary 
in Brunei and new roads - more particularly between Tutong and Belait. 
It is evident, however, that none of these can be provided for out of 
the funds now available and there seems some doubt whether those funds 
will suffice in any oase for the current year". 37 
"Rather melanoholy reading"p oommented Mr Stnbbs. 
38 
During the follow- 
ing year Sir John Anderson assured the Colonial Offioe that he had 
"taken steps to ensure that the utmost eoonoºy is exeroised". 
39 Mr 
Chevallier, in his annual report for 1910, noted thats 
"Every effort was made to economize; thus the Resident's boatmen, 
now an unnecessary luxury, were done away withs there was no 
sufficient need for employing a clerk for Brunei Court work alone, 
and, on the first opportunity, a saving was effected by making the 
former Courts Clerk take over the duties of Chinese Customs Clerk as 
well; there was no necessity for expending $1,200 upon a station for 
the Malay police, who have now been adequately and satisfactorily 
housed at an outlay of $200. In several minor points economies have 
37. CO 531/1 (24281) MoArthur to Anderson, 24 February 1908- 
38o Ibid., minute by Mr 8E Stubbs, 8 July 1908. 
39. CO 531/1 (7111) Anderson to CO, Brunei (oonfidential), 3 February 
1909, paragraph 3. 
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also been oarried oat... ". 
40 
The policy of avoiding expenditure on new offioes was oontinued. 
41 
The 
Resident warned, however, of the danger of making false economies: 
"A Land Code which pre-supposes the exiatenoe of a survey staff has been 
approved and it is absolutely necessary to make some effort to deal with 
land matters as soon as possible. The (people) are applying for land in 
all parts of the State and the Government is at present quite unable to 
prooeed with the applioations owing to the absence of a survey staff. 
Some arrangements must be made for demaroating the land... and unless the 
staff applied for is approved, the work oannot possibly be done". 42 
Brauei was well on the way to balancing increased current 
expenditure, exolading loans, when the outbreak of the Great War redoubled 
the need for eaononW s revenue, whioh had reaohed $165,082 in 1913, fell 
to $126,647 in 1914 and in the following four years annual inoome did 
not exceed the level of $$136,610 aohieved in 1918. Mr Cator (Resident 
1916-21) later reoalled that "many were the shifts to whioh we were put 
to keep expenditure within inoome". on one oooasion., for example, the 
High Commissioner was due to visit Brunets 
"Greatly as we appreoiated the honour, we felt it would be a sinful waste 
of money to spend it on repairing the jetty to which His Excellency would 
arrive when a oapital flight of steps was available elsewhere and was not 
at the moment required for its legitimate purpose. So steps were borrowed 
from the gallows, and... discreetly veiled in red bunting". 43 
The Great War was followed by a soaroity of rioe (whioh foroed 
40. CO 824/1 Brunei Annual Report 1910, p 4. Before the end of 1909, 
the post of messenger was abolished, and the Assistant Resident was 
instructed to live in the Residency, thereby eliminating the used to 
maintain separate quarters for him. 
41. The Resident addeds "The present offices can amply accommodate staff 
until the success or non- success of Brunei Town, as a town built on terra 
firma, has been proved. Until that time, there is no need to increase the 
State debt by useless outlay" (CO 8241 Brunei Annual Report 1910 p 9). 
42. CO 531/2 (11169) memorandum by Chevallier, 9 February 1910. 
43. GE Cator, "Brunei" in Asian Review 1939, p 738. 
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prioes up to famine level), and then there was a trade depression.. 
partioularly in the rubber industry. By the close of 1922, however, the 
worst of the depression# which had "severely tried the State for two 
years"q had been "safely weathered". This period had been trying to the 
Government "but throagh the loyal co-operation of its officers in effect- 
jug economies, the financial position had improved by the end of the 
year" . 
44 (See, also, Appendix 6.2 on p 632, below). 
The mid-1920e were years of unpreoedented prosperity: "trade 
is growing by leaps and boundsp more immigrants are entering the ooantry 
and the making of the road to Thtoog has opened up large traots of 
valuable land whioh are being eagerly taken up by cultivators". 
45 Indeed, 
Ur Pretty, the Resident, recommended that the State's expanding cash 
balanoes "shomld be spent in improving oommanioations throughout the 
oonntry". 
' 
The end of the year 1925, he suggested, marked a watershed: 
"In the past all that has been possible was barely to make both ends 
meet. I am oonvinoed that the lean days are over and that the State is 
now safely embarked on a ooarse of real prosperity". 47 
A further reason for optimism was that, in 1924, the British 
Malayan Petroleum Company (BMPC) was already prodaoiag a small quantity 
of oil for its o vu use; and the Resident antioipated "with ooafidenoe" 
44. CO 824/1 Brunei Annual Report 1922, p 16. 
45" Co 531/19 (1972) memorandum by Nr EEF Pretty, No 363 
(Brunei )p 18 
Deoember 1925, paragraph 6. 
46. Ibid. 9 paragraph 10. In 1928 Mr Pretty was happy 
to report that 
"the hope of a settled agrioultural community is being rapidly fulfilled". 
(CO 717/59 File 523458 statement by Mr Pretty, 4 January 1928, 'General' 
seotion). 
47. As note 45, paragraph 11. Revenue reaohed a pre-oil peak of 
9440,870 in 1927 (approximately $115 per head of population); of. %3969834 
in 1926, $393,875 in 1928 and $345,290 in 1929. 
L- 
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that 1925 would see the aotual oommenoement of export from the State. 
' 
This belief was rather premature: 
"The export of oil from the BXPC' a field at Belait has not yet (1925) 
materialized, but this is always a great potential souroe of revenue if 
and when it becomes an aooomplished faot - and no-one really seems to 
doubt the eventuality, even though the results of boring up to date 
have been disappointing". 49 
Brutnei had to faoe one final trial, however, before it became 
the land "flowing with oil and gao". Sinoe the outbreak of the Great War, 
many of the publio had taken up rubber smallholdings so that in early 
1928 Mr Pretty warned that "the welfare of the majority of the population 
is largely dependent upon the steadiness of the price of rubber". 
50 
Heaoe the Great Depression oame as an especially severe blows 
"The low price of rubber which prevailed throughout 1929 was again 
responsible for a further drop in the revenue of the State... ". 51 
In 1930 Brunei earmarked $509000 of its cash reserve to build 
a wharf at the oapital. Nr tent at the Colonial Offioe suggested that 
this might be a oase for Colonial Development Find assistanoe; bnt his 
seniors ruled thatp since Brunei was prepared to meet the oost out of 
its own oapitalp this would be inappropriate, 
52 It was fortunate, 
however, that in 1930-2 there was 
"a steady inorease in the (oil-linked) revenue coming in from the Belait 
distriot... whioh is almost offsetting the tremendous drop in the general 
revenues of the State consequent on the slump in trade and the fall in 
48. CO 531/18 (6383) Pretty to Oaillemard, No 315 (Brunei), 21 December 
1924, paragraph 10. 
49. As note 45, paragraph 9- 
50- CO 717/59 (File 52345) statement by Mr Pretty, 4 January 1928. 
51" CO 717/70 (File 72349) statement by Mr PAB MoKerron, 3 Februa'Y 
1930, paragraph 6. 
52" Ibid., minutes by Messrs OEJ Gent (12 March),, WD Ellis 
(12 March) 
and Boyd (13 March 1930). 
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the prioe of rubber partioularly. Were it not for the new souroe of 
revenue now Doming in the State would have to go in for retrenohment 
with a vengeanoe". 53 
6. Social Servioes 1906-1932 
Given the severe general and persistent finanoial oonstraints 
just desoribed, the resoaroes available for the provision of sooial 
services necessarily was extremely limited before 1932. After the 
ordinary, administrative expenditure had been met, very little remained 
for anything else, as indioated by the table overleafr Ordinary adminr- 
iatrative expenditure does not appear to have been exoeeeives an late as 
1928, the British Resident's Office was staffed by four clerks (including 
one apprentioe)t a ap akah-puller and three gardenere. 
54 
Laok of funds 
was not the sole diffioultys Brunei was handioapped, also, by the absenoe 
of a Skilled professional and ednoated olass (the population being almost 
entirely illiterate in 1906), a shortage of labour, and the diffioalty 
of obtaining construction materials, especially timber and stone. In 
the remainder of this chapter, I shall ooaoentrate on three spheres of 
a. otivity: publio worksp health and, finally, ednoation. 
(a) Publio Works. The Publio Works Department (PwD), generally, 
was the biggest-spending Government department; and, beoause its aotivities 
tended to inorease rapidly (espeoially from the 1920x), its staff had to 
work at great pressure to keep up. After Dato Roberts' retirement in 
53. CO 717/78 (Fife 82349) statement by Mokerron, 19 February 19311 
Paragraph 6. 
54. CO 717/63 (File 62345) Mr ' Curtisl Brunei Estimates 1929. 
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Table 8. Bruneis Seleoted Items of Government Expenditure 1907-38 
(% straits) 
Part Is- 
Year Total Selected items of expenditures- 
Revenue Politioal Resident's Polioe & Interest on 
Pensions (a) Offioe Prisons FMS loan 
1907 51,777 25,445 n. a. 5,194 nil 
1910 77,051 31,709 11,972b 7,114 nil 
1915 129,529 29,841 10,196 10,213 17,590 
1920 206,253 33,134 15,260 3995450 17,590 
1925 345,573 29,404 15,396 29,555 17,566 
1930 333,069 40,546 21,143 31,383 16,321 
1935 813,532 66,520 20,422 38,910 15,132 
1938 1.179.979 84,205 24,025 
. 
44539 nil 
Part IIs- 
Year Selected items of expenditures- 
Public Works % of Ednoatioa Health 
0revenue i% 
1907 14,7054 28.40 .l nil nil nil 1910 14,705 19.08 nil nil nil nil 
1915 14,299 11.04 405 0.31 241 0.19 
1920 34,454 16.70 1,381 0.67 3,105 1.51 
1925 58,176 16.83 2,770 0.80 5,009 1.45 
1930 132004 39.84 7p289 2.19 17,396 5.22 
1935 13797.73 16.94 11,859 1.46 41,809 5.14 
1938 2399284 20.28 20,755 1.76.47,466 4.02 
Notes as Includes allowances to the Altan and wazirs; 'political 
pensions' to former tulin holders; and, from 1919, retirement pensions 
to former Government officers* 
bs 1911. 
os Expenditure upon, police and prisons was exoeptionally high 
in 1920 (of. 1919 $12,505; 1921 $24,690 and 1923 923,261). There were 
two reasons for thus (1) the establishment of a separate Brunei Police 
Force at the and of 1920; and (2) the exceptionally large number of 
Prisoners (for no reason assigned) in 1920 (167) - of. 35 in 1921 and 39 
in 1922. Only 19 people were being held at the end of 1919. 
ds The cost of building sohoois, hospitals and dispensaries is 
included under "public works". There was no European head of the 
Medical Department until 1929 or of Education until 1949. This resulted 
(before those dates) in lower expenditure upon salaries. 
SOUXoess Brunei Annual Reports 1906-1938. 
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1921, the State Engineer was usually seconded from Malaya. 
55 
The main tasks of the PWD were (i) the ooastruotion and main- 
tenanoe of public buildings, roads and bridges; and (ii) extraordinary 
projeots suoh as Brunei Town (land oapital), the wireless station (1920-1), 
water supply ands later, the provision of electrioity. In Belait distriot, 
beginning in 1922, many of these duties were undertaken IW the BMPC, with 
Government in a subordinate roles the oilfield towns, essentially, were 
built and servioed by the oil ocmpany. 
The soaroity of oonstruotion materials and skilled labour 
interfered seriously with the accomplishment of projected works; and 
since Brunei oould not afford to build roads during the early years of 
the Residential Eras efforts turned instead to clearing rivers "of the 
obstraotions which impede the progress of the boats trading upriver" 
56 
and the ooustruotion of bridle paths. 
57 The firnt rapid expansion of 
publio works dated from the mid-1920x. A large proportion of national 
resouroes was devoted to this oanses annual spending rose from only 
$14,288 in 1923 to $132,704 (40% of total revenue) in 1930. At the end 
of 1932 the department had oonstruoted about one hundred buildings, whioh 
were made of temporary or semi-permanent materials. 
Brunei Town was linked by earth road with Tutong (1925-7), 
55" Its 1922-? 6 the department was headed by a Malay, Inohe Awang bin 
Ha3i Hanafi. No appointment was made in 1930-2 as an eoonoml measure. 
56" CO 531/2 (11169) memorandum by Chevallier, 9 February 1910. 
57. By 1919 thirty-five miles of bridle paths were in user inoluding 
seotions between Batu Apoi and Temburong (1911), Menglait and Demuan 
(7 miles, 1917) and Temburong and Pandaruan (3 miles, also 1917). 
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Kumbang Pasang estate (1927) 
58 
and Bangar (via Limbang) in 1933.59 The 
BMPC built its own roads in BelaIt district. The Brunei-Tatong road 
"opened up much valuable agricultural land" 
60 
and brought extra revenue 
to the Government because higher rents were charged for farms with road 
frontage. The road to Bangar was a joint Brunei-Sarawak projeot, under- 
taken at the behest of the latter, as part of a proposed road link between 
Miri in the south-west and Lawas in the north-east. In mid. -1936 the 
British Resident informed the Sarawak Government that the oosts of 
maintenance were not warranted by the utility to Brunei of the road and 
61 it was proposed to maintain it in future as a bridle path only. 
The numerous rivers neoessitated many bridges. These were 
liable to be washed away by floods (e. g. Kiauggeh Bridge 1928). Wooden 
culverts were gradually replaced with concrete struotures and many new 
bridges oonstruoted, the most important being the Clifford Bridge (oom- 
pleted in 1928) whioh spanned 360 feet across the River Kedayan. 
62 
58. CO 824/1 Brunei Annual Report 1927p p 19. 
59. The section from Bangar to the Pandaru. an was completed in 1931, that 
from Brunei Town to Limbang in 1932. After the introduction of a ferry 
service across the Pandaruan in 1933, it became possible to motor from 
Brunei to Bangar via Limbang. (The Sarawak section of the road had been 
completed in 1929). 
60. CO 824/2 Brunei Annual Report 1932. p 19; of WS Maugham, "Virtue" in 
The Complete Short Stories II (London 1975), pp 1171-207. 
61. CO 604/21 Sarawak Gazette, 1 September 1936, p 229. Cf. RHO, Mss Pao 
074 Mrs Kathleen Kortright to "Aunt Annie", 23 June 19291 "For the first 
time (we) drove the whole way to Pandaruan (from Limbang), the eight miles 
of new road being just completed. I stayed in the oar... and about a dozen 
gedayans came along who had never seen a oar before... They, were so comic 
over everything, the lamps amazed theme and they were terrified when I 
touched the... 3horn. First they said it was a devil and then a deer 
barking". 
62. CO 824/1 Brunei Annual Report 1928, p 20. 
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Elsewhere, pontoons or ferries were called to the aid of the motorist. 
The first oar was imported by Mr Pretty in 1924" In 1933 211 
new oars and 220 new drivers were registered. 
63 
Most of these vehioles 
must have belonged to the BMPC. The Brunei rakyat oertainly laoked the 
resources to purchase a cars for theca, paddling by prabu along rivers 
constituted the prinoipal means of travel. The BMPO maintained a light 
railway (built in 1924-5) from the month of the River Seria to Badas 
(about nine miles inland), which the Public was permitted to use if space 
was available. 
64 
lb) Publio Works Extraordinary 
(i) Brunei Town (land section). The principal extraordinary 
Public, works project was the establishment of the capital on neighbouring 
terra firma, a soheme initiated by the first Residents 
"23... The Sultan's house... lies at the junction of a tributary 
creek (the Sungei Kedayan) with the main river... At the back of his house 
is an extensive tract of flat land, which would make an excellent site 
for a properly laid out town. It has on it ruins of old brick shop- 
housest but they are only the relics of former prosperity... 
24. Some way below the Sultan's house is an inlet called Subuk, 
the site of the Island Trading Syndicate's outoh factory... 
25. Below Subuk is the Consulate 1andq originally granted to 
Sir Spenser St John, on which can still be traced the ruins of his house. 
It is an excellent site for a European dwelling". 65 
Later Nr MoArthnr added: 
63. Cf. 1934: 174 and 179 respeotively. In 1936 the Government derived %5,533 from such lioenoes (of. 1937: $6,123 and 19386 07,922). 
64. CO 824/2 Brunei Annual Report 1938, p 36. There was no aerodrome 
in the State, but a temporary landing ground at Soria had on occasion 
been used. The rivers near the coast provided good landing Bites' for 
seaplanes. 
65" MoArthur, "Report". paragraphs 23-5. (Sir James Brooke had the 
same ideas of. Journal entry for 25 July 1842, quoted by H Koppel, The 
sedition to Borneo of HMS 'Dido' I- London 1846 -p 323). 
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"I wanted a clean dry village, with 'suburbs' of kampoug houses. I also 
wanted to discourage houses in the river". 66 
After being appointed Resident, Mr MoArthur set about estab- 
lisping the new oapital. He showed the way by having the site of the 
former British ooaisulate oleared of jungle and a temporary building put 
up in its plaoe to aooommodate European offioers of the State. In 
December 1906 work oomnenoed on a permanent Residency on this site and 
it had been completed., at a coat of $B'000 by July 1907.67 In addition 
a road - soon dabbed Residenoyr Road - was built from this site to the 
plain behind Kampong Ayer, a distanoe of one and a half miles. 
68 
As presaged in the 1904 "Report"p the plain behind the Sultan's 
is_ was opened up in 1906; and by 1908 two short streets had been 
madep and street lamps erected. During 1910 Chinese shopkeepers trans- 
ferred their operations to the lands this resulted in increased trade 
with the Kedayans, better sanitary oonditions, and an impetus to others 
to follow the example. set. The shops themselves - none of whioh oost 
less than '1,000 - were "a oredit and an attraotion to the plane". 
69 
The fringes of the Rivers Brunei and Kedayan had also been alienated and 
titles issued; many of these lands were fully planted up; oa several, 
houses were being built and ooonpied; and the general feeling of the maea 
of Brunei inhabitants was that a move to the mainland would be profitable, 
The people seemed to be favourable to land settlement. 
66. CO 824/1 Brunei Annual Report 1910, p 15- 
67-, See AC Watson, "Notes on the History of Bubongan Dia-Belas" in 
Bru__ nM ýtueeum Journal 1982. PP 37-104- 
68. Cf. P Blundell, 22. oit. i pp 220-1. 69. CO 824/1 Brunei Annual Report 1910, P 14. 
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"The country will not and oannot ever really advance until the capital 
is on dry land"p Mr Lee-Warner commented. "Hitherto advice has been 
given and no orders for removal have yet been laid on the natives of 
Brunei. Nor do I oonsider from the present aspect that any definite 
orders will be needed. If, however, the end of the year 1911 does not 
see a large exodus from the water, the Government should., I oonsider.. 
issue definite regulations appointing a definite period within which 
migration must be carried out by such persons who have the means and 
whose vocation is not confined to fishing or bark oolleoting, these 
two occupations necessitating proximity to the water". 70 
In 1911 a start was made with more permanent buildings along 
Resi denoy Road, beoause the old ones were in a dangerous state. The 
filling in of swampy groand was oontinuedt but mtmh remained to be done 
- "the want of money being sorely felt in this direction". 
71 
As late as 
1920-1 arrangements were being made for further swamp reolamation. The 
Sultan was built a new la au on the mainland in 1921. 
Two fine rows of new shops were constructed in 1920, which was 
cited as evi denoe of general prosperity. Five years later seven shop 
lots put up for anotion fetohed a sum of %149650p which was about three 
times in excess of the most optimistic anticipations. 
"The appearance of the town was entirely changed and great 
improvements made"l the Resident reported in 1925. "The old market and 
customs house were both demolished, a spacious new market was erected 
and the customs wharf entirely rebuilt and enlarged so as to accommodate 
a customs house in the middle and a godown at either end. The old sea 
wall was rebuilt and extended to a length of 700 feet, a oonsiderable 
area of land being reclaimed within it from the river bed, which was 
subsequently alienated for the erection of seven new shophouses facing 
the waterfront. There is now an esplanade 500 feet long and 70 feet 
broad between the sea wall and the first row of shops". 72 
Chinese people predominated in the land oapitalp whioh oonsisted 
70. Ibid., pp 15-16. 
71. CO 824/1 Brunei Annual Report 1911, p 11. 
72. CO 824/1 Brunei Annual Report 1925, pp 17-18. 
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mainly of Government buildings, shophouses and many private houses. 
73 
The State dootor noted that a regular soheme of 'town planning' had been 
adhered to and adequate steps taken to maintain a "good average health 
of the oitizens". 
74 
The whole land town was bombed flat by the Allies in 1945, so 
building had to begin anew. Although the population of the new oapital 
had reached almost 109000 by 1960, even more people lived in 8ampong 
Ayer. Heroe only half of Mr MoArthur's plan had been aohieveds a new 
town had been built on land; bat the River Village had not disappeared, 
as he had hoped. 
(ii) Telegraph. In 1920-1 a wireless telegraphic installation 
was oonstruoted at a total oost of %12,000. A central station was built 
at Brunei Town, with subsidiary stations in the outdistricts. The system 
was opened for traffio on 17 May 1921 and plaoed every part of Brunei in 
telegraphio communication with Singapore and Europep an "event of no small 
importance to the future of the State". 
75 
Thereafter a separate Wireless 
Department was organized under the supervision of Mr PHF George from 
1921 to 1926. Two years later the post was oooupied by Pen ran Muhammad 
bin Pence Pint, who held offioe until 1967. Despite the telegraph, 
Brunei remained geographically isolated. From 1930, however, the Straits 
Steamship Company's steamer, Brunei, operated between Brunei Town and 
Labuan, visiting Kuala Belait oocasionally. The Sarawak Steamship Coln- 
73. CO 824/1 Brunei Annual Report 1928, p 2. 
74. CO 824/1 Brunei Medical Department Annual Report 1925 ,p2; and 
BMDAR 19 26 pp2. 75. CO 824/1 Brunei Annual Report 1921, p 5. (In 1938,4,589 telegraphic 
messages were handled in Brunei). 
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pany's vessel, Aaby, called about once a mouth direct from Singapore. 
76 
(iii) Telephones. The earliest located mention of a publio 
telephone servioe - albeit it one oonfined to Government offioes in Brunei 
Town - Dame in 1928. By 1929 it was extended to the residenoes of 
offioials. An effort was made in the same year to induce the neighbouring 
estates to subsoribe to the servioe and it was intended to oonstruot a 
line to Tatong in 1930, The AMPC was given permission to link up Kuala 
Belait with the Sarawak frontier and with their field headquarters at 
Seria and Badas. These plans were exeoated. At the end of 1931 a oable 
was put aoross the Ztttong River and the line was extended to Kuala Belait 
during 1932, 
(iv) Water Supply. In 1908 a supply of potable water for the 
land oapital was piped from a oonorete tank positioned about one mile 
from the naeoent township. In the early 1920s "oonsiderable impr-ove- 
meats" resulted in the ooatinaed availability of water even during a 
Prolonged drought. In 192677 a reinforoed concrete dam (the first of a 
series) was oonstraoted at the head of the waterfall at Tasek, about two 
miles from Brunei Town; and the oonneotion of a supply to shophonses and 
Other buildings was aohieved during the following year. 
The people of Kampong Ayer depended for their water supply, 
"on the streams whioh run down to the river from the hills fringing the 
left bank between the Residenoy, and the ton. These streams have been 
ingeniously oondnoted into bamboo pipes which project over the river 
76. Steamers drawing up to 12 feet could reaoh the oapital, but only 
vessels less than two hundred feet in length could negotiate an art- 
ifioial barrier of rook in the river. There was a weekly mail service 
from Brunei Town to Kuala Belait. Buses ran at irregular intervals. 
77. CO 824/1 Brunei Annual Report 1926, p 21. 
192 
banks and discharge their crystal contents into jars and kerosene tins 
which are brought over in canoes each morning". 78 
Later it was suggested that the safety of suoh water was open to quest- 
ion because the streams passed over human burial grounds and were liable 
to oontamination. It was deoided that the piped water servioe from the 
reservoir to Brunei Town should be extended to the river banks and stand 
pipes be put up where the people from the adjoining Kampoag Ayer oould 
oolleot suffioient water for their own use, 
79 
The majority of people in rural areaep on the other hand, 
oontinued to rely on welle. or streams for water. These were also liable 
to oontamination. 
80 
Worse still, most people to Brunei had yet to learn 
filtering or even the value of boiling water prior to use for drinking. 
81 
(o) Health and Eduoatioa. In the first deoades of the Res- 
idential Eraq the population of Brunei was overwhelmingly illiterate 
and not very healthy. In 1906 there was neither school and teacher nor 
hospital and dootor in the Sultanate. 
Apart from periodio outbreaks of oholera and smallpox (before 
1906), those luoky enough to survive infanoy oontinued to be ravaged by 
malaria, beri-beri, yaws, tuberoalosisp even leprosy. In addition, there 
78. CO 824/1 Brunei Annual Report 19219 p 6. 
79. Co 824/1 Brunei Medical Department Annual Report 1929, p 11. 
80. CO 824/1 Brunei Medioal Department Annual Report 1925, p 2. ("Ked- 
ayanss Drop latrines over shallow streams are not unknown but defeoation 
on the surfaoe of the soil in and around their dwellings is a oommon mode 
of nightsoil disposal. A shallow well oonstitutes their water supply for 
all Purposes and its liability to oontamination becomes obvious". BY 
1929 part of the routine duties of the travelling dresser was "to do 
Propaganda work to promote sanitation in rural districts" (BMDAR 1929 
p 13). 
81. CO 824/1 Brunei Medical Department Annual Report 19299 P 79 
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were diseases, suoh as dysentery, enterio fever and ankylostomiasia, 
caused by low standards of bygiene and poor sanitation. Improvement 
in the people's. health, therefore, depended upon progress in other 
spheres. Better sanitation, less overcrowding in houses, the elim- 
ination of p overtyp advanoes in eduoation and a more varied diet were 
essential preoonditious for a hale and vigorous populaoe. 
Prior to the establishment of the Brunei Medioal Department in 
1929, health matters there had been overseen by the Labuan dootor. In 
1919 arrangements were made for him to visit Brunei at least onoe a month; 
and experts also oame from Singapore to offer advioe. The postal olerk 
doubled as a resident dresser in the oapital; and in 1918 a travelling 
dresser was engaged to visit the outstations. These constituted the 
entire medical staff employed by the Government an late as 1926. 
Health efforts during the pre-oil era were handioapped by the 
lack of money and information and the desaitory interest and effort on 
the Part of the authorities. Medioal supplies were insuffioient; it was 
difficult to reach rural dwellero because of poor oommuaioatioas; and 
indigenous suspioion of foreign medioines and methods had to be overoome. 
In 1922 it beoame oompalsory to register all births and deaths in the hope 
that "opportunity will be given to extend considerably the benefits of 
medical assistance throughout the State". 
82 
For a long time records re- 
mained incomplete; henoe even the causes of death were imprecisely knoam. 
83 
82" 00 824/1 Brunei Annual Report 1922, p 16. 
83. "The vast majority of (reoorded) deaths in the State", Dr OE Fisher 
reoalls, "were oertified by the pen. ghulus and the favourite Dauses of death 
were demam (fever) or, in the oase of anyone over the age of fifty, oukup 
(... 'fullness of years')". Letter to the author, 3 May 1984. 
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It was somewhat oomplaoently believed, indeed, that the people were 
healthy at this time. 
During the early years of the Residential Era there were two 
prinoipal oonoerns. First, to prevent a further smallpox epidemio; and, 
seoondly, to resettle the population of Kampong Ayer on dry land. 
The 1904 smallpox epidemio had approximately deoimated the 
population of the capital. In 1911 it was reported that the postmaster 
had vaooinated 475 people against the disease; but plans to appoint a 
resident dootor84 appear to have fallen victim to retrenchment at the 
beginning of the Great War. The last oaee of smallpox in Brunei seems 
to have occurred at Muara in 1914; but the infection did not spread 
thanks to prompt vaooination of the neighboaring population. The most 
satisfactory feature of the year 1919 was the "sudden popularity" of 
vaooination, to whioh Malays previously had had "an ineradioable objeot- 
ion". 
85 
B7 1922 virtually everyone had been injeoted. This obviated 
the neoessitq for legislation, whioh was being considered for 1920 
through fear of a reourrenoe of smallpox in epidemio proportional each 
legislation was always difficult to enforoe and tended to promote a 
prejudice against "modern medioal methods" - something which it was 
"Particularly desirable" to avoid. 
86 
But the dootor warned that the 
danger of another smallpox outbreak still could not be over-eatimated. 
87 
There sae, Fortunately, no repetition of the earlier tragedy. 
84. Co 531/4 (26950) and CO 531/5 (37747)- 85- Co 824/1 Brunei Annual Report 1919, p 6. 
86. I`. 
87. CO 824/1 Brunei Annual Report 1922, p 11. 
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The 1904 smallpox. epidemio, and the outbreak of oholera two 
years beforehand, were adduoed as evidenoe of "how really insanitary the 
place (Kampong Ayer) is"88 and oontributed to a determination to resettle 
the population of the capital on terra firma. Mr Lee-Warner conceded 
that Brunei Town enjoyed the "proud distinoti on of being a unique pity 
built upocs the water"; but, he added, the diatinotion 
"is a. oostly one. For (i) infant mortality in Brunei is appalling; the 
children and their mothers are cramped; lank of exercise causes debility, 
debility fever, and fever for a young child exposed to continuous damp 
- deaths and (ii) the filthy water oontinually used, and the germ-breeding 
debris continually under the houses undoubtedly cause the dysentery and 
diarrhoea which annually decimate the whole population. The fish caught 
under the houses (the staple lack or seasoning for curry in Brunei) feed 
on garbage and cause disease; and (iii) pneumonia is rampant". 89 
This remained the prevailing orthodoir until 1918 when Brunei's 
esoape from the world influenza epidemio prompted eeoond thoughts: 
"Muoh has been written" - thus Mr Cat or - "about the unhealthiness of 
Brunei houses perohed as they are on mudbankss but after this year's 
experienoe it may be doubted whether this system is altogether bad". 90 
Dr AL Hoops, 91 Prinoipal Medioal Offioer of the Straits Settlements, 
agreed that there was no jnstifioation on health grounds for removing 
the people from Kampong &qer. On the oontrary, "the question of eoaven- 
ging is inexpensively and suitably solved. The river is tidäl and dejeota 
are speedily washed away". 
92 A later observer, noting a tendency among 
88. McArthur, "Report", paragraph 23. 
89. CO 824/1 Brunei Annual Report 1910, p 14- 
90" CO 824/1 Brunei Annual Report 1918, p 5- 
914, "A persuasive Irishman with a wonderful gift of dealing with natives" 
(Sir LN Guillemard, Trivial Pond Reoords - London 1937 -p 130)- 
92.00 8241 Brunei Annual Report 1921, p 6. But later it was objected 
that flushing was "never perfect and a certain amount of the dejeota is 
left behind on the banks a little higher ups thus keeping up continuous 
souroes for contamination and forming suitable breeding grounds for flies, 
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the younger generation to settle on the mainland, oommented that "though 
the salutary effeot of the river is absent, the old habits (of rubbish 
damping) still remain". 
93 The population of Kampong Ayer in 1947 was 
at approximately the same level it had been in 1921.94 
The first Government hospital in Brunei was began in the oap- 
ital in November 1928 and opened by the sultan himself in the following 
September. It was originally designed to contain thirty, beds for third 
olass patients. The Malay, however, lusaally prefers to stay at home 
when he is suffering from a severe illness". 
95 The more serious oases 
were sent to the hospitals in Labuan or Miri for treatment. Finally, 
in 1926, the larger employers of labour were required to establish a 
'hospital' and engage a dresser on their sites. 
which are found in abundance in all these houses". This opened the 
possibility of more serious types of intestinal infections, such as 
typhoid and cholera. Pxrthermore, "this highly-polluted water is used 
by the entire population (of Kampong . Ayer) 
for bathing and washing 
purposes". Another feature of the River village was "the prevalence of 
preventable eye diseases, chiefly among children under six" (CO 824/1 
Brunei Medical Department Annual Report 1929, p 11). 
93. CO 824/2 Brunei Annual Report 1937, p 13. 
94. But, during the interval, it had probably increased and then fallen 
back again. 
95" CO 824/2 Brunei Annual Report 1937, p 11. In 1924 the doctor oom- 
plained that the populace was "very conservative in the matter of health 
and treatment for ill-health". The Malay "is extremely reluctant to be 
seen by a European Medical man and when seen he is still more reluctant 
to take the treatment prescribed. His prejudice against admission to 
hospital is so deeply-rooted as to make him rather lose his life than 
come to hospital" (BMDAR 1924, P 2)" Most patients, therefore, were 
Government servants, police officers and prisoners (ibid., p 4). ]Dr 
Cleverton, the visiting medical practitioner, "considered a hospital in 
Brunei as quite unnecessary for the present and that the lines on which 
medical work has been pursued in the past will meet the present (1924) 
and immediate future requirements" (ibid). Admissions to Labuan 
Hospital from Brunei comprised people from estates and Government 
servants (BMDAR 19279 p 3). 
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Improvement in health required,, inter alia, progress in other 
spheres such as ednoatioa. Stress was laid upon helping children, who 
were often more receptive than their parents. Government Malay primary 
sohools were founded in Brunei Town (1912), Muara (1915), Belait (1917) 
and Tatong (1918); and a small private Chinese sohool for the benefit of 
the children of the capital's shopkeepers was started in 1912. Education 
in Brunei, Mr Cat or noted in 1916, needed all the enoouragement the Gov- 
ernment oould provide beoause three of the Pour Malay magistrates and 
most of the Malay olerks hailed from neighbouring Sarawak: 
"It is greatly to be desired"t he oontinuedy "that when these retire 
there shall be natives of Brunei fitted by education and birth to take 
their place and to assume their proper share of responsibility for the 
administration and development of their oountry". 96 
A soheme was inaugurated in 1917 whereby the most promising 
PUPils were taken into Government servioe as apprentioes and it was 
hoped in this way to secure a saooession of Brunei-born people who had 
suffioieat edaoatioa and training to fit them for responsible appoint- 
ments. A further step became possible in 1919, when arrangements were 
made by which Brunei contributed to the cost of the P. igliah school 
"reoently opened" in Labuan and a oertain number of vaoanoies there were 
reserved for Brunei pupils. This would, in theory, enable suooessful 
Brtiinei soholars to qualify for higher posts in the administrative ser- 
vine for xhioh a knowledge of English was required. 
The first diffioalty hindering the development of ednoation in 
Brunei itself was the absenoe of trained teaohers. Sohools were unknown 
96" CO 8241 Brunei Annual Report 1916, p 5. 
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in pre-Residential Brunei and it was most diffioult to find anyone 
literate to open one. The dilemma was that oandidates for training as 
teaohers oould not emerge without prior sohooling; but without teachers 
there oould be no eohools. Seoondly, as the Resident oommented in 1922, 
there remained "a fair amount of lethargy, amongst parents in Brunei" oon- 
oerning the education of their children "and if attendance is not made 
oompulsory, it is improbable that the numbers (of sohoolohildren) will 
materially inorease". 
97 
This was underlined the following year when 
enrolments deolined because a revival in the rubber industry prompted 
Parents to withdraw ohildren from sohool to help with the tapping and 
weeding of their sma11ho1diugs. 
98 Zhirdlyv eduoation was not one of 
the administration's prioritiess annual spending on this item was a 
mere $$713 in 1918 and still only $39425 ten years later. Finally, there 
were few outlets for the produots of Brunei's sohools at this time. 
Henoe, in 1928, Brunei still boasted only four Government sohools (with 
198 Pupils), plus the independent Chinese sohool in the oapital (with 
30 pupils). 
7" Cotolusion 
In this chapter it has been shown how, in the first years of 
the Residential Era, a series of relatively huge loans were obtained 
from the Federated Malay States in order to buy np mortgaged Government 
revenues. Servioing this loan remained a heavy burden in the pre-oil 
97. CO 824/1 Brunei Annual Report 1922, p 12. 
98. CO 824/1 Brunei Annual Report 1923, p 13" 
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era; but the level of debt deolined in relative importanoe as ordinary 
revenue increased. There was no income tax; henoe the principal source 
of inoaane before 1932 remained oustoms duties. Annual revenue per head 
- five dollars in 1911 and still less than twelve dollars in 1931 - was 
so small that provision for sooial servioes neoessarily remained limited 
and the utmost eoonomv had to be exeroised. The problem was that, be- 
fore the discovery of oil, Brunei produced nothing which could generate 
a substantial revenue for the Government, as shall now be shown. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
PHE ECONOMIC BASE 1906-1932 
I. 
- 
Intr oduoti on 
In this ohapter I shall examine the eoonomio base in Brunei 
from 1906 until 1932P when the first oargo of petroleum was exported 
from the Soria field. This obapter is an appropriate piaoe to oonsider, 
also, pertain aspeots of the non-oil eoonomy (suoh as rubber regulation) 
in the deoade beyond 1932. After desoribing the situation and prospeots 
on the eve of the Residential Era, and the extent to which these prospects 
were fulfilled subsequently, I shall examine the development of the main 
nom-oil industries, ands finally, the oondition of the people. A full 
disoussion of the oil seotor of the eoonoaq and the subsequent trans- 
formation of Brunei follows in Part III (ohapters 7»9) of this work. 
2. The Pros sots in 1906 
At the beginning of the Residential Era Brunei was a land of 
slender eoonomio resoaroes. In 1904 its total trade was estimated at 
%5009000y divided equally between imports and exports, or X612,000 if 
ooal exports from Brooketon (then "to all intents and purposes part of 
Sarawak") were inoluded. 
1 
The most valuable exports were ooal and outoh 
both prodaoed by British oonoerns. the majority of indigenous people 
1" PO 572/39 NSH lioArthur, "Report on Brunei in 1904"t paragraphs 45 
and 109. 
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were fishermen, farmers, oraftemen or oolleotore of juggle produoe, 
living at snbsistenoe level or little better. Domestio produotion had 
stagnated beoause of the extortions of Malay pengi. rans; 
2 
foreign invest- 
meat had been disoonraged beoause of unstable politioal oonditions. 
Imports oomprised prinoipally the neoessities of lifer pieoe goods, 
oooonut oil, sugar, salt, matohesp kerosene (pins tobaooo and opium). 
There were no additions to this list before 1918, when 'preserved 
provisions' and (flour' appeared. 
Mr MoArthnr was optimistio, nonetheless, ab out the oountry's 
prospeots in 1904: 
"The soil is fertile, exoept im plaoes where the hills are 
preoipitous or where salt water impregnates the ground, and, judging by 
the condition of the few plantations that exist, is well adapted for 
the oultivation of rioey oooonutsp fruit trees, gambier, pepper and 
similar native produotsg omoh as eg tahl, roteng sago and timber. 
The ooantry... is reported to be rioh in minerals. Coal is 
found in many plaoes... as is also mineral oil. Antimony is said to be 
plentiful. I an told that traces of iron ore are also to be foand9 and 
that gold has been won... in... Temburong district". 3 
Ur MoArthur suggested that the oonnparatively large population (and 
Potential labour f orroe) of the capital was an asset in itself, which 
had oontributed to the deoision of the Island Trading Syudioate to 
establish its outoh faotory theres "I know of no other Malay country 
which could boast, before E ropean intrusion, a town of at least 12,000 
... inhabitants". 
4 
Mr HO Belfield MCS, writing six months later, agreed that the 
2. CO 144/57 (12509) Dr P Leys to F0, No 12 (ooasular), 5 May 1883, 
Paragraph 21; and CO 824/1 Brunei Annual Report 1911, p 7- 
3. MoArthur, "Report", paragraphs 5-6; see also paragraphs 90-1. 
4. Ibi .9 paragraph 92. 
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mineral resoaroes of the State "may in the long run prove to be an asset 
of more value than all other alternative souroes of revenue". 
5 Other- 
wise, he was rather less optimistio than Mr MoArthurs 
"With the exception of... outch... there is now little or no 
export of produce from Brunei (Town). The lose of the Limbang territory 
has killed the sago trade and reduced the export of jungle produce to a 
negligible quantity. The resuscitation of an export trade could under 
the most favourable circumstances only be aooomplished by judicious 
encouragement and careful management, and it is questionable whether it 
could ever reach important dimensions so long as the Limbang trade goes 
elsewhere. 
I... oannot imagine that there can be any reason why the intro- 
duotion of a carefully regulated land system should not eventually result 
in material contribution to revenue. It is probablep however, that it 
will be (a) matter of much difficulty to instill into the Brunei people 
a knowledge of the value of agriculture ... I have never seen any Malay 
people so uniformly indifferent to the cultivation of the soil as the 
inhabitants of this State... and the small amount of desultory planting 
which is done, is the work of the Kedayans, not of the Malays". 6 
3. The Extent to whioh these Prospects were Fulfilled. 
There were four major hopes for the regeneration of Brunei's 
eoonon s the reoovery of Limbaag; the reported presenoe of minerals; 
the introduotion of oapital; and the enoouragement of land settlement. 
To these a fifth was shortly to be addeds v1z. t an inorease in population 
through immigration. Efforts to reoover Limbang, whioh ended in failure 
were disoussed in a previous obapter. Reports of gold, diamonds and 
antimcnp remained unsubstantiated even in the 1950x. 
7 
Iron minerals were 
5" CO 273/310 (33426) bir (later Sir) HC Belfield (1855-1923) to Sir John 
Anderson, 5 June 1905, paragraph 37; also in PO 12/128 p 450- 6- lb-i&, Paragraphs 35-6- 
7s GE Wilford, The Geology and Mineral 8esoaroes of Brunei and Ad. jaoent 
Parts of Sarawak (Burnet 1961), pp 263-4. 
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indeed oommony but not in oommercial quantities. Mineral oil from Buang 
Tawar (as opposed to petroleum from Seria) never beoame a signifioant 
export. Coal prodnotion in Brunei effectively ceased in 1924. 
If Brunei failed to recover Limbang and reports of minerals 
were little more than hearsay, hopes for a substantial inflow of capital 
proved equally illusory. Existing investments oomprised only the Rajah's 
two coal mines and the Island Trading Syndicate's outoh factory. 
8 
In 1906 four applioations by Fhxropean. s for large areas for 
rubber planting were reoeived. Three were judged to be speculative and 
were disallowed. Progress was delayed by tulin olaims; for three years 
after 1906 investors turned "a oold shoulder on Brunei". But at the end 
of 1909, there was "at last some prospect of cultivation in Brunei on a 
large soale". 
9 The attitude of the Colonial Office is indicated by the 
Oase of one Mr Altmanp10 who wished to obtain a oonoession in Temburong 
districts 
"I hope his proposals will be oonsidered sympathetioally if they are 
at all reasonable" - thus Mr Stubbs - "beoause Brunei needs money so 
badly that it would be better to give exceptionally favourable terms 
than to let a good chance fall through". 11 
Mr Collins agreed that "every enoouragement" needed to be given to 
8. In addition., Mr EE Abrahamson (d ? 1915), Secretary of the ITS, had 
acquired, in his own name, a separate concession in Labu district for 
gambier cultivation. Although the lease had been running since o1887, 
no planting had been done; but the annual rent of X500 had been paid 
regularly to Pengiran Muda Muhammad Tajudin. 
9" 00 824/1 Brunei Annual Report 1909, p 6. 
10. Mr Altman was a fellow of the Royal Colonial Institute. He had spent 
twenty years in Borneo before 1909, mainly in Sandakan (CO 531/2: 33176). 
11. CO 531/2 (31778) minute by Mr RE Stubbs, 29 September 1909. 
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enterprise in Brunei. 
12 Hence Mr Altman was given a letter of intro- 
duotion to the High Commissioner; and by April 1910 he had secured his 
concession. Subsequently he formed a oompauy (Brunei Estates Limited), 
ohaired by Sir William Treaoher, with an authorized oapital of £75,000. 
Another oompany was raising £50,000 for an estate in Bruaeis "all this 
introduction of oapital", minuted by Mr Stubbs, "will lead to increased 
(Government) receipts fron customs eto". 
13 
The Resident oommenteds 
"The terms approved (to four ooaoessionaires in 1910) were generous and 
were granted under the impression that British capital would never be 
attracted to Brunei". 14 
In fact, the rubber plantation industry did not develop on any 
great soale in Brunei. Of the eight individuals who had aoquired land 
before the end of 1911, four fell by the wayside almost immediately. 
15 
From the table (overleaf) it will be seen that there were only five 
viable British-owned plantations during the Residential Era, three in 
Temburong distriot (at Labu, Batu Apoi and Biog) and two in Brunei 
distriot (at Gadong and Garnbang sang or Berakas). At least four of 
these estates had been established by 1910; the exception, the one at 
Gadong, was aoquired by the Island Trading Company not later than 1922. 
Two of the three estates in Temburong distriot were owned by one oompaasr 
12. CO 531/2 (33176) minute by Mr AE Collinsp 6 Ootober 1909. 
13. CO 531/2 (11169) minute by Stubbs,, 21 April 1910. 
14. CO 824/1 Brunei Annual Report 1910, p 10. 
15. The four individuals who made nothing of their oonoessions were 
Messrs Bruoe, WE Roberts, H Marshall and H Abrahamson. The latter had 
formed a company, the Tanah Brunei Company, whioh oollapsed in 1912 
(CO 824/1 Brunei Annual Report-1910 ,p 18; BAR 1911, p 8; and CO 
531/4 
items 10226 and 25392). 
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Table 9. European Rubber Estate Ownership in Brunei During the Resident- 
Era 1906-59. 
Estate Year Owner 
1. Labes ? 1906 Conoessioa aoquired by Mr Abrahamson. 
1911-58 Brunei Rubber and Land Company 
(formed 1909; liquidated 1959). 
2. Biang 1910 Conoession aoquired by Mr GJ Altman. 
1911-18 Brunei Estates Limited (formed 1910; 
Reoeiver appointed 1918; oompany 
wound up in 1923). 
1918-29 n. a. 
? 1929-? 59 Lawas (Sarawak) Rubber Estates Ltd; 
renamed in 1934 Lawas (Sarawak) 
Estates Limited. 
3. Batu Apoi. 1910) Coaoeseion acquired by Mr J Rime. 
1912-? 29 Liverpool (Brtnei) Para Rubber Company. 
? 1929-? 59 Lawaa Rubber Estates Limited (which 
also owned Biang Estates see above). 
4. Gadong by 1922 Island. Trading Company (liquidated 
- 1955 1957)" 
5" (torbang Pasang 1910 Coaoession aoquired by Mr Hatton HaLl. 
(or Berakas) - o1920-53 Brunei United Plantations Limited. 
Notes: (1) The Lawas oompaay definitely owned Batu Apoi estate not 
later than 1932 and both Biang and Batu Apoi estates not later than 
1937. From other evidence,, too detailed to be presented here, it might 
be deduced that the most likely year in which the Lawas company acquired 
both estates was 1929. This firm made its last appearanoe in The Stock 
Exchange Official Year Book in 1959. Presumably both estates had been 
sold is either 1959 or late 1958. 
(2) The Liverpool (Brunei) Para Rubber Company was not 
featured in The Stock Exchange Offioial Year Book. 
(3) The Brunei United Plantations Limited was registered in 
Singapore. 
S mess 
, oompiled 
by the author from (a) Brunei Annual Reporte; 
(b) 22 
The Stook Exohauge Offioial Year-Books t and (o) Rubber Produoing Com- 
panies (Official Guide to Investors of Rubber Shares) - editions of 
1915,1924,1936,1940,1942 and 1944 - Financial Times, Loudon. 
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- Lawas (Sarawak) Sabber Estates Limited, renamed Lawas (Sarawak) 
Estates Limited in 1934 - from about 1929 to about 1958. 
In the aase of three estates (Labe, Gadong and Gumbang Pasang) 
there was no change of ownership after the original conoession-holder 
had set up a oompany to ran the property. The first oompauies to own 
Biang and Batu Apoi estates, on the other hand., did not survive. Brunei 
Estates Limited, whioh went into liquidation in 1923, sold Biang to an 
unknown buyer in 1918. Similarly, the Liverpool (Brunei) Para Rubber 
Company, which owned Batu Apoi, went to the wall (or was taken over), 
most probably in 1929. These two estates were then acquired by the 
Lawas oompaay. 
Excluding Branei Estates Limited and the 'Liverpool' oompany, 
an analysis of the four main oompanies (see table, overleaf) reveals that 
they were really small family oonoerns with interlocking directorships. 
They lacked capital, paid low and irregular dividends, and possessed 
oomparatively small acreages. The most substantial oompany, the Lawas, 
had most of its aoreage oatside Brunei. Similarly, the Island Trading 
Company also owned two catch factories, one in Brunei Town and one in 
Sarawak. Iabu Estate, for its part, attempted some diversification by 
experimenting at various times with coffee (1910s)ß rice (1910s and 
1930s) and coconuts (1950s). Scant commercial success appears to have 
attended such ventures. An area of 'native gardens' was also set aside 
on Labu estate; and the oompany issued lioenoes to people wishing to 
tap eluton within the area of its concession. 
The total European-owned acreage of rubber in Brunei had reached 
207 
Table 10. British Rubber Producing Companies in Brunei 1906-59. 
Company Estate Acreages Capitals Dividends 
Year Acres Year Authorized Paid-Up of qIo or 
- .r2£ 
more (a) 
1. BRLO 1911 300 1934 70,000 55,000 1920 
(Labu) 1915 483 1938-59 70,000 58,000 1925-7 
1934 1,073 1940 
1940 1,128 1950-6 
o1949 750 
01954 780 
2. Lawas 1925 985b 1923 50,000 40,000 1936-7 
(Kiang and 1936 3,959b 1925 150,400 85,000 1939-40 
Bata Apoi). 1941 5,944b 1930 2009000 149,640 1950-2 
1949 5,855b 1935 200,000 159,362 1954-7 
o1959 3,511b 1937-59 400,000 202,362 
3. ITC 1936 1,459 1904 40,000 21,000 1923 
(Gadong) 1941 1,489 1911 80,000 n. a. 1929 
1952 713 1938-57 100,000 86,216 1933-4 
1936-7 
1939-40 
1948-52 
4. Bt1PL n. a. ne a. 1953 =--'233,000 66,500 n. a. 
(Gumbang 
Pasang, ) 
Ns (a) The maximum dividend was the 12 paid by the BRLC in 
1926. The next best level, 10%, was aohieved by all three oompanies 
for whom details are available on a oolleotive total of eight oooasions 
(b) Kost of this aoreage was outside Brunei (in 1925, indeed, 
all of it was outside the Sultanate). The Lawas oompaely aotually paid 
dividends of 35% in 1925,50% in 1926 and 25 in 1927 (5% in 1928); but, 
as mentioned, it did not own property in Brunei during those years. 
Souroes oompiled by author from Brunei Annual Report® and The Stook 
Exohange Offioial Year Books. 
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o4,000 in 1929-33 and o5,000 in 1934-8. Of the latter figure, Gadong 
had 1,459 acres and Labu 1,073 acres, leaving an average of about 800 
acres each for the three remaining estates. Three of the four companies 
had a paid-up oapital of less than 11009000.16 The Lawas oompany was 
beat planed with a paid-up oapital reaohing £202,396 by 1937. (Most of 
this oonpany's property was outside Brunei, however). Shareholders 
did not make muoh profit out of Bruneis no dividends at all were paid 
by at least three companies (a) in the. period before rubber reached 
full maturity (01910-18); (b) during the Great Depression (especially 
1929-32); and (o) during the Japanese oooupatioo and its aftermath 
(1941-7). To give an extreme example, during the period 1929 to 1949 
the Brunei Rubber and Land Company (BRLC) paid dividends in only three 
years (1937-8 and 1940). The best profits, generally, were achieved in 
the mid-1920s and the early 1950sß particularly daring the Korean War. 
The oompaaiee were really small family oonoernss the BRLC, for 
examplep was dominated by the Dolbey family, which also held the ohair- 
manship of the Island Trading Company from 01947 to 1956. lär A Parker- 
Smith (direotorp 1927-33, and Chairman, 1934-058) of the Lawas company, 
was also on the board of the BRLC (daring the Seoond World War) and of 
the ITC (o1947-57). 
. 
The Brunei United Plantations Limited, which owned 
Cumbang Pasang Estate, was founded by the Mr Hatton Hall enooautered in 
a previous ohapter. This was the first European estate to be sold to 
16. Some concerns operating in Malaya, by contrast, had paid-up capital 
of £l million, e. g. Liuggi Plantations Limited. 
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the Government (1953), setting thereby a trend to be followed by most, 
if not all, of the other rubber oompanies before the end of the 
Residential Era. 
17 
Apart from rubber, Brunei's timber resouroes offered another 
possible sphere for foreign investment; but,, after two shipments of 
railway sleepers by the North Borneo Trading Company in 1911, operations 
ceased. Thereafter, the Brunei Government looked to local Chinese 
oontraotors to develop the industry. In 1920 mention was made of a 
Shorea Produce Trading Company which "exhausted itself in the effort of 
Doming into being". 
18 
One of the more bizarre applications came from a 
certain Lord Erroll, who sought a concession of 1130,000 square miles" in 
Brunei for oolleoting jungle produce and selecting land for planting 
purposes, 
19 
His Lordship was reminded that the entire Sultanate oould 
have been fitted several times over within the area he was seeking. 
A proposal which might have resulted in considerable develop- 
meat in Brunei was that of the Anglo-Saxon Petroleum Company in 1911 to 
build an oil refinery at Brooketon and a pipeline from the Miri field in 
Sarawak. Althomgh the Colonial Office was not obstruotivey the scheme 
fell through. 
20 
British Residents placed their greatest hopes in the 
17. Part of the Gumbang Pasang estate was used as a Government rubber 
nursery from 1954 and part was cleared to make way for an airport. In 
the late 1960sß Batu Apoi and Labu estates (? Government-owned) were 
still in operation, but Biang was not. 
18. CO 8241 Brunei Annual Report 1920, p 3. 
19" Co 531/3 (14763) Nineteenth Earl of Erroll (1852-1925) to Sir John 
Anderson, 9 March 1911. Erroll commanded British forces in the Great 
War. 
20. CO 531/3 (1219,145239 and 33188). 
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disoovery of petroleum within Brunei itself; but prospeoting operations 
were desultorrj, and it was not until the formation of the British Malayan 
Petroleum Company in 1922 that energetio operations oommenoed. 
In sum, therefore, European oapital investment in Brunei amounted 
to four viable rubber oompanies; a short-lived timber oonoession; ands 
before 1922, lethargio exploration, for oil. In these oiroumstanoess, it 
was the Chinese who formed the baokbone of the business oommunity there. 
They were the principal shopkeepers, traders, and entrepreneurs. Before 
1941 their interests inoluded rubber estates, sago faotoriesy pig-breeding, 
pepper, timber, oharooal and dried prawns. They also finanoed indigenous 
fishermen and eluton tappers. Finally, when a large population began 
to settle in the oilfield, especially in the 1930sß it was the Chinese 
who exploited the potential for market gardening: 
"The well-known skill and industry of the Chinese gardener has even 
suooeeded in growing vegetables of a fair standard in the poor soil of 
Kuala Belait itself. Vegetables and fruits find a ready market and the 
supply is not equal to the demand". 21 
The fourth possible avenue of eoonomio prosperity was effeotive 
land settlement and development. Very little cultivation had been 
attempted immediately before 1906; and, pending the settlement of tulip 
claims, no permanent agriculture was expected.. Attempts to persuade 
River Villagers to take up land oooupation began to bear fruit in 1909, 
when a small settlement was started at Tumasik, where several influential 
e raps took up small blocks. The Sultan himself selected some land 
Oa a hill at the back of the palaoe (but he did not personally settle on 
219 CO 824/2 Brunei Annual Report 19 39 p 19. 
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terra firma until 1922). 
22 
At a lower social level, however,, praotica]Jly 
all the available land in Sungei Tekaying and Sumbiling was given out to 
applicants. This represented a limited success for the Government's 
policy. 
The people were advised to plant oooonut, fruit trees and rioe, 
but the chief attraction to most of them was rubber. In 1909 rubber 
prices were at their peaks the delay in settling tulin olaims was doubly 
unfortunate from Brunei's point of view, therefore, beoausep by the time 
trees were ready for tapping (1914-5). Fers had missed the best of the 
boom. The pioneer land-settlers were money-lenders and members of the 
ra at olass who believed and followed the advice given to them. The 
pengirans, slowly at first, but subsequently in larger numbers, began to 
follow the example set. 
23 
Survey staff throughout Brunei rarely worked at less than full 
pressure and in 1920-19 iadeed. p the office had to be olosed altogether 
to enable the baoklog to be oleared. The population "endorsed with 
aoolamation" the polioy of the Government and preferred to pay for the 
registered ownership of laud rather than pay the poll tax exaoted from 
indigenous people other than Malays who did not owa land. 
24 
But Brunei 
remained little developed agriculturally. Of the total State Land area 
22. CO 824/1 Brunei Annual Report 1922, p 15- 
23. CO 824/1 Brunei Annual Report 1910, p 119 
24. By the end of 1922 a total of 2,013 titles (1,913 for less than 25 
acres) covering 26,309 acres had been issued; and it was hoped that 
this should gradually tend to more settled oultivation. An annual peak 
of 475 applications for land had been received in 1919, principally 
because of the final resolution of the dispute with the Kedayans. 
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of 1,424,640 aores, a mere 31,710 (2.2%) had been alienated under the 
Land Code by 1938, not inoluding a further 2,450 aoree held under 
temporary oooupation lioenoe. Of the alienated area, 149,747 aores were 
under robber, 5,023 under pads and a signifioant proportion (5,000 acres 
in 1933) under sago. Fruit, vegetables and sugar Dane were oonfined to 
oomparatively small areas around the main towns and round the houses on 
land where settlement was gradually taking plane. The main reasons for 
the lack of development were the poverty of Brunei's soils and a dearth 
of "population of agrioaltural habit" (one-third of the people still 
lived in the River Village). (Far from being generally fertile, as Mr 
McArthur had supposedg very little of Brunei's soil was suitable for 
agrioulture because of the intense leaching of nutrients caused by 
heavy rainfall ). 
25 
Attempts to broaden the base of Brunei's agrioulture also 
faileds in 1919 it was lamented that at the Government test garden 
"coffee was. a, complete failures tea could not be induced to germinate, 
indigo did fairly well, but would probably not be an economic proposition 
because of pests; tobacco at first seemed promising but could not be 
freed from insect pests". 26 
Peruvian ootton and ooooa both "promised excellently" but never beoame 
oommeroial propositions. Experiments with ldanila hemp had "poor results". 
27 
In the 1930s9 when several Government test plots were established, the 
results were no more suooessful. Early in the Residential Era some 
rubber estates also attempted to diversify; but onoe again with little 
25. Wilford, op"oit. 9 p 261; Brown, Struoture and Historl, p 
2; Borneo 
Bulletin 
t4 Ootober 1958; and Brunei Annual Report 1970,9 pp 
73-6. 
2 00 824/1 Brunei Annual Report 1919, P 4- 
270 CO 824/1 Brunei Annual Report 1923, P 5" 
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or no commercial suooess. 
Exports in what Mr MoArthur oalled the "hardly impaired stores" 
28 
of jungle produoe amounted to a meagre %17,765 (2,4 of total exports) 
as late as 1916 and peaked at only %T9296 in 1923 (4.14%), thanks to an 
unprecedented crop of illipe buts during that year. 
Population growth was the final possible means of eooaomio 
expansion. In 1904, Mr McArthur estimated the population of Brunei Town 
and State at 12,000 and 30,000 respectively$ and he considered the former 
to be a siguifioant asset. The 1911 oensus disolosed the muoh lower 
figures of 9,767 and 21,718 respeotivelys it was not until the mid-1920s, 
indeed, that a total population of 30,000 was aohieved. Residents were 
soon describing the shortage of people as a "curse" by which the country 
was handioappeds29 "the one need of the country is population", 
30 
cried 
Mr Chevallier in 1910. Mr Lee-Warner suggested that 500 familes might 
be imported from Banjermasin in order to transform Brunei into a 
prosperous rioe-growing distriot as they had in Brian, Perak. This 
Boheme was not implemented. 
In sump most of the hopes of 1906 Dame to nothing. Limbang was 
not reoovered. No new minerals were disoovered before 1929. The inflow 
of capital was derisory. Barely 35,000 acres were under cultivation as 
late as 1938, when Brunei oould still manage to prodaoe scaroely one- 
sixth of its rice requirements; the soils generally, was not fertile; the 
28" McArthur, "Report", paragraph 91" 
29, CO 824/1 Brunei Annual Report 1910, p 16. 
30. Ibid., p 1. 
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only oash Drop suooessfully introduoed was rubber. Finally, there was 
an acute shortage of population, and, therefore, of labour. 
What then was left? In 1906 the prinoipal exports were outoh 
and ooal, to be overtaken by rubber in 1923. The main subsistence agri- 
cultural products were padi, sago and fruit, Brunei also possessed 
fisheries, potentially-valuable forests, and a number of oraft 
industries. 
ý. The Development of the Main Industries 
Daring the pre-oil era Brunei's trade developed as followss 
Table 11. Braueis The Balanoe of Trade 1908-32 (% Straits) 
Year Exports Imports Total Trade Trade Balanoe 
(1) Brunei Town only (1908-14) 
1908 78,009 80,029a 158,933 - 1,120 
1910 245,639 81,985 327,624 + 163,654 
1914 216,282 126,743b 343,025 + 89,539 
(2) Brunei State (1915-32) 
1915 o 543,707 234,004 777,711 + 309,703 
1920 1,173,252 722,678 1,895,930 + 450074 
1925 1,859,736 1,013,418 2,873, x54 + 846,318 
1930 807,449 2,536,422 3,343,871 -1,728,973 
1912 1.505.738 2,4309247 3,935,985 - 924,509 
Noten$ (a) not including rice or opium. (Rice imports into Brunei 
Town in 1914 amounted to %31,352; and into the whole state in 1915 to 
$839067). 
(b) not including opium. 
(o) "The returns from the outstations are in some oases 
incomplete but the figures may be taken as approximately accurate". 
(I-AR p 4) - 
souroes oompiled by author from Brunei Annual Reports. 
(For a oomplete 
net of statistiosp see Appendix 6.3t below). 
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In 1904 Mr MoArthur estimated the trade of Brunei Town at about 
%40090001 divided equally between imports and exports. 
31 The total in 
1908 was under-stated at %158,938 (see Table 12)1, rising to $343,025 in 
1914. Again, in 1904, Mr MoArthur estimated the total trade of Brunei 
State at %612,000. In 1915, the first year for whioh approximate 
national figures became available, the total figure was %777,711 and in 
1917 the million mark had been well exoeeded. This inorease was due to 
a rise in the value of coal exports and the appearance of a new export, 
rubber, first shipped in 1914 and totalling ß$248,919 in 1917. Total 
exports reached a pre-oil peak of $1,859,736 in 1925 but fell to only 
half a million dollars in 1931 because of the Great Depression. The 
high level of imports in 1919-20 is explained by the famine prioe of rice 
(combined with the failure of the 1918/19 boom harvest), the former being 
a result of profiteering by the Indian Government. Brunei's trade balanoe 
was usually favourable, except during the Great Depression (1928-33). The 
defioit during those years was aooounted for as muoh by a steep rise in 
maohinery imports by the BMPC as by the slump in the value of rubber 
exports. Henoe imports rose from %1.38m in 1928 to $2.54m in 1930, 
before falling baok slightly to %2.43m in 1932 (see below, p 634). 
In the pre-oil era Brunei's prinoipal exports were outoh, coal 
and rubber, as indioated in Tables 12 and 13 (overleaf). 
Cutoh, a khaki dye from mangrove, was used in the leather and 
fishing industries for tanning and for the treating and dyeing of nets 
31. Imports were aotually put at $300,000; but Mr MoArthur felt that 
they were worth only $200,000 sold at fair prices (of. p 31: above). 
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Table 12. Exports of Coal, Cutoh and Rubber 1915-24 (ý Straits) 
Year Cutoh Coal Para 'Main 3' Total (1) as 
Rubber Total Exports page of 
(1) (2) (2) 
1915 237,400 148,730 60,103 4460233 543,707 82 
1916 285,400 206,077 142,711 634,188 734,254 86 
1917 330,700 295,800 248,919 875,419 952,260 92 
1918 361,501 413,910 174,868 950,279 1,033,734 92 
1919 304,249 296,621 243,596 844,466 1,134,864 74 
1920 355,300 296,000 214,733 866,033 1,173,252 74 
1921 240,740 275,570 82,217 598,527 791,028 76 
1922 172,600 104,160 91,104 367,864 577,305 64 
1923 238,000 102,820 363,200 704,020 900,307 78 
1924 176,490 98,202 387,793 662,485 867,190 76 
Note: ooal mining at Brooketon oolliery oeased in 1924. 
8, ouroe: oompiled by author from Brunei Annual Reporte. 
* 
Table 13, Rubber Boom and Great Depression 1925-34 (% Straits 
Year Rubber Exportas 
Value % of 
total 
Jelutong 
Value 
0 
Esportss 
ý of 
total 
Total 
Exports 
Para & Jel_ 
utongt %o of 
total exports. 
1925 1,318,218 71 174,288 9 1,859,736 80 
1926 1,032,055 62.5 295,978 18 1,651,048 80 
1927 892,627 62 177,029 12 1,443,703 74 
1928 581,265 55 151,501 14 1PO58PO71 69 
1929 742,999 59 165,120 13 1,251,335 73 
1930 377,927 47 68,922 8.5 807,449 55 
1931 1619204 32 27,928 6 504494 38 
1932 104,899 7 329773 2 1,505,738 9 
1933 236,249 11 199215 1 2,191,037 12 
1934 671,970 19. 39,134 1 3,439,501 21 
Note. Rubber exports had reoovere d the 1928-29 level by 1934, butt 
whereas this had aooounted for 55-59% of total exports in 1928-9, 
it 
represented only 19.5% in 1934" This deoline in proportion is explain- 
ed by the appearanoe of an unpreoedentedly valuable export fron 1932, 
`"9 petroleum. See, alsop Table 18 (below). 
Souroes compiled by author from Brunei Annual Reports. 
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and sails. The process of manufaoture, briefly, was as followss 
"The raw bark is crashed and planed in vats, to which water is added for 
leaching purposes. The liquid is then evaporated to dryness in vacuum 
pans, leaving a solid residue. The finished product is a hard, brittle 
substance,, not unlike pitch, but reddish-brown in colour". 32 
The outoh concession was obtained by the Island Trading Syndicate 
in 1900. A payment of X500 was made to Sultan Hashim for signing this 
agreement. Annual rent of %300 was to be paid in advanoe; and a duty of 
five oents for eaoh pikul (1331 ibs) of manufaotured bark, 
33 
Mr Stubbs 
at the Colonial Office noted that "the syndioate got it cheap, bate un- 
like most Brunei oonoessionaires, they seem quite honest workers". 
34 
Features of the outoh indnstry inoluded inoompetent British 
management and the oooasional total olosure of the faotory for prolonged 
periods. The Island Trading Company (as it became in 1911) suffered from 
its short-sightedness in the first gears of the Residential Eras when 
mangrove areas near Brunei Town were reoklessly wastedf with no attempt 
at ooneervation or reafforestation, so that by the mid-1920a most of the 
bark oonsumed oame from outside Brunet at great extra expense and trouble. 
35 
At times - for example in 1907 and 1938-9 - the faotory was praotioally 
closed; and in 1917-18 wartime shipping restriotions resulted in severe 
oonstraints upon output and redundancy among bark oolleoting gauge, 
who were difficult to reassemble thereafter. (During the 1930sß however, 
the outoh iudnatr7 proved rather more stable than most others). 
32, CO 824/2 Brunei Annual Report 1937, p 26. See also P Blundell, The 
C of fan Waters (London 1923), PP 37-8. 
33. CO 531/2 (28140) oopy of concession dated 11 Rabiulawal 1318 AH (8 
JulY 1900); also in FO 12/116, p 150. 
34. CO 531/2 (28140) minute by Mr Stubbs, 26 August 1909. 
35. CO 874 (Files 861 and 862). See also CO 852/635 (File 4). 
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The whole of the outoh production was exported, mainly to the 
USA at First;. sane went to France and Argentina; but during the Great War 
demand inoreased in the United Kingdom, Japan and China. After 1920 the 
output of outoh averaged around 2,000 tons annually, exoept during the 
Great Depression, when a higher level of almost 3,000 tons was attained. 
The slump in the prioe of rubber after 1929 gave outoh renewed oompara- 
tive importanoe and, in 1931, it regained its position at the top of the 
export list (%194,457 or 34 of total exports). Thereafter outoh was 
again overshadowed, partly by the reoovery of rubber, but prinoipally 
beoause of the beginning of oil exportation. Henoe in 1937 more cutoh 
by value (212,239) was exported than in 1931, but this then represented 
less than 4% of total exports. Nevertheless, outoh remained third in 
importance behind petroleum and rubber. 
During the early years of the British Residential Fra, ooal - 
extraoted from the Rajah of Sarawak's mines at Brooketon (1888-1924) and 
Buang Tawar (1900/1_17)36 - disputed with outoh for the honour of being 
Brunei's most valuable export, ooming out on top (for example) in 1918 and 
1921. At Brooketoni ooal was mined from seams more than twenty feet thiok 
by openoast methods until the removal of overburden beoame prohibitively 
expensive and underground mining had to be introdnoed. At Buang Tawar 
on Berembang Island output was muoh smaller (usually 1,000-1,500 tons 
annually oompaxed with 17-30,000 tons annually from Brooketon), derived 
from opencast and small underground workings. During the years 1906-24 
36. CO 604/5 Sarawak Gazette 16 Maroh 1917, p 74; and CO 604/6 Sarawak 
Gazette. 2 January 1918, p 6. 
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315,396 tons of ooal worth $2, E88,400were exported; 
37 
but the Rajah's 
mines were run at a oonsiderable loss, "whioh is all the more to be 
deplored as the bulk of the ooolies are Brunei Malays who earn a steady 
livelihood under sympathetic masters"*38 Matters improved somewhat after 
1911, when a rival oompany ceased operations in neighbouring Labuan. 
Demand for coal remained unoertain, however; and the cost of transport 
from Brooketon to Labuan to sell the ooal was heavy. Customers were 
mainly passing naval and steamship vessels. The mine at Brooketon man- 
aged to break even in 1917; and the post-Great War ooal shortage ensured 
two unpreoedentedly prosperous years (1918-19). But the imposition of 
an export duty on ooal in 1921, puns various other faotors (geologioal 
oomplioatione, the falling price of ooalp the switch from coal to oil in 
shipping) resulted in the oessatioe of mining at Brooketoa in 1924. There- 
after only a little ooal was produoed in Brunei by indigenous people 
using openoast methods. Most of the produotion was oonsumed looally; 
tut a little was exported (49 tons in 1936,3 in 1937 and 54 in 1938)" 
A number of Earopean oonoerns expressed an interest in resuming the 
oommeroial exploitation of ooal but these attempts oame to nothing. 
39 
Para rubber took over as Brunei's most valuable export during 
the Years 1923-30. Signifioant quantities of Jelutong (wild rubber) were 
3T. Wilford . oit., p 160. See also, ibid., pp 158-94. 38. CO 824/1 Brunei Annual Report 1909, p 8. 
39. CO 824/2 Brunei Annual Report 1930, p 10 and BAR 1 29 p 9; and 
CO 852/76/6. In the late 1940s the Colonial Offioe oommissioned a 
report on the possibility of a renewed coal industry in Brunei. Invest- 
igators oonoluded that ooal was nnct a viable proposition (CO 954/7 File 
58938, items 12 and 14)t a verdiot oonfirmed by Dr Wilford (b 1928) in 
1961 (o 
. oit. v p 194)" 
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also shipped from the Sultanate, espeoially in 1925-9, when the industry 
enjoyed its greatest prosperity. The Jelutong tree was found in all 
dietriota of Brunei, but partioularly in Belait; and in the early years 
of the Residential Era a oonsiderable boost was given to produotion. 
40 
Mr Lee-Warner attempted to introduoe improved methods of tapping and 
treatment of latex, butt quite oorreotly, he was not oonfident of saooess. 
National exports peaked at $$295,978 in 1925, slumped to less than 
%20,000 
in 1933, and had reoovered only to X82,000 bfr 1938. The bulk of the 
-J-elutong 
(two-thirds in 1925) came from Belait, where it was worked 
almost entirely by Than tappers employed by Chinese merohants. The 
preparation of the produotp however, "left mnoh to be desired" and it 
failed to oommand the same prioe as the FKS artio1e. 
41 
Jelutong never aohieved the importanoe of para rubber. The 
first oonsignmeat of the latter was exparted in 1914, when the total 
area planted amounted to about 2,200 aores, of whioh 56.6% was under 
European management. In 1915 several more holdings, inoludiug one owned 
by the Sultan, reaohed the tapping stage. This ooinoided with an un- 
expeoted rise in rubber prioes. Ebidenoe of the profits to be obtained 
oaused a rush to take up land to plant the orop. 
40. Exports from Tatong, for example, jumped from $753 in 1908 to 
$129597 in 1910. 
41. CO 824/1 Brunei Annual Report-1925 ,p 7" The previous year 
the 
Resident commented that the Belait eluton forests seemed "almost 
inexhaustible". They were worked chiefly by nomadic Ibans at that time, 
who were "at the mercy of the Chinese dealers, himself generally the sub- 
agent of a Labuan agent, who in turn is the agent of a Singapore tom, 
a system which left little profit for the actual worker and is therefore 
not an incentive to industry". 
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"The continued demand for rubber" - thus Mr Cator in 1916 - 
"hasp on the whole, a good effect in Brunei though some of its results 
are disquieting. The Braueis themselves have no agricultural tradition 
and, until six or seven years ago, had little knowledge of, and less 
interest ins the subject. In the circumstances it is hardly surprising 
that, on taking up lande they devoted themselves to the most profitable 
and least troublesome product to the almost total exclusion of every- 
thing else. As a results however, oultivation is lopsided - coconuts, 
fruits and pepper are nothing accounted - and should serious disease 
attack rubber, agrionlture in Brunei would collapse. 
Efforts have been made to counteract this tendency by making 
it a condition of title that cultivation must be mixed,, but such a clause 
is easier to insert than to enforce, especially in a country where it is 
essential to attract people to the land. On the other hand, in Brunei 
rubber has not, as elsewhere, replaced useful products but scrub under- 
growth and secondary jungle". 42 
In 1919 the planted acreage of rubber smallholdings overtook 
that of large estates; by 1924 the production of smallholdings had drawn 
level with that of estates; and b7 1938 the 1hropean-owned aoreage 
aoooaated for only about one-third of the total area under planted 
rubber in Brunei. 
The general slump of late 1920 to 1922 seriously disrupted 
Brunei's trades the value of exports halved from $1.1m to 90.58m. At 
this stage, though, "only a small proportion of the native inhabitants 
were rubber planters, so few were directly affected by the fall of the 
market ,,,. 
43 
The depression Dame' however, just when euooeee for the large 
estates, "whioh had straggled so long and so pinokily against adversity"p 
seemed near. This was the more unfortunate beoauee managers had enooeeded 
in "the most diffioalt part of their task" - the building up of a perm- 
anent labour f oroev many of whom had then to be thrown oat of work. 
Following the introduotion of the Stevenson Restriction Scheme 
42. CO 824/1 Brunei Annual Report 1916, p 3. 
43. CO 824/1 Brunei Annual Report 1920, p 2. 
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in November 1922 the pride of rubber rose and tapping oommenoed on all 
the smallholdings as well as on the few larger estates which had tempor- 
arily oeased produotion. A restriotion oommittee for fixing the standard 
produotion of estates of more than 200 aores was formed; smallholdings 
were assessed by the Resi dent. 
44 Prioes then rose because of the Amer- 
loan boom is the mid-1920s. In Brunei there was a soramble for land to 
Plant rubbers in 1927 alone there were 876 applioatione (for a oolleotive 
total of 10,000 aores), of whioh 614 were approved. 
45 
AAtring the Great Depression (beginning 1929) the prioe of rab- 
ber slumped to a nadir of 5 Dents per pound in 1932. This was a severe 
blow to those who depended upon the oropq whioh had been Brunei's most 
valuable export since 1923; 
46 but the country as a whole was pulled 
through by the gathering paoe of oilfield development in Belait. The 
British rubber oompanies, with the prioe of rubber below the Dost of 
44. CO 8241 Brunei Annual Report 1922, p 4- 
45- In 1926 5,289 acres were alienated (3,073 for rubber); in 1928,838 
(700); 1929,538 (481); and in 1930,443 (200). NBs A clause stating 
the purpose for which land was to be used was inserted by the Government 
into every lease before alienation. In some oases land alienated for 
Coconuts and fruits was used illegally for rubber cultivation. 
46. A most important insight into this question is provided by Khoo Soo 
Hock, writing in 1976: "Rubber in the smallholdings is grown in a oom- 
bined activity with rice. Few of the smallholdings are full-fledged 
enterprises in the sense of the smallholding being the sole source of 
income of the owner. Even in the days when the crop was enthusiastically 
taken up, its cultivation was in the nature of a complementary activity 
to rice cultivation or to fruit growing... Despite the ease with which 
the crop has become a feature of their life, rubber had yet never 
SuPPlanted rice cultivation, which remained throughout the dominant 
activity. It must have meant more at one time to the owner, however, 
in terms of the cash proceeds***"* Khoo Soo Hook, "Agricultural Land Use" 
in Khoo Soo Hook, at al., Brunei in Transition(Kuala Lumpur 1976), pp 124 
-5. 
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produotion, were forded to take "drastio measures of eooaomy". 
47 The 
estate labour force was reduced from 1,392 in 1927 to only 609 in 1932.48 
Basio monthly wages for an unskilled tapper then stood at only %7.50 but 
the price of rice fell in sympatby; and. labourers could supplement their 
wages by growing their own vegetables and oatohing their own fish. The 
Depression was also a hard time for the rubber companies in Brunei, as 
indicated in the following table. 
Table 14. The Finances of the Brunei Rubber and Land Company (it sterling) 
Year Produotion Reoeipta 'Coats per lbs Profit Cash 
The per lb f. o. b. all-in & Lose Balanoe 
dd d £ £ 
1929-30 199,168 7.60 6.12 8,71 - 953 +1,006 
1930-31 212,755 3.64 3.65 5,27 -1,352 - 346 
1931-32 225,362 2.22 2.42 3.14 - 805 -1,151 
1932-33 207,594 2.21 1,95 2.58 - 285 -1,346 
1933-34 230,652 3.74 n. a. 3.57 + 16o -1,276 
Sources Rubber Producing Companies 1936 (London 1936, p 79). Dividends 
1929-36s nil. The area planted with rubber at Labu Estate, the one owned 
by the BRLC, (of. p 205 and p 207, above), amounted to 1,073 acres at this 
time, of which 857 were in bearing and 216 had been planted in 1927-8. 
Average yields per acre varied between 232 lbs in 1929-30 and 269 The in 
1933-4. 
Those smallholders who had planted rubber during the 1926-7 
boom would not have suffered a substantial loss of inoome (unless they 
47. CO 824/2 Brunei Annual Report 1930, p 7. (The decline of rubber. 
exports after 1925 may have led to Batu Apot and Biang Estates being 
transferred in 1929 to the Lawas company, which probably had greater 
capital resources than the previous owners). 
48. This affected principally those Indiane brought in during the 1920eß 
Of whom 422 (out of 427) were repatriated. The number of indigenous 
labourers was 606 in 1926 and 527 in 1932; and the reduction of estate 
labour was more than matched, so far as indigenous people were ooncernedp 
by recruitment by the Island Trading Company, the number of whose 
employees at the catch factory, only 500 in 1926-8. was 700 or more in 1930-2. 
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had existing mature smallholdings) for the simple reason that their ra'b- 
ber would not have reached the tapping stage before the Wall Street 
'orash' of 1929,49 
I shall now'go slightly beyond ohapter limits (1932) in order 
to disouss the effeot of rubber regulation after 1934, whioh is most 
appropriately dealt with here. 
Rubber Regulation. In 1934 all important rubber-produoing 
oountries subsoribed to the International Rubber Regulation Agreement, 
whioh banned the further sale of land for rubber planting and imposed 
export quotas on eaoh ooantry, sub-divided between estates and small- 
holdings. As a result of these measuresq, the prioe of rubber tended to 
olimb and in 1938 , Regulation was extended, with modifioations, for a 
further five`yeara. 
On the basis of the available evidenoe, the following oonolusions 
seem tenablet that the smallholder was best-favoured in assumed yield 
within Brunei; that more rubber was exported during the period of rubber 
regulation than in the best pre-slump year (1929) and that exports in 
19,40-1 were about double the 1929 level; that, by oontrastv exports of 
eluto (a non-regulated oommodity) oollapsed after 1929 and even in 
1941 had not reoovered the 1929 level; that in 1930-19 when - in ordinary 
oiroumstanoes, a huge inorease of rubber exports might have been expeoted 
as the area planted in 1926-7 reaohed maturity - there was aotually a 
deoline in exports and the rush to take up land for rubber planting had 
499 All four British rubber oompanies also planted up new areas in the 
mid-1920x. 
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oeased. In short, smallholders' overheads may have been much smaller 
than those of estates; but evem, a smallholder saw little point in tapping 
one pound of rubber when only 5.25 cents would be received in return for 
the labour. It was thought that a price of ten cents (o2.64d) was 
neoessary for the smallholder to begin tapping. In Brunei smallholders 
maintained their share of the market; and an index of seleoted exports 
by value (1928 - 100), indicates that during the years 1929-33, when 
there was no regulation, rubber fared worse than almost any other 
export industry, yet during Regulation years after 1934, it did better 
than all other industries except sago (which was on an extremely low 
base) and petroleum, the export of whioh did not begin until 1932. 
During the Japanese occupation, moreover, rubber production ceased 
altogether beoause it was deemed "unneoessary" for the Japanese war 
effort. In short, it is unwise to rush to the oonolusion that Rubber 
Regulation operated to the disadvantage of the smallholder. The 
evidence rather suggests the opposite, if anything. 
5. Grow More Rioe% 
Rice was the staple food of the people of Brunei, but the 
oatntrp was unable to produce sufficient to meet its needs, in 1906 
"large quantities of rioe were brought in by every schooner, though the 
soil of the country is oapablep were it only cuultivatedp of supply". 
50 
Rice topped the list of imports, by value, from 1915 to 1929 (exoept 
50. Co 824/1 Brunei Annual Report 1906, p 9. 
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1925 and 1928) and again in 1936-7.51 At the beginning of the Resident- 
ial Era, the amount of planting done by Malays was "not wortl2y of serious 
mention", the agricultural part of the population being formed by Kedayans 
and Bisayas. The sedentary cultivation of wet padi was virtually unknown. 
Kedayans were, traditionally, shifting cultivators of hill rises 
"Their usual method is to burn down the jungle on a hillside,, build some 
huts to live ins plant their pads, reap its and then move off elsewhere 
and repeat the operation. ". 52 
From the first efforts were made to get the inhabitants of 
äampong Ayer to settle on land to take up smallholdings to plant 
and rear livestook. There were stretohes of swamp in valleys and over 
wide areas of lowland where irrigation would not have been needed to grow 
rioe. Seeds were supplied from the F KS for distribution to the publio. 
In 1910 Mr Lee-Warner deolared that Brunei oould not advance until the 
oapital was on terra firma. Cheap land was ourrently available, but (he 
warned) unless advantage was taken of the opportunity while it lastedt 
land would be snapped up by speculators and oost more to obtain in future. 
The price whioh a oooonut or oomb of bananas then oommanded was 
"comparatively ruinous". Personal occupation of the land, on the other 
handy would enable all to grow these oommodities and save the expense 
Which then consumed at least one quarter of their expenditure on food, 
51" Rice imports stood at %83,067 (35. of total imports) in 1915, 
peaked at $312,820 in 1919 (51%) and fell to , ß187,421 (9%) in 1935. 
According to one estimate, rice worth x$3,996,317 was imported in the 
rears 1919-38. 
52" McArthur, "Report"s paragraph 31. (Cf. CO 824/1 Brunei Annual 
Re ort 1910, p 13, and BAR 195, p 6s "Kedayans as a M1e observe a 
certain rotation in the areas of oultivation"). 
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An area of 500 sores was demaroated for settlers in 01910. (In faot, 
when River Villagers did begin to move to terra firma, they tended to 
adopt rubber rather than rides see above, p 221). 
Throughout the Residential Era, the aim of British polioy was 
to stimalate domestic rice production in Brunei 
"by the inculcation of modern and eoonomio methods in place of the 
ancient and wasteful custom, by the encouragement of planting fresh 
areasp particularly of wet pads, and by the introduction of better and 
higher yielding strains". 53 
The idea was to rednoe depeadenoe on imports, partioularly in times of 
world soaroity, e. g. after both world ware. 
Following the outbreak of the Great War in 1914, magistrates 
were urged to enoourage people to grow padi. World rioe scaroity led to 
the planting of record acreages in Brunei in seasons 1917-8p 1918-9 and 
1919-20. The Disans and Bisayas, in particular, responded well to these 
exhortations. 
54 
The domeetio harvest failed in 1918 and 1919 at a time 
when imported rioe was most expensives but thanks largely to enoourage- 
meat by the Sultan, a reoord area was planted for the third season in 
suooession (1919-20) and, this time, the resulting yield was "excellent" 
throughout the State. Good harvests were also aohieved in the next two 
years, but an expert suggested that even better results might have been 
obtained if fewer varieties per aore had been sown. 
53. CO 824/2 Brunei Annual Report 1936 .p 10. 
54. "By the Brauei Yialays, through ignorance of agriculture, and by the 
Kedayaas, through natural perversity"p the Resident commented, "the 
Qovernmentls advice was largely disregarded. With the price of rice 
reaching 75 Cents a gantang (of. 48 cents in 1930,23 cents in 1933,30 
cents in 1939), these people have cause to review the soundness of their 
Own judgement", CO 824/1 Brunei Annual Report 1918, p 3" 
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Thereafter the amount of ripe grown in Brunei tended to vary 
inversely with the pride of rubber. When good returns oould be obtained 
for the latter, the pads fields tended to be neglected; when rubber was 
unremunerative, on the other hand, more rioe was planted. Even during 
the Great Depression (1929-33), however, when robber prices slumped, 
never more than 4O of domestic rice requirements were home-grown. 
Padi was planted "exolusively!! 
55 
on indigenous smallholdings of 
two or three aores, particularly in the Kilaaas, Sengkvsoag and Lumapas 
distriots in the neighbourhood of the oapital. During the Great 
Depression, when smallholder inoome from rubber oollapsedy the need to 
produce a higher proportion of rice locally became aoute. In 1932 Dr HA 
Tempan3r, Direotor of Agriculture in Malaya, stated that there was "too 
reason" why Brunei "should not beoome self-supporting in the matter of 
rioe produotion in a oomparatively short spane of time"* 
56 
On the basis 
of his reoommendatioas, a number of pads test plots were established by 
the Governments, in the hope of introducing higher yielding strains and 
of demonstrating to the rural population the stages of wet padi Cultivation 
which they could follow as the season progressed* 
57 
Other steps taken 
55. CO 824/2 Brunei Annual Report 1937, p 20. It is true that in 1919 
a syndicate of Chinese traders in Brunei, with "praiseworthy public 
spirit", cleared and irrigated some land for rice cultivation; but the 
venture was short-lived (Co 824/1 BAR 1919, pp 3-4; and BEAR 1920, p 3). 
In 1932 Dr Tempany (1881-1955) reported that two estates, at Berakas and 
Labu, were taking an interest in rice produotioa (Co 273/596 File 33045/1 
"Report on Agriculture in Labuan and Brunei"p p 25). 
56. Tempany, loci , oit", p 22. 57. Dr Tempany suggested, also, the selection of suitable candidates to 
serve as penghulus and ketuas, who should receive some training; the 
improvement of agricultural methods, including seed supply, drainage and 
irrigation, 
and control of pests. He warned, however of the danger of 
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by the Government in the 1930s included the oonstruction of a Government 
rice mill in the capital (1933), the prohibition of the clearing of vir- 
gin jungle for shifting oultivationg, the weighting of land tenure terms 
in favour of those who adopted sedentary, farming, as well as sohemes for 
the settlement of Malays from Kampong Ayer on land, the provision of 
buffaloes on easy terms, and minor drainage and irrigation projeots. By 
1934 the time had come, if progress was to be made ona sound permanent 
basis, for the appointment of a speoialist Agrionltural Offioer; 
58 but 
it was not until 1937 that a suitable incumbent was foand059 
How suooesaful was the Government's polioy? It was hardly to 
be expeoted that a way of life as customary as shifting cultivation 
oould have been eradioated overnight. The farming of wet padi had been 
virtually unknown in Brunei in 1906; but, by 1929, whioh was seen as a 
turning point, 1,200 acres of wet padi were planted out of a total rice 
aoreage of 5,200. 
"At last", the Resident reported, "the gedayans and 'Aitongop who form 
the balk of the agricultural population, are beginning to realize the 
advantages which this form of padi cultivation has over the sporadic 
and wasteful methods of hill padi so extensively practised by them and 
their forefathers". 60 
The total area under padi inoreased from 5,200 aores in 1929 
to a peak-of 12,000 aores in 1932, after whioh the area fiuotuated 
Chinese shopkeepers gaining a stranglehold on surplus rice by inducing 
indebtedness in producers (hence the 1933 Government rice mill? ). Loo_ 
o. j., PP 21-5-- 
58* CO 273/596 (File 33045/1) Acting High Commissioner hr (later Sir) A 
Caldeoott (1884-1951) to CO, No 464 (33/I+(3), 18 July 1934, paragraph 6. 
59. The post was originally offered to one Mr A Frampton (30)9 then 
serving in British Guiana ibid., CO to Frampton, 27 September 1934), 
but this fell through. Ur GDP Olds was appointed in 1937. 
60. CO 824/1 Brunei Annual Report 1929v p 6. 
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approximately between five and eight thousand acres* The area under wet 
pads rose from 1,200 acres in 1929 to 5,000 aores in 1932, slipping baok 
to 3,487 in 1936 and to only 2,000 aores in 1938" The total output 
doubled between 1929 and 1933 but did not reaoh a pre-war maximum until 
1936 (1,047,398 gantange), after which produotion fell back to only 
740,881 gantangs in 1938 (see Table 159 overleaf). 
The best year (apparently) was 1936 when almost 40% of ripe 
requirements were home produoed. In 1932 the proportion was one-third 
and in 1934 only one-sixth. In other words inoreased attention was paid 
to rioe daring the Great Depression, but by 1938 the position had slipped 
back once again. Nevertheless, the area under wet Qadi in 1938 was 
two-thirds higher than it had been in 1929. In short, it was prinoipally 
"the stern force of economic necessity" 
61 
which had compelled farmers 
to plant up increased areas of rioe in 1929 to 1932. When rubber prioes 
reoovered the number and area of wet Padi holdings showed "a remarkable 
falling off". 
62 
Although the extension of padi cultivation was "the agricultural 
question of outstanding importanoe in Brunei", Dr Tempany pointed out 
that this did not "preclude attention to other orops". 
63 
Subsidiary 
crops were cultivated alongside pads; and wild foods were collected from 
the jungle. In 1932 Dr Tempany, suggested that the planting of coconuts 
and coffee were capable of marked extension to most local needs and 
attention might have been paid also to "the probability of a steadily 
61. CO 824/2 Brunei Annna1 Report 1930, p 7. 
62. CO 824/2 Brunei Annual Report 1938, p 21. 
63. Tempany Report, loo`oit., p (n. a. ); also in Co 604/17 Sarawak 
Gazette., 1 December 1932, p 201. 
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Table 15. Bruneit Rioe, Domestin Production versus Imports. 
Year Aoreages- 
Dry Wet Total 
(sores) 
Looal 
Yield 
(gantangs 
Importss- 
Weight 
) (pikuls) 
Value 
(, $) 
1925 3,333* 1,667* 5,000* 600,000 32,910 242,811 
1926 tie a. n* a, n. a. 0440,000 34,268 273,649 
1927 n. a, n. a. n. a. 0300,000 39,730 298,812 
1928 na. n. a. 04,000 521,000 35,509 232,127 
1929 4,000 1,200 05,200 494,000 27,754 199,697 
1930 4,600 2,900 7,500 500,877 54,370 212,772 
1931 39846 39537 7,383 760v016 309515 133P410 
1932 7,000 5,000 129000 991,223 26,122 121,753 
1933 4,835 3,420 8,255 1,023,960 29,015 106,522 
1934 n. a. n. a. 05,000 o600,000 43,006 131,805 
1935 n. a, n. a, 05,000 o600,000 48,472 187,421 
1936 4,128 3,487 7,615 1,047,398 47,341 172,777 
1937 2,226 2,514 4,740 766,292 42,336 180,911 
1938 2.837 2.186 5,023 740,881 47,142 193,772 
Rom $_ (*) 1924-5 harvest, and so on. 
The figures for domestio aoreages and produotion may not be 
very reliable. In 1926, for example, the Resident stated that there 
was "no reliable reoord of the are a planted, nor oan too muoh relianoe 
be plaoed on the aoouraoy of the figures". (CO 824/1 Brunei Annual 
Report 1926, p 8). Similar oomments were made in 1933 and 1938. 
In 1933 yields per adre were given as follows: wet: 131 gantangs 
per aore; drys 118 gantangs per aore; totals 124 gantangs per aore. 
Other relevant information inoludes (a) population figures - 
see Appendix 6, below; and (b) the rate of rubber release under the 
International Rubber Regulation Agreement of 1934= o87% of the quota 
allotted might have been exported in 1934,67. qß in 1935,62* 5% in 1936, 
834 in 1937 and 55% in 1938. Cf. also, p 315, fn 2 (below). 
Souroes oompiled by author from Brunei Annual Reports. 
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inoreasing demand for meaty poultry, eggs, fresh vegetables and fruit 
as the development of the oilfield proceeds". Groundnuts, oil-pa1mg 
tobaooo and areoanuts were further possibilities. 
64 
Bat suoh new Drops 
were never exported from Brunei and the aoreages under them must have 
remained small. 
Brunei was not a stook-raising ooantry but buffaloes were 
required. in oonjunotion with the preparation of land for wet padi 
Oultivation. Demand for the animals beoame greater as this form of 
agrioulture spread and in 1932 Dr Tempany noted a "marked shortage" of 
buffaloes, The Government had sought for some years to prevent the drain 
of such animals from the ooantry. In 1925 duties were imposed on the 
export of buffaloes and buffalo meat, and., in September 1928, the export 
of buffaloes was prohibited without written permission from the Resident. 
Despite an inorease of 40% in the number of buffaloes between 1930 awd 
1938,65 there remaiuad insuffioient for use in the Padi fields beoanse, 
in the latter sear, the Resident had lannohed another Boheme to entioe 
r" 
64. Ibid. 
65. From 3,669 in 1930 to 5,139 in 1938. Demand inoreased in 1938 
beoause the Resident had launched one of the recurring campaigns to 
induce River Villagers to adopt rice cultivation. Mr J 'Cook 
(now CBE), 
State Agricultural Officer in 1940-1, oommentes "As regards the settle- 
ment scheme, if success is judged in terms of pad! planted then there 
certainly was a modioum of euooess but in the sense of permanent settle- 
ment on the land, then the answer is 'not. The two main obstacles 
militating against real progress were, firstly, and the more important, 
the understandable reluctance of the Kampong Ayer people to undertake, 
to them, a radical change in lifestyle, and, seoondly, the abnormal 
conditions of the time (1940-1) prevented the , Agricultural 
Department 
from giving a 100% baok-up to the scheme". (Mr J Cook CBE, letter to 
the author, 23 March 1985, paragraph 2). 
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River Villagers to start a new life on terra firma. Thus from 1935 
cattle began to be imported, particularly from North Borneo. 
66 
Sago was the third most important agricultural product of Bru- 
nei after rubber and rice. By 1933 there were 5,000 acres of the crop 
under cultivation, almost entirely in Temburong and Belait districts, 
Rumbia required little attention and would grow in swampy areas that 
were useless for anything else. The product was the staple food of the 
peoples of the interior, especially Tutongs and Dusuns, and in difficult 
years was used by others as a substitute for, or supplement toi rioe. 
In addition sago leaves provided the best-quality atap and refuse from 
the manufacture of sago flour was sold as pig-food. 
In 1910 it was suggested that, with sago, exports from 1uka and 
Oya in Sarawak beginning to decline, Brunei sago should have commanded a 
remunerative price and rumbia working alone could have brought prosperity 
to the people of the outdistriots. It was hoped to enoourage the export 
of sago in prepared (rather than raw) form in order to enable the producer 
to avoid losing profits to the middleman. Indeed, exports of sago were 
not insignificant, reaching a maximum of x$84,512 in 1920. During the 
Great Depression the low price of this commodity caused owners to pay 
less attention to their rumbia. Three Chinese-owned factories for the 
manufacture of sago flour remained in existence in 1938, but principally 
66. Livestock worth ß$l, 622 were imported in 1935, of. 262 head worth X12,022 imported in 1941. Apart from buffaloes, there were (in 1938) 
1,300 head of Siamese cattle in Brunei kept either for the supply of 
milk or for slaughter. Two estates maintained herds. Grazing was 
usually inadequate; and, because little stall-feeding was carried out, 
animals were generally in poor condition. 
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to serve the domestio market. 
67 
Craft Industries. The most important indigenous craft indust- 
ries were brass- and silverware, followed by sarongs and ka an . The 
manufacture of silver and brass articles was restricted largely to oer- 
tain family guilds in the oapital. These occupations were at their most 
prosperous in the 1920s in terms of (pre-Japanese oooupation) export 
sales, 
68 
The manufaoture of silverware 
69 
was the most important of the 
oraft industries and the Brunei silversmiths were "perhaps the most 
famous in the Archipelago". 70 The traditional output ooasisted of art- 
idles for the use of the Malay aristooraoy; but the demand for blades 
suoh as those whioh oarried off most of the prizes at the Kuala Lumpur 
Show in 1908, was "never likely to make it worthwhile to assist to any 
great extent those who are engaged in the manufaoture of suoh artioles". 
An arrangement was made in August 1908, whereby the Government undertook 
67. Exports fell to 923,841 in 1925,921,797 in 1930 and reached a 
nadir of only %3,594 in 1931, before recovering to %13,542 by 1938. (An 
extraordinary amount of x$102,592 was shipped in 1940s of. p 315, 
below). 
Most sago was exported as flours-of the 1925 total, for example, 
X22,944 
was exported as flour and only %896 in the raw form. Outside the Brunei 
and Temburong districts peasants were required, in 1938, to take out 
permanent titles to the various pulau (islands) of sago palms over which 
they claimed shadowy ancestral rights. In the same year the Government 
took steps to establish a sago demonstration oentre at kuala Belait in 
order to disseminate improved methods of extracting starch. Be& also 
JS Lim, "A Short Account of Sago Production in Kuala Balai (Belait 
District)" in BE 1974, pp 144-55. 
68. See note 72 (below). 
69. The method employed was "first to beat the silver to the required 
shape, then to ran a mixture consisting mostly of resin . round 
it, 
either outside or inside as the case may be, to prevent its buckling 
while the pattern is being punched oat". (CO 8241 Brunei Annual Report 
___ P 
10). 
70. CO 824/2 Brunei Annual Report 1931, p 10. 
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to advanoe money to the silversmiths and in return to reoeive their ware 
for sale to the publio. In the 1920s and 1930s an effort was made, with 
ooasiderable suooess, to persuade silversmiths to produoe items for 
whioh there would be a demand among'Ptropeans, suoh as oigarette oases, 
ashtrays and finger bowls. Thanks to the assistanoe of the Malayan Arts 
and Crafts Sooiety a reacly market was foand in Singapore and there was a 
steady demand for the silverware. Although there was a large deorease 
in exports during the Great Depression, smiths suffered little beoause, 
with the inorease of 3hropean population, looal sales inoreased. Visitors 
to Brunei were also more numerous; and few left without a souvenir. 
Similarly, many River Villagers were very talented braseworkere. 
71 
Their output at first oomprised mainly gongs (for whioh Brunei was famous), 
sireh boxes, kettles and other hoasehold vessels. The artisans beoame 
skilful at copying accurately saoh items as replioas of motor engine 
parts, propellors and other pieoes of maohinery. Daring the 1920s North 
Borneo and Sarawak were good markets, but exports fell greatly after 
that time and revived only in 1940-1.72 In the 1930s the prodnots of 
71. The method of brass-making was as follows$ "A mould is made in clay 
in the size and shape of the interior space of the vessel desired. This 
is laid over with a mixture of wax and resin which is shaped to form an 
exact replica of the article to be oast. This again is covered with olay, 
a hole being left in some convenient plaoe as an outlet for the wax. 
When the clay is dry the wax is burnt over a fire and the moulten brass 
is poured in to take its place. The olag is then removed with hammer 
and chisel, leaving the article complete and ready for sale. The great 
advantage of the system above described is that articles of very 
elaborate shape and design can be turned out in one casting" 
(CO 824/1 
Br'nnei Anneal Report 1908, p 10). 
72" Exports of brassware were valued at 915,734 in 1925, $546 in 1933 
and $5,795 in 1940. Exports of silverware peaked at %16v500 in 1928, 
falling to %4,346 in 1933, maintaining a level above %T, 000 annually 
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the smiths were mainly sold 1ooa11y. 
The cotton sarongs woven by Brunei women compared well in 
quality with those produced in Malaya. Once again, weaving was centred 
in the River Village., bat after 1930 the market was captured by oheap 
machine textiles from Japan. 
73 
An effort had been made in 1908, however,, 
to stimulate the ear eaving industry by taking off the import duty 
On raw materials required for the work. 
The making of ka an -. a kind of waterproof matting made from 
the leaves of nipah palm - was quite an important industry and large 
numbers of bundles were exported annually. 
"The inhabitants" - thus Sir John Anderson after visiting 
Brunei Town in 1906 - "appeared to be keen traders as the launoh was 
surrounded by boats fall of brasswork ... and of the speoial gold thread 
woven sarongs and beds mats whioh are peouliar to that ooantry. These 
they were all eager to sell, of oourse at prioes which they oonsidered 
suitable to our dignity rather than aooording to the real value of the 
articles". 74 
6. Labour 
There were few large-soale employers of labour during the 
Residential Era. In 1906 the principal enterprises were the Island 
Trading S ndioate's outoh faotory and the Rajah's two ooal mines. The 
from 1935 to 1938,. but dipping to only $4,019 in 1940. Exports of 
ka a reached a maximum of %9,636 in 1941 (of. $4,882 in 1927 and 
$19792 in 1931) whilst sarong exports declined from $9,905 in 1926 to 
a more $319 in 1933, before recovering to $3,242 in 1941. 
73. Boring the years 1926-41 (excluding 1939) sarongs worth %60,081. 
were exported from Brunei, compared with imports of O0.4 million. A 
further 91.5 million of aped cotton goods came into Brunei during the 
'same timespan. 
74. CO 144/80 (5578) Sir J Anderson to CO, No 1 (Labuan), 25 January 
1906, Paragraph 18. 
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ITS, Mr McArthur reported in 1904, 
"employs either direotly as workmen or indirootly as bark oolleotors and 
boatmen under contractors upwards of 400 Malays, and pays looally in 
wages about 4,000 dollars a month. What the people did before this 
factory was started four years ago I do not know. There was one sago 
factory at work then which no doubt gave employment to some; but... the 
population of the town decreased considerably on the loss of the Limbang, 
and... it is only recently, sinoe the opening of the oatoh works, that the 
people have began to return to their homes from Sandakan, Labuan and other 
plaoes along the coast". 75 
In 1908 the Rajah employed 250 people at Brooketon and 72 at Buang 
Tawar. Subsequently, the principal employers, as indioated in Table 18 
(overleaf), also inoluded rubber estates, the Government (PWD) and the 
British Malayan Petroleum: Company (BMPC). 
There was great flexibility in the labour market. In 1919, for 
examples, many of those who would normally have worked on estates fond 
more remunerative oooupations because of the high prioes obtainable for 
sago, jangle produce and fish* 
76 
Similarly, it was notioed in 1926 that 
"the more energetic and progressive workers" at the cutoh faotory were 
"realizing the advantages of taking up land and forsaking the river 
life". 77 In the previous year the profitability of jelutong 
"oomplioated the labour problem in the (Belait) district, since the 
ordinary ooolie could make so much more by tapping elutan that he 
could not be induced to undertake other work, even of an easier kind, 
except at the most extravagant rates of pay". 78 
There was a large turnover of personnel beoauee Naiays prefer- 
red to remain their own masters. The Resident oommented in 19381 
75. MoArthur, "Report", paragraph 34. 
76. CO 824/1 Brunei Annual Report 1919. p 4. 
77. CO 824/1 Brunei Annual Report 1926, p 7. 
78. CO 824/1 Brunei Annual Report 1925, p 7" 
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Table 16. Principal Employers in Brunei, 1921-32 
Year Brooketon Cutoh Rubber P WD BMPC Total 
Faotory Estates 
1921 384 450 777 n"ae nil 1,615 
1922 400 450 495 n. a. n. a. 19345 
1923 364 485 791 n. a. 494 2,134 
1924 not available not available na. 
1925 - 470 683 n. a. 520 1,673 
1926 - 500 954 n. a. 418 1,872 
1927 - 500 19392 156 683 29575 
1928 - 500 867 n. a. 610 1,977 
1929 - 550 1,002 155 633 2,185 
1930 - 700 778 117 9 37 2,532 
1931 - 780 696 0150 859 2,485 
1932 755 -609 o200 1,791 3,355 
Notes: (1) The total population of Brunei in oensus years was 25,451 
in 1921 and 30,135 in 1931. (For full details, see Appendix 6). 
(2) Employment statistics for the years 1906-20 are inoom- 
plete. In 1915, however, 252 people were employed on two rubber 
estates in Temburong distriot; in 1916,524 on three estates; and, in 
1917,531 on three estates. 
In 1915 about 150 men were employed in the ITC's outoh faotory 
in the oapital and a further 700 were engaged upon the oolleotion of 
mangrove bark and firewood. 
(3) By 1938 the ITO outoh faotory employed 145 (307 in 1939), 
rubber estates 561, the PWD 394, the BMPC 1,165 amounting to a total 
of 2,265- 
(4) In 1933 the Resident oommented: "It must be remembered 
that the above figures represent permanent labour foroes only. Many 
more labourers are employed on ooatraot and oasual labour" (CO 824/2 
Brunei Annual Report 1933, p 22). 
So iroes oompiled bg author from Brunei Annual Reports (Co 824/1-2)o 
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"There is a large volume of oasual labour. A considerable proportion 
of the indigenous population oonsists of peasant proprietors who seek... 
wage-earning employment only as a seasonal occupation to supplement the 
means of livelihood obtainable from their smallholdings". 79 
The wages reoeived frequently did not represent the sole souroe of 
inoome. 80 Mr JL Noakes MBE, writing in 1947, explained that the major- 
ity of people in Brunei had two, or more, oooupationss 
"For example., a man might be engaged in fishing at certain periods of 
the year, yet he may also have a small rubber garden from which he 
derives some profit by the labours of himself and his family, and he-may 
cultivate pads in season from whioh he obtains a oonsiderable proportion 
of the food required for the year; furthermore he may work jungle produce 
on ocoasion, thus supplementing his cash income". 81 
After the first rubber estates reaohed the tapping stage in 
1914-15, managers oomplained of a shortage of labour. This difficulty 
had to be solved if the rubber industry was to be a suooess. In Brunei 
distriotv planters were faced with the problem of "turning fishermen, 
jungle workers and gypsies into agricultural labourers". In Temburong 
distriot, where three estates were established, the position was more 
serious beoanse the soant looal population provided no field for reoruit- 
meat of labour unless managers were prepared "to suffer or oorreot 
the defioienoies of Brunei Malays from the oapital. 
82 
The "real oruz" 
of the problem was the "lank of population"t whioh oould be overoome 
79.00 824/2 Brunei Annual Report 1938, p 30. 
80, `d., pp 31-2. 
81. JL Noakes MBE, Sarawak and Brunets A Report on the 1947 Population 
Cenaus (Kuohing 1950), p 61. Note. Exports of forest produoe fell 
from %26,502 in 1927 to only 99,540 in 1931 and remained below %3,000 
annually from 1932 to 1938, exoept 1935 (911#406)- 
82. For suoh alleged failings, see P Blundell (pen-name), The City of 
M_ W_ a_ era (London 1923), PP 142-3. 
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only "by encouraging immigration in every way". 
83 
In 1920 one rubber_oompany oomplained that 
"(a) the labour obtained looally is totally unsuited to rubber 
plantati one; 
(b) indentured Chinese labour or Netherlands Indies labour is not 
all owed; 
(o) under the terms of the lease, Tamil labour oould not be employed 
exoept with the permission of the Government of Brunei; 
(d) the system of 'free labour' is unsatisfaotorys, absoonding is rife 
and diffioult to oheok". 84 
"This means they want indentured (Indian) labour"g one CO olerk 
oommented. 
85 
The High Commissioner explained that before Indian labourers 
ooald be allowed to proceed to Brunei it would be neoessary to assure 
the Indian Government that a medical officer and an official of the 
Labour Department of the Straits Settlements and Federated Malay States 
would be employed. Because of shortage of staff, he was unable to give 
that assaranoev but hoped that by the time the neoessary legislation had 
been passed in Brunei and the sanotion of the Indian Government obtained, 
the position with regard to staff might have improved. 
$6 
Daring the rubber depression of late 1920 to 1922 the demand 
for labour slaokened, ixet revived sharply thereafter. Planters again 
found diffioulty in reorniting suffioient workers, despite the olosure 
(in 1924) of the Rajah's ooal mine at Brooketong whioh left almost 400 
83. CO 824/1 Brunei Annual Report 1918, pp 3-4. 
84. CO 531/14 (14030) Rubber Growers' Association to Under-Seoretary 
Of State, Colonial Office, 16 March 19201, paragraph 2. 
85. Ibidev minute by Beoketty 23 March 1920. 
86. CO 531/14 (42295) Sir LN Guillemard (1862-1951) to CO, No 4 (Brunei), 
24 Jn17 1920, Paragraphs 3-4. 
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people without work. From 1924, therefore, Indian labourers were reoruit- 
ed. By the end of 1927 there were 427 Tamils (out of an estate labour 
foroe of 1,392) working in Brunei. This experiment failed, however, and 
by 1931 only five Indians were employed by the rubber oompanies. There 
were three main reasons for this. First, the slump in the rubber market 
after 1929 left estates with exoess labour. Seoondly, oompanies found 
difficulty in paying the minimum wages presoribed for Indians whilst 
rubber prioes were at rook bottom. Finally, the Indians themselves were 
oharaoterized as "unsatisfaotor7"87 workers, though no reason for this 
was given. By oontrast, Indians oontinued to be employed by the BMPC. 
Throughout the Residential Fra indigenous Malays and Kedayans 
comprised the bulk of the estate labour force. The balance was made up 
of Chinese and Javanese (and Indians during the period 1924-31). In 
1926 the Resident regretted 
"to see some estates still relying on. oasually-reoraited Javanese labour 
of unknown anteoedents. These estates have had oontiuual trouble in 
oonsequenoe"". 88 
Legislation. A Labour Code, based on that in the FMS (1912), 
89 
was passed in 1913. This law showed "many of the signs of a transition 
between indentured labour with its system of penal sanotions and free 
labour with its oivil liberties". Immigrants were examined 
"as to their physical oapaoities and as to the nature of their engage- 
87. CO 824/1 Brunei Annual Report 1928, pp 23-4. 
88. CO 824/1 Brunei Annual Report 1926, p 9. 
89. KG fregonning, A History of Modern Malaya (London 1964), PP 199- 
201; and Chai lion Chan, The Development of British Malaya 1896-1909 
(Kuala Lumpur 1964),. PP 122-130. 
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ments. Agreements of employment may not exceed one month. The employer 
is under an obligation to provide proper accommodation, rations and 
medical services under the general direction of the Controller of Labour. 
Provision is made for maternity benefits, nurseries for infants and 
estates, schools. The minimum age for employment is ten years of age. 
An Indian kind administered by an Indian Immigration Committee is 
established on the financial foundation of fees paid by the employers". 90 
Labourers entered into either "agreements" or "oontraots" with 
their employers. An "agreement" was a verbal agreement to labour valid 
for a mazimnm of thirty days, ors if a "oontinuing agreement"t until the 
expiration of a term of notioe not exoeeding one month. A "oontraot", 
on the other hand, was an engagement to labour in writing valid for not 
more than eighteen months or for not more than 300 days' work. Suoh oon, - 
tracts were not legal in the oases of Indian and Chinese immigrants after 
the passage, in 1918, of an amendment to the 1913 Labour Code. For both 
seta of workers, the employer 
"if wishing to oomplain of "disobedienoe to lawful orders, neglect of 
duty, oarelessness in regard to property, wrongful determination of an 
agreement of servioe, or negleot or refusal to fulfill or to enter on or 
oommenoe aervioe", may apprehend suoh labourer, if he is at the plaoe of 
work and take him before a magistrate. If the magistrate oonsiders that 
there was no suffioient ground for such aotion by the employer and that 
the labourer was detained an unnecessary length of time, he may order the 
employer to pay compensation up to ten dollars. The employer may also 
apprehend on his own responsibility any labourer whom he has reason to 
believe... is absconding from his service". 91 
If an employee broke any agreement or oontraot knowing that 
the aonsequenoe of so doing would be to cause a stoppage of work and 
serious lose to the employer, he was liable., on oonviotion, to a fine 
not exoeeding %100 or imprisonment for a period not exoeeding six 
90. CO 717/58 (File 29226): draft report of International Labour 
Offioe on Labour Conditions in British Malara 1927, Appendix 1. 
91. ibid. 
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months. 
92 
The Labour Enaotment also presoribed the maintenanoe of house 
aooommodation as ordered by a magistrate and of a sanitary and adequate 
water supply. Labourers requiring medioal treatment had to be sent by 
their employer to the nearest hospital. Further, "the Resident may 
require the plaoe of employment to oonstruot and maintain an estate 
hospital". 93 (See above, p 196, and below, p 290). 
In 1923 the jurisdiotion of the Controller of Labour (Malaya) 
was extended to Brunei; and the Brunei State Medical Offioer ex-officio 
became Assistant Controller, 
94 
Contraot service for Chinese labourers 
was abolished in 1918; and Indians were freed from the provisions of the 
Labour Code in 1924. 
Under a revised law passed in 1932 all labour besame free and 
oontraot or indentured labour was forbididen. There were to be no penal 
sanotioas for breach of agreement by the labourer. The employer was 
bound to provide at least 24 days" work in each month for every labourer 
employed by him and no labourer oould be required to work for more than 
six days in one week or for more than six hours on end. (In the late 
1930s the number of hours worked was invariably, less than the statutory 
maximum). The employment of women and young persons on night work or 
underground was prohibited. Maternity benefit was payable to Indtän 
92. Ibid. 
93. Ibid. 
94" Dr OE Fisher reoalls that, as the sole doctor in the State 
(apart 
from the one employed by the BMPC at Seria), "I never regarded very 
seriously my duties as Controller of Labour (1937-9)"" Letter to the 
author, 30 September 1984, paragraph 5" 
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women (all women from 1937) during the period of absenoe from work of 
one month before and one month after oonfinement. 
95 
Labour relations in Brunei remained stable before 1941 and 
strikes were unknown, perhaps because there were no trade unions* 
96 
The 
wages paid by the rubber oompanies, the outoh faotory and the Publio 
Works Department were oertainly not exoessive, but they appear to have 
oovered or exoeeded the local cost of living. Minimum monthly inoome 
for an unskilled labourer working on rubber estates averaged ! 
$14-18 in 
1927-30, #9-12 in 1931, and $$7.50-12 in 1932-5.97 A skilled worker was 
little better remunerated (e. g. $18-24 in 1930, %$13-15 in 1931 and ßd12-15 
in 1932-5)" On some rubber estates labourers were paid by results, whioh 
enabled good tappers to earn more than the rates just mentioned. An 
extra 50% was received for overtime. Miere labour was non-resident, a 
deliberately low basin wage was paid in oonjunotion with a relatively high 
attendanoe bonus to ensure regularity of attendance at work* 
98 Stilled 
workers employed by the Government and the ontoh factory earned much 
larger awe, of up to $55 a month even in 1931. The highest remuneration 
was offered by the NIPCs in 1931 an unskilled oil company labourer was 
95" CO 717/58 (File 29226) ILO report, Appendix 1. 
96. "There were never any riots or strikes in Brunei during my time 
(1928-37) there" (Mr HL Fountain, letter to the author, 16 September 
1983, paragraph 7). "There were indeed no unions/strikes/or politioal 
stators of whom I ever heard in 1935-7" (Dato PX Lintoa, letter to 
the author, 27 March 1984, paragraph 10). "There were no trade unions 
in Brunei and no politioal problems name to light" (Kr JO Black, BR 1937- 
40, letter to the author., 12 April 1983, paragraph 5). "Certainly in Mr 
time (1940-1) there was not the hint of a strike or industrial unrest" (Battsk RN Tamer, letter to the author, 14 August 1983, paragraph 3J). 
97. For purposes of comparison, the Resident's annual salary in 1933 
was j$ß9280 (not inoluding entertainment allowanoe of ßd600). 
98" CO 824/2 Brunei Annual Report 1938, p 32. 
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paid $13 to 933 monthly, whereas an artisan might earn $100. 
An adalt was reokoned to oonsume six gantangs of rioe a month. 
The prioe of seoond quality rioe fell from 48 oents a and tang in 1930 
to 23 oents in 1933-4 before creeping bank up to 28 oents by 1937. In 
1931 the monthly oost of living for an Indian labourer (in the oilfield) 
was roughly %9 while that of Malays and Chinese "may be put at between 
$$10 and $15 a month". 
99 
Allotments were set aside to enable employees 
to grow food. Workers were particularly adept at catching fish, which 
enabled them to reduoe their budget and helped them to subsist. 
Presumably, the onset of the Depressions whioh oaused a marked 
exodus from Brunei, also fostered a quiesoent attitude in the labour 
foroe. ]dring 1929 the total. population of the State was estimated to 
have fallen from 359000 in January to about 29,000 at the end of the 
year. Although 425 Tamil rubber estate workers and assooiated families 
were repatriated in 1928-33, employment in the main industries aotually 
held up quite well (seep 238, above), For those remaining in Brunei, 
many thrown out of work were absorbed by the BMPC or were assisted by 
Government projeots. In 1933 extra provision was made by the latter for 
publio works in the hope that this "will do muoh to eliminate unemploy-- 
meat in the State",, 
100 
Apart from wage labourers, the slump also affeoted the 
independent entrepreneur and the indigenous smallholderss 
"The looal Chinese firms" - thus the Resident in 1930 - "found great 
99. CO 824/2 Brunei Annual Report 19319 F 13. 
100. CO 717/95 (File 13324) statement by Mr TF Carey, 10 Ootober 1932. 
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difficultf in paying for imported merohandieev and there were one or two 
baukraptoiea. The peasants were forced to realize the hoards of silver 
dollars, which they had accumulated in the years of plenty when rubber 
was commanding a good price, although the realization that the intrinsic 
value of savings in the form of these coins had depreciated owing to the 
slump in the price of the metal itself, was probably also responsible for 
the noticeably increased flow of silver dollars into the Treasury". 101 
Large berg of smallholders found that it did not pay to 
tap their rubber trees and oonsiderable areas went out of tapping. At 
first they paid more attention to their sago plantations (whioh had been 
negleoted during the rubber boom). In 1930 exports of sago doubled in 
weight over the previous year and there was muoh inoreased produotion 
for loosl oonsumption mainly as an insuranoe against a possible failure 
of the ripe harvest. At year's end, however, the prioe of sago had also 
fallen so low that it hardly paid to prodnoe it for export. Similarly, 
-JelutLug 
beoame uneoonomio. Fishing provided a livelihood for a great 
many people in Brunei dietriot. It was reported in 1931 that, "in 
addition to fresh fish, whioh has a readg market looallyp a dried 
prawn industry flourishes... (and) is one of the few whioh has not been 
atfeoted by the slump". 
102 
wed prawn exports indeed remained oorn- 
Paratively stable (954,376 in 1929,946,114 in 1932) in the early, 1930eß 
but thereafter slumped to a nadir of $99037 in 1937,103 (No details are 
101. CO 824/2 Brunei Annual Report 1930. p 3- 
102, CO 824/2 Brunei Annual Report 1931, p 11. 
103. It was reported in 1919 that the trade in dried prawns "was new 
and very luorative both for the fishermen and traders a start was made 
in a small way in 1919 by establishing a drying depot on Berbunot 
Island 
(in Brunei Bay) and the industry proved so profitable that there is now 
quite a oonsiderable village (there)". (CO 824/1 Brunei Annual Report 
1p 1). Brunei Bay "oertainly offers unparalleled opportunities 
for development in fishing"q it was added. 
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available oonoeruing how local sales were affeoted by the slump). 
Although there was an inorease in arrears of rent, most landr- 
holders managed to keep up with their payments. 
104 
Imports of ohandu, 
tobaooo and rioe all approximately halved during the years 1927 to 
1931 105 Flour and coconut oil showed a slight decrease. Conversely 
imports of manufaotured artioles and motor vehioles (brought in mainly 
by the BMPC) inoreased sharply. These faots underline the reduoed 
parohasing power of many people beoause of the depression, on the one 
hand, and the wealth of the BKPG, on the other. 
7. Conolusion 
The year 1932 marked the and of an era. Before that time 
Brunei's eoononlº produced nothing which generated substantial wealth 
for the oountry. Apart from the laok of valuable produots, developmental 
handioaps inoluded the extreme isolation of Brunei; the high freight rates 
oharged by the steamship oompaay whioh monopolized the Singapore-Labuan 
104. The Government rent roll was %19,540 in 1928, $18,705 in 1929 and 
919,657 in 1930. Rent arrears at years' end were X112 in 1928, %359 in 
1929 and %730 in 1930. In 1933 288 lots involving a sum of %4,257 and 
an aoreage of 2,436 were oanoelled for non-payment of rent. Nearly all 
of these lands were unoultivated (CO 824/2 Brunei Annual Report 1933, 
p 13). Figures for 1931 and 1932 are not available. By 1938 land rents 
totalled $28,861. As a relief to those farmers who did not rent land, 
annual poll tax was rednoed in 1933 from, x$2.00 to 50 oents. 105. Imports of ohandu fell from 12,660 tahils in 1926 to only 6,642 
in 1931; tobaooo imports from 87,528 lbs to 44,638 The (of. 108,403 lbs 
in 1938). Rioe imports dropped by half in value (298,812 in 1927 and 
%133,410 in 1931) but not in volume (39,730 ip kuls in 1927 to 30,515 
is in 1931). 
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line; 106 the additional expense of trans-shipment from Labuan; the lank 
of population; and the absenoe of infrastruoture (a modern port, roads, 
skilled labour, professional middle olass). The oombiuation of suoh 
taot ors disooaraged foreign investment in Brunei and restrioted develop- 
went. Overall, Brunei laoked the money, the people, and the raw 
materials neoessary for eoonomio take-off. From 1932, however, Brunei 
emerged as a land "flowing with oil and gas", 
107 
although some twenty 
years (1932-52) elapsed before the benefits of the new wealth began 
fu11y, t to be felt. 
106. Until 1914 the route was monopolized by the North German Lloyd 
line. After the outbreak of the Great War, the route was taken over 
by the Straits Steamship Company (KG Tregonning, Home Port Singapore 
- Singapore 1967 - pp 45,103,104 and 105-6). 
107. Mr P Soanlon, letter to the author, 24 August 1983, paragraph 3. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL POLICY IN THE 193OSS THE INITIAL IMPACT OF OIL 1932-41 
1. Introduction 
The first quarter century of the Residential Era had witnessed 
several substantial achievements including the preservation of the Brunei 
Sultanate, the prevention of further territorial encroachments by its 
neighbours (apart from one unfavourable border adjustment), the elim- 
ination of Brooke influence within Brunei, the introduction of a more 
decent administration than had existed before 1906, the rescue of the 
country's finances, and the introduction of one agricultural product 
(rubber) whioh, fluctuating prices notwithstanding, providing marry 
people with unprecedentedly high cash incomes, Overall, the demoralization 
caused by a prolonged period of decline - political, territorial, economic 
and demographic - before 1906 was stemmed and a period of oonsolidation 
had ensued. 
If the year 1906 marked one deoisive point of departure, a 
further watershed was reached in 1932, when the first consignment Of 
Petroleum was exported from the Seria field. An isolated and. heavily- 
indebted baokwater of little or no politioal significanoe before 1932, 
Brunei has sinoe become one of the richest oosntries in the world (on 
a per capita basis) and it is difficult to exaggerate the contrast 
between Brunei in the days of its poverty and its modern self. 
251. 
In this chapter, I shall examine the initial impact on social 
and economic conditions in Brunei of the new wealth derived from petroleum. 
After treating the exploratory stage (1906-29)v I shall examine the 
economic and social policy adopted in the 1930sß and, in the final 
seotiong review the extent of development. But first it is appropriate 
to take stock of the situation when the oil started to flow (1932). 
2. Brunei on the Eve of the Oil Era 
-(1932) 
The 1931 census revealed that the total population of Brunei 
stood at 30,135. The decline in population before 1906 had been turned 
roand into an increase of 38.79% between 1911 and 1931. (At the end of 
1927, furthermore,, the population may have been as high ae 38,378). 
1 
The proportion of Muslim Malays and Kedayans had declined from 75.9% of 
the total enumerated in 1911 to 68.7% in 1931. Some of the pagan tribes 
in outlying areas] such as the Tatongs and Dusuns,. were aoquiring a "thin 
veneer" of Muhammadanism. 
2 
The number of Chinese - mostly traditional 
Confucians but with a Christian element - had grown considerably 
(from 
736 in 1911 to 2,683 twenty years later); but as a proportion of the total 
population they remained oomparatively insignifioant (3.4% in 1911,8.9% 
is 1931). This belies their eoonomio importance, for they dominated non- 
1. At the end of 1928 the population was estimated to be 35,000-(BAR 
19299 p 18). But during that year (1928), 14,000 people had arrived in 
Brunei compared with 17,500 who lefts in other words there was a net 
loss of 3,500 people. Hence the population at the beginning of 1928 
was 38,500 (35,000 + 3,500), from which must be deducted the natural 
increase during the year (births 1,074 less deaths 952 a 122). This 
gives a final population figure of 38,378 (38,500 - 122). 
2. CO 824/1 Brunei Annual Report 1938, p 4. 
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European business and retailing in Brunei. In 1932, indeed, a loan of 
%15,000 was made by the Government to "the only local Malay trader of 
standing" to enable him "to tide over the present crisis and so prevent 
the Chinese from having a monopoly of Brunei trade". 
3 
The general rate 
of natural population increase was not rapids in 1927, for example, the 
number of excess births was a mere 22. The average rate of natural 
increase in the years 1928-32 was just above 1% annually. 
The population remained concentrated in Brunei Muara district, 
whioh had inoreased from 15,910 in 1911 to 18,281 twenty years later; 
but this represented a fall in its proportion of the total population of 
the State (73.2% to 60. "7%). Muoh of the gain had been made by Belait 
distriot, the least populous in 1911 (1,126 or 5.2%), whioh stood at 
3,897 WOO by 1931. Tutong had also slightly inoreased its peroentage 
share of the total. The distriot whioh had shown the fastest growth in 
the decade 1911--219 i. e. Temburong, had since experienced a fall in 
population from 2,912 is 1921 to only 2,306 in 1931- (Otte possible 
explanation is the slump in the rubber industry in 1931; but 1921 was 
also a depression year). 
Brunei Town, with 10,453 inhabitants, remained the only 
significant settlement in the country. More than one in every three 
people in Brunei still lived in the oapital. Its nearest Competitor 
- Kuala Belait - had only 1,193 inhabitants, whilst Seria was not yet 
significant enough to be recorded in the census returns. Since the 
3. CO 717/95 (File 13324): statement by Mr TF Carey, 10 October 1932, 
covering the Brunei Estimates for 1933. 
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beginning of the Residential Era the oollier7 settlement at Brooketon 
(Muara Damit) had dwindled after the olosure of the Rajah's ooal mine 
in 1924, Conversely, villages suoh as Kuala Tatong, Labi and Berbunot 
were gaining in population and oommeroial aotivity. 
Other features of the Brunei populaoe inoluded the rarity of 
polygamy; overorowding in houses (ten per dwelling in the oapital, eight 
in Kuala Belait); the low literaoy rate (1e of indigenous men, 2.60,5f of 
women); and the imbalanoe its the Chinese population (three women to every 
ten men). Certainly in oomparison with what followed, the structure and 
distribution of population had not altered radically since the beginning 
of the Residential Era. The 1931 census of Brunei, Mr JL Noakes MBE 
commented in 19479 
"oovered a population almost wholly indigenous, comparatively seoluded 
and unaffeoted by the economic disturbanoes of the modern world beoause 
the oilfields had scarcely been opened at that date". 4 
Of 12,576 "edonomically aotive " people in 1931, three quarters were 
engaged in "agrioulture, forestry and fishing" and 1,680 in "mining and 
manufaoturing", oompared with only 141 in publio servioe and 58 in the 
professions. 
5 
Following the development of the oil industry, however, the 
demography of Brunei underwent substantial ohangea, as will be seen in 
due OOurse. 
4. JL Noakes MBE, Sarawak and Bruneis A Report on the 1947 Population 
Census (Kuohing 1950)t p 10. (paragraph 65). 
5" CA Vlieland, A Report on the 1931 Census and on Certain Problems of 
Vital Statistios (Crown Agents, n. d. ), paragraph 363. 
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3" Background to the Oil Industry (1906-32) 
(a) Egplorati on 1906-29. Any oompany wishing to searoh for 
minerals in Brunei was required to obtain a short-term "prospeoting 
lioenoe" from the Government. Before beginning long-term extraotion 
of orude oil from the ground, a further "mining lease" was neoessary. 
Such lioenoes and leases were issued by the Resident, subject to the san- 
otion of the High Commissioner when the area exoeeded five square miles. 
In 1909 a mining lease, originally applied for in early 1907,6 
was granted to Mr CE Gadelius, a Danish general merohant based in Sing- 
aporep who sub-leased his rights to the Shanghai-Langkat Compan1y. 
7 
dis 
oonoern oonduoted desultory operations in the Jerudong district (about 
ten miles from the capital) until 1916. For a brief period (1915-17) 
they also aoquired a lioenoe in their own name in Ttitong distriot, where 
their efforts were equally unsuooeesful, To little looal regret, they 
withdrew from Brunei in 1917. 
Oil had been disoovered in the Baram distriot of Sarawak as 
early as 1895, but it was not until 1909 that the Rajah finally granted 
Permission to the Anglo-Saxon Petroleum Company (ASPC) -a subsidiary of 
the Shell Group - to exploit the field. This oompany immediately sought 
a oonoession in Brunei, but found the Government's terms unaooeptable. 
In 1911 the ASPC wished to lay a pipeline from their öliri field and 
through Brunei's territory to the deep water harbour at Brooketon, where 
they hoped to site an oil refinery. The Rajah appealed to the Colonial 
6" CO 531/1 (1331,2127 & 33147); 00 531/2 (30498); & CO 273/388 (41486). 
7" In fulls "Maatsohappij Mijn-Bosh-en Landbouwexploitatie in Langkat". 
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Offioe for sovereignty over Muara Damit to be transferred to Sarawak so 
that he might supervise the development of the refinery. 
8 
This was 
refused; but no objeotion was raised to the building of the refinery 
itself. The ASPC also applied for a licence in Brunei but continued to 
find the terms too onerous and again withdrew. 
In 1913 the . LSPC was granted a lioeaoe to prospeot is Tatong. 
'läey oontinued operations there until 1922, but not very energetioally 
because of the difficulties created by the First World War and the need 
to concentrate on the Miri field, which was already in production. 
Exploration in Belait commenced in March 1911, when a licence 
to prospeot for oil was granted to the British Borneo Petroleum Syndicate 
(BBP5)99 which also held exolusive oil prospeoting rights in North Borneo. 
This ooucern explored energetically in Brunei in 1912-13, but, failing to 
disoover oil, rapidly ran out of oapital. After this time it oeased to be 
a bona fide mining compatq and beoame a mere speoulator. Towards the end 
of 1913, therefore, the BBPS opened negotiations with the ASPC for the 
formation of a new company to search for oil. Whilst these talks were 
Proceeding the Rajah (in the name of his youngest son) advanced a claim 
to exolusive mineral rights in Brunei by virtue of (defunot) Concessions 
originally granted in. 1883 and 1890. This olaim was demonstrably spurious; 
bat two years passed before the Rajah would aooept the faot. 
10 On 11 
8. CO 531/7 (1868) Rajah to Anderson, 14 January 1914; Anderson to 
Rajah, 26 January 1914. 
9. The BBPS was registered on 4 May 1912. Beforehand, it was oalled 
the British Borneo and Burma Petroleum Syndioate. 
10. See above, PP 94-6. 
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November 1914 the ASPC withdrew from the proposed arrangement with the 
BBPS because of an unfavourable report by their geologist and because 
the BBI'S had failed to present a prospeoting licenoe and mining lease by 
their deadline. Me Brooke claim contributed to this delay. 
Lacking the oapaoity after 1914 to oarry out exploration or 
mining on their own account, the BBPS entered similar negotiations with 
a suooessioa of other companies, but again without success. First, the 
Nederlandsohe Koloniale Petroleum Maatschappij (NSPM), a subsidiary of 
Standard Oil of California; then, in 1918, with the D'Aroy Exploration 
Company for the formation of a new firm which would finance mining 
operations in Brunei. In 1919 the D'Aroy company oonduoted a preliminary 
geological survey but decided not to proceed further with the proposed 
arrangement with the BBPS. 'Ihe latter then sought capital from the 
Japanese Kuhara Company, but this also failed. Finally, renewed talks 
between the BBPS and the ASPC resulted (in 1922) in the creation of the 
British Malayan Petroleum Company with an initial capital of £100,000. 
Negotiations on the terms of the leases and lioenoes lasted from 1922 
to 1924. The BMPC also took over the ASPC's licence in Tateng. Vigorous 
mining operations were now inaugurated; oil was disoovered in oommeroial 
quantities in 1929, the first consignment being exported in 1932. 
(b) British Policy 1906-24. In pre-Residential Brunei a number 
Of speculators had been interested in the possibility of disoovering oill 
there. ll Taking advantage of the financial plight of Sultan Hashim, they 
ll. Aooording to )lr GC Harper the first well to be drilled in Brunei 
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hoped to gain valuable concessions very cheaply to resell later for 
substantial profits. The Foreign Office brought pressure to bear on the 
Sultan to prevent him granting such "improper" oonoessions (e. g. to Inohe 
Taha in 1904) in order to forestall the prejudioe of the future revenue 
of a possible Residenoy. Sultan Hashim denounced such interference as 
meaning, practically, the loss of Brunei's independence. 
12 
Heavy mineral oil was discovered in Brunei during March 1903 
at the Rajah's ooal mine at Buang Tawar on Berembang Island. What 
influence did this have upon the decision to appoint a Resident? It is 
true that when first reports were received Mr Stubbs had suggested that., 
if the oil proved a paying property, it would "help to solve the problem 
of how to provide funds for a decent administration of what is left of 
Brunei". 13 By the time Mr McArthur's "Report" was received, however, 
the optimistic: hopes of two years earlier had evaporated. The oil, 
which slowly oozed out just as it had done since first being struck by 
the accidental blow of a pick, could not be described as 
"a valuable. resouroe and I believe the Rajah and his officers consider 
it a matter for regret that its discovery should have interfered with 
the working of coal on Palau Berembang". 14 
The oil was still issuing gently as late as 1928,15 but it brought little 
with the specific purpose of producing oil was located at Ayer Bekunohi 
in 1899. The well was dry. (The Discovery and Development of the Soria 
Oilfield - Bandar Seri Begawan 1975 -P 1). 
12. FO 12/126 p 109, MSH McArthur to Secretary to High Commissioner, 
No 19,15 July 1904, paragraph 1. 
13. CO 144/77 (16635) minute by Mr RE Stubbs, 8 May 1903- 
14. F0 572/39 MSH Moirthur, "Report on Brunei in 1904", paragraph 89e 
15. CO 604/13 Sarawak Gazette, 1 October 1928, p 218. - 
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or no profit to the Rajah. An analysis of its commercial qualities in 
16 1912 produced disappointing results. 
After the introduction of a Resident in 1906 the British 
Government was anxious to encourage bona fide mining oompanies to invest 
in Brunei, in the hope that, if oil were to be foandg its exploitation 
would bring revenue to the administration and prosperity to the oountry. 
In 1906-7 it was suggested, further, that the presence of Europeans in 
the Sultanate would "tend to cheok Sir Charles Brooke*s intrigues", 
17 
The Brunei Mining Enaotment of 1908 sought to balanoe a number 
of interests. On the one hands provisions were made to ensure honest 
mining operations, by giving the Government the right of re-entry if it 
was dissatisfied with the rate of working, and by laying down other 
Conditions, such as maximum limits for the area and duration of mining 
leases.. On the other hand, a British character clause was included. 
This meant that 60% of the capital of any oompany involved in mining 
(as opposed to prospeoting) in Brunei should be held by British subjects, 
that a majority of directors shoulc1 be British, and that the oompany 
should be registered in British territory. Provision was made, also, 
for securing an adequate supply of oil for the Royal Navy and for the 
refining in Brunei or in British territory of all oil which might be won. 
18 
16. CO 531/4 (506) Mr H Chevallier to Secretary to High Commissioner, 
30 November 1912. (This oil, mixed with sand, was used in Labuan to 
form road surfaces suitable for light - bullock cart - traffio). Dato 
WH Doughty (1886-1971), interviewed by Professor DE Brown (late 1960s) 
- tape recording courtesy of Professor Brown. 
17. CO-531/1 (1331) minute by Stubbs, 10 January 1907. 
18. A copy of the 1908 Mining Enactment is not available. Its provisions 
may be gleaned from scattered souroesp such as CO 531/2 (39830)" 
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In practice such conditions were not always insisted upon. It 
proved impossible to demand oomplete oomplianoe with the British charaoter 
olause; oonsiderable lenienoy was shown towards the BBPS, which was 
incapable, after 1914, of prospeoting; the BMPC was permitted to refine 
its oil in Sarawak, which did not become British territory until 1946; 
and the terms conoerning the duration and area of a lease were evaded, 
when it beoame neoessary, by the simple expedient of passing a new 
enactment (1920)19 which allowed more favourable terms demanded by the 
capitalists with whom the Crown Agents had been in negotiation (in this 
Oase, the D'Aroy Exploration Company) to be oonoeded. 
Whitehall's attitude - it was Whitehall which controlled the 
negotiations 
20 
-- towards non-British petroleum oompanies wishing to 
operate in Brunei fluotuated.. The Shanghai-Langkat oompany, for example, 
was registered in Batavia, and British subjects held less than 60% of 
its oapital. No objection was raised, nevertheless, to the sub-lease 
of Mr Gadelius's rights to this oompany. It was thought that uM Gonern- 
meat's interests were proteoted by the Mining Eiaotment (1908) 
"and having regard to the pressing... need for attracting capital to 
Brunei... no attempt should be made to oppose the transfer of the 
concession to a company which is not of British nationality". 21 
Similarly, in 1911 Sir William Treaoher, chairman of the 'British Bor- 
neo'. Syndioates protested to Whitehall that a licence had been granted 
to the Shell Group (i. e. the iSPC), 70% of whose capital was in non- 
19. Co 852/140 (File 8). - 20. I am assured that this was true even in the 1950s (Mr ER Bevißgton 
CMG CIIig, letter to the author, 2 September 1983, paragraph 5)- 
21- CO 531/3 (22867) Admiralty to Colonial Offioe, 11 July 1911. 
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British hands. 
22 
Mr Stubbs shared Sir William's views concerning the 
"objeoti onability" of foreigners, but added: 
"Brunei was not quite like other plaoess its main need was capital and 
for my part I didn't mind where the capital came from so long as it 
came". 23 
It transpired that Sir William himself had been in undisolosed negotiat- 
ion with the Shell Group for the transfer of the 'British Borneo' 
ßyndioate's leases. 
In the period 1911-13 the Brunei Resident believed that the 
British Borneo syndioate was adopting energetio measures and inourring 
heavy expenditure in the search for oil whereas the alleged objective 
of the ABPC was 
"(a) to exclude all other prospeotors from Brunei if possible until 
(b) the oompany had fully exploited, and tested its Miri oilfield in a 
somth-westerly direotion... and (o) until the situation is olear whether 
the BBPS strikes a paying field in Belait and/or the Shanghai-Langkat 
win oil at Jerudong - when the ASPC will deoide whether its pipeline 
shall run to Kednrong in Sarawak or )Iuara Island in Brmnei... I need not 
point out again the vital importanoe to Brunei of expeditiously 
obtaining... a paying field. Brunei has no other hope of revenue. The 
ASPC have no desire to exploit Bruneis delay is their objeot". 24 
The Colonial Offioe had adopted preoisely the opposite view. 
In September 1911 Mr Collins found the representative of the ASPC 
"businesslike and very reasonable" and thought that 
"it would be a more paying thing for Brunei to put the whole of their 
oil industry... into the hands of a substantial oompanyt like the ASPC, 
which intends to run the industry and is not merely hunting a concession". 25 
Whatever may have been the case before 19114, it is clear that 
22. CO 531/3 (10403) Treacher to Stubbs, 30 Maroh 1911. 
23. Ibid., -minnte by Stubbsy-3 May 1911. 24. Co 531/5 (311 13'14) memorandum by Lee-Warner, 10 November 1913. 
25. CO 531/3 (28853) minute by Collins, 9 September 1911. 
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thereafter the BBPS lacked capital resouroes to prospeot for oil and 
became a mere speculator. Ironically, the Colonial office now switched 
its backing to this syndicate (because it was British), whereas successive 
High Commissioners and Residents, who had previously viewed it favourably, 
were anxious to exolude it from Brunei so that they oould deal with people 
who would develop any oilfield whioh might exist, time providing the 
Country with a revenue, and, hence, a better administration. 
In 1914 and again in 1916 neither the Admiralty nor the Colon- 
ial Offioe objeoted to the BBPS ooming to terms with the predominantly 
Datoh ASPC orp subsequently, the NKPM, so long as the British oharaoter 
olause was retained in any new oompany whioh was to be set ups i. e. that 
the oompany should be nominally British. Thereafter HM Government adopted 
a harder line, as recounted by Mr GEA Brindle: 
"Before the war - and early in the war - both we (CO) and the Admiralty 
were disposed to allow foreign capital in a British oil company in a 
proteotorate... Sinoe the war, and especially sinne the development of 
the policy of oontrolling shipping by withholding bunker ooal, the 
Admiralty's views on the subject have altered. They are now, we gather, 
going to insist on strict British control of all oil companies (i. e. 
mining companies)... 
Before the war we were inolined to allow them (the BBPS) to 
get their capital from the Standard Oil when the Shell people broke 
with them. If the Admiralty policy is to be adopted and carried out 
strictly, the Syndicate will have to raise at least 51% of their 
capital from British subjects". 26 
In 1916 the NKPM was endeavouring to secure a relaxation of the 
British charaoter olause. The Admiralty, however, would have regarded 
it as unfortunate 
"ifs at a time when British enterprise is muoh pre-oooupied in other dir- 
eotions, oil-bearing territory under British influenoe were permanently 
26- CO 531/8 (53506) minute by Mr G Grindley 3 Marsh 1916. 
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planed under control whioh, though perhaps nominally British, would be 
actually foreign and boated in foreign territory... My Lords see no 
reason why the exploitation of oil lands within the Empire should not 
be retained in British hands". 27 
Mr (brindle was not oonvinoed that enough British oapital would 
be forthoomingp "but we are bound to try"e28 Henoe the BBPS (and the 
Shanghai-Langkat, which wag also applying for a lease at this time) were 
informed that they must comply with the British character clause. Shortly 
afterwards the NKPM withdrew from its. arrangement with the BBPS. With 
regard to the Shanghai-Langkat"s application, Mr Grindle oommenteds 
"The question of registration in Batavia is more important than the 
proportion of British oapital as it gives the company a foreign nation- 
alitg with the right to diplomatic, intervention when we treat it in a 
high -handed manner". 29 
He reoommendedv, therefore, that the Shanghai-Langkat should be ruled out 
as not oomplying at all with the model and that, if they wanted a mining 
lease., they would have to forma new oompan. 
The BBPS9 having failed to oome to terms, first with the ASPC 
and then'-the NKPH, next (1917) requested relief until one year after the 
oonolusi on of the war. M( Government agreed to waive minimum royalty 
and to rednoe rent per aore from fifty oents to ten. The CO was well 
aware that the syudioate did not have the oapaoity to do any work; but 
the Admiralty favoured "marking time" in oil development in the hope 
that British oapital would be forthooming after the war, 
30 
27, CO 531/10 (29448) Admiralty to 00,22 June 1916. 
28. As note 26. 
29" CO 531/8 (53506) minute by Grindley 1 Deoember 1915- 
30. CO 531/11 (9748) minute by Grindle, 6 Haroh 1917. It would be "an 
advantage". he addedq "to have a syndioate whose British sympathies are 
above suspioion in possession of this area". 
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Meanwhile Sir Arthur Young, the High Commissioner in Singapore, 
was urging that the BBPS should be obliged either to prospeot or to give 
up their 1ioeaoes so that arrangements oould be made with a oompany that 
would. The Colonial Office resisted this pressure because the BBPS had 
settled terms with the D"Aroy Compaay, which conducted a oursory geological 
survey, before deoiding that the results were not euffioiently enoouraging 
to warrant further interest in Brunei. The BBPS then turned to the 
Japanese Kuhara Company for oapital. 
31 
HAI Government-raise no objeotion 
to Japanese prospecting in Brunei but insisted that any newly-oreated 
mining oompany would have to oomply with the British oharaoter olause. 
The Admiralty's attitude was coloured by the belief thatp hitherto., the 
unsuooessfnl searoh for oil indioated that there was not a oommeroial 
field in Brunei and thatp if the Japanese were "prepared to sink capital 
in farther exploration of thin apparently unpromising areas the benefit 
of any such development would partly aoorae to EM Government". 
32 For 
this reason, the extension of Japanese aotivities in this region was 
Permitted. The -Kuhara company quickly lost interest, however,, whereupon 
the BBPS resumed talks with the ASPC, reaching agreement in April 1922. 
How far did HK Government's backing of the BBPS delay the di e- 
oovery of oil in Brunei? On 20 Januarar 1917 Sir Arthur Toaxig invited 
attention to the faut that the capital of the BBPS amounted to a mere 
31. CO 531/15 ('33761) minute by Grindley 14 July 1922. Mr Grindle 
addeds "It is true that the Petroleum Department (of the Board of Trade) 
are agitating for a withdrawal of the British oharaoter restrictions, 
but I take it even they would draw the line at the Kuhara Company". 
32. CO 531/16 (475) Admiralty to Cap 3 January 1922, paragraph 2. 
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£9,446. With these "limited resources", he pointed out, 
"this syndioate is not in a position to develop any oonoession, and must, 
by foroe of oiroamstanoes, oonfine its aotivities to sub-leasing or 
otherwise disposing of its-oonoessions". 33 
In the following Maroh, Sir Arthur added that the syndioate had failed 
to oomply even with the relief terms offered in 1917. Despite this, he 
noted, the syndioate had, expeoted in 1914 to reoeive shares worth £{00,000 
in a new oompaxyr whioh, it was proposed to set up with the ASPC for the 
exploitation of oil in Brauei. In shorty Sir Arthur had been "reluotantly 
foroed to the. oonolusion that this syndioate is not a bona fide mining 
oompany. but merely a pauper with a valuable property for sale". The 
syndioate. possessed a property whioh it oould not persuade others to work 
and whioh it was inoapable of working itself. Henoe the BBPS was really 
a detriment to: the interests of Brunei, for, if it could be ousted, the 
Brunei Government would be in a position to deal direotly with oapital- 
ists. Sir Artbar reocmmended that, if the oompany now failed to pay its 
arrears of rent, "its application for a (new) prospecting licence should 
... be definitely and finally refneed", 
34 
No suoh aotion was taken by the Colonial Offioe beoause, unknown 
to the High Commissioner, the BBPS was near to oompleting an arrangement 
with the D'Aroy Syncttoate. The latter applied, also, for a prospeoting 
ltoenoe oovering all Brunei, with the exoeption of those areas already 
granted to the BBPS in Belait and to the ASPO in Tatong. 
On 14 Deoember 1920 a new High Commissioner, Sir Laurenoe 
33. CO 531/11 (44997) Young to CO, Brunei (oonfidential), 20 July 1917, 
Paragraph 1. 
34. CO 531/12 (25302) Young to CO, Brunei (oonfidential. )p 28 March 1918, 
Paragraph 39. 
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Guillemard, oonsidered the situation to be most unsatisfaotory beoause 
the BBP3/D"Arof people were not attempting to work, were paying the 
Government nothing, and were blooking applioations from other oompanies. 
Whitehall was unwilling to foroe out the BBPS in the hope that Brunei's 
oil ooald be developed by a British ooaoern. Firatp the ayadioate 
itself was backed by some influential people and ooanpaniee. 
35 Secondly, 
before the Great War, it had done honest work and expended a large 
ainaoaat of capital (&40,000). The Colonial Office felt strongly that the 
aradioate deserved a ohanoe to get some return on this-investment, 
36 
Further,, in 1917, it was felt that the BBPS had been so open in its 
dealings with the Colonial Office that "it would almost be sharp praotioe 
+. o inaiet on onr rights" (i. e. of re-entry, wader the terms of mining 
legislatioal on the grounds of the oompau "e failure to oompl7 with the 
oontinuous working olause). At that time the Colonial Offioe waived 
this right and let the BBPS stay on if they paid rent until one year 
after the war. When agreement was reaohecl between the BBPS and ASPC 
in 1922 Mr Brindle reooamnended that 
"whatever the striot legal position may be we are bound to let this agree- 
ment go through as a matter of equity and all round fair dealing. And 
it is distinotly to the publio advantage that the State of Brunei should 
have the Shell to deal with instead of the syndioate. Brunei badly wants 
oil revenue, but will never get any ezoept from some powerful oorporation, 
35. Direotors inoluded Sir William Treaoher (Chairman until 1916); Sir 
John Anderson (1852-1924)of the Guthrie Company (not to be oonfused with 
the eponymous Governor of the Straits Settlements, 1904-11); the Hon A 
Stafford Northoote; and Mr W Keswiok MP. Corporate investors inoluded 
Guthrie and Company, Erlioh and Company, and Rioardo and Posten. 
36. CO 531/16 (19390) minute by Sir G Grindley 6 May 1922. 
266 
such as the Shell", 
37 
When oonsidering the delay caused by the BB'FS., the situation 
within Brunei itself must be borne in mind. First, the ports of Belait 
and Tatong were closed for several moathe each year because of the mon- 
soon. Secondly, the effeot of the Great War must not be under-estimated. 
In 1920 the Petroleum Department noted that, despite seven years' working, 
the LSPC appeared to have achieved little in T. itong. Sir Laurence 
Gillemard oonsideredl however, that the oompaay had done reasonable 
work "in view of the paramount necessity for oonoentrating on production 
at Mira during the liar"038 Henoe even the ASPC may not have been able to 
expedite matters in Belajt. Thirdly, extremely heavy expenditure had to 
be incurred before even prospecting could begins the Belait district was 
inaooessible, rendering extremely diffioult the transport of staff and 
equipment; olimatio oonditions were adverse; the distriot was entirely 
unexplored and oonsequently no adequate maps were in existenoe; the BBPS 
therefore had to oarry out a large amount of topograpbioal surveying 
work in oonjunoti on with geologioal examination "which was thereby very 
materially retarded". 
39 
It seemsp moreover, that both the NKPM and the 
D'Aroy withdrew from their agreements with the BBP8 primarily beoause 
they had oonoluded that there was not a oommeroial oilfield in Brunei. 
With regard to the ASPCq it had been suggested before the war that 
37. Ibid. 
38. CO 531/14 (52522) Ouillemard to CO, No 8 (Brunei), 25 September 
1920, paragraph 2. 
39. CO 531/5 (12777) BBFs to CO, 16 April 1913, paragraph 5" 
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"procrastination" was their aims it may be that, even if they had been 
in possession of the BBPS's rights in 1914-22, espeoiall7 in view of 
unavoidable delays paused by warp matters would not have advanced 
quioker. 
40 
Efforts were not helped by the constant delays oaused by 
correspondence passing between Brunei, Singapore and London. The terms 
of the 150 square miles lioenoe and mining lease first applied for by 
the BBPS in late 1913 were not Finally settled until 1924. 
Did EM Government secure the best terms for the Government and 
people of Brunei? The Colonial Offioe faoed a dilemmas on the one hand, 
they wanted maximum revenue for the Brunei Government; on the other, they 
did not wish to impose oonditions so prohibitive as to disoourage 
potential investors. Capitalists# by presenting a 'take it or leave it" 
attitude, tended to have the upper hand. Time and again the Colonial 
Offioe was obliged to make oonoessions demanded by one oompany or another. 
There were two outside influences. First, the extremely favourable terms 
granted by the Rajah to the ASPC for the Miri field, whioh meant that 
Shell would tend -to oonoentrate on Sarawak if oomparatively unfavourable 
40. In 1914, on the other hand, Mr Douglas (the Resident ' in Brunei) 
believed that the ASPC were almost certain that there was an oilfield in 
Belait beoause of the similarity of the geological formation with that 
of Miri distriot. The Resident reported that "good heavy oil may be 
oonsidered proved. It would certainly have been proved earlier if the 
oompany had not been endeavouring to obtain better terms from the 
Colonial offioe". (co 531/6: 2344, Quarterly Report by FW Douglas, 3 
Deoember 1914). Three weeks after the ASPC., withdrew, indeed, a show of 
oil was disoovered by the BBPS at Labi in November 1914s but not in 
commercial quantities. 
It appears that the ASPC pulled out in 1914 in the belief that 
the BBPS had nowhere else to turn for oapital. This might have been a 
oostly mistake for Shell, had not their rivals deemed Brunei unworthy 
of further investment after preliminary investigation. 
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terms were demanded by the Brunei Government; this, indeed, oontributed 
to the ASPC's decision to withdraw from its proposed arrangement with 
the BBPS in 19 4. Seoondly, companies made comparisons between terms 
offered in other parts of the Commonwealth, e. g. Trinidad and Burma, and 
those being asked for b7 Bruneis this, too, sometimes led to oonoessions 
having to be made bar the Colonial Offioe. 
In 1924 the BMPC won terms of royalty of 2/- a ton of oil 
(with the Government retaining the option of taking 10 in kind). 
41 
In 
1923 the Petroleum Department pointed out to the Colonial Offioe that 
two shillings had oome to be regarded as an inadequate rate. The 
Trinidad Government, for example, was attempting to devise a means of 
seouring from the oil industry, a larger oontribution to revenue. Mr 
Gentf at the Colonial Office, however, took the view that negotiations 
with the BMPC were so far advanoed that no alteration oould be made. Mr 
Beckett 
. greeds "Besides, Malaya is a gamble and we shall 
be lucky to 
get anything"., 
By this time disappointment with regard to Brunei had beoome 
so routine that a frame of mind had arisen in the Colonial Office whioh 
did not expeot-a oommeroial oilfield to be found in Brunei. This oontrib- 
sited to a willingness -to grant generoas oonoessionary terms. It was only 
after the existence of oil had been proved and began to be exported in 
41. Cf. 1913 when the rate in Burma was four shillings per ton. At that 
time, indeed, the Colonial Office was considering a reduction of the 
royalty to only 116 per ton on any production above 100,000 tons annually. 
But this idea was dropped. 
42. CO 531/17 (10477) minute by Mr GLI Gent (1895-1948), 6 March 1923, 
with marginal comment by Mr H Beckett (1891-1952). The Colonial 
Office, loosely, regarded Brunei as part of 'Malaya'; of. p 119 (above). 
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large quantities that dissatisfaotion arose. Nevertheless the 10% opt- 
ion in kind (at six months' notice) was retained, the oil to be delivered 
at any plaoe in the territory nominated. . 
by, the Government. 
To sum ups the British policy was to enoourage bona fide mining 
operations in Brunei, on the one hand, and to keep the oilfields in the 
oontrol of a British oompanyt on the other. During the years 1913-22 
these two aims were mutually exolusive. The British-owned BBPS had 
insufficient oapital; whereas the Shell Group had adequate oapital but 
was owned largely by foreigners. This dichotomy was not resolved until 
1922, when a new Shell subsidiary, the BMPC, was formed to take over 
the rights of the ASPC and the BBPS in Brunei. Shell agreed, further, 
to pay the BBPS one shilling for every ton of oil prodnoed at Seria. 
Given the diffioulties oreated by the Great War and the lack of infra- 
struoture in Brunei, the disoovery of the oilfield was probably not muoh 
delayed by the BBPS's inability to prospeot after 1913. The looal 
authorities were anxious to exolude the BBPS; but the Colonial Offioe 
noted that the oompany had spent muoh money with no return in 1911-13, 
and felt that the syndicate deserved a chance to get some return on this 
investment "if only to enoourage other people to spend their money on oil 
prospeoting". 
43 
With=regard to the terms offered to the oompanies, they 
were reasonable, given the apparently unpromising nature of Brunei. 
(o) The Operations of the B! IPO. In late 1922 the ASPC's 
Prospecting licence in Tatong was renewed under the name of the British 
Malayan Petroleum Company. On 28 July 1923 agreement was reaohed whereby 
43. CO 531/16 (19390) minute by Grindle, 6 May 1922. 
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the BMPC took over the interests of the BBPS in Belait district. Oper- 
ations were commenced on such a scale - not just drilling, but also the 
oonstruotion of inf`rastruoture (r oadsp a railway, bungalows, wharves and 
offioes) - that the BXPC must have been in little doubt that there was 
oil to be found in Belait. In Ztitong, by contrast, the company did very 
little work. In 1924 European staff (in Belait) was izicreaseds twelve 
geologists alone were employed. Towards the end of 1927, favourable 
indioations of oil were disoovered along the seashore between the Belait 
and Ti tong Rivers: 
"It is early to prophesy" - thus )r Pretty in 1927 - "but high hopes are 
entertained that one day there will be a big oilfield here". 44 
lm , April 1929 oil was struck about ten miles north-west of Kuala Belait 
olose to the Seria River, and the well was produoingg though with a 
somewhat reduoed flow, by the end of the year. It was not until the 
middle of 1930, however, that it became clear that a commercial oilfield 
had been found at Soria, But for oontemporary world over-produotiony 
export of petroleum might have begun that year. Nevertheless the oompaay 
prooeeded with a "thorough investigation" of the extent of the field and 
it was "very gratifying" to the Government 
"that, at a time when the oil industry throughout the world is restrioting 
its production, the steady development of the Brunei field is being 
proceeded with". 45 
A pipeline was oonstruoted from Seria to the oil refinery 
aoross the border at Lu: tong in Sarawak and oil prodaotiom for export 
oommenaed in the first quarter of 1932. 
44, CO 824 1 Brunei Annual Report 1927, p 7- 
45- CO 824/2 Brunei Annual Report 1930, p9" 
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B7 1935 Brunei had beoome the third largest prodnoer of oil 
in the British Commonwealth, its annual produotion of 90 million 
gallons being exoeeded only by Trinidad (335 million) and Burma (249 
million). It was, moreover, a very high quality petrol 
"and the whole of the aviation spirit used overseas by the Royal Air 
Force and the bulk of the spirit they use in the United Kingdom is 
drawn from Brunei. With the expansion of the Royal Air Force we may 
reckon on the maintenance of the output from Brunei". 46 
Within three more years., when 111 wells had been oompleted or were in 
the oourse of drilling in the Seria field., the STC had beoome the 
largest single oil produoer in the Colonial Empires 
47 
3. Economic and Social Polion in the 1930s 
(a) The Finanoial Position in 1932" The Straits Times saggested 
in 1934 that "few parts of the world suffered as little ae... Bruuei during 
the slump". 
48 
As far as the Government was oonoerned, this may, well have 
been true. Certain projeots, suoh as the establishment of a Forestry 
Department, had to be deferred, whilst medioal and educational programmes 
were slowed down. But, by dint of strict control of expenditure and 
inoreases in oertain taxes (suoh as higher import dutieso from 1929,012 
tobaooo, petroleum and matches)$ expenditure remained within bounds. Al- 
though the Depression delayed growth, it had not resulted in retrenchment. 
The financial position of the Government had not altered 
46. CO 717/110 (File 51535) minute by Gent, 19 Nlaroh 1935. "So long 
as the wells last"9 added Mr BR Cowell (1877-1967). 
47. CO 824/2 Brunei Annual Report 1938, p 16. Net oil produotion 
amounted to 6959904 long tons, plus 3,195m oubio feet of gas. 
48. Co 604/19 Sarawak Gazette,, 2 July 1934, P 75 (quoting the Straits 
Times). 
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signifioantly for the worse. At the end of 1928 the Brunei Publio Debt 
stood at x$413,000 (or the equivalent of substantially more than one year's 
total revenue). Exoluding this debt from the aooount, Brunei had surplus 
assets of x$242,000 including an ORRF of 
%45,791" By September 1932 the 
surplus assets had decreased, but only to %191,334 (beoause of an 
appropriation in 1930, of %50,000 to pay for the construction of a 
wharf in the oapital), while the ORRF had almost doubled and the National 
Debt had been reduced by a further %24,000. 
The table (below) shows thatp despite the slump in exports, 
Brunei's revenue was little affeoted during the Depression - it was 
aotually higher in 1932 than it had been in 1929 - thanks to the duties 
imposed on the vast amount of machinery and other manufactures brought in 
by the oil oompany. 
e 17. The Financial Position of Brunei 
Year Inoome Expenditure Trades- 
Imports Exports Total 
1929 345,290 344x092 1,484,293 1,251,335 2,735,628 
1930 333,069 373,604* 2#536,422 807,449 3,343,871 
1931 342,011 322,791 2,193,511 501,494 2,695,005 
1932 362,403 334.328 2,430,247 1,505,738 3,935,985 
Notes * inoludes %50,000 for the Brunei Town wharf. 
Somroet 
, 
Brunei Annual Reports. 
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(b) The 1935 Polios. In late 1932 the General Manager of the 
BNPC assured the Resident, Mr TF Carey, that oil royalties of not less 
than %200,000 could be anticipated during the coming year. Mr Carey 
expected a revenue surplus of about $5090009 with which he proposed to 
launch a Reserve Fund. It was hoped that this would ultimately reach 
the amount of a normal year's revenue. 
49 
"Zt is good to see" - thus Mr NE Costar at the Colonial Office - "that 
they are not going to spend up to the hilt during their years of 
prosperity and that they are oreating a reserve fund. .. Experience of 
the slump in all the territories has shown the advisability of forming 
suoh a reserve fund to be drawn upon during times of eoonomio stress, 
and, in the oase of a wasting asset like oil, this is all the more 
desirable". 50 
Despite burgeoning oil revenues a oautious finanoial policy 
was adopted beoause of the unoertainty of future inooare from oil. The 
"apparently, prosperous finanoial oondition of the State", the new Res- 
ident, Mr RE Turnbull, commented at the beginning of 1935 
"is somewhat falsified by the unoertainty attaohing to the future of 
oil revenues, but it is probable that the revenue from this source is 
approaohing its maximum and will remain oomparatively stabilized over 
a period of years". 51 
Later in 1935 an estimate of the oil resouroes of the State 
was attempted and on the basis of these findings a financial and social 
policy for Brunei was prepared. 
The BaIPC oonsidered that "a reasonably oonservative estimate" 
Of the total royalties payable on oil and gas after 1 July 1935 was 
£400,000 (%3.4 million) - equivalent to a produotion of four million tons 
49. CO 717/95 (File 13324) memorandum by Carey, 10 Ootober 1932. 
50. CO 717/102 (File 33313) minute by Mr (later Sir) NE Costar (b 1909), 
5 )Iaroh 1934- 
51- CO 717/110 (File 51535) memo' by Turnbull, 22 January 1935, para' 4. 
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of oil. 
52 
This estimate oovered only the proven reserves. The Resident 
oonsideredg therefore, that $5 million was not an unduly optimistio 
oaloulation. 
53 
The General Manager of the WPC desoribed his own figure 
as "an intelligent gaess" and supposed that a life of at least thirty 
years oould be expeoted for the oilfield. After these reserves were 
exhausted, the country would revert to its former poverty. Meanwhile, 
oil royalties of aboat $2009000 annually might be expeoted. 
54 
It. was deoided to redeem the P'IS loan as quiokly as possible. 
Sinne 1920 a fixed sam of %20,000 had been set aside annually for repay- 
meat of interest (charged at 4) and principal. This rate of interest 
was higher than current rates on Brunei's investments, so arrangements 
were made to wipe out the debt before the end of the following year (1936). 
In 1935 Sir Shenton Thomas, the High Commissioner, visited the 
Sultanate in order to disouss a future finanoial policy with the Resident, 
Mr RE Turnbull. He was warned by the latter that, at the present rate of 
working, known reserves of oil would be exhausted within ten years (i. e. 
bp 1945)" Mr Turnbull, making allowances for probable new disooveries, 
proposed, therefore, to base the States finanoial polioy on the 
estimated position fifteen years henoe (1950), whioh was considered 
likely to be the crucial time with regard to the oil industry: 
"A too conservative policy", he argued, "will oramp development; moreover, 
wise spending now will increase our revenues apart from oil royalties and 
enable us better to face the bugbear of increasing annually recurrent 
expenditure"* 55 
52. Ibid.., Sir T5W Thomas to CO, UMS (Brunei) No 88,10 September 1935, 
Paragraphs 3-4. 
53. Ibid., memorandum by RE Turnbull, 4 June 1935, paragraph 2. 
54.. Ibid., Thomas to C0,10 September 1935, paragraph 4. 
55" Ibid., memorandum by Turnbull, 4 June 1935, paragraph 4" 
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'Annually recurrent' expenditure meant that whioh was "striotly 
unavoidable". It would be inadvisable, he cautioned, 
"to adopt in Brunei the comparative distribution of expenditure between 
the several departments which obtains in similar states possessing 
more stable revenue. It will be neoessary... to pay more attention to 
revenue-producing departments, and less to financially unremunerative 
public services# such as medical and health services and education". 56 
The State was already, spending 9% of its budget on health oars, 
most of which was annually reourrent. There was an adequate hospital 
its the oapital and another "built on very ambitious lines" by the oil 
Company is Kuala Belait; in addition there were smaller 'hospitals' in 
Tatong and Tembarong, wbioh were "often vaoant and never full". The 
dispensary servioes were "by no means (? used) to the limit of their 
potentialities". It was "difficult to encourage the use of the new 
nmedioal servioes; onoe established and aooeptedy howeverp their with- 
drawal would be disastrcis". But any further inoreases in medioal 
expenditure ought to be approaohed with ""the greatest oaution". 
A long term forestry policy was in the course of consideration 
by the new Direotor of that department, The Agrioultural Department, 
which it was hoped woald ultimately be revenue-produoingt demanded special 
attention. Its activities, it was feared, would necessarily be limited 
by the pauoity (in numbers) of the State's agrioaltural population. 
Sir Shenton Thomas, when endorsing this polioy, oommenteds 
"It is diffioult at present to Torsee future souroes of revenue. 
Brunei is remote, has a small agrioultural population, and no harbour 
where a ship of any size oan enter. Anything that the State oan pro- 
duos (exoept oil) is already produoed just as oheaply and in greater 
56 " Ybi d. , paragraph 8* 
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quantities in )Malaya and other Far East countries. 
It seems to mep therefore, that for the next few years at any 
rate, the policy should bet- 
(a) to stimulate the cultivation of food supplies and other 
agricultural products...; 
(b) to demarcate forest reserves and to examine the timber 
resources of the country in case they may prove commercially exploitable; 
(o) to build up a substantial reserve by annual contributions 
from revenue so that the ordinary activities of Government shall not be 
too severely hampered if the oilfield is worked out in 30-35 years' time; 
(d) to provide no more in the way of recurrent expenditure than 
is reasonably necessary to meet the needs of the people". 57 
Mr Gent at the Colonial Office felt that the High Commissioner's 
views were "of all the greater value as a result of his personal knowledge 
of the ooantry". The four points (outlined above) were satisfaotory bitt 
they did not "toaoh upon, many servioee whioh must to some extent be 
admitted to benefit from an expanding revenue"958 
When the Estimates for 1936 were submitted a few months later, 
Mr 0 Rankin -a junior olerk at the Colonial Office - felt that greater 
resouroes ought to be devoted to sooial servioes. 
59 This view would 
appear to have eohoed that of )! r Gent, just quoted; but the latter now 
argued that 
"... the chief risk to the Brunei administration is the risk of interruption 
of the oil royalty and for that reason it will be a sounder state of things 
when there is a general reserve fund of a substantial character which the 
(Government can fall back on in case of emergency to ease the (? change) 
from its present affluence to its old time poverty". 60 
(o) The 1938 Polioy. It soon beoame olear that the basis of the 
approved 1935 polioy - future oil prodnoti on and the size of reserves - 
57. Ibid., Thomas to Co. 10 September 1935, paragraph 7- 
589 Ibid., minute by Gent, 16 Ootober 1935- 
59. CO 717/117 (File 51535) minute by Mr G Ranking 13 March 1936. For 
the actual expenditure, see p 184 (above) and pp 297 and 448 (below). 
60. Ibid., minute by Gent, 16 March 1936. 
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had been seriously under-estimated, $r 1937 Mr Gent felt that there 
was no need for the existing policy to be "regarded as a Bible for an 
indefinite period in the future". Nor was there "any partioular merit 
in piling up surplus balances now that the public debt has been paid 
off". Henoe he suggested that the High Commissioner 
"be asked to review, in the light of the new information available, 
particularly in the matter of the State's oil resources, the financial 
and developmental policy explained in... 1935, with a view to ensuring 
progress is made with such development projects as will inorease the 
(? oapital) resources of the State and improve the condition of the 
people; and such projects of this character as will themselves promise a 
yield to revenue in future years should be particularly considered". 61 
In reply the High Commissioner sabmitted a new policy, prepared 
by the British Resident (Mr JO Black at the beginning of 1938, whioh 
aimed 
'"to limit recurrent expenditure to a figure not greater than the revenue 
which is derived from all sources other than oil, to use as much of the 
oil revenue as may be required on works of development and, after seeing 
that the working balances are adequate, to place any unspent balance of 
oil revenue each year to a reserve fund which will be kept intact against 
the day when the oil resources have been exhausted. The interest from 
the reserve fund would go to revenue. The fund will be instituted by 
transferring to it all the present invested reserves., amounting approx- 
imately to %704,428. The case for an oil reserve fund (Sir Shenton 
continued) is even stronger than the case for an opium revenue reserve 
fund; for the money now used to buy opium may be expected to yield a 
revenue return by being spent on other taxed artioles, whereas when the 
oil is exhausted there will be no money... The amount to be added each 
year will depend on the developmental programme which will be the matter 
of first importance". 62 
The Colonial Offioe aooepted the proposal to establish an oil 
Rind "as a broad aim of financial polioyp though not one which could or 
61. CO 717/123 (File 51535)-minute by cent, 6 Maroh 1937. 
62. CO-717/129 (File 51535) Thomas to CO, ups (Brunei) No 27,30 April 
19389 paragraph 3. 
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should be too rigidly applied". The proposal was approved, therefore, 
on the understanding that this reserve would be earmarked as a "General 
Reserve Fand whioh it is desirable to maintain against the shrinkage of 
revenue from oil and other souroes, which might be expeoted to follow 
the working out of the State's oilfield". 
63 
Mr Blaok had prepared a oomprehensive polioy64 for agrioulturev 
forestryy health, eduoationg oommunioationsp surveys and harbours. He 
took it 
"as axiomatio that agrioulture should be enooaraged to develop side by 
side and oonoomitantly with the exploitation of the oil resouroes of the 
State and that the interests of the one should not be permitted to obtrude 
unduly to the disadvantage of the latter". 
The Tempany Plan (to expand wet rice cultivation) of 1932 would be oon- 
tinned. An important role in the development of agriculture would be 
Played by road construction because experienoe had shown that laud 
occupation and permanent cultivation followed oloeely on any extension 
or improvement of the road system. The Colonial Offioe's adviser agreed 
that the emphasis upon rioe was oorreots 
"First oonsideration should always be given to food supplies... and when 
adequate provision has been made... attention should be given to the 
possibility of the development of eoonomio Drops for export". 65 
Mr Blaolc suggested measures to nurture a looal timber industry and to 
improve the jelutong output and he outlined plans, to be oonsidered in 
a moment, for the extension of medicine and education. 
Mr NJS Andrews, in Whitehall, got the impression in 1939 
63. Ib1 d,, CO to High Commissioner, No 41 (UMS), 19 July 1938, para. 2. 
64. Ibid., memorandum by Mr J(G Biaok, 31 January 1938. 
65" Ibid., minute by Sir Frank Stookdale (b 1883), 16 June 1938. 
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"that Brunei might well spend a bit more; the financial policy it has set 
itself is very oonservative and it has a long way to Co. Nevertheless 
'progress' made in too much of a hurry is far worse than none at all". 66 
Sir Shenton Thomas, although unaware (presumably) of this opinion in the 
Colonial Offioep provided his answer to the oharge in 19401 
"It may be suggested that the pace of development in Brunei could be 
very considerably accelerated by spending more of the revenue accruing 
from the production of oil. In my opinion that would be a mistake. 
Faster development cannot take place without the importation of a large 
alien population. It is better policy by the gradual expansion of the 
social servioes, education and infant welfare and by agricultural 
assistance to build up a health' and progressive indigenous population,, 
administered and offioered by men of their own race. Development on 
these lines may be slower,, but in the long run it will produce a more 
homogenous and happier State". 67 
London "entirely oonoarred" in this analysis. 
68 
4. Results 
Instead of spending all the new oil revenue at onoey the 
administration preferred to build up a reserve fund in preparation for 
the day when oil revenue oeased. Rapid development was seen as un- 
desirable because it oould not have been achieved without importing "a 
large alien population" which might disrupt the homogeneity of the State. 
In this final seotioa, I shall review the developments whioh aotually 
took place in the 1930a. 
Finanoe. During the years 1932-40 annual State revenue 
increased from $0.36 million to %1.56 million, i. e. it more than quad- 
rupled. Over the same period annual exports rose from $1.5 million 
66. CO 717/136 (File 51535) minute by Andrews (b 1902), 8 July 1939. 
67. CO 717/141 (File 51535) Thomas to CO, UMS (Brunei) No 199 13 April 
1940v paragraph 6. 
68. Ibid., CO to Thomas, UMS (Brunei) No 29p 30 May 1940, paragraph 2. 
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to ; 9.6 million (see Tables, overleaf). The National Debt was paid off; 
and, in its plaoeg Brunei built up a General Reserve Fund standing at 
$1.5 million at the end of 1940. At the latter date there was also an 
opium reserve fund of more than x$0.2 million. The country possessed 
surplus assets of 00.825-million. Asked to explain why income tax had 
not been introduoed in the 1930s, Mr JG Blank oommentes 
"I never for a moment considered this possibility... It would have been 
quite impraotioable. At that time there was no income tax in the 
Straits Settlements or the FMS". 69 
The Publio Works Department oontinued to be the highest spending 
publio authority in the 1930s. By 1938 217 buildings with a current 
value of 482,300 had been oonstruoted. 
70 
Approximately half had been 
built since 1932. They included seven police stations, two gaols, six 
post offioes, twenty one Malay schools (seventeen built since 1928), 
living quarters for,, Government employees, a hospital (1929) a telephone 
exchange,, and a number of oust ans houses, court buildings and abattoirs. 
From 1933 construction was made in brick in order to reduce maintenance 
costs. At the end of 1941,273 buildings were maintained and owned by 
the State to the value of %628,422.71 
By 1938 more than one hundred miles of (mainly earth) road, 
of whioh almost one-third was maintained by the BMPCI, had been built 
in Brunei. Road oonstruotioa there was not easy beoauae of swampy ter- 
rain, heavy rainfall and flooding, the great difficulty of transporting 
69. Nr JG Blaokp letter to the author, 25 February 1985, paragraph 1. 
70. CO 824/2 Brunei Annual Report 1938. p 38. 
71. Brunei Annual Report 19469 P 41. 
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Table 18. Exports of Oil from Brunei 1932-41 (in ý Straits) 
Year Wells 
(a) 
Oil Exportes- 
Tons Value (1) 
Total 
Exports (2) 
(1) as %age 
of (2) 
1932 8 176,275 %1,094,663 %1,505,738 72.70 
1933 n. a. 276,845b 1,760,861 2,191_, 037 80.37 
1934 30 374591 2074669 394399501 68.96 
1935 36 441,744 2,785,037 3,778,655 73.70 
1936 53 445,081 2,975,103 4,205,270 70.75 
1937 65 550,247 3,873,959 5,595,240 69.24 
1938 39 685,257 5,512,549 6,580,482 83.78 
1939 n. a. o n. a. n. a. n. a. 
1940 n. a. o 7,515,000 9,622,973 78.10 
1941 n. a. o 4,388,000 6,624,835 66.24 
Notess (a) Producing wells only. Cf., for example, 1938 when only 
39 out of a total of ill wells were actually producing oil. 
(b) Given elsewhere as 280,523 tons. 
(o) Dr Wilford stat es that production in 1939 was 5.5m barrels 
(each barrel comprising 42 Ame rican gallons); in 1940 6.27m barrels; in 
1941 3.95m barrels (Wilford, The Geology and Mineral Resources of Brunei 
- Brunei 1961 -p 147). 
Sources: Compiled by author from Brunei Annual Reports 1932-46. 
* 
Table 19. The Initial Impaot of Oil Revenue 1932-41 (in 0 Straits)- 
Year Oil Royalty 
(1) 
Non-ail 
Revenue 
Total 
Revenue (2) 
(1) as %age 
of (2) 
1911 nil 109,430 109,430 nil 
1921 nil 161,250 161,250 nil 
1931 nil 342,011 342,011 nil 
1932 67,510 294,893 362,403 18.62 
1933 235,756 344,994 580,750 40.95 
1934 286,929 358,091 645,020 44.48 
1935 383,112 430,420 8139532 47.09 
1936 489,172 439,518 928,689 52.67 
1937 482,567 566,726 1,049,293 45.98 
1938 592,350 587,629 1,179,979 50.20 
1939 710,599 563,645 1,274,644 55.71 
1940 792,537 763,817 1,556,354 50.92 
1941 5482711 7779201 1,325,912 41.38 
8onroe$s Compiled by author from Brunei Annual Reporte 1911=4-6- and 
EOon- 
anio Survey of the Colonial Territories (London 1955, p 107" 
* 
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materiale; and the dearth of good road metal in the State. Road surfaoes, 
oons equently, were suitable only for light traffio and often had to be 
closed for a day, or two after heavy rain to allow them to dry out and to 
prevent serious damage. ' Road maintenanoe was expensive (almost %500 per 
mile in 1938). This was despite a $67,000 road improvement soheme in 
1936-7 under which practically the whole of the earth roads in the State 
were resurfaced, cambered and raised above the flood level when necessary; 
and a number of diversions were built to avoid flood areas or to smooth 
cut bends. This led to some improvement; but roads still had to be 
closed to reduce possible damage. It was felt, however, that the enormous 
cost of concrete roads was not justified at the existing stage of the 
country's development. 
The Government was keen to encourage the construction of roads. 
In 1932, for example, Mr Carey commented: 
"It has been found that the construction of roads is having the effect 
of causing agricultural people to concentrate in one area rather than 
to wander all over the district as was formerly the case. Silanas CO 
the Tutong road; Lumapas on the Limbang road, and signs of activity 
on the new Berakas road all bear out this contention. 
I have in mind two roads for 1933: one to the coast near 
Jerudong from 10th Mile on the tong road and one to Kuala Abang in the 
Tatong District from about 18th Mile on the tong road, Both roads will 
open up scattered kampong agricultural areas". 72 
Roads also facilitated the provision of health and education 
services. ' If people were concentrated and settled, instead of scattered 
72. CO 717/95 (File 13323): statement by Mr TF Carey, 10 October 1932. 
He added: "Experiments in concrete surfaces for the main roads are to 
be tried. This method has been calculated to be less expensive than 
other methods of metalling and more durable. A small experimental strip 
has been put down on Residency Road and seems very satisfactory. It is 
proposed to aim at the gradual metalling of the whole tong Road". This 
scheme does not appear to have been implemented before 1941. 
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and nomadic, sohools (for example) became more viable; and the people 
were more readily accessible to travelling medical staff. It was hoped 
that euoh indioatioas of a better life in settled oommunities would 
enoourage shifting cultivators to abandon what was oonsidered to be a 
wasteful praotioe. 
73 
In 1934 the Resident oommenteds 
"The State has enjoyed a most prosperous year in spite of the slump in 
all commodities. This prosperity is due almost entirely to the 
development of the oilfield and it must be confessed that the poor 
peasants in the more remote districts have not shared to the same 
extent in the general welfare. 
They have benefited indirectly, however, in that it has been 
possible to spend more on opening up the country and medical and education 
services have been brought nearer their doors. Increased sums have also 
been spent on the encouragement of husbandry and the nucleus of an 
Agricultural Department has been started.. With a rise in the price of 
rubber, the peasant, too, may look forward to better times as many have 
trees on their smallholdings". 74 
In his statement of policy in 1938 the Resident warned that 
if the eoonomio - and particularly agrioultural - development of the 
Sultanate was to be advanoed a good system of roads and paths was "one 
of the primary essentials". The first aim should be the provision of 
bridle paths at some distanoe inland from the ooast between the river 
systems, and linking up potentially important agricultural and industrial 
areas with each other and with the markets and points of export. He 
argaed, furthers that bridle paths should be sited and graded in such a 
way as to be easily capable of oonversioa into a road system later, if 
need be, when development had progressed beyond the initial stages. A 
73. CO 852/249 (File 15, item 7) CO Flemmioh and (3D' Olds, "Soil 
Erosion in Brunei", 6 August 1938. 
74. CO 717/102 (File 33313) statement by British Resident, 9 January 
1934, paragraph 8. 
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number of bridle paths were planned for oonstruotion in 1938, inoluding 
one which might beoome the genesis of an inland route between the oap- 
ital and the Seria oilfield, 
75 In 1939 $243,000 was voted for "speoial 
servioes, espeoially roads and bridle paths" whioh were "essential for 
the State's development". 
76 
A further $509000 was voted in 1941 for 
main roads. 
77 
Water supplies were improved so that by 1930 twenty-one 
million gallons of water were supplied to about 1,600 oonsumers in the 
land capital. The River Villagers, by contrast, collected an average 
of only one gallon a day from the standpipes overhanging the edge of 
the river. Although the water from Tasek was-not filtered, it was 
originally pronounoed "very pure". 
78 
Later it was found to be unsatis- 
faotory and a purification soheme was planned for 1939.79 $º' 1938 
various smaller water sohemes were in operation in Brunei Town, Tutong, 
Kilanas and Labi. 
The British Residency building was supplied with electricity 
not later than 1927; 
80 
and two years later the post offioe in the capital 
75. CO 717/129 (File 51535) memorandum by Mr Blaok, 31 January 1938, 
paragraphs 54-55. 
76. CO 717/136 (File 51535) Thomas to Co, UMS (Brunei) No 50,21 April 
1939, paragraphs 2-3- 
77* CO 717/145 (File 51535) Thomas to 00, UMS (Brunei) No 16,25 March 
1941, paragraph 3. 
78. CO 824/2 Brunei Annual Report 1933, p 21. 
79. In the Brunei Estimates for 1939 a sum of $139500 was set aside for 
"a filtration plant for the waterworks at Brunei" (CO 717/136 File 51535)- 
80o AC Watson, "Notes on the History of Bubongan Dua-Belas. The British 
High Commissioner's Residence in Brunei" in BMJ' 1982, P 55" NBs In 19599 
after the post of British Resident in Brunei was abolished, a British 
High Commissioner (under the Foreign Office, rather than the Colonial 
Offioe) was accredited to Brunei. He continued to live in what 
had been 
the British Residency building. 
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was also "eleotrioally lit". 
81 
In 1932 "plans in course of preparation" 
inoluded "eleotrio light scheme, Brunei". 
82 
During the following year 
a small "additional" eleotrical generator posting %5,000 was installed 
"with a view to lighting senior officers' quarters and providing power 
for a rice mill which was set up for the benefit of the agricultural 
populatioa". 
83 
At the end of 1933 `a sum'of %30,000 was set aside for 
the installation of an eleotrio Boheme in Branei Town. 
84 
An Eleotrioal Department was established under the State Ehgiaeer 
in 1935: two years later 91,000 units of electricity were generated in 
the oapital, of which 74,332 were sold to 182 oonsumers (mainly street 
lighting, Government quarters and members of the publio). 
85 
In Belait district the BMPC supplied both water and electricity 
to the Government, which effected distribution to the public through its 
own reticulation networks. 
86 
The telephone link between Titoug and Kuala Belait proved 
"most unsatisfaotory" and was dismantled in 1934. The BMPC operated an 
installation at Kuala Belait which was linked up with the Government's 
system at Kuala Tatong during 1938, thus rendering possible telephonio 
oommunioatioa between Brunei and Miri. 
87 
81. CO 824/1 Brunei Annual Report 1929, p 12. 
82. CO 824/2 Brunei Annual Report 1932, p 24. 
83. CO 824/2 Brunei Annual Report 1933, p 31; and BAR 1pp 19- 
84. CO 824/2 Brunei Annual Report 1933, p 29. 
85" CO 824/2 Brunei Annual Report 1936, p 23 and BAR 1217 p 38. During 
the following year (1938) there was an inorease of 9.8% in the number of 
eleotrioal units sold. 
86. In 1938 annual water consumption in (a) Seria and (b) Kuala Belait 
was 0.56m and 6.5m gallons respeotively. Cf. pp 436-7 (below). 
87. CO 824/2 Brunei Annual Report 1938, p 37. 
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"It often took ages to get through to Brunei (from Kuala Belait)", 
Datuk Turner recalls, "and the call was usually inaudible anyway. 
(8y ooatrast), I got through to (Xiri) at once". 88 
Health and Eduoation. Following the establishment of a 
Medioal Department in 1929 "the biggest single problem" to be oonfronted 
was infant mortalitgs in 1927 almost 42% of babies born in the oapital 
failed to survive their first year. Brunei women were still praotioally 
Purdah and midwifery was praotised by untrained bidans. Dietary errors 
were responsible for even more infant deaths than bad midwiferr. 
89 
Aotion was delayed by the Great Depression and the oonsequent 
deorease in revenue (1929-31) beoause "the state oaaoot undertake sohemes 
involving large sums of money". 
90 Eventually, in 1933, a Chinese lady 
was appointed maternity nnrse91 and her snooess was beyond all expeot- 
atione, partly beoanee _ of a rumour 
(whioh the Government did nothing 
to oontradiot) that attendanoe by the nurse was oompulsory and thatt if 
she were not oalled, a fine would be levied. Tbasp no less than 90% of 
births in the oapital were attended br the midwife in her first year. 
In addition many bidans came forward for voluntary training. 
Soon a boat woman was appointed as probationer midwife, her 
training supervised by the nurse,. and a ohild welfare olinio was established 
in a room in Brunei Town hospital. It was not until 1938 that a separate 
and large olinio was built. That year the midwife and her six assistants 
88. Da_ Tarnerz letter to the author, 16 February 1983 (enolosiug 
chapter of autobiograpby, p 16). NB: Apart from telephones, 63 wirelesses 
were registered in 1937,89 in 1938. 
89. Dr OE Fisher, letter to the author, 16 October 1984, paragraph 1. 
90. CO 8242 Brunei Annual Report 1931, p 5. 
91. The "excellent" (Dr Fisher, loo. oit., paragraph 2) Mrs Lee, who 
probably retired in 1958. 
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attended 540 births (in the mothers' own homes) and dealt with 7,500 
appearances at the clinic. Their work was confined to the capital, 
which oontained, however, about 30% of the total population. Arrange- 
ments were made in 1938 to send a local nurse to Singapore for training 
so that an infant welfare centre oculd be set up in Kuala Belait. 
The enormous fluctuations in the infant mortality rate (21; 
in 19359 35"6ý in 1936 and 22% in 1937) make it difficult to assess the 
results of these efforts. The swings were blamed upon the smallness of 
the sample rather than the inoompleteness of registration, as had been 
supposed earlier, The general trend, however,, was certainly downwards. 
The rate of infant mortality during the six years from 1927 to 1932 
averaged 31% annually oompared with only 26% during the following sex- 
ennial period (1933-8). Further, infant mortality was halved from 42% 
in 1927 and 36% in 1928 to only 22% in 1937 and 21% in 1938; and by 
1947-8 the rate had declined to less than 1$. 
92 
In his 1938 programme, Mr Blaok aimed at the eventual establish- 
meat in eaoh of the four distriots of the State of an infant welfare and 
maternity oentre with a trained nurse and one or more looally-trained 
midwives, until, at length, a complete midwifery and child welfare 
servioe would be available throughout the oountry. 
93 
In any plan for the extension of welfare servioesp "not the 
least difficulty" was the reoruitment of the necessary trained staffs 
"The suooeas of such a scheme"p the Resident warned, , will be largely 
92. Compiled by author from Brunei Annual Reports. 
93. CO 717/129 (File 51535) memorandum by )Ir Blaokt 31 January 1938, 
Paragraph 44. 
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dependent upon the supply of suitably-trained looal girls, for, even if 
it were possible to import all the nurses, their usefulness would be 
oonsiderably impaired if they had no intelligent subordinates to make 
oontaots with the people in the villages. It is hoped that when the 
new oentre is opened in Brunei Town it may be possible to attraot 
looal girls to be trained". 94 
The Colonial Office argued that the recruitment of personnel for welfare 
was more important than the building of centres because well-trained 
nurses oould do very useful work with only simple oentres to work in 
and by visiting mothers in their homes. 
95 
In September 1938 a fully-trained nurse, formerly in the employ 
of the WSG was appointed staff nurse, Brunei, in charge of the maternity 
wards in the hospital. This enabled the health nurse (Mrs Lee) to devote 
all her time to maternity and ohild welfare servioes. In Deoember 1938 
a new infant welfare olinio adjoining the hospital was opened at Brunei 
Town. There was a great inorease in attendance during 1939.96 
Three probationer nurses were in training by this time. They 
spent one-third of the time in the olinio assisting the health nurse. 
The latter devoted her aftermoons to home visiting. A seoond olinio 
was opened on 3 April 1939 at Kuala Belait where the work was carried 
out by a qualified midwife who had worked in Singapore. The attendance 
of mothers and babies was "most enoouragiug". 
97 A local Chinese lady was 
sent to Singapore in January 1939 to undergo a4 year oonrse of training 
in maternity and ohiid welfare* When she had oompleted thing it was 
94. I bi d., paragraph 45- 
95- Ibid., CO to High Commissioner, UMS (Brunei) No 82,16 Ang]. Bt 1938, 
Paragraph 3. 
96. CO 717A41 (File 51535) statement by Mr Pengilley, on ednoation and 
health in Brunei, 13 Maroh 1940. 
97. Ibid. 
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intended to appoint'her as health nurse, Kuala Belait. 
98 
The Colonial 
Office was satisfied that the Brunei Medical Department was "being run 
and is being expanded on sound lines". 
99 
For 1941 %10,500 was voted 
for a further infant welfare centre. 
100 
Extensions had also been made to the Government hospital in the 
capital, which had been opened in 1929. A development scheme provided 
for the addition of new wards at the rate of one a years in the hope 
that Brunei would have a well-equipped and up-to-date hospital. W 1936 
thirty beds were available and, at the olose of 1937, two seoond olass 
wards of eight beds each were under oonstruotion. Dr OE Fisher, State 
Medical Officer from 1937 to 1939, oomments that there was "no shortage 
of hospital beds" though there probably would have been if communications 
within the oountry had been better. 
101 
98. Ibid. This student was the daughter of the Treasurer, Mr Thian 
Thi. "Her name", Dr Fisher recalls, "was Suzannah and she was so good 
that I arranged for her to go to Singapore General Hospital for training 
to be a fully-qualified nurse... (She) was a very capable, highly- 
intelligent nurse" (letter to the author, 16 October 1984)- 
99- CO 7, x17/141 (File 51535) minute by r AGH Smart, 17 June 1940. 
100. CO 717/145 (File 51535) Thomas to CO, UMS (Brunei) No 16,25 March 
1941, paragraph 3. , 101. Letter to the author, 24 January 1985, paragraph 4. Dr Fisher 
adds that the reluctance of Brunei Malays to go into hospital when sick 
was due to "their fear of dying in hospital. They did not usually 
object to admission to hospital for relatively minor complaints but 
they 
were terrified of dying outside the family circle. This fear was based 
partly on Muslim religious soruples, but probably chiefly on the 
intense 
prejudices of the old women in the kamponggs". There might have 
been a 
shortage of hospital beds, Dr Fisher continues, "if communications 
had 
been better, as there was not the same difficulty with up-oountr. T 
tribes 
such as the Dusuns and Kedayans... (The) suggestion that people could not 
afford to take time off work was not true, as it was chiefly the very 
ill Malay who refused admission to hospital, and he would have 
been too 
ill to work. In any case, the average Brunei Malay was only too pleased 
to have any excuse not to work" (ibid. ). 
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Before the Japanese occupation there were outdoor dispensaries 
at Brunei Town (attached to the hospital), Temburong (1934) and Tutong 
(built after 1938, bombed during the War). There were also plans to 
build a dispensary at Kuala Belait. Travelling dressersp working along 
rivers, roads and paths, penetrated to almost every part of the State, 
so that praotioally the whole of the population could receive "medical 
servioe of a sort". 
102 
The number of inpatients rose from 199 in 1932 
to 614 in 1938, the number of outpatients from 11,060 to 19,345 over the 
same period. 
103 
During the 1930e there was a BMPC hospital at Kuala Belait 
whioh oontained two small wardsp a laboratory and a minor operating 
theatre, The oompany! s hospital was made available to Government 
patients. By 1934 there were unqualified dressers at two rubber estates 
and another-possessed a dispensary. 
Allowing for the high infant mortality rate, it was felt that 
the remainder of the population was relatively healt1Lyt 
"The two common causes of invalidism - malaria and ankylostomiasis - 
are uncommon in the large centres of population and other grave 
diseases are also rare. ". 104 
Malaria was not regarded as an immediate problem. The disease 
was relatively unusual in the larger centres of population and rubber 
estates, where anti-malarial measures were taken, but it was fairly 
common in the outlying, rioe-growing distriots. One reason for the 
102. CO 824/2 Brunei Annual Report 1937, p 12. 
103. Of the 614 inpatients in 1938,82 were admitted for malaria, 49 
for beri-beri and 19 for tuberculosis. (The hospital was destroyed by 
Allied bombing near the end of the war). 
104. CO 8242 Brunei Annual Report 1932, P 4" 
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comparatively low incidence of malaria, especially in relation to neigh- 
bouring countries, was that Brunei had avoided mistakesp such as clearing 
hills and ravines near the towns, made elsewhere. Regular anti-malarial 
measures - draining, oiling and olearing - were practicable only in and 
around Brunei Town and., later, Kuala Belait. School-children through- 
out the country were examined for enlarged spleens and treated when 
io5 
aeoessary" 
The poor diet of the majority of the population was reported 
to be "the most important single cause of ill-health in the State"*106 
In 1938 49 patients were treated for beri-beri (compared with 60 in 1936 
and 24 in 1937). 'ttiberonlosis was "extremely prevalent"9 especially 
among the Chinese, but only 19 people were treated for the disease in 
hospital. The major cause of registered deaths (only about 10% of the 
total) was 'old age, followed by convulsions, diarrhoea and other digest- 
ive diseases, tuberculosis and malaria. 
Simultaneously with the foundation of the Medical Department 
(1929) was the inauguration of a programme of public health and sanitation 
measures. The settlements of Tutong and Belait, plus the capital, were 
constituted as Sanitary Board areasy and systems of sanitation control 
introdnoed. The boards dealt with all municipal questions, such as 
buildings, markets, street lighting and hawkers' licensing. In 1930 
105., The highest incidence was in rural areas, where the free distrib- 
ution of quinine was the only measure that could be carried out. The 
number of malaria cases treated in 1938 was 763 (including 82 in 
hospital). 
106. CO 824/2 Brunei Annual Report 1938, p 9. 
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inspection services were improved. Sanitary latrines were installed in 
all Government buildings in the State. Some houses in Brunei had their 
own water-borne systems. In a few places, where suitable, bore holes 
were provided by the Government. 
All houses in Board areas were liable to scrutiny and plans 
for all proposed new buildings, as well as improvements to existing ones, 
had to be submitted for approval. There remained a tendency to overcrowd- 
ing in Malay homesy and sanitation in them was not very modern. Chinese 
shophouses were closely regalated: certain minimum requirements in the 
way of open spaces and partitioning were insisted upon. Daring the 1930s, 
however, there was a tendency among the more affluent Chinese to forsake 
the shophouse in favour of private dwellings, ranging from the substant- 
ial self-contained house standing in its own grounds to the much less 
pretentious wooden structure erected on a small plot of land. Government 
housing, built of brick after 1933, remained the most healthy and oom- 
fortable. Originally occupied by senior Government officers (both Euro- 
pean and indigenous), the lower ranking staff appear to have benefited 
as the 1930a progressed. Estates and the BMPC accommodated their own 
workers, but labour lines were subject to inspection by the Boards. (A 
large proportion of rubber estates' labourers lived in their own homes 
elsewhere). The Dasung, Murat and Than settlers in the interior had long- 
honses9 up to 150 feet in length, for dwellings. Sanitation was primitive 
and farm animals frequently were kept on the ground under the rooms. 
Progress had begun to be made in the field of education. In 
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1928 only 12% of boys and no girls at all attended sohooly even in Brutei 
Town. A law of 1929 made attendance compulsory for every boy aged 7-14 
who lived within two miles of a school where free education in the child's 
own language was provided by the Government. This measure was applied 
only in Brunei Town at first but was extended to Kuala Belait in 1933. 
It was lightly enforced, however, "as it is considered better to 
encourage education by example rather than penal measures". 
1o7 
The 
unavailability of teachers was given as the main reason preventing the 
extension of compulsory attendance to the outstations. 
The results of the new law were soon apparent. In 1929 an 
additional school for 455 pupils was constructed in the capital, thereby 
trebling the total number of pupils at a stroke. In 1930 the Resident 
commented: 
"For financial reasons... further expansion in the provision of education 
facilities will have to be gradual but it is the policy of the Government 
to endeavour to open at least one new school a year", 108 
A total of 17 Malay sohools were oonstructed in the decade 1929-389 
which took the total up from 4 to 21 and the number of pupils from 189 
to 1,810. A further three sohools had been opened by 1941; but pupils 
had fallen to 1,746. The initial impetus for a school came from village 
councils, which presented to the Government a request for a school. If 
granted, villagers provided the materials and erected the buildings 
(including accommodation for a teacher) with the assistance of a small 
grant from the Government. Should the sohool then prove viable, the 
107. Source now n. a. (Partly CO 824/2 BAR 1932, p 22). 
1089 CO 824/2 Brunei Annual Report 1930, p 20. 
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Government oonstruoted permanent buildings. In short, the demand had to 
be demonstrated before the State would furnish full finanoial banking. 
Onoe the school had been built, education was free, although pupils had 
to buy their awn exeroise . books and penoils. 
Nothing was taught in the schools whioh would tend to drive 
Pupils away from their agrioultural pursuits. The curriculum, based 
upon that introduoed in Kala ra by RO Winstedt in 1917, included literacy 
in both Jawi and Rosanized soript, oompoeitioa, aritbmetio, geograph3', 
histor7p hygiene, drawing and phyaioal exeroiae. Inetraotion in basketry 
was available in some sohools. Football was popular; and in 1937 bad- 
minton and hookey were introdnoed in Brunei Town. Attendanoe at extra- 
ourrioular Muhammadan religious olasses was optional. 
Ostaide the main centres, organized eduoation was rendered very 
diffioult beoauee of the soattered nature of the population and the poor 
oommaaioations. In addition, the praotioe of shifting cultivation meant 
that children were not long in one plaoe and this caused one or two 
sohools to lose viability (in the 1920s). 
Nom-Xalay indigenous people showed interest in ednoation. In 
1926, for example, the Eedayans of Kilanas opened a school, which sur- 
Prised the administration sinoe the pupils were children of farmersy, few 
Of whom were literate. A further step was taken in 1938 when the Resident 
proposed to extend the Compulsory Attendanoe Enactment to the 2% of the 
indigenous population whose mother tongue was not Malay. It was argued 
that education in their several vernaculars was not feasible and that 
1tfl u stioally the other indigenous groups would have to be assimilated 
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to the lialay (whioh was the lingua franoa). The Resident suggested, 
indeed, that non Malay indigenes 
"appear to show much more keenness for education and greater receptivity 
than the Malays, who are inclined to be apathetic, which suggests that 
the latter may, in the course of time, find themselves being ousted from 
positions in the Government service and in other spheres of life, not by 
Chinese or Indians or other aliens, but by their own compatriots". 109 
The first attempt to establish a vernaon, lar sohool for Malay 
girls ended in failure. The sohool was opened in 1930, with an enrolment 
of 24Y mainly, daughters of Government servants, but olosed during the 
following year beoanae of the departure of the school-mistress. Re-opened 
in 1932 under an unqualified teaoher, the sohool finally olosed in 1934" 
The grip of purdahit was argued, had made the effort premature. The 
faot that 189 girls attended boys' vernaoalar sohools in 1938 suggests, 
however, that this view was erroneous. 
In 1938 Mr 81aok oommented that no real progress in female 
eduoation would be made until separate instruotion was available. The 
difficulty lay in the recruitment of suitable women teachers. The efforts 
of the Government to obtain the servioes even of one had proved unavail- 
ing. 110 Mr Gent at the Colonial Offioe agreed that the provision of free 
sohooling for boys 
"must remain largely ineffeotive in diffusing any ednoational standards 
so long as no progress is made with this question of girls' eduoation". 111 
A aPeoialist commented that the training of women teachers was "a 
fundamental oondition of sooial progress". A neoessary first step, in 
1099 CO 824/2 Brunei Annual Report 1938, p 34- 
110, CO 717A29 (File 51535) memo by Blaokp 31 January 1938, para. 49. 
111. Ibid. 9 minute by Gent, 13 June 1938. 
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his view, was the establishment of a residential training oollege (with 
general educational classes) for Malay women under a competent Eiropean 
with experience of work in Malaya. This advice was forwarded to the 
High Commissioner for oonsideration. 
112 
"Outside the Brunei distriot", the Resident noted in 1938, 
"girls in small numbers have attended boys' schools, but... there can be 
little hope of overooming the prejudioe of oonservative Muslim opinion 
against the attendance of girls at sohool until separate instruction 
under women teachers should be available". 113 
In 1938 two local women teachers were recruited and a girls' section 
was started in a school in the capital. It was proposed to establish a 
separate sohool early in 1939. At Kuala Belait 48 girls were attending 
school. By 1941 there were 24 Malay vernacular schools with 1,746 
pupils (1,434 boys, -312 girls) taught by 68 teaohersq, of whom only 12 
were trained and only five were women. (By 1941 the total population 
was of the order of 40,000, of whom perhaps 6,000 were children aged 7-14). 
Even in 1938 the Resident judged that the time was not yet ripe 
for Ehglish (i. e. secondary) schools in Brunei. Suitable candidates 
Continued to be sent to the school in Labuan, however. A proposal from 
a visiting expert to begin English edaoation soon afterwards was not 
implemented beoause of the Japanese oooupation. 
It was arranged in 1929 that two plaoes annually woald be 
reserved for Brunie at the Sultan Idris Training College (SITC) at 
Tanjong Maliur in Malaya. The first studentis returned in late 1932 and 
112. Ibid., minute by Mr A Mayhew, 26 July, 1938; and ibid., CO to High 
Commissioner, UMS No 82 (Brunei), 16 August 1938, paragraph 2. 
113. CO 824/2 Brunei Annual Report 1938, p 34" 
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began as teaohers in 1933. The number of oandidates, seleoted by 
competitive examination, who were sent to the SITC was increased to a 
quota of four annually from 1938. They were seleoted from the ranks of 
probationary and pupil teachers, i. e. boys who had passed the fifth 
standard and had been appointed to temporary posts in the Eduoation 
Department pending their training at Tanjong Nialim. At the beginning 
of 1940 Brunei had seven SITC-trained teaohers: two more would graduate 
before the end of the year, and there were eight other students from 
Brunei training there. Four more were due to arrive in Malaya in 
November 1940.114 
Brunei students were also sent to the Agricultural School at 
Serdang and the Forestry School at Kepong, both in Malaya. Finally, 
the younger brother of the Sultan (mow, 1985, the Seri Begawan Sultan) 
and the two sons of the Pengiran Bendahara were sent to the Malay College 
at Kuala Kangsar. This was perceived as "a step forward in the admin- 
istration of the State as it is the first time that Brunei prinoes have 
received an eduoatioa in the English sense of the word". 
115 
Taking aooouat of seven private fee-paying sohools -4 Chinese 
(with 245 Pupils), two Roman Catholio schools (with 105 pupils) and an 
ýPa (Auglioan) sohool (with 71 pupils) - Brunei had in 1938 a grand 
total of 28 schools with 2,231 pupils. 
Expenditure on ednoation increased from $$7,310 in 1929 to 
%41,562 in 1941. (Expenditure on buildings was included under publio 
114. CO 717/141 (File 51535) statement by Mr Pengilley on eduoation and 
health, 13 March 1940. 
115" CO 824/2 Brunei Annual Report 1932. P 15. 
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works). Sir J Campbell, at the Colonial Offioe, noted that muoh of the 
expenditure classified as 'special' appeared in fact to be 'normal' and 
there was consequently some danger of over-estimating the soundness of 
the position with regard to the annually-recurrent expenditure relative 
to the "revenue derived from souroes other than oil". 
116 
The High 
Commissioner was notified to this effect. 
The Sultan of Brunei partioipated in the new prosperity. In 
1934 his allowanoe was inoreased from %1,000 to %1,500 a month and in 
1938 X500 a month was added. He also reoeived extra allowances for the 
cost of servioes and so on; and, in 1939, a sum was voted to enable the 
monarch to provide himself with a motor oar. Although the Sultan was 
Par more costly to Brunei than the Resident - in 1940 Civil List 
expenditure amounted to X37,438 compared with only %12,610 for the 
British Resident's Offioe - His Highness oonstantly petitioned for yet 
more funds; and often had to be denied by the Resident. 
117 
Administration. In 1936 Mr AS Small, the Acting High Coauniss- 
ionerv decided that a more senior officer was needed to fill the post of 
Resident in Brunei because the revenue there was rising rapidly thanks 
116. CO 717/145 (File 51535) minute by Sir J Campbell, 8 June 1941- 
117. Mr JG Blaok, letters to the authors 12 April 1983, paragraph 6; 
and 8 September 1983, paragraph 2. For purposes of oomparison, the 
Sultan of Perak's annual allowanoe was inoreased in 1929 from x$120,000 
to %150,000 and that of the sultan of Pahang from $78,000 to x$96,000. 
The annual inoome of the Rajah Muda of Perak was inoreased in 1929 from %18,000 to $22,500; that of the Bendahara from %12,600 to #16,380. Eben 
in 1948, as reoalled by Mr LEN Davis CMG (BR Brunei 1948), Sultan Ahmad 
Tajuddin bore a grudge against the Resident beoause he, Mr Davis, 
refused to loosen the purse strings. (Mr LHN Davis CMGs letters to the 
authors 28 February 1983, Part It paragraph 6; and 22 January 1985, 
Paragraph 5). 
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to the oil industry, planing extra burdens on the shoulders of the Res- 
ident as the country began to assume an unprecedented importance. Des- 
pite this, the latter officer was completely isolated at eight hundred 
miles from Singapore "and in Oase of emergenoy must aot entirely on his 
own initiative". The European heads of department (see below) were often 
senior in servioe to the Resident "and the position is apt to be em- 
barrassing to him". In the past, a young, fit offioer had been essential 
because of the difficulties of oommunioation in Brunei (of* pp 123-4, 
above). Sinoe the Great Har, however, the oountry, had been opened up to 
some extent and oommanicatioas had improved to such a degree that it had 
beoome feasible for an older oivil servant to be appointed. Mr Small 
reoommended., therefore,, that the post of Resident should be upgraded 
from Class IV to Class II of the NOS scale* 
118 
A final factor of "paramount importance" underlying this 
decision., which was approved by the Colonial Offioe, lay in the "character 
and oonduot" of the Brunei monarch. Sultan nuhammad Jemalul Alam, who 
died in 1924, was suooeeded by his son, Ahmad Tajuddin (b 1913)" Sinoe 
the latter was an eleven year old minor on aooession, a Regenoy of the 
two wazirs again oame into operation, this time from 1924 to 1931. $P 
1936 His Highness was 
"Proving rather troublesome now that he is now growing up and has acquired 
a taste for power. There have been several clashes between His Highness 
and the British Residents and I recently found it neoessary to send Mr 
MW Pretty, the Secretary to the High Commissioner, to Brunei in order 
to smooth matters down. Mr Pretty... is oonvinoed that His Highness, who 
118. CO 717/121 (File 51756) Mr, later Sire AS Small (1887-1944) to 
CO9 S (Brunei) confidential, 30 June 1936, paragraph 5" 
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has a vastly exaggerated idea of his own importance, will only accept 
advice readily from someone considerably older than himself and the recent 
trouble is the fault of the present system where a very junior officer of 
Class IV is sent to a post, of which the responsibilities are far greater 
than he should, in fairness, be called upon to bear". 119 
Mr Small regarded it as "most important that, at this stage of his life, 
His Highness should have as his adviser an offioer of ripe years and 
experienoe". 
120 
Mr JG Black, the first Grade II Resident, reoallss 
"I suppose I must have read the Treaty, but the existence of such a 
provision (requiring acceptance of 'advice') never entered my mind. 
There was certainly never an occasion when recourse might have been 
had to it. Differences with the Sultan were about private and personal 
matters, such as borrowing money and getting into debt". 121 
It was not until 1940 that Sultan Abmad was installed as Yang 
Dipertuan. The High Commissioner, Sir Shenton Thomas,, reoommended that 
the opportunity shoald be taken to bestow the CMCI upon His Highness. This 
would be "politioally wise" and would give "added pleasure" to the moaaroh 
beoause it would "remove the reproaoh... of being the only ruler of a 
Malay State who has not been privileged to receive a mark of HI's fav- 
1j122 OtL . In a message to the Sultan on the oaoasion of his coronation, 
17 March 1940, Sir Shenton affirmed his confidence that "under the guid- 
anoe of Your Highness... and supported by the advioe of the British Resident, 
the State will make continued and rapid progress along sound lines". 
123 
In faoto Sultan Ahmad Tajuddin was a most unfortunate monaroh 
who died as early as 1950 (aged o36). Consistent reports leave little 
119. RU-9 Paragraph 4. 
120. Ibid. 
121. JG U B1ackq letter to the authors 8 September 1983, paragraphs 1-2. 
122. CO 717/143 (File 51908) Sir TSw Thomas to CO, UMS (Brunei) oon- 
fidential, 13 January 1940, paragraphs 2-3. 
123. Ibid., item 109 8 Irvine MC to High Commissioner, 30 March 1940. 
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doubt that His Highness enjoyed the good life and that his exoessesp 
Particularly alooholisn, contributed largely to his early demise (and 
also had unfortunate politioal oonsequenoes for Brunei, as shown in 
Chapter 10). 
124 
His mother prevented him from being sent to Malaya for 
schooling, so that he laoked formal education. His British tutor, Mr 
8F Stalley, onoe manager of the cutoh faotory, was apparently, an equally 
colourful oharaoter. 
125 
On the more positive side, Sir Ahmad (the knight- 
hood was a oourtesy bestowed in 1949 on the oooasion of the silver, jubilee 
of his aooession) oould boast the treading of some new ground. In 1931 
he visited Malaya 
126 
and, having married a Selangorese prinoess in 1934, 
he made a number of return visits there. In 1932, a year after he 
attained his majority, he beoame the first Brunei monaroh to visit the 
United Kingdom, were he remained for about a year. On the oooasion of 
a visit to Kuala Belait, the Sultan left with Datuk Tarner 
"twenty four oopies of a little booklet of proverbs, which he claimed 
to have written personally-like a modern Solomon, for the purpose of 
exhorting his subjeots to tread the path of virtue". 127 
Sir Shenton Thomasp when making out a aase for His Highness to be awarded 
the CKGp oommented thatp although the Sultan's oonduot during his early 
years of sovereignty was not always "correct"p and he had had to be 
warned severely more than onoe, he (the Sultan) had "done nothing 
124. Several souroes (of. p 352, below). One or two British Residents, 
also, were said to imbibe rather more alcohol than was entirely good for 
themselves. 
125" Dato WH Doughty (1886-1971), interviewed by Professor DE Brown in 
the late 1960s (tape recording courtesy of Professor Brown); and Mr A 
Gilmour CMG, letter to the author, 18 January 1984. 
126. For details, see British Malaya (December 1931), p 211. 
127. Datuic'RN Turner, letter to the author, 16 February 1983, p 10. 
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soandalous"; and, in oonsidering the pasty'his upbringing 
"must not be forgotten. It is not easy for a young boy (His Highness was 
o27 years old in 1940), brought up in a remote State and in the atmosphere 
of a small and syoophantio oourt, to withstand the temptations to whioh, 
as a member of the royal house, he must be subjected. On the other band, 
he has many good points. He is essentially loyal (to SM Government)... 
He may be irresponsible but he has no vioes and he tries to understand 
the art of Government and to help in the advanoement of his people. It 
is not his fault that many of his proposals are impraoticable". 128 
Mr JQ Blaok looks baok upon his aervioe in Brunei as perhaps 
the most rewarding tour of his MCS oareers 
"There was great scope for development and no laolc of funds. The bud- 
get proposals and estimates had, of ooursej to be approved by the High 
Commissioner but otherwise one had generally a free hand. One could 
sense one's plans coming to fruition... and feel a sense of personal 
responsibility. Singapore was a thousand miles away". 129 
How did Mr Black, as Resident, spend an ordinary office day? s 
"I find it rather diffioult now to outline a routine day in the life of 
the BR Brunei. He did everythingi Tuesday was a busy day finishing off 
oorrespondenoe for the mail to Singapore and beyond and on Thursday 
dealing with the mail from Singapore eto. The Government launohq IMuara, 
left on Wednesday to oonneot with the inward and outward servioes from 
Singapore. From time to time visits were made to Kuala Belait and up- 
ooantry stations. When I first went to Brunei I was oonstantly being 
summoned to the Istana, sometimes twioe a day. I managed to convinoe 
the Sultan that it would be more businesslike to fix one day a week, 
when we would disouss all matters". 130 
The number of European administrators in Brunei was inoreased. 
In 1931, just before the first oil was exported, the post of Assistant 
Resident was revived and the incumbent stationed in Kuala Belait to super- 
vise the development of the oilfield area and exeroise a "general over- 
sight" of Tatong distriot. 
131 
Following the expansion of sohools during 
128. CO 717/143 (File 51908) Sir TSW Thomas to CO, IIMS (Brunei) conf- 
ideatial (Honours), 13 January 1940, paragraph 2. 
129. Mr Jß Blaok, letter to the author, 12 April 1983P paragraph 1- 
130* Mr J(3 Black, letter to the author, 28 February 1984, paras' 1-2. 
131. Da tuk Turner, letter to the author, 16 February 1983, P 5" 
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the 1930s, the Assistant Resident became ex-officio State Education 
Offioer from 1938.132 In addition, the Assistant Resident deputised for 
the Resident when the latter went on 'local' leave. Mr DA Somerville 
(1908-74)9 Assistant Resident in 1934-59 recalled in 1970: 
"In contradistinction to Kuala Kangsar (where he had been 
stationed)) there was little land office work in Kuala Belait as the 
native inhabitants, mainly of Disun or kindred tribes, had not really 
reached the stage of settled cultivation. The object of Government in 
the district was to temper the 'wind of change' which had started to blow 
with the advent of the oil company. Although there was a Brunei district 
officer stationed in Kuala Belait, the Assistant Resident's job was 
largely that of a DO and he exercised his authority directly and not on 
the basis of advising the existing Malay officials, as was the practice 
in the UMS of the Malayan mainland. 
The position in Brunei itself (i. e# the capital) was rather 
different. Under the Treaty, the British Resident exeroised many admin- 
istrative functions directly, particularly in matters of land admin- 
istration, but the framework of a Malay State still existed and the views 
of local notables had considerable weight. The Sultan at that time was 
still a minor (sic), which limited his personal influence. 
My relations with the Malay DO in Kuala Belait were uniformly 
friendly and tours of inspection to the few Atsun settlements upriver 
were a welcome change from office routine. The presence of the oil oom- 
pany meant the provision of electricity, water and natural gas for cook- 
ing and also a wider social circle than existed in most other stations 
in Borneo at that time". 133 
Did the Assistant Resident hold exeoutive powers? 
132. CC 824/2 Brunei Annual Report 1938, P 35" 
133. Memorandum by Mr DA Somerville, Maroh 1970 (photocopy courtesy of 
the late Professor RW Heussler, letter to the author, 16 May 1983). Mr 
Somerville's statement that the "looal notables had considerable weight" 
is rather unusuals most other informants state that the wazirs -book lit- 
tle interest in administrative affairs. Concerning the "wider social 
oirole", Mr EL Fountain, a member of the BMPC's staff from 1929 to 1937, 
recalls that, in those days, "Government officials kept very much to 
themselves and only mixed with the upper echelons of the oil business. 
(Mr) Somerville was the only exception I knew" (letter to the author, 11 
October 1983, paragraph 3). Datuk 'turner addss "... although I made it 
MY' business to get along well in my daily relationship with the Oil 
Company personnel, there were none except the Dootor... and the Labour 
Superintendent 
... with whom I felt any close rapport" 
(letter to the 
author, 16 February 1983, P 5)" 
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"There was no clear dividing line" - time Datuk Turner - "between 
administrative and executive duties. The Assistant Resident was a 
Johannes Factotum, dealing with anything that cropped ups and, in Kuala 
Belait distriotv tended to do what a District Officer would have done 
in Malaya, with the (existing Malay) DO rather in the role of an 
Assistant DO in Malaya". 134 
The Assistant Resident, of oourse, was oompletely unarmed. There was 
no battalion of Gurkhas in the Seria oilfield or anywhere else in Brunei 
either during the 1930s or at any other time of the British Residential 
Era. Only in 1941 were small detachments of 'Indian' troops and Sikh 
polioe stationed briefly in the Niri-Seria area with the apeoifio par- 
Pose of supervising the oilfield destruotion soheme (of. pp 316-19f below). 
On the oontrary, the situation was so safe that it did not matter (Datuk 
Turner recalls) that his sliding door into the garden would not shuts 
"There was next to no orime in Kuala Belait - people just did not go in 
for murders, battery and the like, and theft was virtually unheard of. 
To that extent, Kuala Belait was a Shangri-la... ". 135 
On the other hand, Datak Tamer found himself "under-stretohed so far as 
work was coaoerned". 
136 
Apart from the re-instated Assistant Resident, separate Depart- 
mente of Medioal and Health (1929), Forestry (1933) and Agrioulture (1937) 
under European offioers were oreated. They joined the existing Direotor 
of Publio Works and the Chief Polioe Offioery so that, even in 1941, the 
full complement of European officers in Brunei comprised only the Resident 
and six subordinates. Dr Old Fisher, State lledioal Offioer 1937-9, had 
"pretty well oomplete powere to do as I thought fit. Theoretioallyp I 
134. Da tuk RN Turner, 28 lauuarl 1985, paragraph 1 (3)- 
135* Da tnk RN Turner, letter to the author, 16 February 1983, P 7. 
136. bid,, p 5" 
305 
was under the authority" of the Director of Medical Services in Singapore 
but for practical purposes his only power was that he could transfer me 
to another post or send me on long leave at any time. All darr to day 
decisions were my sole responsibility, but, of course, major decisions 
of polioy, such as the building of two new hospital wards and an infant 
welfare centre were referred to the Resident for approval, as were the 
annual estimates of expenditure of the Medical Department. The Resident 
invariably gave approval as there was no shortage of money". 137 
Dr Fisher adds a further insights 
"Of oourset my real powers should be seen within the oontext of a 
primitive State with vestigial oommunioations and in whioh I was sole 
medioal officer. These factors were the real limitations on my powers 
to act". 138 
Departmental heads did not operate on a 'oabinet' basis, presumably 
beoause there was not enough to discuses "No meetings of Heads of 
Department ever took plaoe at the Residency or anywhere else, as far as 
I can remember", Dr Fisher oomments. 
139 
The working relationship 
was muoh more direot. Sir John Peel Kt., referring to the years 1946-8, 
staters 
"Departmental Heads were responsible to the British Resident and through 
him to the Sultan for the running of their departments". 140 
Unlike the other teohnioal staff, the Forestry Offioer had his 
headquarters in Kuala Belait. 
As the soope of Government expanded, more Government employees 
were reoraited. The Brunei establishment doubled from about 232 staff 
in 1930 to about 466 in 1941. This gave a stimulus to 1 opal eduoationp 
137. Dr OE Fisher, letter to the author, 24 January 1985, paragraph 2. 
138. Ibid. 
139. I`. 
140. Dato Sir WJ Peel ht, DSLJ, DSNB, letter to the author, 19 January 
1985, paragraph 2. 
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whioh was neoessary if trained personnel were to be aoquired. The BMPC 
also required inoreasing numbers of literate staff, the Government found, 
indeed, that the oompany, by paying higher salariesp was able to attraot 
the cream of the local talent. 
The growth of Kuala Belait (and Tttong) had neoessitated the 
oreatioa (in'1929) of Sanitary Boards to supervise munioipal matters. 
There was also more work for district offioers, 
l41 
who 
"oolleoted taxes, heard minor oasesp inoluding those relating to inherit- 
anoe of property, and (were responsible for) land work. (They) also 
helped to ran the Sanitary Boards of the townships (e. g. seeing that bye- 
laws and regulations were observed and various lioenoes issued)". 142 
Mr LET Davis CMG reoalls that, in 1948, the duties of DOs inoluded. 
"reoeiving, inspecting and dealing with applications for land, dealing 
with transfers of land and inheritance matters, checking that crops, 
e. g. rubber, were not prohibited by a title, supervising expenditure 
of any sums approved for local improvements such as bridle paths or 
minor drainage or irrigation works. The list would surely be much 
longer ands in general, embrace administration of a district or area and 
00-ordination with specialist arms of Government, e. g. the Agricultural 
Department". 143 
In 1935, indeed, the post of the most senior distriot offioer - the DO 
Brunei and Muara - was abolished for the time being. The former incumbent 
then beoame '8eoretary to Resident', a new post with a salary ranging from 
141. Borneo Bulletin, 21 Ootober 1972. Pengiran Dato Paduka Othman bin 
Pengiran Anak Muhammad Salleh (b 1918) remembered that his work in the 
Temburong distriot offioe from 1937 varied from "selling opium to aoting 
as sub-treasurer, land offioer, and oourtv postal and religious olerk". 
He had to walk twelve miles eaoh month handing out wages to teaohersq 
ke tuas and imams. "I also used to oanoe at times"q he added. "I learned 
a lot in Temburong as there were only three of us under the Distriot 
Offioer". During the Japanese oooupation he was also "rations olerk for 
food, olothing and everything else in short supply". 
142. Datuk RN Turner, letter to the author, 28 January 1985, paragraph 
1.2. 
143. Mr LHN Davis, letter to the author, 22 January 1985, paragraph 4" 
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$3,120 to i$3,600 annually, and his previous duties were taken over by 
an 'Assistant Controller of Land Revenue' who was a Grade III officer 
is the Brunei Administrative Servioe (BAS; not to be oonfused with the 
Malayan Civil Servioe)p with a salary of 840 to $1,200.11 
This expansion of the bureauoraoy was not entirely weloomeds 
"While attention has been oonoentrated upon the large departments of new 
growth", the Resident oommented in 1935, "the aotual administrative org- 
anization has been negleoted. Its work, however, has inoreased enormous- 
ly and an inorease in the establishment is inevitable". 145 
The staff of the Land and Distriot Offioesp for example, inoreased from 
29 in 1930 to 42 im 1941. The 1930 figures also inoluded forest guards; 
in 1941 the new Forestry Department had a staff of 18. The Polioe Foroe 
grew from 48 in 1931 to 81 in 1935 and. 92 by 1941. The new Assistant 
Resident's Offioe in Kuala Belait had a subordinate staff of four by 
1941. New Treasury and Courts Departments (formerly branohes of the 
British Resident's Office) had been created before 1941. 
Ones of the features of the 1930s was the growing importaaae 
of Belait distriotp which -earlier had carried little weight in the Sul- 
tanate. It had been remote, inaooessible, of little eoonomio importaooe 
and scantily populated. In short, it was dismissed as the most "back- 
ward"146 of the 'rivers' in Brunei, with only 1,126 inhabitants in 
1911.147 By 1931, Belait still oomprised only 13% (3,897) of Brunei's 
total population of 30,135" By 1938, however, when the Sultanate'e 
144. CO 717/117 (File 51535/1936) Brunei Estimates 1936. 
145. CO 717/110 (File 51535/1935) memorandum by Mr RE Tarnbull, 4 June 
1935, paragraph 12. 
146. CO 824/1 Brunei Annual Report 1912, p 5; and BAR 1913 ,p6. 
147. CO 531/3 (34002) WR Lee-Warner to Sir A Young, No 254,17 May 
1911, Paragraph 1. 
308 
population was estimated to be 37,868, Belait may have aooounted for 
approaohing one-quarter. This relative gain was made partly by internal 
migration, but prinoipally by immigrants from outside the State. 
148 By 
then orude oil oomprised 84% of Brunei's exports in terms of value. 
The operations of the BMPC were originally oentred some miles 
up the Belait at Labi, where a "fair-sized village" had sprang up by 
1924, proving a great magnet to Chinese from other parts of Borneo. 
Although the BtTC finally withdrew from the village in November 1931,149 
the Chinese market gardeners serving the oilfield remained there. 
The settlement at Kuala Belait, at first a transit camp for 
people and materials going to and ooming from the drilling sites upriver, 
began to expand rapidly after the establishment., in 1928, of a depot with 
a wharf and wireless stage. A rest house and club was opened in 1929. 
Earlier in the same year the BMPC had transferred its headquarters to the 
village from Labi. The Government, similarly., moved its distriot offioe 
from Kuala Balai, an inconvenient distanoe upriver, to Kuala Belait, 
whioh was more aooessible to a traveller (suoh as the Resident) arriving 
by sea from the oapital. in 1929 a "preliminary lay-out" of Kuala Bel- 
ait village area was oompleted, twenty shophouses were constructed and 
the principal street was named after the British Resident, Mr MoKerron. 
Thereafter growth was rapid. The township, which had only 1,193 
inhabitants in 1931, was estimated to have a population approaching 
148. CO 824/2 Brunei Annual Report 19389 P 5- 
149- CO 717/77 (File 82320) Sir c Clementi '(1875-1951) to CO, UMS 
(Brunei) 
confidential, 1 Maroh 1932, enclosing the oil report for the 
fourth quarter of 1931. 
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5,000 by 1938.150 
The settlement at Seria had originated as a drilling camp. 
Too insignifioant to be even reoorded in the 1931 oensusy a township 
sprang up thereafter: and a road to Kuala Belait had been oompleted by 
1938, as well as a bridge over the River Seria. 
"Seria was some eight miles distant from Kuala Belait in the 
direotion of Brunei Town"v Datuk Turner reoalls, referring to 1940-1. 
"There were all the wells,... and there lived most of the senior staff 
and labour foroe... Coming towards Kuala Belait along the road, there was 
a stretoh of about four miles of ooastal jungle until one, name to Panaga 
... and then four miles more with land being opened up rapidly for the 
oultivation of vegetables on either side of the road, until one name to 
Kuala Belait, first through a Chinese seotionp then through a Malay one 
and finally to a oluster of bungalows stretohing along the beaoh as far 
as the river mouth, where the offioes of the Brunei part of the oilfield 
were situated, and beyond, a short way up the river, was a little port 
for the handling of oargo and the Government oustoms house... ". 151 
In short., these townships were gradually developing as rivals 
to the oapital, where the population had been oonoentrated formerly. 
Buts, more than this., the newoomers were mainly non-Muslim immigrants - 
espeoially Chinese and, to a lesser extent, Indians - employed by the 
oil company. They were often eduoated, skilled workers whose lifestyle 
was industrial rather than agrioultural. 
152 
In order to service them 
there Wan an expansion in the tertiary eeotor of the eoonomy. 
Even more notioeable was the influenoe of the British Malayan 
Petroleum Company. The crude oil which they produced dominated Brunei's 
export trade after 1932; and the oompany aoooanted direotly, for half the 
oonntry'a revenue in the form of oil royalties alone and indireotly (e. g. 
150. CO 824/2 Brunei Annual Report 1938, p 5- 
151a Daattuk Turner, letter to the author, 16 February 1983, p 3. 
152. In 1933 Borneans (inoluding Malays and Ibans) aooounted for 34ö of 
the BMPC's labour foroe; in 1938,37%. 
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oustoms duties) oontributed further significant sums. By 1931 the 
oompany was already running its own roads, railway (from Seria to Badas, 
built in 1924-5)9 hospital (1925), 
153 
eleotrioity and water supplies, 
fire station and telephone exohange. In addition the oompany had wharves, 
offices and, for its staff, bungalows and houses. During the following 
deoade, these servioes were expanded. In 1935 a new, well-equipped hos- 
pital, with modern X-Ray installations and full medical and surgical 
equipment, was built at Kuala Belait. 
154 In addition dispensaries and 
first aid points were set up throughout the oilfield. These were coupled 
with an emergenoy medioal and ambulanoe servioe. The oompany also epon- 
Bored a maternity olinio. In the 1930s anti-malarial measures, such as 
draining and oiling, were taken in oonjunotion with the Government. The 
oompan7 furnished reoreational facilities, suoh as a football field and 
tennis oourt (1931), a "first rate" golf course at Panaga, and a sooial 
olub. The oompany also retailed petrol and cold storage meat; and the 
Government found it cheaper and quioker to sub-contract jobs, suoh as 
road extensions, to the BMPC. In short, by 1941, the Government was 
very =oh the "poor relation" in Belait district. 
155 
A further important point is that the oompany's head offices 
were in Miri (Sarawak) and there was a oonstant traffio between the Mini 
and seria wings of the oilfield. As a result, Belait distriot tended to 
153. CO 824/1 Brunei Annual Report 1925, p6 (paragraph 27); and ibid., 
and 
_Brunei 
Medical Department Annual Report 1927, p 7- 
154. GC Harper, op. oit. I p 37" Mr Harper appears to have 
been unaware 
of the earlier hospital, set up in 1925- 
155- Datuk Tirner, letter to the author, 16 February 1983, p 8, 
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have more in oommon and oloser links with Baram distriot aoross the bor- 
der in Sarawak than with the oapital of the Sultanate. The whole oilfield, 
indeed, was treated as a unit by defence and law and order planners as 
well as by the Shell Group, In addition the poor oommanioations within 
Brunei meant that people in the oilfield and the oapital passed their 
lives in isolation from the other. This ooutributed to a polarization 
in the State whioh was already beooming apparent by 1941. 
If the BMPC resembled in some respeota a State within the 
State, MCS offioers who served in Brunei were not dissatisfied with this 
situation. Relations with the oil oompany, Mr Blaok comments, 
"were good and there was no attempt to interfere with the administration 
of the Government. In faot the Government was muoh indebted to the 
oompany for the various services provided in the town of Kuala Belait". 156 
Da_ tuk Turner agreess 
"The oompany never tried to set itself up as a rival or to ohallenge 
the functions of the Government. It was just a very big fish in a 
small pools One oouldn't get away from itt".. 157 
6. Conolusi on 
In oomparison with the period 1906-31P the 19309 appeared to 
be a time of quite rapid change; but in the oontext of Brunei's post-1945 
achievements, those of the first deoade of the oil era (1932-41) appear 
somewhat less impressive, partly beoause of Government fiscal oaution. 
There is no doubt, however, that in some respeots the 1930s marked a 
olear departure from the past. In 1936 Mr Gent at the Colonial Office 
156. Mr JG Blaok, letter to the author, 16 May 1983, paragraph 5- 
157. Da. tuk Turner, letter to the author, 14 August 1983, paragraph 3 (B). 
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noted that "from being perhaps the most remote and baokward of all the 
territories under the High Commissioner's control, Brunei has acquired a 
rapid importance and wealth from the disoovery of its oil resouroes". 
158 
PF 1937 oil produotion was recognized in the Colonial Offioe as having 
opened up "the prospect of a new standard of administration and develop- 
meat for this small State". 
159 
From 1932 to 1941 annual Government rev- 
enue quadrupled, the National Debt was liquidated and substantial credit 
balanoes were amassed in preparation for the day when oil ran out. The 
soope of administration was expanded and greater attention was given to 
the improvement of infrastruoture and social servioes., Symbolioally, 
public buildings began tobe constructed of brick from 1933 (instead of 
the temporary or semi-permanent materials used previously). Equally 
important was the rising influenoe of the BNPC9 the shifting of the 
State's eoonomio oentre of gravity from the oapital to the oilfield, and 
the evidenoe of a polarization between Brunei and Belait distriot. As 
early as 1940-1 the Government could be oharaoterized as very muoh the 
"poor relation" of the BMPC in Belait distriot. In short, there was a 
break with the pre-oil past; and the retention of politioal authority 
enabled the Government to make iaoreased demands on the oil sector after 
the Pacific War. 
The early benefits of the new oil wealth were enjoyed priu- 
oipally by the BMPC, whioh paid not more than 10% in oil royalties. 
158. CO 717/129 (File 51535) minute by Mr Gent, 13 June 1938- 
159, CO 717/123 (File 51535) minute by Mr Gent, 6 )laroh 1937" 
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Government servantsp oilfield personnel and Chinese shopkeepers, mer- 
chants and market gardeners, were the seotions of the population who 
had brio% houses supplied with running water and eleotrioity, sent their 
children to local sohoolsq took advantage of the new hospitals, and 
enjoyed the recreational facilities provided by the oil company. For 
the River Villagers and raral dwellers, on the other hand, there was no 
electricity, water had to be collected from a distanoe, they were less 
likely to send their children to sohoolp and remained suspicious of the 
new health services. Their economic well-being, moreover, had to some 
extent beoome tied to the vioissitudes of the world market and pertio- 
ularly to the price of rubber. 
Brunei remained a comparatively uncomplicated country in 1941. 
It still oould not boast a single seoondary school, a single looally- 
trained doctor, lawyer or engineer. The country lacked even a commercial 
bank (unless the Post Offioe Savings Bank, founded in 1935, is thus 
oharaoterized). The oooatry had little unemployment, only insignifioant 
orime, and sinoe 1904 there had been no further epidemio of a killer 
disease suoh as smallpox, Trade uni onsp politioal parties and a strident 
nationalist movement were oonspiouous by their absenoe. The oountry was 
"idyllio"160 in the reoolleotion of one British offioer who served there 
in the late 1930s. But Brunei's "steady progress to modern state hood'ý161 
was then disrupted by the Japanese oooupation. 
160. Dr OE Fisher, letter to the author, 24 March 1984, paragraph 4- p 
161. ER Bevington CM( CEng, The Eoonomy and Development of the State of 
Branei (June 1956), p 5. Copy courtesy of Mr Bevington. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
THE 1940ss A DECADE WASTED? (WAR, JAPANESE OCCUPATION & RECONSTRUCTION) 
1. Introduotion 
If Brunei had been oomparatively unaffeoted by the Great War 
(1914-18)1 a tragioall»-different situation obtained during the Paoifio 
War of 1941-59 when the oountry suffered from illegal Japanese oooupation. 
In the previous decade a platform for the future growth of the Sultanate 
had been established. During the years 1941-5v on the other hands the 
Japanese Military Administration not oaly tailed to build upon these 
founda. tioas, but allowed existing gains to be frittered away. The 
administration was negleoted, trading came to a standstill, rubber exports 
oeasedp the health and education systems ran dawns and the Japanese 
polioy was to subordinate all else to their war effort. Given their 
rapidly deteriorating war situation, whioh eventually resulted in the 
1. Althoagh fiscal recovery and trading growth had been retarded by 
wartime conditions and shipping restriotionsp life in the Sultanate had 
not been drastically affected. The report by Mr Cator for inoluUion in 
the official history, The Empire At' War, by Sir CP Luoasq ran as follows; 
"Brunei. As was to be expected from its position and circumstances the 
Part played by... Brunei in the War was neither prominent nor exciting$ 
but throughont... the Sultan was a most faithful... supporter of the 
British cause and lost no opportunity of impressing on his subjects 
their duties and obligations. The generosity with which the War Funds 
and Charities were supported and the attitude of unswerving loyalty 
adopted by all classes showed that the efforts of the State were limited, 
not by want of goodwill, but by want of power" (CO 273/5011 52339)" The 
few uropeans in Brunei paid a voluntary income tax varying from 1% to 
6, the proceeds of which - £. 123.12 in 1917 (CO 531/11. '10762) and £163.31 
in 1918 (CO 531/13: 3922) - were remitted to HK Treasury. 
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Sultanate being virtually out off from the outside world - the Japanese 
oan hardly have been expeoted to add signifioautlp to the progress of 
Brunei, even if it had been one of their priorities. When the Allies 
returned in June 1945 the reoonstraoti on of the Sultanate had to begin 
almost from soratoh; and it was not until 1953 that a new phase in the 
oonutry"s development oommenoed. 
2. "The State is indefensible" 
The outbreak of the Seoond World War on 3 September 1939 
originally gave a oonsiderable boost to Brunei's eoonoin , stimulating 
espeoially the produotion of oil, rubber and sago. 
2 
Conversely, there 
was a sharp rise in the Dost of living, for whioh labourers were paid 
oompensator7 allowanoes. The revival of rubber, in partioular, inoreased 
the general prosperity and purohasing power. 
3 
The Sultan ordered two gifts of 100,000 eaoh to be paid from 
State funds to the imperial exohequer; 
4 but these may not be regarded as 
voluntary oontributions. In 1940 speoial war taxation was introdnoed, 
in the form of an export duty on rubber of 2. ad, vai., doubted in 1941 
to 9%' and inoreased duties on liquor and tobaooo imports. The prooeeds 
2. The quota for rubber release for the fourth quarter of 1941 was 120% 
oompared with 60% in the third quarter of 1939. Exports of rubber from 
Brunei inoreased from 2.78 million pounds (lbs) in 1938 to 4.43 million 
The in 1940 and 4.64 million in 1941. Oil exports rose from 5 million 
barrels in 1938 to 5.53 million in 1939 and 6.27 million in 1940 (before 
falling to just under 4 million barrels in 1941). Sago exports rooketed 
from $13,542 in 1938 to 9102092 in 1940- 
3* CO 717/136 (File 51535) statement by Mr JO Blaokv n. d. v enol, in Sir 
TSW Thomas to CO, UMS (Brunei) No 509 21 April 1939; and CO 717/141 (Fille 
51535) statement by Mr Pengilley, 13 Maroh 1940. 
4. Co 717/139 (File 51888/4) and 00 717/143 (File 51888/4). 
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V51010 in 1940) were remitted to the United Kingdom. The inorease in 
tension with Japan resulted in, provision being made in Maroh 1941 so as 
to enable local expenditure incurred in oonneotion with the war to be 
defrayed from speoial taxation. The Resident retained discretion to 
deoide what proportion should be paid over to HM Government. 
5 
The United Kingdom laoked the resouroes adequately to defend 
Brunei. Minor measures only were possible. These inoluded the aooumnlation 
of food stocks, 
6 
passage of an Official Secrets Enactment (February 1941) 
to deter spies,, 
7 
and the recruitment of extra police. In addition, 
provision was made for the establishment of a Brunei Volunteer Foroe, 
8 
whioh was not expeoted to resist an enemy landing. A vote was made for 
air raid preoautions. in the oilfield area. 
9 
On 10 and 11 May 1941 the 2/15 Punjab Regiment left Singapore 
for Borneo. one oompaay was stationed in the Miri-Seria oilfield, the 
majority in Kuohing (Sarawak). SH Government was oonoerned about the 
defenoeleae state of British Borneo. Air, naval and man-power were 
deficient and conoentrated elsewhere in the Par Easts 
"The task of the existing small garrison in North Borneo (meaning, here, 
Sarawak and Brunei) is to defend the airfields and oilfields as far as 
5" CO 717/146 (File 51656) statement by Mr Pengilley, 24 March 1941. 
6. B7 September 1941 stocks in Brunei amounted to 180 days' supply of 
rioev 42 of flour, 14 of milk, 42 of sugar and 60 of salt. (00852/494 
File 21 item 751 Sir TSW Thomas to co, No 492 (telegram), 30 September 
1941). Second-grade Thai rice rose in price from 30 cents a Taut aa in 
September 1939 to 49 cents a anta by March 1941. Cheaper rice (36 
cents) was available from Burma at the latter date (i_., item 55)- 
7. CO 323/1848 (File 7307A)- 
8- CO 820/50 (File 36516/6); and CO 531/32 . 
(Bi1e 19 item l)- 
99 The total supplementary expenditure on emergenov measures in 1941 
amounted to X86,537 compared with X66,876 derived from 'war taxation: 
rubber export'. (Brunei Annual Report t 1946, pp 69-70). 
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Possible, gaining suffioient time, in the event of any major attaok, for 
their denial to the enemy". 10 
It was supposed that Japan laoked the oapaoity simultaneously to strike 
in Malaya and Borneo. For this reason British Borneo was not defendeds 
"Surely the answer" - thus Mr Gent - "is that the state is indefensible 
against a major attack by Japan so long as our military, air and naval 
strength is only suffioient to ensure the defence of more vital points 
such as Malaya and to fight at least a delaying aotion at points, e. g. 
Hong Kong, which are more significant than North Borneo". 11 
The, United Kingdom had been slow to appreoiate the potential 
threat from Japan, as indicated by the intermittent fashion in which the 
naval base at Singapore was oonstruoted. Further, the Allied powers 
failed to present a united front to Japan (in the sense of making it olear 
an attack on one would be regarded as an attaok on all). 
12 
After the 
fall of Franoe, moreover, British naval strength had to be diverted to 
the Mediterranean., where, formerly, the Frenoh Navy had balanoed the 
Italian. 13 Finally, the Japanese always held the initiatives 
"The enemy oan strike when and where he pleases"p Sir JE Shaokbergh 
refleoted on the eve of the Paoifio War; "we (the Allies) oan do nothing, 
oannot even deoide whether we will hit baok or not, until the blow has 
fallen. And even then we shall apparently have to waste days, if not 
weeks, sending long telegrams to one another and disoussing teohnioal 
questions of international law. By the time we are ready (if ever) the 
enemy will presumably have reaohed its objeotive unopposed". 14 
Oilfield Decrial Soheme. On the morning of 8 Deoember 1941, 
following the Japanese attaok on British Malaya, the telegram ordering the 
10. Co 968/15 (File 2v item 172) Mr RH Soott to Mr JO Sterudale-Bennett, 
most seoret, 31 August 1941. 
11. Ibid., item 174, Gent to Sterndale-Bennett (FO), 6 September 1941- 
12, This oorrespondenoe is in Co 968/8 (Files 10 and 11). 
13. Point owed to Dr DK Bassett. 
14. CO 968/8 (File 11) minute by Sir JE Shuokbergh (1877-1953), 27 
November 1941. 
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implementation of the oil denial soheme was reoeived in Miri-Seria. This 
plan had been drawn up by 1938, if not earlier. 
15 
The aim was to derby 
the enemy the oil wells absolutely for an indefinite periods the scheme 
Was not "oompromised by any desire to retain them intaot in the hope 
that we should eventually reoooupy the territories". The task of the 
Punjab-. Regiment was to proteot the demolition parties until the destraotiou 
of the installations had been oompleted and to oover the withdrawal to 
l6 Singapore of skilled teohnioians and essential maohine parts* 
In September 1941 all "naturally flowing" oil wells had been 
oemented off, effeotivelg rendering them useless as produoers of oil; 
produotion also oeased at Miri and part of the Lutong refinery was dis- 
mantled and the equipment shipped to Singapore. On 8 Deoember, therefore, 
the only wells rem fining to be inoapaoitated were a few "gas-lift" wells 
at Seria, i. e. those wells where gas had to be used to pump the oil up 
to the surfaoe. The oompressor station was destroyed and the well heads 
were then blown off. All oil equipment, installations, seoondary workshops 
and the eleotrioity-generating stations even stooks of whisky and gin, 
were destroyed. In short, "the whole emergenoy soheme was effeotively 
oarried out". 
17 
A Japanese soaroe agrees that "the enemy had destroyed 
the key installations in the oilfields and mnoh time was neoessaxry to 
n 
15" The files in the CO 323 series, numbered 6214/16, for 1935,1936 and 
1938 are olosed for 50 nears; the file for 1937 is "missing"; and the 
file for 1939 is "destroyed under statute". Cf. CO 717/123 (File 51535), 
minute by Mr Gent, 6 Maroh 1937s "We (the co) have also made proposals 
for the inauguration of a form of defenoe foroe for the oilfield in 
Brunei in assooiation with Sarawak". 
16. CO 968/15 (File 5) minute by Mr AR Thomas, 2 January 1942- 
17.00 968/15 (File 6, item 4) report by Messrs AO Buohan and RN 
Connook, 22 Deoember 1941. 
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repair (them)", 
18 
On 16 Deoember 1941 a ooastal look-out reported thirteen large 
Japanese warships and one large oil tanker north of Miri. The soldiers 
of the Punjab Regiment having been withdrawn on the 13th after the 
suooeasful oompletioa of the oil destruotion Boheme, and the volunteer 
foroe being mostly disbanded, the landing took plaoe unopposed (by ground 
foroes). From Kuala Belait the Japanese moved quiokly overland to Tatong 
and on the 22nd they had reached the capital. The British government 
officials (inoluding the Resident)19 and rubber planters were seized and 
interned for the remainder of the oonfliot, briefly in Miri and then in 
Kuohi 2ý ng. A party of Daropeaas (inoluding the general manager of the 
BMPC, Mr Parry), who had escaped into the interior, were massacred by 
the Japanese at Long Nawang, along with the looal Dutoh garrison. 
21 
18. Imperial War Museum (hereafter IWM)s Box 6, AL 1099, Col. Itsu 
Ogawa and Lt. Col. Ino Sei, "Borneo Operations 1941-2" (Japanese Studies 
in World War II9 No 22). p 252. 
19. In early 1942 the British Residents of Brunei (Mr Pengilley) and 
Labuan (Mr Humphrey) were invited by the Japanese to work under them. 
Both refused. (Mr Pengilley EDI letter to the author, 10 May 1983; 2L 
Sri. 
DDatuk 
AHP Humphrey PMN CMG OBE, letter to the author, 5 April 1983, 
paragraph 5). The Brunei State Medical Officer, Dr Graham, was not 
finally interned until 1943. 
20. CO 60430 Sarawak Gazette, 10 August 1950, pp 205-212 ("Guests of 
the Japanese"); (RHO) Mss BE s454s Datuk RN Tyner, "From the Depths of 
My Memory" (3 vois, 1976), Chapter Ix (pp 62-82); (IWM) A6024108 "Enemy 
Internment of British Civilians, 1941-5" (typescript of an interview 
with Datuk Humphrey, 1983). 
21. "As horrible as anything ever perpetrated in history" (including the 
bayoneting of children). Major GS Carter DSO, "Extract of a Report on 
the Long Nawang Massacre" (1950), typescript in the possession of the 
author, courtesy of Major Carter. Cf. Lieutenant Okino, a novel by Mr 
RH Hiokling (London 1968). According to Major Carter's report 45 of 
the 68 victims were Ditch. 
The Japanese were not entirely unopposed, however. Their 
transports were bombed at least once a day whilst landing at the oilfield, 
resulting in forty "casualties" (Ogawa and Sei, loo____: oit., p 256). British 
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It was reported that there were "no seoret sooieties or (pro- 
Japanese) fifth -oolumn"; bitt the people oould do nothing praotioal to 
resist the invader. Chinese shopkeepers in Braneig however, had 
boyootted Japanese goods since 1937" 
22 
3. The New- Leader of the East 
Japanese determination to oreate a Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity 
Sphere to support their own 'inner zone' (Japan, Korea and 'Manohukuo' ) 
eoonomy is well-known, as are the varioasxstages by whioh they moved 
inexorably towards an invasion of South. -East Asia in 1938-41.23 The 
sources agree that on 17-20 and 28 December Datoh planes (two of which 
were lost) attacked Japanese shipping off Miri "and are believed to have 
sunk at least one destroyer" (Co 604/29 Sarawak Gazette, 7 October 1949, 
p 266 and 7 November 1949, p 291). Post-war Japanese accounts concede 
that on 22 December 1941, three ships, including one destroyter, were 
"torpedoed" by "enemy submarines"p causing heavy damage to all three. 
(IWM) Bo= 22, AL 5256, Itsa Ogawa and Lt. Col. Masash Ino, "Borneo 
Operations, 1941-5" - Japanese monograph No 26, HQ US Army, Japan, 1957 
p 12. 
Kuching airfield, guarded by the Punjab Regiment because it 
afforded access to Dutoh Borneo, was denied to the enemy, who was resisted 
for five months across Borneo (wo 203/2869). The retreat was disastrous 
for the Punjab Regiment, who lost 524 killed or missing (of whom 473 were 
Indians), whilst the remaining 579 were interned, after capture on 3 
April 1942, in Java. An enemy source admits the loss of 100 Japanese 
dead and 100 injured during this campaign. 
22.00 824/2 Brunei Annual Report 1938, p 28. The Japanese had an 
obvious 'sleeping agent' in Kuala Belait, a fanoy goods dealer called 
Mr Suzuki Datuk RN Turner SPIK CK0, letter to the author, 16 February 
1983). 
23. JC Lebra (ed), The Japanese Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere 
in World War II (Kuala Lumpur 1975); J Livingston, J Moore &F Oldfather, 
The Japan Reader is Imperial Japan 1800-1945 (Harmoadsworth 1976); Marias 
B Jansen, "Japan" in Enoyolopaedia Britannica (Chicago 1972), Vol 12 No 
12, p 913; 0 ganahele, The Japanese Occupation of Indonesian Prelude to 
Independenoe (Cornell PhD, 1967); and R Storry, A History of Modern 
Ja an (Harmondsworth 1976). 
321 
role of SE Asia was to supply the raw materials for the 'inner zone' and 
to provide the ueoessary foodstuffs for the Japanese armies stationed in 
the respective southern countries. The Greater East Asia Sphere had 
"the primary aim of seouring benefits to Japan rather than to the member 
nations of the bloo". 
24 
The "natives", for their part, were to be brought 
to a "oomplete reoognitiou... of Japan's real power". Even Japan's puppet 
wartime leader in Barmai Dr Ba Maw, complained that for Japanese militarists 
"there was only one way to do a thing, the Japanese way; only one goal 
and interest, the Japanese interest; only one destiny for the East Asian 
oonntries, to beoome so many 1[anohnkuos or Koreas tied forever to Japan". 25 
The Japanese appeared to have little respeot for Xalays - "the new order 
in Asia"p the Japan Times thundered, "requires virile peoples" - Whilst 
the Chinese immigrants were "superfluous". 
26 
The Kawaguohi Detao1meat, the Japanelle tack foros detailed for 
NW Borneo, prooeeded from Canton via Caaorauh Bay in the first part of 
December 1941. General Beikea (or Kiyotaki) Yawaguobi decided that 
"a landing would be made at Kiri and Soria to capture and secure the 
oilfield district and airfields in that area. A part of the force would 
then re-establish the Miri oilfield while the main body was to capture 
the äuohing airbase as soon as possible". 27 
When Japanese troops, under Captain Koyamaq entered Brunei Town, they were 
allegedly "entbusiastioally weloomed by the inhabitant 0#1028 Pending the 
arrival of permanent J'apaneee administrative staff, 1eneral Kawaguobi, 
24. H Benda, at al., in Lebra (ed) . oit. 9 p 101; of. Jansen, 100 
t). 
25" 6ixoted in Lebra (ed), opý pp 157. 
26. Japan Times and Advertiser, 17 February 1942. 
27. (IWM) AL 1099 Col. Itsa Ogawa and Lt. Col. Ino Sei, "Borneo Operations, 
1941-2", p 254- 
28. (RHO) Iss Pao 855, Inohe Raus, "Stories of Brunei" (1942), trans- 
lated by Mr P Soanlon (1951), p 29; and Osaka Hainiobi, 18 January 1942, 
p 6. 
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with the oonsent of the Sultan, 
29 
handed the administration of the 
oonntry to Inohe Ibrahim, formerly 'Secretary to Resident', 
30 
In Maroh 1942 the Kawaguohi Detaohment left Borneo for the 
Philippines and was later annihilated on CJuadaloanal The 4th Independent 
Mixed Regimente directly attached to the Southern Army, took over the 
duties of the Kawaguohi Detaohment in Borneo and was responsible for 
peaoe and orders the establishment of a military government, the 
development of natural resources and the mopping up of the remaining 
enemy in the mountain ranges of west Borneo. In April, in order to 
expand Japanese military government, Tokyo ordered the aotivation of 
the Borneo Garrison Army (BGA), oommaaded by Goiohi Nakahatap who estab- 
lished his headquarters in Kuohing. In July 1942 the 4th Independent 
Mixed Regiment was re-organized into the 40th and 41st Independent 
Garrison Infantry Battalions with abort four hundred soldiers each. 
Borneo was divided into two zones by the Japaneses 'North Borneo' 
(formerly British Borneo), whioh was ooatrolled by the Army; and 'South 
29. Pr p de Wit (1914-83), who had not been arrested at first because 
the Japanese thought he was a Germane recalled that the sultan had "no 
qualme about signing the capitulation" because the British had let him 
down. "He was not pleased with the Japanese soldiers"p Ft de Wit added. 
"His peace was disturbed and they ordered dinners all the time. He hoped 
the Americans would come to help get them (the Japanese) out, but the 
news was not good". (Fr P de Wit, "Van Sultans en Sultans Doahters" in 
Maanblad van Mill Hill. No 7t December 1951, pp 185-6. Translation from 
the Dutch by courtesy of Miss Town Ablbers). 
30. Inohe Raus, loo. oit., On 1 April 1942 oloolca were advanced one hour 
all over Brunei so as to conform with Tokyo time. The year was also 
calculated in Japanese style from 4 July 1942 (1942AD " 2602 JS). 
31. Henry I Shawp "Ouaäaloanals A Triumph" in World War II (Orbis, London, 
1971-3)9 pp 1249-50. Of 6,000 Japanese, 90% fell on one day, 13 
September 1942. 
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Borneo' (formerly Dutch Borneo) under the Navy. The former political 
divisions of British Borneo were disregarded by the Japanese. The whole 
area was governed as one b7 a military oommander. The first governor of 
'North Borneo' was General Maeda, 
32 
who hailed from a family with a long 
warrior tradition. With his appointment, Tokyo radio deolaredp "the old 
order had been oompletely done away with and New Borneo will emerge as 
a valuable member of the Par East Go-Prosperity Region". 
33 
On 12 April 
1942 he oonfi ded to Domei neweageaoy his conviotion that, with the neo- 
e8sary oapital and laboarg the reeouroes of 'North Borneo' could be speedily 
developed "to bolster Japan's proseoution of the War". 
34 
He added that 
"aotion without words" would be his polioy. He was "ao possessor of any 
pet eoonomio theory". 
35 After only four months in offioe, however,, 
General Maeda was killed in an aircraft accident (5 September 1942), on 
the premise that reeearoh work met preoede oonstraotion undertakings, 
the general had busied himself with inspeotion trips. With his "inoisive 
judgement and extraordinary diligenoe", he laid "the foandations of the 
32. Lieutenant-General Toahinari Maeda (1885-1942), son of Visaonnt 
Toshiaki Maeda. 1905, graduated from Military Staff College, subsequently 
continuing his studies in Europe. 19278 military attaohep London. After- 
wards he served successively as a regimental oommander, a sectional chief 
of the Arty General Staff, and as an instructor at the Military Staff 
College, of which he became president in 1936. He then commanded a unit 
in 'Maaohukuo', before assuming his final post as C-in-C. Borneo Garrison 
AMY,, His service was "unostentatious yet brilliant". Also President 
of the Bunka Hake Kai (Society for Public Service through Culture). 
Hobbys chess. Japan Times and Advertiser. 29 October 1942. 
33. (BBC Written Archives Centre, hereafter BBCWAC), Daily Digest of 
Foreign Broadcasts (hereafter DDFB) No 1l000t Italian language broadcast 
from Tokyo, 12 April 1942. 
34. Of similar statements by General Toj'o on 20 February 1943 and 11 
March 1943 (DDFB 1315 and 1332)- 
35. DDFB No 1000, Domei report, 12 April 1942. 
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military administration in Borneo whioh was about to embark upon the 
oonstruotion stage when he met his untimely death". 
36 It remained "a 
matter for oongratulation" (to the Japanese). * however, that "peaoe and 
order in Borneo is perfect". 
37 
The late governor was suooeeded by General Yamawaki, 
38 
an 
authority on military education and considered to be "the fittest leader 
of oonstruotion work in Borneo, whioh is now taking a definite shape". 
39 
General Yamawaki was still in offioe in mid-1944 but not at the time of 
the Japanese surrender, At his military headquarters in Kuching were 
the administrative departments, such as general affairs, finanoe and 
oonveyance. 
40 
Local government oonsisted of prefeotural and dietriot 
offioes. There were five prefeotures in 'North Borneo' and either 
36. Japan Times and Advertiser, 29 October 1942. 
37" Ibid. 
38. Lieutenant-General Nasataka Tamawaki. Graduate of Military Staff 
College. Later he served as a member of the Inspectorate General of 
military education, as a military attache to the Japanese legation in 
Poland, as a member of the Army General Staff and as an instructor at 
the Military Staff College. 1932s participated in Woosung landing. 
1934: military attache to Japanese legations in Poland and Roumania. 
Subsequently Director of Ordnance Bureau of War Ministry and Vice 
Inspector-General of Military Education. Dec 19381 Vice Minister of War. 
19401 appointed commander of an outpost unit, after which he became 
President of the Military Staff College, coot 19421 appointed C-in-C, 
Borneo Garrison Army- ibid. t and DDF'B No 1772, German language broadcast 
from Tokyo,, 10.15 hours, 23 May 1944)- 
39. Japan Times and Advertiser, 29 October 1942. 
40. According to information supplied to the author by courtesy of Prof. 
DE Brown, the general affairs department dealt with administration, race, 
personnel, education and religion, and information and propaganda; the 
finance department with the control of exchange prices and distribution, 
research of important resourcess aoquisition of goods for civilian use) 
finance and monetary circulation, and the management of factories; and 
the conveyance department with the transport of goods and mail. Sub- 
sequently new departments, such as police and industry, were established. 
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fifteen or twenty distriots. 
41 
Brunei was abolished as a separate entity 
and replaoed by the prefecture of 'Mira Shih', whioh enoompassed Brunei, 
Labuang and the Fourth and Fifth Divisions of Sarawak,, 
42 
The Japanese 
made no attempt to depose the Sultan, however; on the contrary, he was 
granted a pension and twioe deoorated. 
In late May 1942 over five hundred Japanese offioials arrived 
in Borneo. 43 Japanese martial law had been imposed; but Islamio and 
adat law were to be upheld. The maintenanoe of peace and pubiio order 
were "basin" to Japanese polioy. Polioe were re-trained in Japanese 
methods. Crime remained unoommon, the most frequent offene being 
laroeny. Internal passports were issued, to control river traffio. 
Dr RHW Reece states that generally-speaking the Japanese were 
oontent to oontrol ooastal areas and riverine settlements-, and, apart from 
000asional patrols, made no attempt to bring the whole of the interior 
under their olose influeaoe. 
44 An effort was made? to inouloate anti- 
European feeling; and in the later stages of the warp the teaohing of 
Japanese was introdaoed into the school curriculum and all Government 
servants were required to attend night olasses so that they might master 
the language. Expeditions were made by Japanese officials into the 
41. an Times and Advertiser, 2 June 1942; and DDFB No 1055,7 June 
1942 (Domei Report). 
42. It was administered "by a governor of high rank (y)..... originally 
stationed at Miri, who moved to Brunei (Town) in April 2602 (1942 AD). 
The Governor at this time was Mr T 8odama; before the Head Offioe of 
Miri Shih moved to Brunei (Town), Mr T Kimura was sub-distriot oommander 
until 29 June 2602". (Inohe Raus, loo. oit., pp 29-30). 
43. an Times and Advertiser, 2 June 1942; and DDFB. No 1049,1 June 
1942; German language broadoast from Tokyo, 09.30 hours, 31 May 1942- 
44- RHW Reeoe, The Name of Brooke (Kuala Lumpur 1982), p 143. 
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interior of the island9 films were shown, radio speeches made, Japan- 
ese newspapers issued in Malay, and medical supplies and other items 
distributed to the publio. 
45 
The oonstruotion programme entrusted to General Yamawaki in 
1942-4 soon faltered. It was reported subsequently by Brigadier Maoaskiet 
the Chief Civil Affairs Offioer in British Borneo (1945-6)p that: 
"During the early days of the occupation the Japanese attempted to 
administer the territory and to collect taxes but soon gave up the task 
as unprofitable. For the past year (1944-5) their policy has been the 
seizure of materials and labour for military needs and complete neglect 
of every other consideration. They continued to pay salaries to Govern- 
ment servants in depreciated Japanese currency, and the native officers 
and subordinate staff succeeded in maintaining outward order by per- 
suasion, coupled with drastic punishment by the Japanese for any visible 
sign of disorder". 46 
Or agaius 
"After invasion the Japanese attempted to carry on the former machinery 
of government, but there was soon a complete breakdown in the methods of 
administration and the Japanese rule degenerated into mere spoliation 
enforced by the Army through the medium of the Kempe ital. No attempt 
was made by the Japanese to carry out or even maintain public works 
and their attempt to oontinue the fiscal system was soon abandoned and 
they relied upon such revenue as they could raise by granting gambling 
lioenoes and monopolies of trade". 47 
Brunei Malays seem to have remained at their posts in the 
administration, polioe and sohools. 
48 
Most of these people were to be 
45- "Borneo" in British Survey (Vol VIA No 12), 12 December 19459 p 3. 
46. CO 531/31 (File 30) CFC Macaskie (1888-1969) to War Office, 8 
September 1945v paragraph 31; also in CO 874/1107. 
47. WO 203/2400 Macaskie, "Final Report of the British Military Admin- 
istration in Borneo s 10. June 1945 to 15 July 1946", n. 
d., paragraph 3. 
Mr (later Sir) LD Qammans MP agreed that "a striking fact about the 
Japanese occupation was their appalling ineffioienoy. Wherever they 
went the administrative and eoonomio machine just ran down". 
48. For example, Pen ran Ahmad bin Pen ran Anak Lubo (b 1899), who 
became District Offioer in Tutong; Pen ran Muhammad remained as State 
Wireless Officer; Inohe Harzen as Superintendent of Education; and Inche 
Taib as DO Belait. 
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found later in prominent positions in the Sultanate. The police and 
teachers who had been indootrinated by the Japanese, indeed, were among 
those least well-disposed towards the resumption of the British Resident- 
ial System in 1946. On. l October 1943 the Japanese Military Administration 
issued a deolaratiou respeoting "the political rights of 'North Borneo' 
natives". Provincial councils were tobe established in each prefecture 
on & Deoember 1943" Five to fifteen "prominent natives" were to be 
appointed as "extraordinary members" of the ooanoils by the Japanese 
Military Adminietration. 
49 
On 2, February 1944 it was announoed that ten 
people from 'North Borneo' were to be sent for an inspeotion tour of 
Japan to last for one month. Five other youths were to be sent to Japan 
for one year courses at agricultural, technical and other scientific 
institutions. The purpose of suoh training was to enable students 
"to oo-operate more fully with Japan". 
51 
The economy. The Japanese complained that the British had left 
Borneo as undeveloped as possible. 
52 
The first priority was the rehab- 
ilitation of the Miri-Seria oilfield. The destraotion of installations 
did not unduly oonoern planners in Tokyo. One industrialist thought that 
the Borneo fields were the shallowest in the world so that new wells oould 
49. (BBC WAG) DDFB No 1537,2 Ootober 1943, German language broadoast 
from Tokyo, 09.40 hours, 1 Ootober 1943. 
50. DDFB No 1660,2 February 1944 (Domei report). 
51. DDFB No 1661,3 February 19441 Domei report, 1 February 1944. 
52. The Osaka Mainiohi and Tokyo Niohi Niohi, 18 January 1942, p 6. At 
one stage Mr Aoki, Minister for Greater East Asia, even deolared that 
the natural resouroes in Borneo were "deliberately hidden" while the 
north-west of the island was under British rule (DDFB No 1399,17 May 
19431 Domei report, 15 May 1943, quoting Mr Aoki). 
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be bored in about two or three months or in a year at the most. 
53 Though 
laok of maohinery oaused severe inoonvenienoe in reconstraotioap experts 
managed to operate pumps by repairing damaged parts with automobile motors 
and other mechanical odds and ends. 
54 
Dr Reeoe states that the Japanese 
managed to sink sixteen new wells in Miri-Seria during the ocoupation. 
55 
Production remained significantly below pre-war levels; 
56 
and output in 
1947 alone exceeded the total produced during the years 1942-5.57 
At the end of 1942 the Japanese announoed that the "fundamentals" 
for the development of Borneo were 
"the attainment of independeuoe in the matter of food supply and the 
inoreased produotion of oil, ooal and minerals, and the eoonomio 
exploitation of the forestall. 58 
The first aim was to double rioe prodnotion in order to eliminate the need 
for imports. New areas of jungle were to be brought under oultivation 
53. This was the attitude of a Nr Ishihara, President of the Ishihara 
Industrial Marine Transportation Company, quote& in JO Lebra (ed), OP.. 
2'-t. , pp 44-5. 
54" (BBO WAG) DDFB No 1000,13 April 1942, Domei report. 
55. RHW Reeoe, . oit., p 143- 
56. Prodnotion from Soria alone in 1939 was 5.53 million barrels, in 1940 
6.27m barrels annually. Japanese output during the 3. years of the 
occupation totalled only 11.5m barrels from Miri and Soria combined (3.3m 
barrels annually). (00 Harper, The Disoover9 and Development of the Seria 
Oilfield - Bandar Seri Begawan, 1975 -p 21). Of, DDFB No 929, Tokyo 
radio, 19.55 his, 31 January 1942* "Japanese successes in Sarawak and 
Brunei guarantee an annual supply of °3.5 million tons (o20+ million 
barrels) of petroleum". Daring the Qooupation a large number of BMPC 
staff were employed by the Japanese in the same job that they had with 
the company (Harper, op. oit., p 22 fn). 
57. The Japanese produced an estimated 1,600,000 tons during the 
oooupation (Brunei Annual Report 1946). Production in 1947 amounted to 
1,689,963 tons. 
58. CO 874/1104 Gent to Sir N Malcolm (BNBC), 29 January 1943, enclosing 
World Eoonomio News (Hamburg), 22 January 1943; of. BBC WAG) DDFB No 
1262,31 Deoember 1942: Domei report, 30 December 1942. 
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For the purpose; and beoauae rubber was available in abundanoe throughout 
the Co-Prosperity Sphere, plans were made to shift rubber cultivators to 
other agricultural undertakings, particularly rice and cotton. In faotp 
however, the Japanese failed to ensure sufficient food gmpplies. Farther 
light is shed on this matter ty Professor AR Maxwells 
"Japanese occupation forces in Brunei (1941-5) attempted to appropriate 
rice and money from Kedayan villagers. If they had no money the troops 
wanted their labour, especially to collect wood from the forest. Con- 
seqaeutly, many fled into the forest to escape these exactions. Small 
groups of families established swiddens within walking distance of each 
other. Houses were built in awiddens. Small groups were living dis- 
persed in the forest east of gampong Pyasaw-pyasaw. According to 
informants, the scattered and nonr-nucleated settlement pattern probably 
prevented some harsh treatment by avoiding the direct reach of Japanese 
troops... (Food), supplies during the occupation were unprediotable and 
often short. Kedayan villagers affirmed that some Bararray (i. e. Brunei 
Ifalays) accompanied them into the forest and learned how to cultivate 
rice for the first time". 59 
Timber felled in Borneo to make way for" agrioultural land was 
"vital" for the Japanese war effort. 
60 
Coal was extraoted from the seam 
at Subok near Brunei Town. The outoh industrl appears to have been 
continued, A branch of the Yokohama Specie Bank was opened in Miri. 
61 
A Maritime Bureau and shipbuilding programme for 'North Borneo' were 
established in Kuohing. 
62 
Thirty Chinese, representing their compatriots 
in Borneo, pledged a "donation" in 1942 to the Japanese military author- 
ities of three million yen to be raised in two months and to liquidate 
all pro-Chiang Kai Shek aotivities. Chinese residentst it was reported, 
59" AR Maxwell, Uraug Daratt An Ethnographio Study of the Kadayan of 
Labs Valley, Brunei (Am Urbor, 1981)9 pp 107-8. 
60. BBC WACI DDFB No 1095,17 July 19421 Darret report. 
61. DDFB No 1115,6 August 1942, English language broadcast from 
Batavia, 5 August 1942. 
62. DDFB No 1161,21 September 19421 Domei report; and DDFB No 1267,5 
January 1943. 
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were doing business under the proteotion of the Nipponese authorities,, 
63 
The Kwok rebellion of 1943 in Jesselton indioates the real feelings of 
the Chinese; but, by adding to Japanese feelings of insecurity, it led 
to greater repression. 
64 
Shortages. In Marsh 1943 the Japanese Military Administration 
officially recognized the establishment of the North Borneo Materials 
Distribution Assooiation whioh aimed at establishing the supply and 
distribution of goods in (North Borneo' on a well-planned basis. The 
tasks of the new assooiation was to oontrol goods imported from Japan and 
the 'southern regions', inolnding daily neoessitiesp foodstuffs, maohines 
and textiles, and commodities produced in 'North Borneo'. 
65 
If this 
move was designed to prevent shortages, it failed signally. 
Apart from Brunei having been out off from its traditional 
export markets (viz. the-United Kingdom and the United States), Allied 
destruotion of Japanese shipping66 brought trade to a standstill and 
"only oertain shopkeepers were allowed to remain as distributors". 
67 
The 
Japanese curreuoy declined rapidly in value. Cash crop production ceased. 
Inevitable hardship followed. As General Tojo aoourately observed, the 
"suooesstui outoome'of the war" was a prerequisite for building up 
63. (BBC WAC) DDFB No 1106,28 July 1942t Domei report, 27 July 1943. 
64. J Maxwell Hall, ginabalu Caerrillass An Aooount of the Double Tenth 
,1 
(Borneo Literature Bureau 1968); T Harrisson, "The Chinese in Borneo 
1942-1946" in International Affairs (1950), PP 354-62; and notes from the 
Japanese Riku tin (oourtesy of Professor D^ Brown). 
65. (BBC WAC) DDFB No 1331,10 Maroh 1943: Domei report (Maroh 1943)- 
66. During the war the Allies sank about 90% of Japanese naval and 
tnerohant shipping (R Storry, A History of Modern Japan - Harmondsworth, 
1976, Revised Edn -p 228). 
67. Brunei Annual Report 1946, P 7" 
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Greater East Asia. 
68 
Unfortunately for him, Japanese armies everywhere 
were in retreat. 
For the Brunei people matters started to beoome harsh at the 
beginning of 1944, by which time the stores of food and medicine stock- 
Piled before the war had beoome exhausted. The Japanese themselves 
lacked food, so they confiscated most of the local harvest in 1944 to 
remedy the deficienoy. The effect of this was that 
"a serious state of starvation set in (among the people of Brunei), 
which grew worse week by week. Together with the lank of food, medicines 
were in very short supply and almost non-existent, malaria spread, and 
the resistanoe of the population to disease was broken down... No anti- 
malaria work was done... ". 69 
The lack of means for repairing and replacing equipment made fishing 
difficult; and even a needle became a rarity. From 1944 Kampong Ayer 
was progressively emptied of people as the inhabitants went into the 
interior to cultivate a piece of land* 
70 
4_ "Strategio areas in Borneo will have to be abandoned to the enercy1171 
From the end of 1943 the Borneo Garrison Army (BaA), apprehenn 
sine of the defensive weakness of Borneo, submitted reports to higher 
oommand requesting reinforoements in order to oonvert its garrison into 
an operational unit. In April 1944 BOA headquarters was transferred from 
I{uohing to Jesselton, and, at the same time, came under the command of 
68. (BBC WAC) DDFB No 1432,19 June 1943: General Too quoted by Domei. 
69. Brunei Annual Report 1946, p 7. Cf. Borneo Bulletin, 6 Deoember 
1975, p 15. 
70. Brunei Annual Report 1946, p 7; of. P 344-5. 
71. This seotion is based upons (IWM) Box 22, AL 5256: Col. -Itsu Ogawa 
and Lt. Col. Masash Ino, "Borneo Operations 1941-1945" (Japanese Monograph 
No 26 - HQ, US Army, Japan, 1957)" 
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the Seventh Area Arms. Allied invasion was anticipated in about 
January 1945. At a meeting of ohiefe of staff in Singapore during 
August 1944, the BGL was` ordered to secure key points, such as Tawao, 
Tawi-Taws and Sandakan against the advanoing enemy. The chief of staff 
of the BOA requested one and a half divisions for this purpose; but this 
was rejeoted and one independent mixed brigade and two infantry battalions 
had to suffioe. in late 1944 the BfA was re-organized into the 37th 
Aru1. Although the BGA saorifioed ground defenoe preparations in order 
to oonoeutrate on the ooaetraotioa of eleven airbasee, this task was 
extremely difficult in "underdeveloped and barren Borneo" beoause of 
the aonte shortage of labour and materials. Existing air units were 
eaffioient only for the purpose of esoorting ooastal shipping and 
patrolling the ooasts of Borneo. In Ootober 8,000 reinforoements for 
the 37th Army arrived in Jesselt on from Japan. An Australian attaok 
was now expected in Xaroh 1945= 
"Our estimate of the Australian plans for the capture of Borneo iss 
assisted by elements of the USAF and elements of the British Fleet, the 
Australian Forces will seize certain airbases in strategic areas on the 
east coast. Simultaneously, they will execute landings at strategic 
points on the west ooastp especially in the vicinity, of Brunei. They 
will then establish a footing in West Borneo as part of the overall 
establishment of a strategic pattern for the invasion of Malaya from the 
east". 72 
In January 1945 the west ooast of Borneo was given priority for 
Japanese troop oonoentratioo. Crossing from east to west oaused many losses 
but the redeployment had been oompleted by February. 
73 
Air'raids grew 80 
72. Ibid., p 38. 
73. This was the oooasiou, of, the notorious Sandakan-Ranau death maroh, 
survived by only six (out of about 29400) Allied prisoners-of-war. C 
Simpson, "Six From Borneo" (Text of a BBC/ABC Radio 'dooudrama'g oourtesy 
of Major 03 Carter DSO). 
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intense that all oommunioations were out off not only from the outside 
world but also between units on the island. An order to withdraw from 
Labuan oould not be oonveyed to the troops stationed there. The South- 
ern. Army's estimate of the situation was that Borneo would be only a 
proteotive advanoed position for the more important areas in the southern 
regions around Singapore, and that strategio areas in Borneo would 
gradually have to be abandoned to the enemy. The aim was to draw as 
many Allied foroes as possible away from Japan itself. 
The 37th Arms oomciander was ordered to strengthen the defenoes 
is and around Kuohiug by withdrawing one infantry battalion from Banjer- 
masin and half a battalion from Miri. As sea transport around Borneo 
was praotioally impossible, the battalion was first moved from Banjermasin 
to Java, But at the eud, of the war, half the troops were still oa Java. 
In the meantime the half battalion of infantry ordered. to evacuate Miri 
was unable to reach Kuohing, beoause the troops, siok and starving, were 
oompelled to maroh over barren terrain and were oonstantly attacked by 
'bandits'. The garrison at Kuohing oonsieted only of one and a half 
infantry battalions and some auxiliary troops. The 10th Independent Air 
Brigade, whioh had already lost "all" its planes, was unable to provide 
air cover. Inter-island sea transport and shipments from overseas oame 
to a standstill by the end of 1944. Most Japanese troops suffered from 
malnutrition and. q beoause of the lank of medical supplies 
(exoept in 
Kuohing seotor) and poor sanitation, in addition -to the heavy oasualtiee 
suffered during trans-Borneo movements, were very prone to malaria and 
other diseases. 
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Allied Operations74 The 1945 Borneo Campaign (Operation Oboe) 
"was direoted towards the oapture of oertain areas on the north-west and. 
east ooasts of Borneop prinoipally with a view to the establishment of 
advanoed air bases and the resumption of oil and rubber produotion". 75 
This was to be a prelude to operatiLons against Java and Sumatra. At the 
same time South Eaat Asia Command (SEAC)'y from bases in India and Burma, 
would launch Operation 'Zipper's the liberation-of Malaya. If these 
operations suooeeded, the soene would be set for -the final assault on 
the Japanese mainland, planned for 1946. 
Originallg six 'Oboes' were planned but the number was later 
rednoed to three and their order altered as follows: 
Oboe 1 Tarakan 
Oboe 6 Brunei Bay 
Oboe 2 Balikpapan 
The target date for Oboe Six was 23 Mar 1945 but was deferred 
to 10 June beoanse of the delay in advanoing troops and equipment to the 
Morotai headquarters. Enemy strength on Borneo was estimated at 3290009 
iuoluding 15,000 oombat troops. Evidenoe aooumulated that the NE tip of 
the island was being evaouated and soldiers shifted towards the Jesselton 
area. A number of troops had also been withdrawn from Tarakaa. The 
Japanese fleet in Singapore was expeoted to be too busy on oonvO7 duty 
or under repair in dook to interfere with planned Allied operations. The 
enemy was estimated to have 15 airoraft in Borneo, but 63 more in Java. 
Oboe One, whioh lasted from 27 May to 20 June 1945, resulted 
74. This seotion is based upon WO 203/2690 Lt. Chen. Sir LJ Morshead 
(1889-1959)), "First Australia Corps: Report on Operations during the 
Borneo Campaign, I Mag to 15 August 1945"" 
75.1`., p 2. 
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in the liberation, of Tarakan and, the elimination of the Japanese garrison. 
The aim of Oboe Six was "to secure the Brunei Bay area... in 
order to permit the establishment of an advanoed fleet base and to 
proteot existing oil and rubber resouroes". 
76 After preliminary air 
and naval. bombardment a simultaneous landing was effected by the Ninth 
Australian Division. oommanded by General Wootten (1893-1970) on Labnan 
and on the mainland., north of Brunei Town on 10 June 1945. The landing 
on all beaches was made on time and without opposition, exoept on Labuan. 
Brunei Town was liberated on 13 June and the Australians aooonplished 
their limited aim of establishing a perimeter oleared of Japanese troops 
stretohing from 
. 
Paper to Miri., On 14, August 1945 Japan 
, expressed. a 
desire to acoede to the Allied peaoe propoaals. 
77 
The Servioee Reoonnaissanoe Detachment (SRD). 
78 
In Maroh 1945, 
before the landing by regular Australian forces, a preliminary SRD was 
dropped by paraohute into the interior of Borneo to gather intelligenoel 
deny food supplies to the enemy and train guerrillas to go into aotion 
when regular troops should arrive. In addition the 3RD had to prevent 
fleeing Japanese regrouping inland in order to launch a counter- 
Offensive against the Australians. The SRD officers-- fort? -nine in all, 
76. Ibid., p 18. 
77. Of the 5,400 Japanese troops within the Ninth Australian Division's 
perimeter, 2,530 were killed and 130 taken prisoner (before 14 August). 
Australian losses amounted to 79 killed and 209 wounded. In the 1945 
Borneo oampaign as a whole, 121 Australians were slain (1,825 injured). 
78. See T Harrisson, World Within, A Borneo Story (London 1959); GS 
Carter, A Tragedy of Borneo 1941-45 (Kuala Belait, o1958); CS Carter, 
"Return to Borneo 1945" (typesoript in possession of the author, oourtesy, 
of Major Carter); and Sarawak Gazette, 2 June 1947,2 July 1947 and 12 
April 1951. (Co 604/27 and CO 604/31). 
336 
led 17 Majors T Harrisson, 0 Carter and W Soohon (eaoh DSO) - were 
weloomed by the people of the interior and soon 2,000 anti-Japanese 
guerrillas, many well-armed, had been raised. Reasons for the friendly 
reoeption of Allied offioers inoluded remembranoe of pre-war Brooke 
administration; the, disruption of oommeroe under the Japanese; and the 
highlanders' traditions as fighting men. 
The seotor oommanded by Major Carter iuoluded the Belait and 
Tut ong distriots of Brunei, During this time, he reoalls. 
"I never thought to reornit Brunei Malays as guerrilla forces as they 
had no stomaoh for it. All air men were from the... tribes of Sarawak 
and a few Chinese from around the oilfields". 79 
At dawn on 10 Jane 19459 as the regular Aasträlian foroes landed, the 
guerrillas trained by the SRD in the hinterland 
"fell upon the mainland Japanese, their oo-operators, installations and 
oommanioations whenever we could get at them. In striot military terms 
this was not great shakes. But the wide soatter, the ferooity, and the 
oomplete surprise of these attaoks had a far greater effeot than their 
simple statistioal signifioanoe. Our irregular efforts gave to the 
unluoky enemy the impression of a general synchronized attaok". 80 
Thus ended the Japanese ooonpation. 
If the Japanese had failed to aohieve their broader etrategio 
and eoonomio objeotives in Borneo, their oooupation of Brunei was wholly 
disastrous for the Sultanate and disrupted the oountry's "smooth advanoe 
towards modern statehood" (Bevington). It is difficult to suggest a 
single benefit derived by the people of Brunei from the period of Japan- 
ese oooupation. Did the Japanese provide good administration? On the 
79. Major GS Carter D309 letter to the author, 3 August 1983- 
80* Harrisson, . oit., p 259. 
(In the Lawas-Branei-Soria sector the 
guerrillas actually aooounted for more enemy- fatalities than the 
Australian forces had done. SRD casualties were negligible). 
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contrary, their rule degenerated into "mere spoliation enforced by the 
army through the medium. of the kempeitai". Their policy in 1944-5 was 
"the seizure of materials and labour for military needs, and the oom- 
plete neglect of every other consideration". Oil production by the 
Japanese in Brunei was significantly below pre-war levels and nothing 
was added to the finances of the country which suffered from massive 
inflation; trading came to a standstill beoause of Allied success in 
eliminating Japanese shipping; roads were allowed to beoome overgrown; 
the eduoation system and medical servioe, far from expanding, had ground 
to a halt, so that a whole generation of sohool-ohildren was lost and 
the people generally were reduced to malnutrition and inoapacity through 
disease. Did the Japanese even advance the independence of Brunei? The 
first popular political party in the Sultanate did not appear until 1956, 
eleven years after the Japanese had been driven out. If the Allies had 
lost the war, moreover, Brunei must have remained one of the "Manchukuos 
or Koreas forever tied to Japan". The Japanese had not even brought 
greater administrative opportunities to the people of Brunei, beoause 
most of the senior civil servants they employed had already held high 
office under the British, in short, for the remainder of the 1940s the 
returning British had to clear up the chaos inherited from the Japanese: 
to restore decent administration, to rehabilitate the eoonomy, to eliminate 
fear and restore justice, to rebuild the towns, re-establish and expand 
welfare services, and reconstruct the roads. 
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ý. British Planning for Post-War Borneo 
Planning for post-war British Borneo started with a realization 
that when the Far Eastern territories were liberated, relief measures 
would be necessary for the civilian population and prisoners of war 
interned by the Japanese. 
81 
In about Ootober 1942 Mr G3 Wodemaa, 
formerly Chief Seoretary in Ceyloap was appointed temporarily to the 
Colonial Offioe to investigate Par Eastern relief needs. He oonoluded 
that it would be essential to have a skeleton administration in being 
and read to go in with the oooupying foroes. 
$2 
But the very people 
most suitable for'suoh a task - oolonial oivil servants in the Far East 
- were languishing in Japanese Damps. It was olear, therefore, that 
einoe the survivors would require prolonged rest and reouperation after 
release., a wholly new oadre of administrators would have to be recruited. 
Henoe the three prinoipal tasks of the planners weres 
1. an estimate of preliminary relief supplies for the civilian population; 
2. preparations for the treatment, and repatriation of internees; and 
3. recruitment of administrative offioers who would be ready to take up 
their tasks immediately upon re-entry of Allied foroes into Japanese- 
000upied territories. 
The War Offioe had two principal oonoerns. First, that military 
oommandere should not be burdened with administrative worries while 
battles were in progress; andq seoondly= that starving and aiok indigenous 
Populations should not hinder operations. Henoe the War Office also 
81.00 865/79 minute by Mr Gent, 1 December 1942. 
82. Ibid., memoranduca by Mr GS Wodeman CMa (b 1886), 9 November 1942. 
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considered it essential that the nucleus of a civil administration 
should accompany the re-oooupying Allied foroes. 
83 
In October 1943 a Borneo Planning Unit was establised, origin- 
ally at the Colonial Offioep under the command of Mr CFC Maoaskie, the 
most senior civil servant from British Borneo to avoid internment. 
84 
His task was to prepare a skeleton administration. Long-term polioy 
direotives were drafted in oonjunotion with regular Colonial Offioe 
staff for the guidanoe of Mr Maoaskie and his future oolleagues in the 
oivil administration. 
85 
These direotives, though primarily oonoerned 
with the longer terms, were to be implemented as far as praotioable dur- 
ing the period of military administration. The future oonstitutional 
order also required re-thinking (see Chapter 10p below). 
As ohief planner, Mr Maoaskie was responsible for the general 
direotion and oontrol of planning, for politioal and oonstitutional 
affairs, and matters of law. He also reoommended the seleotion of the 
other members of the unit. The tasks of the deputy head planner, Mr PH 
Pollard (d 01955) - head of the Sarawak Government's offioes in London - 
oonoerned personnel, distriot administration and looal government, public 
relations, information servioes and oensorshipt and the oil industry. 
The financial planner, ohosen temporarily, was Mr FM Pinnook (d 1967), 
who was to be joined by Mr CE Gasooignel, then serving as Sarawak (Govern- 
ment agent in Sydney. The police post was oooupied by Mr WL Soohon, who 
had spent nine years in Sarawakp, but was currently deputy governor of 
83. CO 865/14 memorandum by Mr PAB MoKerron (WO)B 8 Deoember 1942. 
84. See CO 865 (Far Eastern Reoonstruotiou) and CAB 98/41- 
85. CO 531/31 (File 5) minute by Gent, 19 September 1944. 
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Wormwood Scrubs gaol. - The engineer, Mr CP Birt (1903-81), had worked 
for the PWD in Sarawak, but was currently employed on Admiralty work in 
Ceylon. The Medical Offioerq Dr PA Dingle (b 1881), was retained only 
as a part-time consultant because he was considered to be too old to 
return to Borneo upon re-occupation. Both Mr Pollard and Dr Dingle 
appear to have 'joined the BPU in November 1943, followed by Mr Pinnook 
in January 1944 and Mr Birt in about April 1944. Further offioers - 
Messrs Gasooigne, Leaoh and Newton-Wade - had joined by June 1944. 
It was laid down that during the period of military admin- 
istration 'British Borneo' would be administered as one territory. The 
formal'statement of the BPU's objectives also declared that 
"every member of the BPU must keep'-in olose touch with the corresponding 
member of the Malaya, Planning Unit (MPU) in order to obtain guidance and 
to ensure that the policy to be pursued in Borneo should be as uniform 
as possible with that to be pursued in Malaya". 86 
Mr Maoaskie kept "in close touch" with the head of the MPÜ, General Sir 
H Hone, but he was not actually under the latter's order. 
87 
Borneo's inclusion within an American military sphere - South- 
West Pacific Command (SWPC) under General MacArthur rather than South- 
East Asia Command (SEAC) controlled by the British Admiral Mountbatten - 
created problems because HM Government feared that Washington intended 
to keep civil affairs policy in its own hands. Australian interference 
also had to be discouraged. After prolonged discussion a UK US 'civil 
affairs charter' was agreed (October 1943), under which 1 Government 
86. CO 865/8 (item 2) BPUs statement of objeots, paragraph 5- 
87* WO 203/3973 (item 3A) Hone to Supreme Allied Commander South-East 
Asia (SACSEA), 18 July 1944. 
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was empowered to formulate oivil affairs polioies for Borneo whioh the 
foroe oonminander was required to follow. 
88 
The BPU experienoed a oonsiderable shortage of offioerst of a 
proposed establishment of 121, only 66 oould be gathered. The essende 
was to find personnel competent to parry on under the Colonial Office 
after the transfer to civil administration. 
89 
Internees were to be 
repatriated at onoe and not be permitted to join the staff of the milit- 
ary administration even if anxious to do so. After a period of 
reouperation many of these offioials might be suitable to return. Some 
released Government servants were rather bitter about this deoisions 
"I have seen Maoaskie... and others"v one oommented. "I offered my 
servioes for a few months but soon gathered we are not required. I did 
get one person to admit that we are regarded as semi-mental oases. 
Everybody is most kind, but we oannot help feeling that they have been 
told to humour us... ". 90 
The administrative direotive (as revised on 31 Marsh 1944) 
stated that during the period of military administration British Borneo 
would be unified under the CCAO. On resumption of oivil government, 
Labuan would be united with NorthaBorneop but the separate identity of 
Sarawak and Brunei would be maintained. A Governor-General in Singapore 
would oo-ordinate policy in the three territories as far as possible. It 
was of great importance that recurrent expenditure on administration 
should be kept low, and to this end the uaifioation of pertain departments 
was desirable. A customs union, involving joint tariffs leading towards 
Ultimate free trade, was reoommended. In such oases the duties on Bratei 
88" This oorreapondenoe may be found in CO 96885 (File 1)- 
89, CO 865/31 memorandum by General Sir R Hone, 7 October 1943. 
90. CO 874/1107 RG Evans to Mr (later Sir) CR Smith, 20 Ootober 1945" 
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and Sarawak transhipment oargo oolleoted at Labuaa would be oredited to 
Brunei or Sarawak respeotively. Certain teohnioal services such as 
medioalp vetinerary, agrioulture and edaoation departments might be 
oombined in personnel, though each territory would oontrol the expend- 
iture upon suoh departments within its own sphere. A joint Court of 
Appeal was planned, as well as the adoption of the prinoipal Malayan 
Codes as a step towards uniformity of laws of general applioation. 
91 
Until late 1944 the BPU had consisted of 14 officers. In 
February 1945 it was militarised and became known as "50 CALL" (50th Civil 
Affairs Unit). The advanoe party of six officers left for Melbourne in 
February 1945 and the main boll left in Masoh. On arrival it was learned 
that the Borneo invasion would be staged at an early date and a unit was 
formed with oonsiderable haste with Australian offioers and other ranks. 
The Australian unit was known as the British Borneo Civil Affairs Unit 
(BBCAIJ) and grew up alongside the nuoleus of 50 CAII. Offioers of 50 CAU 
were attaohed to the Australian army and were posted to BBCW but it was 
not until June 1945 that the merger was complete and BBCAU as well as 
50 CD, which became a holding unit, came under one command* 
92, 
ö. The British Military Administration (June 1945 to Ju1y 19461 
Brigadier Maoaskiet the CCAO, who had been given background 
direotivea on the logger-term polioy of HM Government, 
93 
had a dual 
91. Co 531/31 (File 49 item 2) Direotive on Administration, 11 
Februar? 1944, revised on 31 Maroh 1944. 
92. WO 203/2400 CFC Maoaskie, "Final Report of the BMA"p Paragraph 4- 
93. CO 531/31 (File 5). 
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responsibilitys to the military oommander for immediate oivil affairs 
and to the Colonial Offioe for the progressive re-establishment of oivil 
administration. He was assisted by a central executive staff based on 
Labuan and bg district We (Civil Affairs Offioers). Daring the period 
of hostilities before the Japanese surrender in August 1945, the Aus- 
tralian oommander refased to delegate powers to the CCAO. Matters 
improved, however, after the original Australian general was replaced. 
The headquarters of the BMA after the Australian landing was 
on Labuan, which rapidly beoame one vast transit camp. Apart from 
isolated pookets of resistance, the military stage oonoluded locally on 
10 September 1945 when the Australians acoepted the surrender of Lt. Gen. 
Baba, oommanding the 37th Japanese Ar .t and his oolleagues., "an exoept- 
ionally evil-looking set of men, the embodiment of cruelty and tyranny"., 
94 
One-third of the Allied prisoners held in Kuobing had died and the sur- 
vivors were "skin and bone". Released internees were brought to Labuan 
for medioa]. treatment and repatriation. 
95 Japanese Surrendered Personnel 
were oolleoted, disarmed and returned to their homeland. 
96 
All Civil Affairs Offioers were enjoined to 
"administer to the best of their ability with a sense of impartiality 
and justioe and without fear or favour... The prinoiples of good admin- 
istration are the preservation of law, order and justioe, the prevention 
of disorder and distress, the removal of fear and the creation of 
eoonomio well-being". 97 
94. (RHO) Mss Pao s71 (File 8)s Maoaskie, "Notes for an Autobiography 
of a North Borneo Career" (1964), p 132. 
95. Maoaskie, "Autobiography", p 132; and WO 203/2367,3106,37999 3800, 
4575,4576,5620 and, 5641- 
96. wo 203/2518 and 5535- 
97. Co 531/31 (File 14, sub-file 10) Maoaskie, General Instruotions for 
Communioati on to all CAOs, paragraph 4. 
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Distribution of food supplies. One of the main tasks of the 
oivil affairs unit (CAIJ) was the distribution of relief supplies, 
partioularly food and olothing, and the administration of medioal Dare 
to the sick. There had been a "vast inorease" in malaria*V malnutrition, 
beri-beri and other diseases. 
98 
During the occupation many people had 
deserted good wet pads land and taken to the hills where they were less 
exposed to Japanese marauders. Of those who remained, many had left 
their villages and lived by their Adi fields. On the Allied return 
stray Japanese units on the run created uncertainty, and the acreage 
planted under paadi was mnoh less than in previous years. The 1945-6 
harvest was poor, and was further reduoed by the depredations of pests, 
especially wild pigs. Rifles were loaned to agricultural overseers to 
deal with this problem. 
99 The demonstration and experimental stations 
in Brunei were quiokly re-opened. 
100 
Distribution of relief supplies was handioapped by Japanese 
negleot of roads and the acate shortage of shipping. After a while the 
BMA began to charge for its supplies in order to encourage domestic 
produotion. 
101 
Although food stooks were perilously olose to exhaustion 
at times,, unrest never assumed anything like the proportions it did in 
Malaya. (In Braneil, moreover, the returning Allies faoed none of the 
political complications caused, for example, by the MPAJA in Malaya or 
98. WO 203/2400 Macaskie, "Final Report of the C'IA'', paragraph 104- 
990 1, paragraph 49" 
100" CO 531/31 (File 309 item 13) BMA report for the month ending 25 
November 1945, paragraph 34- 
101* WO 203/2281 50 CAU to WO9 October 1945; and Mr FW Pinnock to Lt. 
001- GIZI Morgan (wo)g 21 September 1945" 
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by the Vietnamese and Indonesian deolarations of independenoe). 
Medical supplies: The advance party of the entire C. AU had 
only three dootors. The establishment of hospitals was undertaken by 
the Ninth Australian Division until suffioient staff of the CAU arrived 
to take over all oivilian hospitals. Indigenous dressers were 
102 
There was a shortage of clothing. The acoommoda. tion problem was acute 
beoause of Allied bombing. Sawn timber for rebuilding was not available 
and atap was expensive. Medical supplies were insufficient; Admiral 
Mountbatten warned on 10 September 1945 that unless "aotion was taken 
quiokly there would be a oomplete lank of relief stores when SEAC took 
overs "The oondition of oivilian population Borneo is serious and laok 
of supplies quite unaooeptable", 
103 
he telegraphed. By Ootober 1945 
essential aervioes in Brunei were being restored and there had been a 
"marked improvement" during the previous two months in the condition 
of the population. The BMA assumed responsibility for the pre-war 
hospitals and dispensaries run by the BMPC and rubber oompanies. 
Trained midwives and child welfare.. workers were in aotion in most areas 
by the end of 1945. Generally, disease was being oontrolledl but the 
volume of work exceeded pre-war levels. Thereafter, the scale of ill- 
health tended to subside. 
104 
102. WO 203/2400 Maoaskie, "Pinall Report of BANA", paragraph 27-- 
103. WO 203/4360 (item 5) SACSEA to WO, signal, 10 September 1945, 
Paragraph 3. 
104. WO 203/2400 Maoaskie, "Final Report of BMA", paragraphs 95-105; Cf. CO 
537/1628, Dr Smarts report, January 1946. Nurse Lee had continued, within 
the limits of drugs and equipment available, to do child welfare work during 
the occupation, until she contracted typhoid. Prevalent diseases in Brunei 
in late 1945 included malaria, blackwater fever, yaws and anaemias. 
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Administrative restoration. Apart from the distribution of 
relief supplies, the second main task of the oivil affairs staff was the 
restoration of an administration in preparation for the handover to 
oivilian control. When the Australians landed in Brunei, the Sultan had 
taken refuge in the oountry. 
105 
Contaot was re-established both with 
him and with Inche Ibrahim. 
106 
The monaroh played no role during the BMA. The military oommand- 
er assumed full jurisdiotion temporarily. Property rights, religious 
liberty and Malay custom., were respected. Military administration was 
seen as essential to maintain order and aohieve rapid rehabilitation. 
Thus the Sultan and his State Counoii oould not immediately resume their 
status and functions; nor was the Sultan allowed to travel abroad. 
107 
105. (RHO) Mss Pao s71 (File 8) Maoaskie, "Autobiography"Y p 145. (The 
Sultan, who was not in good health, had taken refuge for some three 
months at a kam on at the mouth of the Limbang). 
106. Ibid., pp 145-6. "Inohe Ibrahim had carried on the civil admin- 
istration under the Japanese, and, no doubt fearing that he might be 
treated as a oollaboratort had retired to a house some miles away. -. On 
my first visit to Brunei after the liberation I drove with another officer 
to his house and he came to the door looking as white as a sheet. I am 
sure he thought we were the English equivalent of the kemp eitWhen I 
advanced with outstretched hand and asked him if he didn't remember men 
the look of relief that came into his face was gratifying to see" (ibid). 
Mr gay commented that Inohe Ibrahim was "far gone with consumption" (ibid., 
File 5v ICay to Maoaskiev 11 February 1946, confidential, paragraph 3). 
107. WO 203/5293 (item 1) directive from SACSEA to ALFSEA, 21 July 1945, 
Appendix A; of CO 855/56 British Borneo Military Administration Gazette 
(hereafter BBMAG ,1 September 1945, Proclamation No 1. On 
23 April 1946 
the Sultan requested permission to travel to India and the United Kingdom. 
This wish evidently was not granted. (CO 992/1 Register. The actual 
documents were "destroyed under statute"). Of CO 531/31 (File 149 sub- 
file 7, top seorett BS/42, destroyed), "Special instructions regarding 
the Sultan of Brunei". If proved a 'oollaborator'p he was to be 
removed with his wives to Labuan. Wing Commander gay reported that the 
monarch was "only too relieved" to see the British return. There was 
"_ question" of collaboration; on the oontraryp His Highness and family 
347 
The Civil Affairs Officer stationed in Brunei was Wing Commander 
KEH Kay (b 1904; now deceased), formerly a planter there, whilst a 
Captain Marshall set up a headquarters at Kuala Belait and oontinued to 
administer the distriot. Most of the former Malay Government servants 
name to join as soon as they were able and many other "willing helpers" 
came to assist in any way possible to rehabilitate the country. It was 
intended ultimately to reinstate all members of the pre-oooupation 
establishment (except for those whose oondaot during the oocupation was 
under suspioion). "That almost all the people were overjoyed to see 
us bank was obvious from the great welcome we have had everywhere"p Mr 
Kay reported, 
108 (Bat anyone bearing relief supplies to a siok and 
starving population was unlikely to have been rebuffed). 
The duties of CAOs, instead of diminishing, increased as the 
military administration expanded to fulfill the funotions of government. 
Magisterial duties played a prominent part in the work of CAOs after the 
first three months of the BMA (when they had been denied magisterial powers 
by the Australian oommander). 
109 
Stories of alleged Collaboration Came 
Pouring in; and Rr Kay was "very disappointed" that a number of Malara 
and Chinese 
"turned against the British and oppressed their fellow oonutrymen, mulot- 
ed them of food or money by selling (oommodities), inoluding medioine, at 
"detested" the Japanese. (RHO) Mss Pao 071 (File 2) Kay to blaoaskie, 20 
June 1945- 
108- Iid., (File 5) Kay, report on the first six months of the BMA in 
Brunei, 31 December 1945, paragraph 3. "The amount of good hidden 
money, he added, "bears out the faith the people had in the British". 
109. CO 855156 BBMAG. 1 October 1945, Proclamation No 10, Military 
Courts Proclamation, 3 September 1945" 
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wicked prices ... 
(School) teaohers... and the police were the most notice- 
able whose behaviour was neither loyal nor proper". 110 
The deoision to aooord Japanese oooupation ourrenoy no value whatever 
'baused very little troable" (a) beoause its purohasing power had already 
diminished to little or nothing; and (b) beoause "anyone who held 
quantities of that currency had almost certainly been a collaborator with 
the Japanese and received no sympath7 from the bulk of the population". 
111 
Those sufficiently astute to have converted their financial gains into 
landed property, however, emerged as rich men from the oooupation. Many 
other people inourred heavy oash losses merely to survive daring the war. 
A oonsiderable number of shopkeepers had also lost their homes during 
Allied bombing, much of whioh appeared - from the safety of a post-war 
vantage point - to have been "quite unneoessary". 
112 
The re-opening of 
shops helped to ourb the black market, but the pawn shop remained "all 
too popular". Many people continued to rely on free relief; but "what- 
ever system one adopts"p Mr Kay argued, "a few may wangle more than they 
deserve«. 113 Subsequently, Brunei submitted olaims for war damage 
compensation totalling $3,439,916, of which 47% was Chinese, 32%o 'opean 
and 21% indigenous. Awards paid by HM Government in settlement of these 
olaims totalled %1.15 million. 
114 
110. As note 108 (my modifications in parentheses). 
111. )laoaskie, "Autobiography", p 128. 
112. As note 108. Casualty figures for the bombing are not available. 
The worst inoident was the razing of Brunei Town hospital. Sir John 
Peel, the first post-war Resident, was not aware of great resentment on 
the part of the publio because of Allied bombing (interview, 4 September 
1983). 
113. As note 108, paragraph 5- 
114. Ibid., (File 7) Macaskie to Palmer, 25 Maroh 1948 and 28 February 
1951; and ibid., (File 8) Maoaski e, "Autobiography", p 154. 
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One of the "moat serious problems" confronting the admin- 
istration was the re-establishment of an efficient police force because 
the ooustabulary, particularly in Sarawakp was assooiated in the publio 
mind with Japanese oppression. For the time being a oombiaed British 
Borneo Police Force was established, a large number being placed in Bru- 
nei because of its "military significauoe". 
115 Constabulary morale had 
been impaired bfr the demoralizing effeot of enemy oooupation; the 
deterioration in disoipline and efficienoy; the high proportion of raw 
reoruits to replace casualties; the poor oonditions of service and the 
high oost of living. 
116 
By the end of 1945, however, the foroe was 
"beginning to funotion with a measure of efficienoy and oonsiderable 
progress had been made in suppressing crime and maintaining order". 
117 
On 26 June 1946 the Police Proclamation 1945 was repealed and another 
signed re-constituting the Brunei Police Force. 
118 
Martial law had been proolaimed on 10 June 1945 for "reason of 
military neoessity and for the prevention and suppression of disorder. and 
the maintenance of public safety". Judicial, administrative, executive 
and legislative power was vested in the Commander-in-Chief (Morehead) who 
delegated it to the oonmander of the Ninth Australian Division (Wootten). 
The latter issued a General, Offenoes Proolamation. Japanese legislation 
115. CO 855/56 BBMAG, 1 Ootober 1945, Proolamation No 12s (British 
Borneo) Polioe Foroe Proolamation, 12 September 1945. NB: At that time 
there were still some stray Japanese units in Limbang and Tfusan whioh 
had not yet surrendered. 
116. co 531/31 (File 30, item 12) BMA report for the month ending 25 
Ootober 1945. 
117. WO 203/2400 Macaskie, "Final Report of the BMA, paragraph 54- 
118- CO 855/56 BBMAG, 5 July 1946, Proolamations Nos 41 and 43,26 
June 1946. 
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was nullified. 
119 
Instead of the pre-war courts, jurisdiotion was to be 
exercised by "oorrespoading courts and tribunals, established by the 
Commander-in-Chief". There was no appeal (exoept in the Oase of a death 
sentence). A moratorium was placed on civil suits. Apart from the 
'Supreme Court', whioh oovered all NW Borneo, the military oourts oorres- 
ponded with the pre-1941 oomrts in their powers. In Ootober 1945 a large 
number of cases ended in discharge because of insufficient evidence. 
Priority was given to trials of alleged oollaborators, but progress in 
proseouting them was retarded by want of staff and experienced offioers. 
There was "an unusually large number of crimes of violence and murder". 
During the following month, November 1945, offenoes against the person 
and property oontinued to be above normal,, but the disposal of such 
hearings was both "prompt and efficient". By December all the outstanding 
superior oourt oases in Brunei: inoluding those of alleged oollaborationg 
had been oompleted. 
120 
At the olose of the BMA period indigenous 
magistrates,, not exoluding those operating daring the oooupation, were 
taking their full share in the administration of justice. 
Education. The Japanese olosed all the English schools in 
Brunei and Labuan. During 1944 enrolment in Malay sohools deolined from 
day to day because people started to move out into the jungle to grow 
more food. So great was the exodus that, by December 1944, there were 
more teaohers than pupils'. The Brunei Town sohool olosed in 1945 
119. I_., BBMAG, 1 September 1945, preamble to Proolamation (No 1)9 
"To Establish A Military Administration'', 10 June 1945. 
120, WO 203/2405 BMA report for the month ending 25 Deoember 1945, 
Paragraph 46. 
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beoause of the intensification of Allied bombing. The Japanese found 
work for displaced teachers as propaganda officers or padi instructors, 
but generally morale reached its nadir then. 
121 
A whole educational 
generation had been lost because of the Japanese oocupation. 
122 
The BPU direotive stated that "it should be the polioy, of the 
Government in the field of education to foster the sense of a common 
citizenship amongst all oommunities in British Borneo". Mission schools 
were to be enoouraged. Hy Jane 1946 22 Malay schools with 1,091 pupils 
had also been re-opened in Brunei and there were an additional five non- 
Government sohools (828 pupils taught by 15 teaohers). 
123 
The Handover. The restoration of the Residential System in 
Brunei, originally planned for 1 January 1946, gras delayed pending (a) a 
deoision about the oonstitutional future of British Borneo and (b) the 
provision of adequate civilian staff. In January 1946 Mr Macaskie 
reported that Brunei could revert to civilian government at the beginning 
of Maxoh, but, since the British Resident in Brunei might in future be 
responsible to the Government of North Borneo, it would be advisable for 
121, WO 203/2400 DMA report for the month ending 25 December 1945, 
Paragraph 46. 
122. According to the 1947 census the highest literacy was in the age 
group 20-24 years, instead of in the age group 10-14 or 15-19 (as in 
1960), LW Jones, Report on the Census of Population Taken on 10 August 
1260 (Kuching, 01960), p 49. Total literaoy increased from 26.1% in 
1947 to 47.9% in 1960 (and 69. $ in 1971). The breakdown according to 
age group was as followss- 
Age Groups 10-14 15-19 20-24 25--29 of. 55+ 
1947 19.1% 26. % 33.2% 30.2; 15.3% 
1960 74.3% 62.0%1 48.2% 45.9% 13.1% 
1-971 92.6 91.2% 81.2°% 71.9% 24.1% 
Sources State of Brunei, Report on the Census of Population 1971 (Bandar 
Seri Begawan), p 49. See, also, pp 548-9 (below) for further details. 
123. WO 203/2400 Macaskie, "Final Report of the BMA", paragraph 64. 
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Brunei to wait until its neighbour was ready for the handover. By June 
1946 the Sultanate was "really in pretty good shape" when oompared with 
other parts of north-west Borneo, except for the delay in re-starting 
rubber exports, There was "no lank of purohasing power" thanks to the 
Oil company and Brunei had already aohieved "reasonable prosperity". 
124 
A growing wish surfaoed, partioularly among Chinese traders, for the 
ending of military administration and a return to the affluenoe of pre- 
war years, 
125 
The handover oeremony eventually took plaos on 6 July 1946 at 
15.15 hours. 126 The Sultan pledged the Brunei people's "allegiaaoe" to 
HK King George VI and his own "full oo-operation" with the new British 
Resident, Mr WJ Peel, 127 The Sultan and pengirana, reportedly, were 
"delighted at the return of British proteotion and influenoet#. 
128 
Slightly earlier, on the first auuiversary (13 June) of the "liberation" 
of his ooantry from the "evil oppression" of the Japanese, the Sultan 
124. CO 537/1613 (item 137) Maoaskie to Sir PIK Lloyd, 25 May 1946; and 
CO 537/1643 (item 18) Maoaskie to Llofd9 16 June 1946. 
125. WO 203/2405 HU report (December 1945), seoret, paragraph 2; and 
CO 537/1613 (item 126) ALFSEA to WOB 15 May 1946. 
126. (RHO) Maoaskie, "Autobiography"p p 146. "Etiquette required me to 
arrive last at the Court House where the (handover) ceremony was to take 
place at two o'clock in the afternoon"p Mr Maoaskie recalled later. 
"During the morning it was reported to me that the Sultan was drinking 
hard and probably would not be able to turn up. I posted an observer at 
a crossroads which the Sultan's oar was bound to pass and when I arrived 
there was told that the Sultan's oar had not yet passed. So I drove 
round and on returning there was still no sign of the Sultan. So I drove 
round the town again and this time the Sultan had passed, apparently in 
good order. Actually the Sultan did his part and made his speech very 
well''. 
127. - CO 537/1613 (item 214A) Sultan to King, 6 July 1946. 
128. Ibid., item 227, Governor-General (of Malaga and British Borneo) 
to CO, No 94 (telegram), 18 June 1946, paragraph 4. 
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sent his "1oya1 greeting" to His Majesty. 
129 
Mr Kay, for his part, was 
embittered at being passed over by the Colonial Offioe for the post of 
British Resident, 
130 
perhaps beoause he had been a planter before the 
war and not an administrator. 
7. Reoonstruotion 
If reoovery in the oilfields made Brunei seem better plaoed 
than other parts of British Borneo, it was nevertheless a shattered 
ooantry of whioh Mr Peel inherited oontrol in 1946. War damage was 
oousiderable and only four temporary buildings were put up during the 
period of military administration. Government buildings and oommeroial 
premises in the land oapital had been destroyed oompletel7r131 but the 
residential quarter at Subok had escaped bombing. The bazaars at Tatong 
and Kuala Belait had been destroyed and oilfield installations, fired 
by the retreating Japanese, were still operating at below pre-war 
production levels. Brunei's eoonom had been disorientated through being 
out off from its export markets and its sources of imports. Stretches 
of roads had beoome overgrown. The health and eduoation systems had ruu 
down during the Japanese interlude and, despite the re-opening of school 
129. Ibid. item 139, BMA to C0, June 1946 (no date given; presumably 
the 13th but possibly the 10th). 
130. (RHO) Mss Pao s71 (File 3), Kay to Maoaskie, 22 April 1946. "So 
after all there is no suitable post for me though for ten months I have 
done a job more diffioult than any previous Resident, exoept possibly 
the first, as I feel sure they would admit". 
131. Of 273 buildings whioh the Government maintained in Deoember 1941, 
68 (worth %160,000 at original Dost) had been destroyed oompletely and 
a further 26 were damaged (Brunei Annual Report 1946, p 41). 
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buildings, fundamental problems remained. Public utilities were out of 
order. In the remainder of this chapter I shall examine how much of the 
"wasted years" of Japanese oocupation had been retrieved in the later 
1940s. 
Attempts at reoonstruotion were hindered by lack of everything. 
Labour for this purpose was ertremely soaroe because of the need to 
oonoentrate on food produotionp the higher wages paid by the oil oompany, 
and, in 1950-1, the high price of rubber (of. P 372, below). There was 
no hard stone in Brunei except at Butiry about four miles from the capital: 
this deficiency rendered the oonstruotion of roads difficult and expensive. 
The supply of timber could not keep pace with demand; there was a shortage 
of tools and other equipment, a dearth of qualified town planners and 
skilled engineers, and, finally, insufficient 0ontraotore. 
Rebuilding the towns. As late as 1949 it had still not beoome 
possible "to oommence rebuilding the towns whioh were destroyed or badI7 
damaged during the war". 
132 
A new town plan was prepared for the oapital 
in 1947 and it was hoped to make a "serious start" on the work of 
reoonatruotion during the following year. Further town plans were 
approved for Kuala Belait (1949) and Seria (1950). In all these sohemes 
provision was made for roads, buildings adan , shophouses and open 
apaoea to be oarefully laid out. Meanwhile sea and river walla were 
repaired and land was reolaimed for further oonstruotioa. The rehab- 
ilitation of towns in Brunei prooeeded muoh more slowly than in Malaya 
beoause of a want of rebuilding materials, itself a result of Brunei's 
132. Brunei Annual Report 1949p p 1. 
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isolated geographical position. More rapid progress oommenoed in 1950 
when building construction was given priority; and by 1954 the capital 
showed few signs of its ordeal. Funding appears not to have been a 
limiting factors PWD expenditure jumped from 0.57 million in 1947 to 
2.98 million in 1950 and %7.2 million in 1952" 
After the war it was found that existing water installations 
required urgent overhaul, primarily beoause of Japanese negleot or misuse. 
The difficulty of obtaining spare parts delayed reoonneotion of supply 
after 1945"ßt by 1950 consumption in Brunei Town was double the 1938 
level. In 1953 the main reservoir serving the oapital provided a direot 
supply to just under five hundred oonsumers and to twelve standpipes for 
the people of Kampong Ayer. The only water in the Kuala Belait-Seria 
district came from two wells. This water was described as of "bad oolour, 
odour and taste". In 1950 the BAIPC proposed to oarry out a scheme to 
treat water at Seria and, after prolonged negotiations, an agreement was 
reached whereby the Government was to purchase filtered and treated water 
from the BMPC for domestio requirements at Kuala Belait. The estimated 
cost to the Government was $2 million. 
The generators whioh had supplied eleotrioity before the war 
had been damaged by Japanese oarelessness or Allied bombing so that in 
the late 1940s only a makeshift supply was possible. In the oapital, 
only two old generators, subjeot to oonstant breakdowns, were available 
for use, and even then only between 18,00 and 23.00 hours. There were 
88 oonsumers (in 1949) who were severely restrioted in the number and 
size of lamps they might use. A separate generator was used to supply 
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street lighting. By 1950 Government generators in the capital had a 
total capacity of 17 kilowatts and supplied 130,367 units of electricity 
to 337 consumers. Before the occupation the BMPG had supplied electricity 
to the Government for distribution in Seria and Kuala Belait. During the 
war, however, the oompan 's plant was damaged and they oould not revert 
to the former. system. Consequently the Government had to run a ten kilo- 
watts generator for supplying Government quarters and street lighting in 
those towns, The BMPC's offices and quarters in Seria were supplied from 
a set of portable plants. In addition a private oompany in Seria ran a 
small generator and provided a supply to fifteen shophouses. From 18 
February 1949 a bulk supply was purchased by the Government under agree- 
ment from the BMPC for distribution to Government quarters and private 
houses in Seria and Kuala Belait. The total number of consumers there 
at the end of 1949 was 126, inoluding 66 who had joined during the 
previous twelve months. 
The, Japanese negleoted the roads, maintaining only the one 
between Zitong and Nuara (via the oapital) beoause that was the roste of 
their proposed oil pipeline. The remaining roads were allowed to revert 
to jungle. Rehabilitation prooeeded slowly after 1945 beoau$e of short- 
ages of materials and personnel. Road widening was oarried out in oertain 
sections and other improvements made elsewhere. Bridle paths were 
oleared and re-opened. By 1949 the re-metalling of the Brunei-Tutong 
road had been oompleted and attention then turned to the earth roads to 
Kuala Abang and Muara. _ 
At the end of 1950 there were 140 miles of road 
in Brunei, 34 miles of bridle paths and 1p? 00 registered vehicles 
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(2,048 lioensed drivers). In the early 1950s further road work was 
delayed because priority was given to building construction. 
In 1946 after the years of Japanese negleot, the Brunei education 
system was a shambles. Sohools had been destroyed by bombing while those 
left standing were in disrepair; teaohersj, pupils and parents had "lost 
interest"y nor was there "that determination to make up for lost time 
whioh is suoh a strong feature of sohoole in Malaya, '; 
133 
and books and 
furniture were lost. An expert from Malaya, Mr AW Frisbyp made a number 
of short-term reoommendatioas for shaking the people out of their apathy 
and inoreasing enrolment in sohools. He urged that a larger proportion 
of national inoome be earmarked for ednoation and the department be plaoed 
in professional hands. Ordinary expenditure on education inoreased from 
56,018 in 1947 to %201,041 in 1950 and %319,380 in 1952 (of. %42,562 in 
1941). It proved impossible to obtain a State Eduoation Offioer until 
1949 beoause several people refused the post. 
l34 
Mr Frisby recommended a cautious measure of reform, in particular 
a limited iatroduotion of English education to satisfy the needs of the 
oivil servioe and the BMPC as well as to go some way towards meeting 
nasoent nationalist demands for better eduoation. But he believed that 
widespread English eduoation was unneoessary, expensive and, for politioal 
reasons, undesirable. He suggested instead a oomposite sohool oonsisting 
of three vernaoular (Malay, Chinese and English) primary streams, an Eng- 
lish seoondary sohool and a trades sohool open to ohildren from all parts 
133. CO 943/1 (File 2, item 1) Governor-General to C0, No 28 (saving), 
18 November 1946, enolosing report by Mr AW Frisby (d 1973), 28 Ootober 
1946, paragraph 16. 
134. CO 943/1 (File 4). 
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of the State. This soheme appears not to have been implemented per se 
but in 1949 the B1TC took the first steps to establish a trades sohool. 
135 
With regard to Malalt education, the main tasks were to persuade 
parents to send their children to school and to provide trained teaohers. 
i36 
In 1947 it was estimated that only 30% of indigenous children 
(501pf of boys and 10f of girls) of sohool age were enrolled. Even these 
figures were not entirely aocuratep however, beoause there remained in 
sohool a number of overage ohildren whose eduoation had been disrupted 
by the Japanese oooupati on. As a result pupils of widely differing ages 
sat in the same olassroom, The low enrolment was attributed to a number 
of faotors, inoluding -the absenoe of a tradition of going to sohool and 
the reluotance of parents to send their ohildren (espeoially daughters) 
to sohöol. It was found that attendanoe even of those enrolled was poor. 
At Mr Frisby's suggestion a 'sohool attendanoe offioer' was appointed to 
remedy thisp and a number of sohools were built in pads distriotn so that 
children of farmers could attend. Immediately after the wary lack of 
clothing and the abeenoe of women teaohera diaoouraged parents from 
sending their daughters to sohool. But by 1952 there were signs of 
improvement. By then 6g% of the 6-12 age group was enrolled. In 1949 
135" Entrants were originally oompany apprentioes but subsequently young 
stars were seleoted from promising pupils throughout British Borneo. By 
1959 almost two hundred students were aoquiring useful teohnioal skills 
at the sohool, but with no obligation, to work for the BMPC after the 
completion of the oourse. (the company had been interested in the scheme 
originally as a means of reducing its dependence on imported Chinese 
artisans., who had. gone on strike in September 1946). 
136. In additi one the lack of equipment, including desks and textbooks, 
took a long time to be overcomes as late as 1950 one oopy of each book 
could not be provided to every pupil. 
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Mr Pearoe, the State Education Offioer (1949-54)p oommented that in the 
lus there was great enthusiasm for the new sohools and teaohers were 
persons respeoted in the oommunity. He attempted to make vernaoular 
eduoati on more attraotive by the introduction of Draft aotivities, suoh 
as cloth-weaving, net-making and book-binding. 
137 
The seoond issue was the dearth of qualified teaohers. A 
significant breakthrough in this reapeot occurred in 1949 when the joint 
Borneo Training College was opened at Kuohing. Brunei's quota, initially, 
was ten students per year (twenty from 1954). As publio enthusiasm for 
eduoation gathered momentum and the teaohing situation eased, a new. 
difficulty arose beoause the rubber boom of 1950-2 oreate8 a shortage of 
labour, whioh delayed the oonstraotion of new eohools, e®peoially in 
Kampong Ayer and the ulus. In addition, ooatraotors proved reluotaat to 
tender for up-oountry eohools beoauee of the trouble involved in trans- 
porting men and materials to the interior and of providing aooommodatioa 
for the former while they were there. 
Given these oiroumstanoes the achievements of the years 1946 to 
1953 were respeotable. Eleven new Malay primary sohools had been opened 
(as against 22 existing ones in June 1946), the number of trained teachers 
rose from 14 to 589 and their pupils from 1,091 to 2,679. In 1949 Mr 
Peaxoe had oommented that the eduoation system was expanding laterally 
rather than growing up. The provision of English seoondary sohools was 
137. "The sohools, it is feltp should not only appeal to parents as 
praotioal and useful institutions, but should make an irresistible 
appeal to the ohild itself". 
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seen as hazardous so long as it was not possible to see where the next 
English teacher was coming from. As demand increased in Malaya and 
Singapore, oompetition for the servioes of suoh teachers was fieroe. 
Government English schools, nevertheless, were started at Brunei Town 
in 1951 and Kuala Belait during the following year. The demand for 
admissions exceeded the available resources of building aooommodation 
and teaohing staff. Meanwhile the BMPC's trade sohool was beginning to 
flourish. Three new Chinese independent sohools had been established, 
The Christian mission schools, while experienoing staff shortages and 
outdated acoommodationp were also expanded. Overall there were 46 
sohoois with 5,917 pupils in 1953. 
Health. The direotive on long-term medioal and health polioy138 
drawn up by the Borneo Planning Unit in 1944 aooorded priority to anti- 
malarial measures. A nutritional polioy was to be devised for the 
population. In order to meet the long-term development of the oountry 
a survey by qualified persons was to be made at the earliest opportunity 
of all existing medical institutions with a view to determining what 
further provision should be planned. speoial institutions for the treat- 
ment of mental patients and lepers were necessary. Local people needed 
to be trained to "the highest standard of medioal skill so that they may 
themselves provide the personnel required for the expanding health 
servioes of the oountry". 
139 
138. CO 531/31 (File 4) Draft direotive on medioal and health polioy, 
22 Januarar 1944. 
139. Ibid. 
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The legacy of "Japanese neglect and callous policies" 
140 
to- 
wards the indigenous population was still evident upon the restoration 
of civilian administration in mid-1946. As a result of severe mal- 
nutrition the resistanoe of the people to disease was substantially 
weakened. Malaria, helminthio diseases, tuberculosis and anaemia were 
widespread. No anti-malarial work had been done by the enemy. Allied 
bombing had. razed the hospital in Brunei Town and other faoilities could 
not be developed in suffioient quantity for some time; there was a dearth 
of trained personnel; travelling difficulties (and a lank of supplies) 
delayed the resumption of the travelling dispensary service until 1949. 
In short, when demand for medical care was most aoutet the means for its 
provision were deficient. 
A Malay house in the capital was converted for use as a temporary 
hospital, but only basio forms of, treatment could be provided. . 
More 
equipment, inoluding X-ray faoilities, beoame available in 1947, but 
there were long waiting lists espeoially for tuberculosis patients. In 
1946 there were dispensaries at Temburong, Tatong and Muara, each with 
faoilities for eight short-stay patients. The Tatong dispensary had been 
damaged by Allied bombing but sinoe repaired. Temporary struotnres were 
built, at Muara and Kuala Tatong, the latter in 1947. In 195 a modern 
spaoious hospital with eighty beds was ready, in the oapital (but serious 
oonstruotion defeots soon became evident). During 1950 a new dispensary 
(with rest beds) and a new maternity olinio were opened in Kuala Helait. 
140. Brunei Annual Report 1946. 
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Helminthio diseases and tuberculosis replaoed malaria in 1952 as the 
commonest cause for admission to hospital. Before 1950, inpatieut 
aoooramodation at Kuala Belait had been supplied by the BMPC's hospital 
on repayment by the Government. The oompany employed two dootors, one 
of whom received a retaining fee from the Government and looked after 
State patients. 
The shortage of medioal supplies and transport difficulties 
preoluded the resumption of the travelling dispensary eervioe until 1949, 
although sinne 1947 dressers at Tatong and Temburong had'-'paid. monthly 
visits upriver. By 1949 four mobile dispensaries had resumed operations. 
One was in the form of an ambulanoe whioh patrolled the road between 
'hitong and Huara via the capital. The three riverine dispensaries 
were based at the permanent buildings at Kuala Belait, Tatong and Banger. 
(The Muara dispensary wait olosed is 1949 because of the institution of 
the road travelling servioe and the small number of persons treated 
previously at l(uara). 
The Eoonoiiy. The immediate priorities were to rehabilitate 
the oilfield and to inoreaee food prodaotion. Oilfield reoovery and 
expansion - disouseed fully in the following ohapter - were impressives 
output reaohed 4 million tone worth $200 million in 1950 (of. lees than 
lm tons worth %ß7.5m in 1940) and almost 5 million tons worth just under 
$263 million in 1951. Government revenue showed a similar explosion, 
from $1.56 million in 1940 to $13 million in 1950 and $24 million in 
1951. (The Malayan - formerly Straits' - dollar had been devalued by 
against the Amerioan dollar in November 1949). 
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Reoovery, in other seotors of the eooaom was less speotacular. 
Beoause of the acute food shortage throughout the world in 1946, the 
Brunei Government rationed commodities such as rice, flour and sugar. 
In 1947 supplies improved and imports of cloth "met a particularly 
pressing need of people for olothing". (In 1949 the British Red Cross 
Sooiety took a oensus of impoverished persons and distributed olothing, 
in 1950, to over 31,000 people out of a current population of 45,000). 
The iaorease of domestio food produotion was an urgent neoessity. 
The rioe ration in mid-1946 was only five ounoes a day and only imported 
rice got into the shops at controlled prices# it was not easy to induoe 
dornestio produoers to put their supplies on to the legitimate market. 
Other food orops were not in short supply, however, and there was no 
prospeot of the population starving. The enforoed necessity of a more 
varied diet (including vegetables), indeed, helped to diminish the 
inoidenoe of defioienoy diseases. Employers were statutorily required 
to plant foodstuffs in proportion to the strength of their labour foroe. 
The mouths after July 1946 - i. e. between harvests - were 
perhaps the most difficult. An expert was sent to Brunei to suggest ways 
Of inoreasing food produotion. Inoreased attention to vegetables, root 
orops, fruits, sago, oooonuts, and livestock was advised. The latter, 
whose numbers had been reduced by half during the warp were vital not only 
as a source of food but for pads production. Fish, at thirty cents a kati, 
were at an attractive price for the produoerp but output was limited by 
the shortage of net-making materials, hooks and other essential equipment. 
141 
141. CO 852 629 (File 1. item 18) report by Mr South, 4 June 1946. 
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The insufficiency of rice contributed to labour unrest in the 
oilfield. Workers there were aotuall7 reoeiving double rations beoause 
of olerioal error; but this was still not enough. 
142 In September 1946 
there was a strike of a gravity to require the despatoh of a labour 
adviser from Malaya to settle the dispute. This was aohieved fairly 
quiok1,143 The High Commissioner oontinued to warn, however, that 
unless deliveries of rice supplies to Borneo were treated as a special 
oases there might be serious unrest in the future. (At one stage stooks 
of oereals in Brunei had fallen to six days' supply and health conditions 
were deteriorating rapidly, both ber i-beri and tuberculosis re-appearing 
in alarming proportions), 
144 
The Colonial Office managed to make pro- 
vision for an immediate shipment of 2,000 tons to Borneo and to inorease 
the quota for British territories there for the first half of 1947" 
Allocations of rice were controlled by an international committee in 
Washington. In the seoond half of 1947 the British Government asked for 
39,000 tons for British Borneo and obtained 25,000 tons, whioh was 
142. For purposes of rice rationing Brunei was included within North 
Borneo. At the Borneo Governors' Conference held in Jesselton on 31 
January 1947, Mr Peel complained that the rice ration in Brunei was 
only three ounces per person per week. The Governor of North Borneo, 
the minutes record, "said he was unable to understand why the rice 
ration was so low since the rice was distributed on a population basis 
to all territories equally. He always gave Brunei its total allocation 
and the fault must lie with the distribution system from Labuan. He 
suggested that the oil company might be getting supplies direct from 
Labuan which are debited to Brunei's allocation,,. It was known that the 
workers on the oilfield were getting an inflated ration which was a leg- 
aoy of the BMA regime". CO 537/2243 (item i), minutes, paragraph 13. 
143. CO 954/1 (File 58901/1946) report by Mr (later Dz) OW Wolters, 
October 1946 (no date given). 
144. CO 852/629 (File 1, item 22) Governor-General to CO, secret, 
No 195 (telegram), 9 September 1946. 
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considered reasonable. 
145 
Measures to increase pads production included the establishment 
Of pads test plots. The State agricultural station was situated at 
Kilanas, nine miles from Brunei Town, in the heart of the main rioe- 
produoiag distriot. Subsidiary stations were looated at Lumapas, Birau 
and Mulaut, Many smallholders, penghulus and ketuas visited the stations, 
which provided a focus of local interest for cultivators. By 1949 a 65- 
aore wet Kadi settlement had been established at Mulaut. The aim of the 
Government was to enoourage peasants in the vioinity to take up wet adi 
land under permanent title instead of temporary oocupatioa licences. The 
cultivators in this area were fortunate to be able to make use of the 
oonorete dams, drains and irrigation ditohee whioh were oonstruoted by 
the Government. In the period 1949-51 applioations to take up a total 
of 182 aores in Niulaut were reoeived. An annual State Agrioultural Fair, 
held oentrally, and looal weekly fairs in the distriots were sponsored, 
in an attempt to improve the quality of agricultural produce. Seedlings 
were distributed (300,000 in 1947). Meohaninal ploughs were demonstrated 
but evoked little interest from smallholders. Assistance was given to 
oontrol pests and diseases. Finally, the Government established a rioe 
mill in 1949 and purohased pads at the fixed prioe of 55 oents a anta . 
The acreage under cultivation was approximately 8,000 to 9,000 during the 
Years 1947-53. Output Of j adi totalled three-quarters of domestio 
requirements in 1948-519 largely beoause of muoh inoreased (but still low) 
145. CO 852/568 (File 9. item 43) Morris report on ripe allooations 
(January to June 1947), 1 January 1947. 
366 
Table 20. Rioe Yields in Brunei 1946-1952 (gantangs per aore) 
'Season Wet Padi Yieldos Dry Padi Yields: Total Yields: 
Total Per Total Per Total Per 
Acre Acre Acre 
1937-8 390,603 1791 350,278 123 740,881 147 
1946-7 480,179 102 437,139 116 917,318 108 
1947-8 1,461,643' 314 770,190 174 2,231,833 245 
1948-9 197959709 370 903P948 240 296999657 313 
1949-50 1,892,789 374 694,740 240 2,587,529 325 
1950-1 1,789,017 327 744,960 240 2,533,977 296 
1951-2 1,101,760 243 457,365 120 1.559,125- 177 
Sources Colonial Offioe, An Economic Survey of the Colonial Terri- 
tories Vol. 5s The Far East (London 1955). P 103. 
Notes Aoreages planted with rioe totalled 8,475 in 1946-7; 9,092 in 
1947-8; 8,615 in 1948-9; 7,952 in 1949-50; 8,575 in 1950-1; and 8,796 
in 1951-2. Aging these years, bT. far the majority of the total ripe 
aoreage was under wet padi, e. g. 64% in 1949-50 and 195D-1 and nearly 
57% in 1951-2. 
* 
Yields per aorep rather than an extension of the aoreage planted (of. 
19329 when 12,000 aores were said to have been sown). The experimental 
stations had initial problems with yields and an attempt to introduoe 
double oropping in 1954 was a failure. Sven soy popular yields of 
rioe were around 300 gantangs per aore (see Table 209 above), which 
represented a vast improvement on earlier levels: e. g. 124 gantangs in 
1933 and 108 gante s in 1947. Three quarters of Brunei's rice require- 
meats were produced domestically in 1948-519 but this proportion was not 
maintained in the 1950a, when the population approximately doubled. 
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Apart from rice a second major source of food was fish. Many 
of the inhabitants of Brunei distriot and of the ooastal villages between 
Tatoag and Kuala Belait obtained their livelihood from fishing, but the 
finanoing and marketing as well as the dried prawn indastry were in the 
hands of Chinese merohants. There was a shortage of boats and nets. In 
1949 a joint Sarawak-Brunei Fisheries Department under Mr E Banks was for- 
med. Eaquir7 suggested that European-style deep-sea trawling was noti feas- 
ible and that greater production could be obtained only by the development 
of existing methods. Assistance to fishermen, therefore, took the form 
of loans to purohase outboard motors and more seaworthy rebus to bring 
the oatoh more easily and quiokly to market. In early 1951 a tub146 
oommittee and fishery inspeotor were appointed to supervise the industry 
and to prevent both smuggling and interloping by nniioensed fishermen. 
Rhe appointment resulted in "an immediate increase in the quantity of 
prawns landed" (by ensuring that the whole of the catoh was landed at 
Barn Baru island rather than smuggled into neighbouring territories). 
146. The main method of fishing was called tugu, a tugs net being a 
fine mesh net of funnel-shaped design some twenty feet in length and 
gradnally increasing in width from the cod end to the mouth, which was 
often twenty feet in width. These nets were not in suitable locations 
by means of round pole stakes and the prawns were carried into the net 
by the prevailing tide. One location might have as many as 50-150 nets 
in a continuous line. In 1950 the Fisheries Department made a thorough 
investigation into this industry, as a result of disputes which had 
developed about locations and lioenoes, mainly due to a free-for-all 
policy which resulted from the Japanese occupation. The industry was 
quite a considerable one, there being 92 licensed tuga fishermen owning 
565 tum nets (which represented a purchase value of $168,000). Most 
of the prawns caught were dried. All tuguu fishermen were indebted to 
Chinese shopkeepers, who bought the catch and dried the product. It 
was estimated that the fisherman received barely 25% of the value of his 
catch from the middleman. 
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The Government attempted also to aid the bubo fishermen of 
Tutong, who had formed their-own society. A bubo (cage) oould be oon- 
struoted entirely of jungle materials and henoe was oheaps its popularity 
inoreased rapidly in the early 1950s. Loans were made to the Thtong 
fishermen for the purohase of better praline and outboard engines. Similar 
aid was given to a number of Kuala Belait bubu fishermen in the hope of 
providing a much-needed increase in the supply of fresh fish to the far 
end of the State. The Government hoped that by awakening interest in 
co-operative sooieties, the fishermen themselves would obtain a more 
reasonable share of the profits derived from a strenuous day's work. 
Other means to maximize food produotion inoluded increased 
attention to fruit, vegetables and poaltry. Complementary orops suoh as 
taps ooa, yams, sweet potatoes were planted after the pads crop, before 
the land was allowed to go bank to fallow. 
147 
Maize was interplanted 
with rioe by some people as a form of insuranoe. Sago was a useful 
reserve food Drop when rioe was scaroe. The aoreage was 2,046 in 1948 
and 2,000-2,500 in 1951-5 (a significant proportion of the total area 
under cultivation in Brunei). 
1t 
Coconuts remained a smallholders' crop, 
149 
147. In 1948 the acreage under rubber totalled 19,102 acres whilst that 
under pads was 9,092 acres (wet 4,655; dry 4,437). Subsidiary crops 
(with acreages) were as follows sweet potatoes (245), tapioca 
(523), 
sago (29046)9 maize (171), men alai (65)t sugar cane (485), groundnuts 
(57)v vegetables (403), lesser yams (78). coffee and cocoa (48)9 pine- 
apples (590), bananas (575), unspecified fruits (1028), coconuts (1066), 
tobacco (78) and derries (64). Brunei Annual Report 1948, p 12. 
148. Some raw sago was exported to Sarawak,, but its quality was "crude" 
and little was done to improve it. By 1958 four sago factories had been 
opened in Kuala Belait district. 
149. An attempt was made by Labu Estate, with Government financial 
assistance, to plant 300 acres of coconuts in 1955-7 for commercial 
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used ohiefly as an ingredient of the diet or manufaotured into oil for 
oooking purposes. No oopra was produced. Likewise, fruit cultivation 
traditionally was not oonduoted on a very soientifio basis. Pure stands 
of fruit trees were the exoeption, suoh Drops as oooonuts and areoanuts 
usually being found interplanted with a variety of fruit trees under 
semi-jungle oonditions. Fruits were usually of doubtful eating quality. 
Poultry and ducks were kept because they were hardy and economical to 
feed. Goats were raised to supplement meat produotion. Cattle were 
kept in small numbers throughout the oountry. 
A number of Chinese and indigenes were involved in oommeroial 
pig-farming. The swine industry was "very primitive". The Chinese 
bred their pigs in sties whereas the Dusuns and other non-Muslim peoples 
kept them on free range. Sties were usually, of poor oonstruotion and 
feeding staff comprised cooked sago pith, which was low in protein, and 
quantities of prawn refuse, local fish meal and bean oake meal, which were 
not suffioient to balanoe the diet. Even the better piggeries took over 
a . year to fatten an animal. But for most Chinese, piggy-breeding was mainly 
oarri'ed on as a sideline and source of manure for market gardens. 
1 5 
$7 
1951 564 aores of land was used for suoh horticulture in Brunei. 
151 
Purposes. But in 1958 almost all the seedlings were destroyed by wild 
boar (CO 824/5 Brunei Annual Report 1958, P 33)- 
150* In 1958 the Kuala Belait municipal authorities prohibited pig- 
breeding in their area, so there was a considerable decline in the num- 
ber of pigs in Brunei. (Cf. A Burgess, Devil of a State - London 1961 - 
P 76). 
151. During the 1950s there was a steady expansion in the industry, 
especially in the western end of the State, where there was a large 
demand for fresh vegetables. Most of the trade, both growing and market- 
ing, was in the hands of local Chinese people. Yields were poor at first 
because of lack of soil fertility. By 1955 Malaya were taking increased 
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These then were the main possible souroes of food after 1946. 
The problem of inoreasing food produotion, however, oouid not be viewed 
in isolation. A balance had to be struck between food production and 
oash crop production because, while food was of primary importance in. 
19 46, smallholders were dependent on the sale of their cash crops, 
prinoipally rubber, to enable them to purohase relief supplies and such 
items of food as they oould not produoe for themselves. 
In early 1945 the Rubber Growers' Assooiation. and the Colonial 
Office o o-. operated in the fopmation of a Borneo Rubber Estates' Owners 
Guarantee Company (BREOGC), the primary objeot of whioh was to promote 
all measures for the rehabilitation of the rubber-produoing industry in 
Borneo. 152 Unauthorized tapping on Gadong and Berakas estates began 
almost immediately after the Allied landing in June 1945. The UGC 
protested but the BMA enoouraged tapping beoause it provided employment 
for a number of people. The BPU had taken the view that unless the 
rubber industry was quiokly revived, the people would have no money to 
purchase relief supplies. For the most part rubber plantations had been 
entirely neglected during the Japanese occupation. About 500 acres of 
rubber estates had been out out or destroyed, chiefly on European estates. 
Preliminary investigation in 1945 revealed that properties were overgrown 
interest in this form of cultivation. Market gardeners began to adopt 
shifting cultivations they occupied land for up to three years, won a 
good return on capital and then moved to a new area. Fruit and vegetables 
commanded high prices but the cultivation required some labour and care. 
Some growers in more remote areas found themselves at a disadvantage 
because of the difficulty of marketing the crops they were forced to 
sell to middlemen who commanded their own prices. 
152. Co 852/671 (File 3, item 23). 
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and much time and money would be necessary to restore trees to normal 
Condition. Floods had oaused heavy damage. Young rubber planted in 
1939 was suffocated. by cover crops. By October 1945 a Rubber Purchasing 
Unit., led by Lt. Col. MAX Oakford, had arrived in Borneo. The purohasing 
unit, appointed by the Ministry of Supply in London, interpreted its duty 
to be the purchase or rubber and of other commodities when specifically 
asked for by the Ministry. It was not direotlp interested in the eoon- 
omic rehabilitation of British Borneo. By April 1946 only one cargo of 
rubber, from Kuohing in Sarawak, had been exported from British Borneo. 
This oaused "grave disoontent" among smallholders who had no market for 
their rubber as a result. 
153 
After the resumption of oivil government in July 1946, tapping 
was held up beoause of-shortage of coagulant, but in 1947 produotion 
exoeeded the 1938 level, Smokehouses were built to help the smallholder 
to obtain a better return for the end produot. In praotioe, smallholders 
had little inoentive to improve the quality of sheet produced because 
this was not reflected in the prioe obtained from the Chinese rubber 
dealers. Smallholders showed a "lack of care and cleanliness" in its 
preparation. The quality of rubber was reduced further because a large 
proportion of trees were old and were planted on sloping land already 
depleted of its fertility by many years of earlier shifting cultivation. 
Rubber trees had beoome unproduotive beoause of unskilled tapping in 
the past. Bark oonsumption was "nearly always excessive" espeoially 
153. WO 203/2281 Col. ML Bernaoohi (1911-83), for Brigadier Maoaskie, 
to WO9 27 March 1946. 
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Table 21. Rubber Output in Brunei 1946-52 
Year Rubber Exportss- 
Weight (lbs) Value (% Malayan) 
1938 2,778,351 623,565 
1941 4,635,835 1,758,824 
1946 (a) 1,952,862 781,145 
1947 4,030,034 19282j214 
1948 4,563,147 1-9594635 
1949 3,669,393 1,220,892 
1950 5,730,034 6,154,169 
1951 5,161,694 8,036,992 
1952 3,298,928 3,785,050 
Notes, (a) Seoond half of the year only. 
(b) Output exported in 1959 totalled 1,647 tons worth %3.5m 
(oompared with 293m lbs worth $1.7m in 1958). 
(o) During these years rubber was Brunei's seoond most valuable 
export produot, being exceeded in importanoe only by petroleum. 
* 
when owners did not live on their holdings. 
154 The number of trees in 
tapping inoreased markedly, during the boom years of 1950-1p when prices 
were very high beoause of the extra demand oreated by the Korean War 
(see Table 219 above). Holdings in the vioinity of padi areasy however, 
were tapped' irregularly, and the fluotuations were direotly related to 
the P a4-planting and harvesting seasons. The European owned estates, 
of which there were only five (ran by four companies) in 1945-6, suffered 
from shortage of oapital and labour. One oompany sold up to the 
Government in 1953 setting a trend followed by the other oompanies 
before the end of the Residential Era. The four rubber oompaniesp whioh 
found increasing difficulty in finding anyone prepared to accept employ- 
154" Many smallholdings were worked on a share-cropping basis, the bulk 
of the proceeds being retained by the tapper. 
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ment as tappers and suffered from isolation from the main shipping 
routes, went oat of business one by one during the years 1953-8. Agri- 
culture suffered from the rival attraotions of the oilfield and employ- 
meat with the Government where greater earnings could be made. 
There had been little, if any, forestry administration by the 
Japanese authorities in Brunei from 1941 to 1945, although royalties 
oontinued to be colleoted "in a desultory way until 19449 but only on 
produce used by persons other than Japanese", -155 Depletion of the forest 
by felling for timber was not extensive during the war but many inroads 
were made by hill farming and shifting cultivation. After 1946 Brunei's 
forests, properly-managed, were regarded as "an asset of oontittually 
inoreasing value" and the greatest importance was attached to their 
maiutenanoe "not only as a souroe of revenue but on account of the many 
other benefits that aoorae from the possession of them". 
156 
Forest Industries. The ITC's outoh faotory had been completely 
destroyed by Allied bombing in 1945" Production resumed only, briefly, 
from September 1949 to April 1952. The administration was not unduly 
oonoerneds the termination of the oonoession would enable "a more effeot- 
ive control to be exercised over the mangrove forest than hitherto". 
157 
Exports of eluton resumed in 1947" The price rose dramatic- 
ally in 1949-51 in line with that of rubber. 
158 
The Brunei produoers 
155" Brunei Annual Report 19460 p 27. 
156. Brunei Annual Report 1949, P 19. 
157. Brunei Annual Report 1952, p 29. 
158. During 1951 the price of bone-dry eluton reached a new peak of %270 per pikul but dealers experienced difficulty in obtaining sufficient 
labour for tapping and production showed a sharp decrease. 
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found diffioulty in organizing their tappers because the Singapore buyers 
declared themselves unable to give anything longer than monthly oontraots. 
The whole of the produotion was bought by lßalayan CIattas Limited of Sing- 
apore (a subsidiary of Wrigley's). Annual exports of jelutong totalled 
$1159134 in 1949 and reached a peak of x$500,379 is 1958.159 
Timber. Brunei had never had a timber exporting industry, 
despite the large area covered by forest. After the war the Government 
disoouraged an export trade, urging that looal requirements reoeive prior 
oonsideration. A proteotive tariff of 10% was imposed on imports to 
stimulate looal produotion. The ohief demand during 1946 was for 
materials for temporary buildings and timber for temporary engineering 
aonstruotion in the oilfield. For this purpose softwood timber and poles 
from the ooastal swamp forest were readily available. The demand sub- 
sequentl7 was for high grade timber for permanent oonstraotion, but in 
this oase the supply was unsatisfactory beoause of the inaooessibility 
of hill forest. Demand maiulp (77% in 1947) from the BMPC9 continued 
to exceed local supply, despite increases in annual output (718,000 cubic 
Feet in 1947,770,875 in 1949 and 987,408 in 1951, but only 557,183 oubio 
Feet in 1950). In 1952 the BMPC imported 1,798 tons of sawn timber and 
47 tons of teak - these figures being "of interest as an index of the 
160 
amount by which the local timber trade is enable to most the demand". 
159" Experiments with pulai, a less-favoured latex, were oondaoted in 
1949-52, but it was rejected as a substitute for eluton . In March 
1952 all licences to tap Pula were withdrawn because it had been 
disoovered that eluton latex was being adulterated with lower-grade 
ulai latex. 
160. Brunei Annual Report 19529 p 30. 
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Daring 1947 an Australian timber company began exporting logs to Ans- 
tralia for plywood manufacture. Diffioulty was experienoed in obtaining 
a sufficient proportion of floating logs to make rafting by sea a sound 
proposition and this method had to be abandoned in favour of shipping by 
small, shallow draft vessels. 
In 1949 firewood contraotors were ooatinually urged to produoe 
Charcoal for export, but efforts in this, direotion were deterred by 
shipping difficulties. Bat in 1952-3 there was a great expansions in 
the latter year there were 22 kilns either built or under oonstruotion 
varying in capaoity from 25-30 ip kals to 150 iß$. 
161 
After 1945 Brunei had a small but growing sawmilling industry, 
mostly in the hands of small-eoale Chinese operators. In 1946 a privately 
owned sawmill situated on the Badae-Seria light railway produoed soft- 
Woods., boards and soantlinga, ohiefly to the order of the BMPC. There 
were in addition two poorly-equipped sawmills turning out rough quality 
timber in the oapitai. The.. absenoe of a qualified sawyer remained a 
drawback throughout the late 1940e. Even the WC failed in its attempt, 
made in 1949, to establish an eoonomio mill. In'the early 195001 however, 
there was a great inorease in the number of new mills (8 in 1949,24 in 
1953). Of these, a few were, permanent mills in towns, but most were 
portable mills in the forest usually oonsisting of a petrol engine and 
one 48" saw benoh. Equipment was not up to date or effioient in layouts 
the argument being that with spasmodio supplies of logs there was no 
161. Brunei Annual Report 1949, p 24 and . 
BAR 19539 p 50. 
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object in having a good mill. Outturn was not greats the largest saw- 
mill in Belait district, for example, paid annual royalty of less than 
X20,000s this compared with, say, the Rajang basin in Sarawak, where 
several operators could each guarantee a royalty of at least %25,000. 
The industry was handicapped in Brunei by the shortage and high cost of 
labour because of competition from the oil company, while the export 
trade was limited because of the high trans-shipment costs (X17 a ton) 
at Labuan. Hence Brunei timber was rendered uncompetitive with that 
produced by its neighbours. The mills concentrated on supplying the 
internal market, which was dominated by the requirements of the BMPC. 
8. Conolusion 
To sum ups it was not possible to oommeuoe rebuilding the towns 
of Brunei until 1949 or later. Building oonstruotion was given priority 
from 1950 so that by 1954 Brunei Town at least showed few signs of its 
wartime ordeal. In the economic sphere, oilfield rehabilitation took 
first plaoe. The recovery and growth of this industry were phenomenal so 
that by 1950 produotion was about six times the 1938 level; Government 
revenues benefited in even greater proportion because of increases in the 
rate of oil royalty and, front 1950, the introduction of income tax. The 
second priority was to increase domestio food production. In 1948-51 
local produotion of rice aooonnted for 75% of home needs compared with not 
more than 40% before the Japanese oooapation. In 1946-9 rubber exports 
failed to match the level of the best pre-war year (1941) but there was 
a boom in price during the Korean War which caused new output records. 
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Water and eleotrioity supplies, although remaining inadequate, exoeeded 
pre-war totals by 1950. In the sphere of eduoationg Mr Pearoe oomplained 
that the system was expanding laterally but not growing up; whilst, in 
1948, it was commented that nothing had been done to adapt the educational 
system to "the needs of the present era of intensive industrial 
aotivity, 
162 
In the health sphere infant mortality was down from 21% 
in 1938 to 13.8% in 1950; inpatients were up from 614 in 1938 to 1,105 
in 1950 and outpatients from 19,435 in 1938 to over 50,000 in 1950 (not 
including 23,107 attendances at the riverine dispensaries by the latter 
date). The birth rate inoreased from 3.8% in 1938 to 5.7% whilst the 
death rate dipped from 2.2% to 2% (1.7% in 1951). In 1952 it was 
reported: 
"Every effort has continued to be made to raise the standard of living 
of the people, to oombat the effects of hookworm, malaria and mal- 
nutritiong largely responsible for their slower increase and heavier 
infant mortality; and to provide the widely disseminated education 
facilities that alone would make it possible for them to take their 
proper plaoe in the eoonomio and commercial, no less than the politioal, 
structure of the country; but greatly expanded health, medical and 
educational servioes as well as the formidable task of recruiting more 
trained staff to effeot and maintain them over the State's dispersed 
and backward agricultural areas are vital and imperative preliminaries 
to the achievement of these ends". 163 
Progress from 1953 was far more rapid. 
162. Brunei Annual Report 19481, p 18. 
163. Brunei Annual Report 1952, p 2. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
! 'ML STEAM ABEADs THE FIRST FIVE YEAR DEMOPMBNP PLAN 1953-1958 
1. Introduoti on 
In this ohapter the economic development` and social progress 
made in Brunei during the period of the first development plan (1953-8) 
are examined. The sine qua non for this projeot was the burgeoning oil 
revenues of the Saltanate, partioalarly after the introdnotion of inoome 
tax in 1950, The third seotion of this ohapter deals with the assumptions 
behind the development programme; and, in the final ®eotion, the 
implementation of some of these sohemes is desoribed. 
2. Baokgronnd 
"We are anxious to see new oil produotion in sterling areas". 
The quiok reoovery of the Serie oilfield was regarded as a great success 
by Hk! Government. The last well fire was extinguished only on 27 Sept- 
ember 1945" The BMPO proposed to build a new refinery on 1 Uara Island; 
meanwhile the Lutong (Sarawak) refinery would be rehabilitated. The 
Iinietry of fteL in London *as "fu' lly in eyrmpatbb" with the company' e 
proposal beoanse "we are anxious to see new production and refining 
oapaoity developed in sterling areas", 
1 
thereb7 to save soaroe British 
1. CO 852/643 (File it, item 17), Jiinfuel to CO (RH Bart), 24 Ootober 
1945. Cf. CO 852/983 (Idle 3, item 19) Minfuel to 00,14 MaY 1947" 
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reserves of Amerioan ourrenoy. While this remained the prime oonsider- 
ation, Borneo oil assumed greater peroeived importanoe from the defence 
angle after the Chinese Revolution of 1949.2 The BMPC oo-operated with 
FIM Government's polioy of developing the Belait oilfield as rapidly as 
possible (of. P 386, below). In 1948 Brunei overtook Trinidad as the 
leading prodnoer of orade oil in the British Commonwealth. A further 
turning point was reaohed in 1954, wbioh was a year 
"of transition and consolidation. The oilfield may be said to have 
passed, in a planned and orderly manner, out of the 'rush$ period which 
followed the end of the warp when the Commonwealth's - demand for non- 
dollar oil supplies made it necessary to accelerate production at the 
expense of many other forms of activity". 3 
It was foand that the 8eria oilfield extended under the sea; hence the 
oontinental shelf was annexed by proolamation in 1954. Exploration on 
land failed to bring any worthwhile results, exoept at Jerudong, where 
produotion was possible on a limited soale in 1956-60. 
Turning from produotion' to refining, the BXPC deoided in 1949 
not to prooeed with the proposed refinery on Muara Island. This was 
despite generous oomoessions from the Colonial Offioeq which even waived, 
without asking a consideration fee, its requirement that the company 
should refine 50% of Soria oil at Lutoug in Sarawak. 
"So rioh as to be almost indeoent". In 1946 the prinoipal 
souroes of Government revenue remained the same as in pre-war years, the 
most important being oil royalty, followed by customs revenue. Brunei's 
2. CO 825/51 (File 55o63/7/19499 item 37), revised report of (HM Govern- 
ment's) BE Asian Working Party, 19 September 1949, paragraphs 10-11. 
3. Brunei Annual Report 1254o p 59 " 
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ouatoms tariffs had been inoreased to bring them into line with those 
of North Borneo. This delayed oommeroial reoovery and disadvantaged 
the people of Brunei, whose imports beoame more expensive. 
4 Cession 
money payments from Sarawak were oompounded in 1948.5 The sale of opium 
was prohibited,, so revenue from this source ceased. Thanks principally 
to the rapid expansion ýof oil output and inoreases in the rate of oil 
royalty (see bel(w), the Brunei Government's revenue in 1949 amounted to 
0$..? million, oompared with X1.5m in 1940. One CO olerk oommenteds 
"This fortunate little State is so rioh as to be almost indeoent and in 
the fortunate position of being able to sit baok and watoh the oil flow 
out and the money flow -in". 6 
Polioys "The oil oompany ought to pap more". After the war the 
Brunei Government resumed its oautious pre-war financial policy of meeting 
all ordinary expenditure from 'revenue other than that derived-from oil'. 
Oil revenue was used for special expenditure, the surplus being invested 
in a General Reserve Fand. Mr Peel pointed out that whereas before 1941 
revenue from oil and non-oil souroes had approximately balanoed, oil was 
providing over three-quarters of the total in 1947. Be urged some revision 
of polioys "in order that Brunei should benefit from the inoreased revenue 
it is essential that some Government departments should be expanded to 
some extent". The High Commissioner ruled that the pre-war polioy was 
sound and that "there should not at present be any oonsiderable departure 
from that polioy". 
7 (Brunei had unknown liabilities with regard to war 
4" See below, p 388 (fn. 27)" 
5. CO 537/2242- 
6. CO 823/76 (File 55426/1949, item 1). report by Mr L3 Greening OBE MC 
(b 1895), 12 April 1949" 
7. CO 943/1 (File 1., item 11)y Governor-General (of Malaya and Borneo, 
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damage oompeusatioa and the oost of the WIA). Mr Palmer at the Colonial 
Office considered the policy "somewhat unduly oonservative" and suggested 
that the Resident be invited to devise a five 7eax plan and, taking 
aooount of the possibletliabilities from the war, to draw up "a somewhat 
more realistio finanoial polio". 
8 
Although the High Commissioner's 
cautious approach was endorsed for the time being, an economic forecast 
for the ooming five years (1948-52) was requested. This was forwarded 
to the Colonial Orfioe by telegram on 17 Deoember 1947. Mr amble, the 
Brunei Treasurer (1946-54), suggested that it would be "neoessary and 
wise" to amend the existing finanoial polioy to enable the State to meet 
a projeotecl defioit on non-oil revenue and to keep pane with its obliga- 
tioae to the publio. Mr Trambie reoommended that 
"the State be permitted to embark a part of the oil royalties for this 
purpose on a sliding soale of approximately the following ratios 1948 
and 19498 10%; 1950,1951 and 1952,5%"" 9 
The High Commiesionerp )lr XaoDonald, agreed and urged strongly that 
"a fairlT large proportion of the State's surpluses should be plaoed to 
a general reserve ... 
(It) would be prudent to ensure that, when oil revenue 
diminishes or oeases, the State's reserves enable it to maintain the 
standards to whioh it should then have attained". 10 
The Colonial Offioe agreed that oil revenue woald have to be 
brought in to make good the defioits 
"This, however, raises the whole issue of oontinuing to maintain two 
separate budgets... In the past it may have been a oonvenient and salutary 
es-offioio High Commissioner for Brunei) to CO,. No 1 (seoret), 30 Jan- 
nary 1947, paragraph 2 (inoluding oomments by the Resident). 
8. Ibid,, minute by Mr Palmer, 20 February 1947. 
9. CO 943/1 (File 15, item 9), memorandum by xr Trumble, Paragraph 8. 
10. Ibid., Governor-General to 00,17 Deoember 1947, paragraphs 2-3. 
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fiotion to lay down that oil revenue was only available to meet extra- 
ordinary expenditure, but it should be nothing more than a oonvenient 
rule of thumb... and... oil revenue should in future be inoluded in the 
general revenue and.. the aim should be to put a reasonable proportion 
of the total revenue to reserve, against the time when oil as a souroe 
of revenue will no longer exist". 11 
The Colonial Offioe did not believe that Brunei should simply draw on 
the aooumalated reserve when oil revenue oeasedt these funds would 
eventually be exhausted and the ooantry would then be left without 
reserves or alternative souroes of revenue. Henoe the Colonial Offioe 
suggested that the surplus should be utilized to develop other eoonomio 
resoaroes. 
12 
In 1948 Mr Palmer had the temerity to suggest that the oil 
company should pay more to the Brunei Government. 
In April 1949 Mr R Qallieti at the Colonial Offioe oonourred 
that the supply of oil was uncertain and that Brunei "may in due course 
find itself with a muoh larger population and publio servioes and nothing 
muoh with whioh to maintain them" unless agrionlture and fieheriee were 
rapidly developed. He urged that Brunei 
"should determine what proportion of its surplus in needed for current 
development projects and what proportion it should not aside to provide 
a regular inoome more or less equal to that now derived from oil. That 
iss it should aim at replacing its oil capital as it is used up by 
(1) 
productive oapital assets in agrioulture, forestry, fisheries and small 
industries; (2) investment funds to yield a pre-determined fixed income 
about fifty years hence". 13 
The Brunei administration was advised. to prepare a five year 
plan "os general lines whioh woaid be primarily directed towards 
building up alternative souroes of revenue and eoonoin to replaoe the 
11. Ibid., item 10p CO to Governor-General, saving (oonfidential), 11 
)Iaroh 1948 (based on a minute by Mr JR Rednall, 2 Februarg 1948)- 
12,, Ibid., paragraphs 5-6. 
13. CO 943/1 (File 17) minute by Mr R Gallettip 9 April 1949. 
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wasting oil asset". 
14 
After the Chinese Revolution of 1949 there was 
oonoern about the possible spread of oommunism to SE Asia. Mr KG Ashton 
at the Colonial Offioe warned that it ooald not be expeoted that the 
British Proteotorates in Borneo "will indefinitely oontinue to be an 
idyllio refuge from the harsh politios of the outside world". But the 
auooeea of demagogues 
"will depend on the wisdom of the (British Borneo) territories' govern- 
ments in eoonomiop social and constitutional matters, on the economic 
prosperity of the territories (both as directly enjoyed by individual 
producers and tradesmen, and as reflected in the revenue available to 
finance Government services) and on the political example not by the 
adjacent countries of SE Asia". 15 
The main aims of the Colonial Offioe were to promote eurveys (to aoquire 
essential information about the natural reeouroes of the territories); 
the improvement of oommuuioations; the testing and popularizing of various 
oaah orops as alternatives to ribber and oil and the possible oreation of 
an export trade in rioe; and improving standards in health and ednoation. 
Brunei, for the time being, was oonoentrating on post-war reoonstruotiou 
and rehabilitation; when this programme was oompleted it would be able 
to finanoe its own development plan along broader lines. 
Hit Government's inter-departmental working party for SE Asia 
agreed that illiteraoy, disease and malnutrition in BE Asia provided an 
environment in whioh oommuniam might flourish. The Treasury wanted 
"to develop the natural rescuroes of the region in the way of food, power 
and all primary produote, but not to embark on an7 over-ambitions sohemes 
of industrialization in the east whioh might result eventually in un- 
14. CO 825/76 (Pile 55426/49, item 5) minute by Mr JD Higham GIG (b 1914), 26 May 1949. 
15" CO 825/53 (Pile 55063/7/5, item 1), memorandum by Mr XG Ashton, 24 
August 1949, Paragraph 5. 
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desirable oompetitioti with the west"ß16 
The Cabinet Offioe noted that the United Kingdom's oolonies in the Far 
East "oan only benefit if India and Japan sell them oheap oonsumer goods. 
It is we who lose". 
17 
Mr Higham at the Colonial Office preferred, as a 
short term polioyt to "go all oat for rioe produotion in British terri- 
tories" in the Far East. 
18 
The final working party report noted that 
British Borneo was "being developed politioally and eoonotnioally on lines 
fully in aooordanoe with the needs of its population and with an eye to 
its possible future as a rice surplus area which can plays its part in 
alleviating the food shortage". 
19 
The British Resident in Brunei, who was less sanguine, replied 
that an increase in rice production would require new colonists on the 
land, but it was "difficult to see from what parts new settlers... could 
acme". Purthermorev "the nature of the terrain appears to be unsuitable 
for the mechanical cultivation of rice". The only new industry of import- 
anoe whioh had appeared siaoe 1945 was the export of firewood to Hong 
Kong. Opportunities and inducements for the investment of private oap- 
ital from overseas were not very great. The most promising field was 
forestry, but the possibilities had been investigated by Steel Brothers, 
formerly of Rangoon, who pronounoed the difficulties to be so great as 
to render exploitation an aueoonomio proposition. There was "plenty 
16. CO 825/51 (File 55063/7, item 13), Treasury to Foreign Offioe, 28 
June 1949. 
17. Ibid., item 11, Cabinet Office to Foreign Office, 27 June 1949. 
18. Ibid.,, minute by Higham, 27 June 1949" 
19. bisl., item 37, revised report of (BM Government's) BE Asia Working 
Party, 19 September 1949, paragraph 12. 
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of cheap land" for large-scale agricultural ventures, such as rubber 
estatesq but any new business would have to import workers. The 'cry- 
ing need# of the ooantry was, for teohnioal experts. 
20 
Meanwhile., in September 1949, an citline plan for the ten 
years 1948 to 1957, of whioh the first year (1948-9) had already almost 
elapsed, was sabmitted to the Colonial Offioe by the Brunei Government. 
A surplus of $25 million over the ten years was antioipated, of whioh 
it was thought X10 million might be devoted to development and welfare 
programmes. Mr Ashton deolared that the plan allotted "an impressive 
proportion of the money to eoonomio development" ($6 million out of 910 
million). Sir GO Whiteley (1891-1958) minuted that the only question 
was whether the plan was on a big enoagh soale. Mr P Selwyn, on the 
other hand, felt that many of the objeots were "eztremely vague" and 
there was no indioation as to how they were to be aohieved.. More oould 
have been allotted to social servioes, in his opinion. 
21 
The introdnotion of oompany inoome tax - at a rate of 20% upon 
profits from 1 January 1950 (30% from the beginning of 1953) - oansed an 
explosion in national revenue (see Table 229 overleaf). In 1949 the 
annual inoome of the Brunei Government amounted to less than $$9 million; 
in 1951, with inoome tax yielding $40 million, it was $69 million; and 
in 1953 $98.98 million (of whioh inoome tax oomprised $61 million). 
20. Co 825/87 (File 55425/43, item 1)9 memorandum by Pretty, enole in 
High Commissioner to co, No 2 (saving), 14 August 1950. 
21. Co 943/1 (File 189 item 1)9 Aoting High Commissioner to CO, No 5 
(Brunei), 24 September 1949; and minutes thereon by Ashton (25 Ootober 
1949), Whiteley (27 Ootober) and Selwyn (23 November). 
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Table 22. Oil Exports and Government Revenue 1946-59 (in millions of 
Malayan dollars). 
Year Oil Exportes- Total Government Revenues- 
Tons Value Exports Oil I Inoome Total 
Royalty Tax 
m im jm im im im 
1946* 0.2 n. a 0.9 0.06 nil, 0.8 
1947 1.7 29.5 n. a. 1.0 nil 4.4 
1948 2.6 47.1 49.3 4.2 nil 6.6 
1949a 3.2 60.1 62.1 5.6 nil 8.7 
1950 4.0 198.2 205.4 13.2 0.009 17.3 
1951 4.9 262.8 271.8 24.2 40.0 69.4 
1952 5.0 270.7 275.6 26.8 41.6 75.7 
1953 4.8 264.0 282.6 25.5 61.0 99.0 
1954 4.7 262.2 273.5 26.6 n. a. 96.0 
1955 5.1 287.0 303.4 31.6 50.0 102.7 
1956 5.5 309.3 330.3 39.2 54.4 118.0 
1957 5.4 313.7 340-0 44.4 57.5 131.0 
1958 5.1 300.4 326.9 39.0 59.3 131.3 
1959 n. a. 292.6 310.0 38.0 55.8 129.6= 
Notes. * second half of the year only. 
® the pound sterling was devalued by thirty per cent against 
the American dollar in November 1949. The Malayan dollar, 
as the Straits' dollar was renamed after the Second World, 
War, remained fixed at 2s 4d (10. i166). 
Sou roes. Compiled by the author from Brunei Annual Reports (and also from 
the Brunei budget estimates, available in Rhodes House, oxford). 
Investment inoome also spiralled to %12.6m annually by 1955 and 
X25.4m 
in 1959. In the latter year total Government reoeipts were %129.6m, 
slightly down on the previous year's level. It is to be observed that, 
whereas as late as 1931 the annual revenue at the disposal of the Brunei 
Government per head of population was less than twelve dollars, b' 1959 
%1,500 was available per head per year (see Table 7 on p 179, above). 
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"'0 fortunate Bruner", oommented Sir GO Whiteley an early as 1951.22 
The ten year plan had beoome redandaut because Brunei by that time 
had far greater resonroee than had been antioipated. 
The rooketing Government revenues should not obsoure the faot 
that the BMPC enjoyed exoeptionally favourable terms. The royalty rate 
paid by that oompany before the war was W. 10 per too. Investigation in 
1945 revealed that in the United States royalties reaohed up to (00.37 
per ton, in Venezuela slightly more, and in Saudi Arabia and Iraq ; 0,, 20* 
23 
The Colonial Office in that year recommended royalties of not leas than 
i0U. 20 per ton in the Commonwealth. 
24 
After the warp therefore, the Bru- 
nei Government exeroieed its reserved option to take ten per Dent of 
Soria oil in kind. This was then sold baok to the oompa at prides 
agreed from time to time (see below). Intimation of this intention was 
first made to the BMPC in Meal 1946: but the six months' notioe was given 
only orally, whereas technically it should have been in writing. 
25 
Henoe 
Payment in kind did not begin until August 1947, to the detriment of the 
State of Brunei and the corresponding advantage of the BMPC. 
The ooma y agreed to buy the oil baok at the rate of £. 2.25 
per ton of light orade oil and 11.75 for heavy orude ail. Theme rates, 
suggested to the Colonial Office 137 the Minfuelp were to apply for a 
22, CO 943/2 (File 7) minute by Sir GC Whiteley, 23 August 1951- 
23. CO 852/646 (File 39 item 1) memorandum by atinfael, 13 June 1945" 
24. Ibid., item 169 minutes of 19th Colonial Eoonomio Advisory Committee 
meeting, 1 November 1945. 
25" CO 852/983 (File 3, item 4) BMPC to CO, 28 February 1947; and ibid., 
item 13, BMPC to CO, 25 April 1947" "This was admittedly a try-on (by 
the Colonial Offioe)", Mr RE Burt minuted on 7 Maroh 1947, "and it has 
not been snooessfnl". 
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period of two years from August 1947. Based on 10% of the value of crude 
oi19 the oompany's offer was equivalent to a royalty of 910.175 on the 
heavy and M. 225 on the light crude. Since the company was producing 
approximately equal quantities of each, the average royalty of 90.20 
was in line with the new guidelines established by White ha11.26 By wag 
of reoompensep the oompany was granted a rebate of more than half a 
million dollars for all the onatome duty whioh it had paid on maohinery 
imported to rehabilitate the Soria oilfield. 
27 
In 1949 the royalt7 was revised to take into oonsideration "the 
sales value of the main, produote derived from orude oil prodnoed in Bru- 
nette. As a result the effeotive rojalty was inoreased to C D-51 for 
light ornde andfD. 385 for heavl, a sigaifioant improvement despite the 
30% devaluation of sterling against the Alnerioan dollar in 1949 (of. 
Table 22, on p 386, above). 
28 
In April 1950 the visit of a speoialist 
26. Ibid., item 11 Ninfuel to C0f 25 January 1947. The field prioe for 
the best Texan light orude at this time was £3.25 per ton, but Persian 
orudep approximately the same quality as Soria light orudeq fetohecl only 
£2.40 per ton. Henoe Brunei fared reasonably when receiving £2.25 per 
ton of Soria light orade oil. With regard to heavy orudep on the other 
hand, the market prioe was £2.55 per ton, whereas the BNPC bought baok at 
only Cl-75 per ton, i. e. t0.80 was allowed for gathering, transporting, 
processing and loading. The Ninfuel was satisfied, however, that there 
should be a differential of XD. 50 between the prices for light and 
heavy petroleum. The oompany's offer of Ll. 75 per ton for the latter, 
therefore, was "acceptable". 
27. CO 852/1079 (File 5) minute by Mr Palmer, 5 Deoember 1949. 
(Cf. 
earlier in 1949 )Ir Galletti at the Colonial Office had suggested that 
Brunei might very easily forego the very small proceeds from export 
duties - x$103,000 - and remove the import duties on necessities such as 
flour, soap and salt because such relief "might be of some value to the 
Population at a time when imports might be very expensive". This was 
rejeoted because it would have put Brunei out of step with North Borneo 
(CO 943/1 File 179 minute by Galletti, 9 April 1949, with marginal 
comment by Sir GG Whiteley, n. d.. See also, aboveg p 380)- 
28, CO 852/1204 (File 2p items 20 and 26). 
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to Brunei resulted in a further tightening up of the taxation rules* 
29 
(In 1955 the royalty rate was inoreased to 12.5% on old leases, but for 
offshore leases it was rednoed to only 8% on prodnotion from wells sit- 
uated 3-10 nautioal miles from the ooast and % if more than ten miles). 
30 
The yield from inoome tax gives an indioation of the soale of 
Profit aohieved by the BMPC. In 1951 the Brunei Government reoeived $40 
million from inoome tax whioh suggests pre-tax profits of the order of 
%200 million for the oompaw. 
31 
The British also took advantage of Brunei's wealth to seoure 
cheap loans for less-favoured neighbouring British oolonies. 
32 The 
yield from Government investments,, entrusted to the Crown Agents on 
behalf of the Brunei Government, was also not the optimums it was 
feareds 
"The-differenoe between actual earnings and potential earnings (i. e. of 
interest on reserves) has been substantial. ... Examination of existing 
investments shows that an unduly large proportion are on a relatively 
short term, with oorrespondingly low interest rates. There is no like- 
lihood of the State needing to realize any of its investments for many 
years to Dome and therefore long-term, high yielding investments should 
be the order or the day, and it should be possible to exoeed the figure 
of 31% by a oomfortable margin". 33 
29. CO 852/1204 (File 4, item 1) Poster Report 1950. 
30. Borneo Bulletin, 5 November 1955- 
31. This is so assuming (a) that the rate of inoome tax was 20% and 
(b) 
that the BMPC paid the overwhelming bulk of the inoome tax reoeived by 
the Brunei Government. Mr HL Fountain reoalls (in a letter to the author, 
16 September 1983, paragraph 15) that shares in the BMPC bought for only 
£0.12 in the 1920x, were later sold for £2.35 each. 
32. Not entirely suooeesfully: see CO 1022/309. 
33. ER Bevington, The Eoonomy and Development of the State of Brun 
June 1956, Pp 70-1 (oopy oourtesy of Mr ER Bevington CMG CEng). In one 
Partioular oase in 1957, "investments showing a book value of 12.8 
million were sold for ß$10.2m, the differenoe of 
$2.52m being the loss 
on the sale of these investments. Losses to this extent", the Auditor 
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Henoe the Crown Agents would have to be kept up to the mark in future. 
Similarly, excessive departmental estimating caused further losses 
beoause large sums, whioh might have been invested to earn interest, 
were kept in hand earning nothing. 
B' 1953 the work of post-war rehabilitation in Brunei was 
appr oaohing oompletion. In July of that year the Government published 
a bald Summary of Proposals, 
34 
a wide-ranging plan for the future 
development of the State and the improvement of its public servioes. 
The State Coanoil voted X1100 million to be spent over the next five 
years for the welfare of the people of Brunei, as against $10 million 
over ten years in the outline plan of 1948. A Commissioner of Develop- 
menty Mr ER Bevington from the Colonial Servioe in Fiji, was appointed 
to parry out the all-embraoing new plan. In order of seniority, be 
ranked seoond only to the Resident. 
35 
3. Assumptions Behind the First Five Year Plan (1953-8) 
The Problem and Objeotive. 
36 
Although the broad goals of the 
first Five ? ear Plan were laid down in 1953, detailed planning oontinued 
in 1954 and 1955. In his review, published in June 1956, Mr BevingtOn, 
based hie planning on the assumption that no new reservoir of oil 
oonoluded, "mast be expeoted if the polioy of limited depreoiation... is 
aontitmed during times when investments generally are depreoiating" 
(CO 
824/3 Audit Report 1957, paragraph 48). 
34. CO 1022/336 Summary of Proposals (Brunei, July 1953,6 pp). 
35. Letter of instruotions from Sir Anthony Abell to Mr Bevington, 13 
Ootober 1954, paragraph 8 (Dopy oourtesy of Mr Bevington CMG CEng). 
36. The following section is based upon Bevington, o . oit., especially 
pp 6-14,18-21 and 53-63. 
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would be founds the administration was "in a position of trust"t he 
argued, "and it would be the height of folly to plan expenditure now on 
a more presumption that more oil was found". The existing Soria field 
was assumed to have a further life of 25 years. The ourrent peak of 
produotion had been reaohed in 1952 (of* p 386, above) and a progressive 
deoline of output was expeoted. Sinoe 83% of State, revenue was derived 
from petroleum, the task in hand was to aooamnlate suffioient funds 
before oil output diminished and then oeased altogether, whilst, at the 
same times making a seoond string to the State's bow in the form of 
alternative eoonomio development. Expenditure was to be governed by 
these two "over-riding ooaeideratioas". 
The prime need was to conoentrate the known available reeouroes 
Ott neoessities and oarefully-planned eoonomio development, so that if 
oil revenue deoreased, the State would be able to maintain the servioea 
thus oreated and be able to progress as an eoonomioally-stable entity 
without outside assistanoe. This would entail oareful budgeting eaoh 
year with a view to aooumulating the maximum surplus while oil revenue 
remained buoyant, and the oareful management of expenditure, inoluding 
the avoidanoe of long-term subsidies on servioes whioh should beoome 
self-maintaining. Similarly, development expenditure needed to be 
direoted sensibly to ensure that the money was spent on true eooaomio 
development whioh would enhanoe the ability of the people to support the 
eervioee oreated. If a new oil reservoir was found, a more optimistic 
view of the timespan within whioh alternative eoonomio bases need be 
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fostered would be possible. 
There were three requioitee, in Mr Bevington's opinions to 
the implementation of a development programmes money, materials and 
people. Mone7 was "suffioient but no more" for the programme envisaged 
is 1953. A buyer's market for materials had been established. (This 
favoared,, Brnnei; and the position was better than in the immediate after- 
math of the war). The prinoipel diffioulty, oonoerned personnel, most of 
whom had to be reoraited from outside the Sultanate. There was a wide - 
and widening - gap between the standard of the prodnots of local sohools 
and. the quality of staff required to manage the new development pro-. 
grammes. Experts engaged from overseas would be employed "for a limited 
period only and will be replaoed by trained Braneians as soon as they 
beoome available", 
37 
Diversitiaation of the Eoonoi . It was important that existing 
non-oil industries ehoald not be allowed to oollapee and that, new ones 
should be established. The Brunei eoonom7 bad depended upon agrioulture 
before 1932 and might have. to do eo again. The people already had a 
working knowledge of robber prodaotion, ample supplies of badwood were 
available locally for bud-grafting, and the rubber industry was therefore 
"the first and most obvious one to, enoourage for the futurett. The boom 
of 1950-1 showed its elastioit3s the people were able to respond 
immediately to high prioee. In other words, this was an industry whioh 
was worth keeping alive and to which, in case of used., the populace 
Could readily return. Daring the ware no replanting had been undertaken; 
37. CO 1022/336 Summary of Proposale, p 6. 
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after the war good quality replanting material was not available locally. 
By 1953, therefore, most plantations were long past their peak, if not 
entirely neglected. A vigorous replanting programme was neoessary, and 
only Government oould supply the stock. The soheme was expeoted to 
iaorease yield per tree and therefore yield per tapper, an important 
point when labour was expensive. Some form of subsidy was necessary to 
assist smallholders in the olearing of land and to tide them over the 
period when the old trees must be felled and the new ones were not yet 
in bearing. . Most important of all, some repayment by smallholders was 
essential if they were to value the budded stook they had obtained and 
look after it in haebandlike manner. 
Rios oaltivation remained tedious and baok-breaking. Ex- 
perimental surveys into meohanioal cultivation were seen by Mr Bevington 
as "only a beginning". If suooessful, further drainage and irrigatiom 
would beoome neoeesary and farmers womld have to be trained in new 
methods. Brunei had "suffioient" lowland areas to become self-supporting 
in rioe (Xr Bevington supposed), but was unlikei' to do so while labour 
oomld earn money more easily elsewhere. Meohanioal oultivation should 
go far to remove the drudgery from ripe growing and increase the yield 
per worker and therefore his oash, retura. 
As alternative means to diversify the eoonom , Mr Bevington 
considered the merits of oopral, oil palm and ooooa, whioh bad all been 
neglected in Brunei "although having obvious possibilities ooapled with 
that ease of working which is usually associated with a 'tree eoonomy'". 
Such crops could not be established immediately; but research and 
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experimentation into possibilities was needed, and there was time to 
undertake suoh studies before petroleum ran out. The meat-eating habit 
was growing in Brunei. Henne experiments were also required with 
climatioally-suitable cattle and grasses so that Brunei might establish 
"a small cattle industry whioh may go far to out down the State's relianoe 
on imported meat and give it some measure of independeuoe". A strain 
of oattle whioh oould give worthwhile milk yields in Brunei was a further 
requirement. in general, shifting cultivation needed to be eliminated 
if the living standards of such farmers were to be raised, 
Mr Bevington argued that the possibility of a large-soale 
oommercial fishery industry for Brunei could not be written off on the 
basis of the survey taken in 1949-50 (whioh had oonoluded that the time- 
honoured methods of the Brunei Malays were more suitable than European- 
style Danish seining; of. P 367, above). The Commissioner of Development 
noted that consumption in the Sultanate was not met by local fishermen; 
and there was an inexhaustible market in Singapore for any future 
surplus. Within Brunei the Government had ooatrolled prioe and dis- 
tribation in order to ensure that fish was available to ails without suoh 
oontrol all supplies would have gone to the oilfield where there was the 
greatest demand and purohasing power. Suoh restriotions limited the 
return to the fisherman, who had little opportunity of improving his 
equipment and returns. To out suoh a. vicious oirole, Mr Bevington 
suggested that the first neoessity was to inorease looal produotion 
until it met demand and then aohieve a surplus for export. Looal 
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fishermen needed to be given aooess to more effioient methods although 
rapid changes could not be expected. Mr Bevington suggested that the 
Government should demonstrate the advantages of heavier, slower-moving 
but cheaper and longer-lasting craft, and take over financing and 
marketing from the Chinese middlemen. A programme of this type was 
essential if fishermen were to be raised from the bare subsistence 
level. The seoond stage of development would require still larger 
Draft and methods new to Brunei fishermen. Although the first brief 
experiment with Danish seining in 1949-50 had not been a suooess., it 
ways by no means proved that commercial returns were not obtainable by 
suoh European methods provided suitable looal fishermen could be induced 
to experiment. Comparable experiments in Sarawak and Malaya needed to 
be watched and profited from. 
A similar emphasis on the improvement of traditional oocupations 
was shown in the Government's reluctance to allow the handicraft industry 
to the out. Instead, it was argued that better market researoh was 
required: the days of the 'ktaiok knaok' were over beoause people would 
burp only useful objeots baying a funotional value. Gold oloths, for 
example, found few uses outside the Malaysian world despite the quality 
of the workmanship. It was suggested that this was an industry whioh 
lent itself to some form of oo-operative organisation. 
Other seoondary industries were neoessary to reduoe the wastage 
Of natural gas produoed in assooiation with Seria oil. Agrioultural and 
indastrial. loans from the Government could foster the econorry. A soil 
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survey and a geologioal survey were to be undertaken in the hope that 
they would aid the development programme by yielding information for 
Government departments, farmers and oommeroial undertakings. 
In short, the Brunei Government seemed not to have envisaged 
diversification of the economy beyond improvements in traditional 
aotivities; and there was a high degree of overt'-optimism in the 1953 
plan given earlier comments about problems of labour, terrain, weak 
personal commitment and in-built oonservatism, to name a few. The soil 
survey, as shall be seen in due coarser seemed to confirm Mr Pretty's 
gloomy appraisal of the situation in August 1950 (see above, p 384). 
It has been suggested,, further,, that to use waste gas was merely to 
provide a facility rather than significantly to diversify the economy. 
In the sphere of sooial servioesp the Summary of Proposals 
(19 53) made provision for non-oontributory pensions for the elderly and 
disabled; the resettlement of the inhabitants of Kampong Ayer on terra 
firma; the oonstruotion of roads, ports, a telephone exohange and 
aerodrome; town planning, inoluding reolamation and anti-erosion works 
and the extension of water supplies and eleotrioity; the oonstruotion 
of thirty new sohools and the provision of soholarships and free primary 
eohool meals; and the expansion of medioal servioes, inoluding a new 
hospital in Kuala Belaitq the extension of travelling dispensaries in 
rural areaey anti-malarial Works the training of nurses and dressers, 
and the extension of maternity servioes. 
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4. Implementation 
(a) The Economy. Brunei continued to remain overwhelmingly 
dependent upon exports of crude oil. Apart from the minor accumulation 
at Jerudong, no new oil reservoir was disoovered until 1963 when the 
offshore field at Ampa Patohes was struok. Most of Brunei's oil is now 
(1985) derived from under the sea. . Following the 
fourfold inorease in 
the prioe of oil imposed by OPEC in 1973 Brunei has aohieved unpreoedent- 
ed wealth. 
It was not possible to make better use of Brunei's waste gas 
in the 1950s. Mr Bevington realized that the prerequisites for the 
establishment of suooessftil seoondary industries - an unlimited supply 
of power, raw materials olose at hand, adequate looal labour (both skilled 
and unskilled), a good port, and ready aooess to markets - were mostly 
laoking. Possibilities inoluded the manufaoture of oementp nitrogen 
fertilizers and aluminium; but none of these ideas were implemented 
because of the difficulties just outlined. There was no sulphur in the 
gas at Seria, so a , number of sulphur-using projeots were antomatioally 
ruled out. Mr Bevington realized- in any oases that 
"If some day industry based on gas beoomes a reality, it will broaden 
the eooncmy of the State but for a limited period only. The write-off 
period will probably have to be short and oapitalisation rednoed or the 
oost of the prodaot inoreased. Agrioaiture will not diminish in 
importance as the mainstay for the futures it will merely be given a 
longer preparation period". 38 
Some waste gas was used, however, to supply domestio oonsumers 
in the oilfield area. In 1953 238 Government quarters and 70 private 
38. Bevington, o . oit., p 62. 
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oonsumers were thus supplied. Two years later X600,000 was approved by 
the Government for a new retioulation system in order to give an adequate 
snpp17 to a much larger area. Work on this projeot did not begin until 
1958. It was oortipleted the following gear,, howeverg resulting in a 
general inoreaee of pressure at consumer points and the inolusion of 
areas not previously served in Seria. On 21 January 1955 the sultan 
opened the Bl3PC"s new 014 million gas plant, whioh resulted in an 
inorease in consumers from 867 in 1956 to 1,387 in 1958. (It was not 
until 1972 - when natural gas in liquefied form began to be exported to 
Japan - that a full use was found for Brunei's !. Waste' gas). 
39 
The soil survey taken in 1956 proved disoonragings there 
appeared to be very little extra flat land suitable for further agrioult- 
Ural development. 40 Aithoagh Irrohe Hamidoon, the State Agrionltnral 
Offioe; oritioieed its findings as unrepresentative beoanee it was 
based upon a email (60,000 sores) and swampy area, a larger-eoale survey 
reaohed muoh the same oonolueioae in 1970. &luall7 disooaraging rae the 
$130,000 geological survey, wbioh was ready by 1959.41 Apart from oil, 
the chief mineral resource of Brunei was coal. ? uture mining prospects 
were poor beoan®e there waa negligible looal demand for ooal and it was 
39. Daring the Residential Bra the value of annual natural gas exports 
from Brunei peaked at $1028 million in 19479 before falling to $0.44m 
in both 1951 and 1952. A slight recovery then ensued ($0.62m in 1958); 
but as late as 1970 Brunei's natural gas exports fetched only slightly 
above %l. Om. After the-oommencement of liquefied natural gas exporting 
in 19721, however, there was a phenomenal increase from $46.5m in 1973 
to $685m in 1976. Sources compiled by author from Brunei Annual Reports. 
40. Borneo Bulletin, 4 and 25 October 1958. 
41. Borneo Bulletin, 15 August 1959. A revised version (presumably) of 
this report - (M Wilford, The Geolo4tr and Mineral Resources of Brunei and 
AdJ anent Parts of Sarawak - was published in Brunei in 1961. 
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unlikely that Brunei's lignite oomld oompete eoonomioally in overseas 
ooantriee with fuel oil and looally-prodnoed ooal as a fuel for general 
heating purposes. Xuoh of the ooal-bearing area was relatively inaooess-- 
ible, most of the thicker seams dipped steeply, and many had olay floors 
and roofs. The thickest and most aooessible seams at Brooketoa Colliery 
had probably been worked out. Other mineral resoaroes inoluded oon- 
straotional materials suoh as sand, gravel and limestone, and brick o1ay. 
äost of the limestone oould be used for Dement manufaoture, but was 
situated in the relatively inaooessible interior. Extensive deposits of 
high-grade eilioa sand suitable for glase-making ooourred in the ooastal 
area. Dr Wilford, the geologist, was unable to substantiate reports of 
antimony and diamonds said to be found in the area (see above, pp 202-3). 
If suitable secondary industries proved elusive, the preservat- 
Lou of existing non-oil occupations was no less diffioult. Both Mr 
Pretty in 1950 and Mr Bevington later on had seen rubber as a possible 
area of growth. In earl? 1956 a five million dollar rubber improvement 
Boheme, aimed at smallholders, was announced. After the Korean War boom 
eaded, low prioes and the attraction of other work (such as the oilfield 
and the building programme) resulted in a sharp decline in tapping. The 
aim of the rubber soheme was to increase smallholder acreage and to 
l- improve the quality of their prodnot. To aohieve this purpose, Baal 
holdere were given eubeidiee, bonuses, improved planting materiale and 
ohemioale, Towards the and of 1953 the Government had purohaeed the 
Brunei United Plaatatioae Company's estate at Berakae, 
42 
where a 33-aore 
42. See above, p 205. 
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rubber nursery was started the following August "with the objeot of 
produoing budded stumps for sale to smallholders , '. 
43 
Towards half a 
million improved seedlings and budded stumps from Berakas were sold (at 
25 cents a time) during the years 1955-9.44 Iuº 1957 new planting was 
eubsidized at the rate of X300 an aore and replanting at X500 an adre 
(limited to a minimum of three aorea and a maximum of ten). In eaoh 
Oase deductions were made for the cost of planting materiale and fertil- 
izers. Subsidies were paid for the first three years after planting, 
subjeot to a stand of rubber having been established to the satis- 
faction of the State Agrioaltural Offioer. 
45 
Attempts to induce the 
production of smoked sheet met with little response beoause small- 
holders "were oontent to sell their uusmoked sheet at a lower prioe 
thaw they were entitled to". The extra labour and oare whioh the 
produoti on of smoked sheet entailed was not matched by the prioe paid 
by Chinese dealers, 
46 
Total rubber produotion (of whioh only, a small and declining 
Proportion was aoooanted for by surviving estates) aotually fell sharply, 
from 3.2 million pounds (weight) in 1955 to oaly 2.3 million in 1958. 
It showed an even more alarming deoline in value because of the falling 
world pride, on the one hand, and, on the other, the attraction of easier 
work, an assured wage being available to persons who previously made 
a living by tapping rubber. In 1958 it was estimated that not more 
43. Brunei Annual Report 1954P p 34- 
449 Brunei Annual Report 19559 P 39- 
45- 00 824/5 Brunei Annual Report 1957, p 33- 
46o Brunei Annual Report 1950, p 12 and BAR 1955 ýp 38. 
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than 50% of all smallholdings were in tapping and this fell to a mere 
2% during the pads-planting and harvesting periods. In 1959, however, 
output revived to reach its highest annual level since 1953 because of 
higher world prioes and the greater attention to rubber in Brunei follow- 
ing the disbandment of workers hitherto engaged in development projeots. 
In the next years, however, rubber production oontinued to deoline. By 
1959 all of the European rubber oompanies had sold their estates, usually 
to the Government. These estates do not appear to have participated in 
the 1956 soheme. 
In the case of rubber, market foroes rather than the persuasion 
of the Government had prevailed. The benefits of the rioe improvement 
soheme were also not immediately apparent. The Banot resettlement pro- 
gramme, whioh oommenoed in Maroh 1952, was speoifioally designed for 
Malays from Kampong Ayer with the objeot of enoouragiug these nom- 
agricultural people to acquire land for food crops, rubber cultivation, 
goats and poultry-rearing and wet-pads growing. The people were provided 
with land free of charge, free seed, fruit trees, and a limited number of 
planting materials and poultry. A house grant of $50 per family plus a 
family subsidy of two dollars per working day would oease after the first 
Ya 4 harvest. Payment was also made for the oonstraotion of an aooess 
road and drain. Wells were oonstruoted to supply settlers with fresh 
drinking water. Nineteen families had settled before the end of X952.47 
In 1953 it was reported that early settlers showed keenness in 
47. Brunei Annual Report 19529 p 20. 
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farm work, espeoially poultry-rearing. '8 Some workersp however, were 
ooatent with a plot of land which their wives could oultivate, allowing 
themselves to adhere to their previous lifestyle, while the Government 
recognized that certain types, such as tradesmen and fishermen, might 
refuse to move for many years to come. By 1955 it was admitted that 
progress towards resettlement at Baunot (and similar sites) was slow and 
that the Government might have to make the aid offered even more attraot- 
ive. 49 Expenditure upon resettlement amounted to $116,413 in 1954, but 
fell to only $129561 in 1957 as interest waned. By 1960 the population 
of the River Village was higher than it had ever been in this century: of 
the 221,939 inhabitants of Brunei Town, 139237 lined in Kampong Ayer 
oompared with less than 10,000 on terra firma. 
50 The Banot sohemep in 
short, had attracted oomparatively few people (the exaot number is not 
available), although it offered waters electricity and soavenging services 
not available in Kampoag Ayer. Presumably there was a basio oultural 
antipathy to the move, despite the generous finanoial and other inoentives 
to do so. Perhaps., also, the type of labour required in Buaot, other 
than in poultry farming, was more rigorous than in Kampoag A3er. 
51 
Conneoted with this plan to resettle River Villagers on the 
48. Brunei Annual Report 19539 pp 40-1. 
49" Brunei Annual Report 1955, p 2. 
50. DE Brown, Bruneis The Struoture and History of a Bornean Malay_ 
Sultanate (Brunei 1970), P 41- 
51. The resistance to land settlement persists to this day. "Urban 
Brunei", the Telegraph Sunday Magazine reported on 5 February 1984, "is 
famous for its... water villages... The locals love theme despite the 
lank of running water or modern sanitation... and efforts to move km2ong 
inhabitants to houses on land have been most unpopular". 
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mainland were the Mulaut irrigation projeot and experiments into the 
mechanioal oultivation of pad, all of whioh were designed to render 
the Sultanate self-sufficient in rioe. Mechanical cultivation, if 
feasible, would overoome the shortage of labour. 
52 
In 1954 oonsultants began a survey of the drainage and irrig- 
ation potentialities of the Lumpas and Mulaut areas. This survey 
indioated that oertain traots were suitable for irrigation for wet Pa4 
growing. By 1956 plans had been drafted which, it was hoped, would make 
Brunei completely self-supporting in rice "within three or four years". 
Five million dollars were earmarked under the plan for the drainage and 
irrigation of 8,000 acres of land near the capital. 
53 
The River Mulaut 
dam was oompleted in 1958; but the overall soheme was defeated by the 
difficulty of obtaining sufficient supplies of unpolluted water and of 
labour to work in the pads field. s. 
54 
The seoond aspeot of the ripe programme, as enquiry into the 
practicability of mechanical cultivation, was completed in May 1958.55 
Considerable suooess was olaimed in the oultivation of deep swamps for 
ripe growing, New implements were designed to reduoe labour, speed u7- 
work and out oosts of produotion. Aooording to a report in the Borneo 
Bulletin, the Mulaut soheme was abandoned beoause "additional funds were 
not available". 
56 
52, Borneo Bulletin, 27 November 1954. 
53. Brunei Annual Report 1956, p vi. 
54. CO 824/5 Brunei Annual Report 1959, P 32- 
55e The final report had yet to be presented at the oonolusion of the 
Year; and no further information is available to the present writer. 
56. Borneo Bulletin, 12 April 1958. 
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The pads Boheme failed to render Brunei self suffioient in 
rioev or aaythiug approaching auch a oondition. Whereas the country"a 
population more than doubled between 1947 and 1960, acreages planted 
with rioe. 9 total output and yields per aore failed to keep paoe, and, 
after 1953, were less impressive than they had been in the immediate 
Post-war period. 
57 In 1957-8, the worst season, domestio produotion met 
only one-third of requirements. There was some evidenoe of a beginning 
of meohanizatioo, however; 
58 
andq as mentioned, the researoh engineers 
had designed some implements specifically for use in Brunei. 
Another industry attraoting the Government's attention was 
fishing. Many of the inhabitants of Brunei distriot and of the ooastal 
villages between Tdtong and Kuala Belait gained their livelihood from 
fishing. Sea fishermen operated olose inshore on rooky patohes or ooral 
beds. The prawn fishing industry, with headquarters on the islands of 
57. The area under rice declined from 8,615 acres in 1948-9 season to 
less than 7,000 acres during the years 1954-60. Total production, which 
had peaked at 2.7m gantat9s in 1948-9 season, declined to 2. lm in 1951-2 
and by 1957-8 had slumped to only 0.67m Ran` tangs, before recovering to 
1.04m in 1958-9. Yields of wet padi were as follows$ 370 gantangs_ per 
acre in 1948-9,200 gantangs is 1957-8, and 224 in 1964-5. Yields of 
dry padi were even poorers 240 gantangs per aore in 1949-50 and 1950-1, 
70 antan in 1957-8, and 159 gantangs in both 1958-9 and 1964-5. Rios 
imports fluctuated from a peak of 89,916 ip kuls to a low of 25,198 in 
1955 and baok up again to 83,585 ip kuls in 1957. (See also, pp 225-31, 
278 and 363-6, above). 
58. Imports of 'agricultural machinery and implements' (excluding 
tractors) totalled over $lm in 1956, but less than $100,000 annually in 
1953-5 and 1957" (Perhaps the unusually high level in 1956 was because 
of imports brought in by the research engineers, the figures for the 
other years representing the standard level). Imports of tractors rose 
sharply from #0.36m annually in 1954 to $2.24m in 1957, but halved in 
the following year. The value of manufactured fertilizers brought into 
Brunei during 1958 totalled only $18,849. 
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Baru Baru and Berbunot, was centred around the south-eastern part of 
Brunei Bay. The industry was certainly, not an insignificant one, for, 
in 1953, it was reported that 
"numerous fishing stakes and nets (tugus) are to be seen extending from 
the Southern shores (of Brunei Bay) to nine miles out,, and praotioally 
right aoross the Bay from west to eastp leaving olear only the navigable 
channels of the Brunei, Limbang, Tembarong and Pandaraan Rivers". 59 
Most of the fishermen were employed by a handful of Chinese middlemen 
residing in the two islands mentioned. Fresh prawns were bought from 
the fishermen by the towkays and resold at market rates. There was an 
export trade in prawn dust (produoed by sun-drying and then powdering of 
seleoted prawns); and a fish paste oalled balaohan was also manufaotured 
for local retailing. Otherwise, all fish and prawns landed at Brunei 
ports were for consumption within the State and none was exported. 
The ooast off Kuala Belait was oonsiderablr more exposed than 
in Brunei Bay, so fishing there was muoh more dependent on the weather. 
Catohes failed to meet demand in the oilfield towns; and the soaxoity 
of fish there oaused its prioe to rise. 
(Apart from sea fishing, with which we are oonoerned here, 
river fisheries also existed; but the returns were "so small as to be 
negligible" 
60 
and, in general, they, were operated for the personal oon- 
sumptioa of the owners. The fish were of "no marketable value"). 
61 
Heohanization of the sea fishing industry had been prooeeding 
sinoe the start of the 1950s. In 1955 it was reported that the intro- 
59" Brunei Annual Rep ort 19 539 P 54. 
60. Brunei Annual Rep ort 19 54, P 56. 
61. Brunei Annual Rep ort 19 559- p 62. 
406 
duotion and extensive use of outboard engines, originally purohased on 
interest-free loans to the individual fishermen had, in that year, 
enabled the industry to extend its activities to the nearer offshore 
grounds. As a result, produoti on was almost treble the previous year's 
oatoh, itself a year (1954) of exoepti oral abundanoe; 
62 
and, by the end 
of 1955, only the very small, one- or two-mangy rahus were still using 
hand paddles as a means of propulsion. 
63 
In 1956 the oatoh doubled again. 
Mr Bevingtons, the Development Commissioner., then argued that 
outboard engines were not very eooaomioal to operate and he hoped that 
fishermen would opt instead for heavier and slower-moving, but more oost- 
effective, diesel-powered oraft. 
64 
Two years later, however, fishermen 
stated that the new, heavier boats were too small for the crew and. equip- 
meat used in looal fishing and that they were unsafe in rough seas. 
65 
In the marketing seotor of the fishing industry] the Goveru- 
meat faoed the following diffioultiees 
(1) to ensure that the aotual fishermen got a fair deal from 
the middlemen and that the fishermen, for their part, delivered their 
entire oatch to the WA. 7 
(2) to secure continuity of supply in the capital; and 
(3) to improve the quantity of fish retailed in the oilfield. 
In 1954 marketing was in the hands of a limited number of 
62. Brunei Annual Report 19559 p 61; and Brunei Annual Report 1954, 
p57. 
63. Brunei Annual Report 1955, p 61. 
64. See above, pp 394-59 
65" CO 824/5 Brunei Annual Report 1958, p 58. 
407 
lioensed t owka s. Controls were exeroised (by the Government) over the 
movement of fish and prawns within the State and in the Brunei Town area 
a prioe oontrol was imposed. The towkay system largely finanoed the 
industry. The fisherman 
"obtains the neoessary gear and boats, and in some oases even food, from 
the Chinese t,, and is thereafter oonsidered to be under 'oontraot' 
to hand over to the towkay all the fish that he oatohes". 66 
This system was open to abuse beoause the initial debt was often "out of 
proportion to the fisherman's earnings and is oarried on indefinitely". 
It was, however, of advantage to the fisherman during the monsoon seasons, 
when for days on end he might be xeatherboaad and unable to put to sea. 
67 
The. introdnotion of power-driven oraft and the resultant 
increase in the fishermen's returns was expected, in time, to enable the 
fishermen to become independent of the tovkay system. Consideratioa was 
given by the Government to a marketing scheme which aimed to remove from 
the few lioeused wholesalers the control whioh they exeroised over sea 
produoe after it had been landed; but nothing seems to have emerged 
from suoh deliberations. 
68 
The doubling of the oat oh in 1956 was asoribed-largely to a 
tightening of oontrol over the homeward-bound fisherman returning with 
his day's oatoh, previously waylaid in the river by oraft from neigh- 
bouring ports in the Brunei Bay area and entioed to sell his fish to 
them at probably slightly higher rates than the oontrolled prioes. The 
Brunei fisherman, having disposed of most of his oatoh,, could proceed to 
Brunei Annual Report 19542 p 58. 
67. x. 
68. Brunei Annual Report 1955, p 64. 
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his home with the minimum of delay, usually experienoed when landing his 
fish in the Brunei Town market. Striot enforcement of the rule that fish 
might only be disposed of in the licensed market and to certain licensed 
merohante, supported by surprise patrols, produoed results whioh satis- 
fied the Government, 
69 
Greater continuity of supply was also achieved. 
Formerly, any surplus left unsold would have been oonverted into animal 
food. Now, however, with an almost daily surplus of first quality fish, 
little diffioulty was experienoed in disposing of the previona day's 
balance thanks to growing interest in 'ioed' fish. Fish beoame available 
praotioally throaghout the day, whereas previously it had been neoessary 
to await the return of the fishing fleets and then soramble for a share 
of their frequentlp inadequate oatohea. 
70 
In short, the Government was 
oonoeraed to proteot the interests of the oonsumer as well as those of 
the prodnoer; 1utp given the inorease in the total oatchpthe fishermen 
themselves must have enjoyed better overall returns. (No figures are 
available, however, to demonstrate this contention). 
The Government also faoed the task of how to seoure an adequate 
sappl7 to the oilfield without, at the same time, denuding the capital 
of fish. Early in 1955 prioe oontrol was extended to inolude Kuala Bel- 
ait and Seria. Previ oasly, in spite of 'movement restriotions' being 
enforoed on sea prodnoe landed in Bruneip a large quantity of the daily 
catch was diverted to the oilfield area and resulted in a flourishing 
blank market and frequent shortages of sea food in the northern half of 
69. Brunei Annual Report 19 5b 9P 55. 
70. Ibid., p 558" 
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the country. It was hoped that the extension of price control would 
ensure a fair distribution of fish and prawns landed in Brunei and re- 
move "the inoentive to (smuggle' these oommodities out of the area in 
which they are caught". 
71 
Iu 1955 the measure seemed to be workingj72 
but two years later lithe high prioes for fish in Seria" (despite attempted 
Prioe oontrol) ooeitributed to a oontiuuiug black market. The Marine 
Department lacked the staff to prevent this happening. 
73 
In 1958, it 
was deoided to issue permits for movements of fish from the capital to 
Serial 417 were handed out in 1958 for 687 pikuls of fresh fish and 45 
Pikuls of prawns . 
74 
These quantities failed to matoh the demand, as 
the import figures prove (see below., footnote 76 on p 410). 
The growth in the quantity of fresh fish landed in Brunei Town 
was very impressive, The amount rose from a mere 2,264 iý kuls in 1953 
to no less than 40,330 Pik-als kuls in 1959, whilat produotion of prawns rose 
from 589 ip kale to 4,742 ip kuls over the same period* 
75 (These figures 
do not inolude landings made at Muaray Barn Baru, %tong, Kuala Labu and 
Kuala Belait ). The inoreasing demand for fresh sear-food in the oapital 
oaused the export of prawn dust to deoldne oonsiderably, from the mid- 
1950n. Despite the markeddinorease of domestio prodaotion of fish, there 
Were also heavy imports of fish and assooiated prodnots during the 
71.. Brunei Annual Report 1955, p 63. See, also, Borneo Bulletin, 11 
Deoember 1954 (letters) and Borneo Bulletin, 30 April 1955- 
72. Brunei Annual Report 1955, p 63. 
73. CO 824/5 Brunei Annual Report 1957, P 57. See, also, Borneo Bulletin 
10 March 1956 and Borneo Bulletin, 2 March 1957- 
74. CO 824/5 Brunei Annual Report 1958, p 56. 
75. Compiled by author from Brunei Annual Reports. 
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1950s- 76 
As in the fishing industry, so in other aspeots of the eoonomy,, 
the Government's purpose during the period of the five year plan was to 
Preserve and strengthen traditional Malay skills, while simultaneously 
improving the general eoonomio prospeots for indigenous subjeots. In May 
1956 $5OO, ooo was provided for development loans to help "small (business-) 
men to expand and improve their businesses on fair and reasonable terms" 
(the fairness of the terms to be deoided ihr the Government, of oourse) - 
but only for projeots which would "benefit the country" and help to pro- 
vide new and better servioes. It was Government polioy 
"to enoottrage Malay enterprise and, in the reoent past, there have been 
several examples of substantial loans being made to projeots originated 
by local people". 77 
The money was to be made available for relatively small-soale 
items - e. g. to enable farmers to buy buffaloes or boatmen to buy 
engines78 - whioh, in itself, revealed the comparatively weak ranking 
and role (in Government eyes) of Malay peasants, fishermen and oraftsmen. 
The State Counoil had decided earlier in 1956 to grant a loan to ereot 
buildings for silversmiths on the mainland* 
79 Whilst the latter were 
recognized as producing work of exceptionally high standard, their out- 
Put oould not matoh the demand. Established oraftemen were often too 
76. In 1953 2,320 pikuls of "fishs fresh or simply preserved" worth 
$$185,400 were imported, oompared with 3,888 pikuls worth $$434,054 in 
1958. In addition, imports of "fishs canned or fish preparations" rose 
sharply between 1953 and 1955 (%651,315 in the latter year), but by 
1958 had fallen back to %207,739 (or only two thirds of the 1953 level). 
77. Borneo Bulletin, 5 May 1956. 
78. Ibid. 
79. Borneo Bulletin, 7 January 1956. 
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busy to teaoh youngsters, whereas the latter oould earn more money else- 
where for less graft, Hence, when the Government set up a showplace and 
general workshop in Jalan Roberts, with a sohool, for apprentice silver- 
smiths under Pehin Bendabari, the latter had to be paid an annual allow- 
anoe to oompensate him for loss of earnings while teaohing. 
80 
Most 
silversmiths were of advanced age. 
81 
Under the 1956 soheme, ten pupils 
would be trained for three years on a grant of $85 per month, which would 
be gradually reduced as their own profioienoy and earnings inoreased. 
While`the Brunei Government was determined to preserve a traditional 
orafts seotor, the labour input was small and meohanization oould be 
applied only to pertain preliminary processes. Similarly, Brunei women 
oontinued to weave high quality sarongs, whioh oould sell individually 
for up to %200, but took about three weeks to produce on the somewhat 
primitive wheals in use. 
82 
A rather more innovative eoheme, involving apprenticeships 
for oabinet-making, wood-craft, upholstering and bookbinding, was 
announced in January 1958.83 In March the State Council agreed that 
loans for development buildings might be granted to Brunei citizens on 
oertain conditions, inoluding that they owned the land of the prospeotive 
80. Ibid. (NB. "Sales" of silver in Brunei totalled $24,950 in 1956, 
oompared with $19,271 in the previous year, and $11,070 in 1954" In the 
best pre-war year, 1928, "exports" of silverware, were worth $$16,500. - 
See p 235 (above); and Brunei Annual Report 1956, p viii). 
81. Borneo Bulletin, 7 January 1956, (An example was Awang Jamar, born 
in about 1891 or 1892, whose anoestors had oome from Java, where they 
had also been silversmiths. Ibid. ). Seep also, Borneo Bulletin, 19 
March 1983, pp 20-22. 
82. Borneo Bulletin, 14 January 1956, 
83. Borneo Bulletin, 11 January 1958. 
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site, that the proposed buildings were permanent, and that the plans 
were approved by a professional arohiteot. 
84 
In oonolusion, it may be remarked that the Government's eoonomio 
projeots, even if snooessful, still implied that the role of the indigene 
was oonfined to that of paid oraftsmeng artisan or smallholder, instead 
of being large-aoale entrepreneurs. There were, however, no Government 
restrictions on non-indigenous ownership (unlike Maiapa, where Chinese 
businessmen often had to be fronted by a nominal bumipatra). Clearly, 
the schemes which have just been outlined were- not intended radically 
to alter the economic balanoe of power and function in Brunei. Rather 
more progress, on the other hand, was made in the sphere of sooial 
servioes, as shall become apparent in the next two sections. 
(b) "The first and pressing neoessity". 
$5 
Education was given the 
highest priority in the development plan. The prinoipal aims in 1953 
were to build and equip thirty new sohools and provide teaohers for them; 
to inorease the number of overseas soholarships; and to introduoe a free 
school meals servioe. 
86 
Improved local education was a neoessary pre- 
liminary°t o the reduction of Government dependence on personnel recruited 
from overseas, which was creating disquiet among Malays already in the 
B4- Borneo Bulletin, 29 Maroh 1958. 
85" Bevingt on, o. of t.. p 39. 
86. CO 1022/336 Summary of Proposals, paragraphs 13 and 20; and Brunei 
Annual Report 1954, p 5. The Ednoation Plan was drawn up in 1954 by 
the State Education Offioer, Mr HJ Padmorep following oonsultation with 
the Resident, the Direotor of Eduoation (Sarawak), the former Brunei 
State Ednoation 0ffioert and the Superintendent of Malay Education" 
(ZAR-1.25-49 PP 71-2). 
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civil serviae. 
87 
By 1954 the apathy of pre-war years had changed to a "olamant 
demand for eduoation". 
88 
In 1954-5 Just under $11.25 million was voted 
for various extraordinary educational projeots, inoluding sohool buildings 
and equipment, teacher training, expatriate staff from the United Kingdom, 
grants-in-aid to private schools, and financial provision for overseas 
soholarships, adult ednoation, teaohing aids, sobool libraries, and the 
creation of a vernacular literature. A representative Education Advisory 
Committee was established in 1955.89 There was no intention of building 
up a "white collar complex" and emphasis throughout school life was also 
plaoed upon praotioal training, snoh as sohool gardens. 
From the beginning of 1954 the priority was to train teachers 
to meet rising enrolments of pupils, following an appeal by the Sultan 
to all parents to send their ohildren, espeoially daughters, to sohoolo90 
"If edaoation is to progress rapidly" - thus Mr Bevingtou some time later 
- "the vioious oirole of low standard pupils beooming low standard 
teaohers and turning out low standard pupils must be out". 91 
Coustruotion of 23 new Malay primary schools (presumably including several 
replaoements for existing sohools) and a further three large seoondary 
sohools had been virtually oompleted before the end of 1957. The Govern- 
meat set itself the target of training 300 teaohers within ten years. 
87. CO 1022/396 (item 12) Sir AV Abell to CO, No 54 (saving), 13 MY 
1953, paragraphs 4-5- 
88* Bevington, 02-oit p 39- 89. Brunei Annual Report 1954, P 73 and CO 824/4 NJ Padmore, Triennial 
Report on Ednoation 19 5-7, p 12. 
90. Padmore, loo. ait., p 5; Borneo Bulletin, 4 Deoember 1954 and Borneo 
Bulletin, 5 Maroh 1955" 
91. Bevington, op. oit., p 39. 
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After the founding of Brunei's 'own training oollege in 1956 students were 
no longer sent to Batu Lintang in Sarawak (of. P 3599 above, and p 4181, 
below), but links were maintained with oolleges in Singapore, Tanjong 
Malim (SITC)'and Kota Bahru. Women teaohers were trained at Malacca 
and, from 1955, at Jesselton. As a result, the number of trained 
teaohers in Malay primary sohools doubled from 61 in 1953 to 122 in 1958 
and a further one hundred students were being trained in the latter year. 
It was neoessary, howeverp to oontinue to employ unqualified staff: no 
lees than 96 at the end of 1953, for example. 
An important feature of the development plan was the reorait- 
ment of 'speoialist, top-quality'Raglish teaohers from the United Kingdom 
for the new seoondar7 sohools. Brunei also took advantage of Malaya's 
offer to provide" annually five of its own oitizens to be trained as 
English teaohers in the United Kingdomiand afterwards to serve in Brunei. 
This solution was ezpensive92 but neoessary if progress was wanted. 
The Government assumed greater oontrol of the independent 
Chinese veruaoular sohools, principally for politioal reasons, vize to 
avoid the kind of disturbanoes whioh had ooourred recently in Chinese 
Middle Sohools in Singapore and Sarawak. 
93 (There were seven suoh 
establishments in Branei in 1953 and an eighth was added in 1956. By 
92" Under this projeot, whioh was planned originally to last for three 
years, fifteen Malayans were trained as teaohers at Kirkby, near Liver- 
pool. Although this soheme Dost the Brunei Government %163,817, it was 
Pronounoed to have been snob, a suooess that it was extended, in 1958, 
for a further five years. When the soheme matured, thirty teaohers, 
including ten womeno would have been trained for servioe in Brunei 
(Padmore, loo. oit. 9 p 15)- 
93* Borneo Bulletin, 29 October 1955,28 May 1955 and 7 April 1956. 
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the following year three of them had aeoondary aeotiona). 
94 
In return 
for a Government subsidy covering 50% of school costs plus certain 
building grants (from 1955), half the sohool oommitteep inoluding the 
chairman, was to be appointed by the Government. Chinese teaohers were 
awarded a pay rise of 25% to bring them into oonformity with Government 
salary soales. This measure at onoe oreated a greater sense of seonrity 
among Chinese teaohersp and, as a results their feelings of unrest 
subsided and itineracy was much reduoed. 
95 Praotioallr all the well- 
qualified teaohers in Chinese sohools name from overseasp but there were 
some locally-born, if untrained, staff. Each passing year witnessed a 
stead, v inorease in the alreacyr high peroentage of Chinese ohildren in 
sohool096 An inspeotor of suoh sohools was engaged in Maroh 1955.97 
In addition, half the oost of training Brunei Chinese students as 
94. The medium of instruction was Mandarin. Brunei Chinese schools, it 
was reported in 1951, taught "the conventional subjects, superimposed on 
the background of their own culture. (The curriculum included) arithmetio, 
general knowledge, civics, physical training, games and handwork. English 
as a subject is added in the third year. History, geography and social 
science completed the Higher Primary curriculum". The first Chinese 
school to open Middle (secondary) classes was the one at Brunei Town 
in 1953; two more had followed suit by 1957. It was hoped that this 
would produce more teachers having Brunei domicile. Prior to 1955, when 
only token Government grants were awarded, Chinese schools experienced 
difficulty in raising sufficient capital to meet the cost of providing 
new buildings. In 1955, however, the Government made available $$109,000 
for this purpose, and, in the next year, no less than %412,000 was 
forthcoming. 
95" Brunei Annual Report 19559 pp 74-5; Brunei Annual Report 1956, p 64; 
and CO 824/5 Brunei Annual Report 1957, p 63. 
96. " Padmore, loo . oit., p 7. It is interesting to note that in 1957 
4,821 Chinese attended all types of school in Brunei compared with 
4,835 Malays. This was despite the fact that Malays were about twice 
as numerous in the general population. (See p 417, below). 
97. Borneo Bulletin, 19 March 1955" 
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teaohers at Sibu in Sarawak was also met by the Brunei Government. 
98 
It 
is to be emphasized that these subventions did not win the unanimous 
approval of members of the State Counoil. 
99 
Under the Development Plan, the independent Christian mission 
aohools, of which there were seven by 1959, were awarded grants totalling 
one-third of the Dost of teachers' salaries. But these schools failed 
to build up a full permanent staff (because teachers were often the wives 
of BMPC employees and their availability was oontingent upon their has- 
bands remaining in the oonntry), and the subsid was not suffioient for 
teaohers to be paid at Government rates. 
100 
State aid was also available 
for new buildings. A condition of such Government financial help (asp 
also, with the Chinese vernacular sohools) was that a ooarse of instruot- 
ion in the Malay, language had to be followed. 
101 The State Ednoation 
Officer regretted that, as late as 1958, "the curriculum in these mission 
sohools is entirely literary and they are not yet in a position to afford 
buildings and equipment to start effeotive teaching of soienoe, domestio 
eoienoe, metalwork and woodwork". 
102 
Sir Anthofll Abell, the High Com- 
missioner, encouraged the missionaries, however,, because they maintained 
"the highest standards of integrity, loyalty and discipline" whilst 
preserving "traditions and customs evolved over many generations against 
98. CO 824/5 Brunei Annual Report 1957, p 63. See also Sarawak Annual 
Report 19562 P 77; SAR 1p 64; and SAR 1959 p 93. 
99" On 1 February 1958, for example, the Borneo Bulletin reported that 
finanoial support for Chinese sohools had been extended for a further 
Year, but only after "lengthy and heated debate" in the State Counoil. 
(Evidently, times had ohanged sinoe 1924 and before% see p 137, above). 
100. Padmore, loo-cit., p 33- 
101, Ibid. 
102. Ibid., p 7. 
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those (such as communists) who wish to institute a creed of violence 
and false values"* 
103 
In mid-1959, however, State backing of Christian 
eduoation was withdrawn beoause it had oome to be deemed inappropriate 
in a oountry with a (narrowing) Muslim majority, 
104 
Government English Schools. Before 1951, when the organized 
teaching of English began in Brunei, parents with sufficient financial 
resouroes sent their ohildren to Kuohiug, Labuan, Jesseltou or Singapore 
for an English eduoation. In 1951-2 two very small Government English 
sohools were started in Brunei Town and Kuala Belait (see above, pp 359- 
60). By the end of 1954 there were approximately 250 pupils in the two 
sohools. Teaohing oonditions were extremely bad at that time. 
105 
Under the Development Plan three major sohools were built to 
replaoe the existing ones and were named after the Sultan, Sultana and 
the British High Commissioner. The buildings were oonstruoted in several 
stages. The Sultan Omar Ali Saifuddin (SOAS) College in the capital was 
begun in July 1954, eventually oosting 13,000,000 to complete. (The 
neoessity for the expenditure of suoh a sum - whioh represented double 
the Government's entire annual reoeipts even in the best pre-oooupation 
Year, 1940 - to provide just one fully-equipped aeooadary sohool, must 
surely make us hesitate even more before oritioizing the efforts of 
pre-war Residents in the eduoational sphere). After a 1aclp principal 
had been 
. engaged in 1957, one seotion of 
the sohool was separated to form 
103. Borneo Bulletin, 25 June 1955 (my addition in parenthesis). 
104. Borneo Bulletin, 20 June 1959; and CO 824/5 Brunei Annual Report 
1__, p 68. 
105. Padmare, 100. oit. 9p 15. 
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the Sekolah Tinggi. Perempuan Rajah Isteri (Sultana's High School for 
Girls ), 106 From 1956 another seotion of BOAS College was used for 
teacher training, the first such institute in Brunei, before moving to 
a new site in 1959. The Abell College in Seria, the third Government 
seoondary sohool, was officially opened in 1958, though versions of the 
sohool (originally in Kuala Belait) had existed sinoe 1952. All these 
sohools were headed by as expatriate, assisted by other expatriate 
teachers (such as the minor British novelist, Mr A Burgess) in key posts. 
Eaoh sohool was "generously equipped" with modern furniture, textbooks 
and teaohing aids. Laboratories, workshops and art-rooms were added in 
order to ensure the broadest-possible edaoation. In 1959 a gynasium/ 
auditorium and a swimming pool were planned for SOAS College. 
107 
The 
prinoipal limitation was obtaining sufficient speoialist teaohers. Safe- 
guards were made to prevent too many students being attraoted to "white 
collar" employment. In 1955 candidates were entered for an external 
examination - the Sarawak Junior Certificate - for the first time and, 
in 1958, GCE 'Ordinary Level' standard was attained. Plans were afoot 
for the establishment of a Sixth Form at SOAS College. 
108 
Government English Schools in Brunei were "the envy of visiting 
eduoati onalists". 
109 
All olassrooms had eleotrio fans and, by 1958, 
teaohing oonditione generally were "as modern and as oomfortable as oan 
106. In 1954 it was envisaged that Brunei Town would eventually require 
a 600-boys' seoondary school and a 300-girlst secondary school. In fact, 
enrolment in SOAS College in 1959 was 491 (including 20 girls) with a 
further 184 girls attending the STPRI. 
107. Padmore, loo. oit., pp 15-17- 
1089 Ibid. p 20. 
1o9. Ib d., PP 44-5. 
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be possibly made in this area so near to the equator". 
110 
Students had 
diffioulty_in studying at home in the evenings beoause of poor lighting 
o onditi ons and so it beoame Government policy to provide comfortable 
hostel aooommodation for all seoondary pupils living away from their 
homes. The majority of families in and around Brunei Town possessed a 
radio and attendance at oinema was popular. There were few books for 
leisure reading in Malay and Chinese homes, but the ciroulation of news- 
papers, both looally-produoed and imported, was rising. Little English 
was spoken in homes. 
Achievement. The eduoation programme was not without its 
suooesses. First, Malay primary schools were established in many 
soattered and inaooessible up-oountry looations. All these sohools 
were finished in bright oolours and stood out in the various villages 
as the finest buildings around* 
112 
Almost every kam on had its school 
and by 1958 90% of Malay boys of sohool age and 37% of Malay girls were 
earolled. 
113 
If the number of Malay vernaoular schools increased only 
from 33 to 52 between 1953 and 1959, many older sohools moved into new 
premises and the total number of pupils nearly trebled (from 2,769 to 
7,164). In addition, there were eight semi-independent Chinese primary 
schools with 3,459 1 Pi1s in 1959114 and a much more even sex ratio 
(19944 boys to 1,515 girls), partly beoause Chinese sohools were mainly 
110. Ibid., p 45. 
111. Ibid., pp 45-8. (Nowadays Bruneians are exoellent lingaistss see 
below, p 549, footnote 61). 
112. Ibi_d., p 17. 
113. Ibid., P 32, 
114. There was also one unaided Chinese sohool (with 131 pupils in 1959)" 
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in urban areas (and hence more accessible) and partly because Chinese 
parents allowed their daughters more latitude. It was hoped that, as 
more Malay women teaohers beoame available, more Malay girls would also 
be sent to sohool. 
115 
There were, in the primary sector, a further seven 
non-Government Christian mission sohools, oompared with only three before 
the oooupation. Most of the pupils were Brunei Chinese, but a sizeable 
minority of Malays also attended, 
116 
Finallyp eaoh type of sohool pro- 
vided seoondary olasses; and three modern Government English seoondary 
sohools had been opened. By 1959 Brunei possessed 72 primary sohools 
with 13,618 pupils and eight seoondary schools with a register of 1,119 
ohildren. A further 199 students, predöminantly from outside the Sultan- 
ate, were being trained at the BMPC's Trades School at Seria (see pp 357- 
8p above). Overall, a total of 15,006 obildren attended sohool in 1959117 
and there were 64 student teaohers enrolled at Berakas College. A number 
Of Youngsters were awarded soholarships to attend sohools and then 
universities overseas. About one thousand adults attended night olasses 
115. Mr Padmore reported in 1958 that parents in Brunei were "extremely 
fond" of their children. Families of six to twelve boys and girls were 
not uncommon. Generally, "most of the children frbm an early age are 
self reliant and particularly in the country districts (they) assist with 
the cooking of the family meals, search for and chop the fire-wood, the 
girls particularly washing their clothes and assisting their mothers with 
the young children. The girls generally speaking have a harder life than 
bcts and it is only in recent years that girls are being encouraged to go 
to school". There was a "deep rooted traditional feeling that the place 
for girls is at home helping the mother to rear the large families... " 
(ibid. PP 46,47 and 48). 
116. Figures are available for 1951 when, oat of 863 children attending 
mission schools, 598 (690) were Chinese compared with only 168 Malara. 
117. In 1960 16,679 attended school out of a population of 39,109 aged 
under 15. Eben after excluding the under fives, there was clearly much 
Progress to be made before universal education became a reality. 
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and a'further 915 joined adult literaoy olasses, begun in 1959. In the 
same year a regional literature bureau was established. This expansion 
oost a hefty sum of moneys oapital expenditure under the Development 
Plan aooounted for $$15 million by mid-1958118 whilst annually-reourrent 
oharges jumped from %0.3m in 1952 to about %3.2 million in 1958. 
If a oonsiderable amount of money was being devoted to education 
and progress had been made in building sohoolsp enrolling ohildren and 
training teachers, Brunei was still far from achieving universal and 
high-quality education at the conclusion of the Residential Era. (To 
this day, indeed, the country lacks a university). In places, classes 
were too large119 and the number of teachers, particularly specialists, 
remained insufficient., The absence of Malay girls in school was striking. 
In the main urban centres, paradoxically, rising enrolments strained 
existing school accommodation. Some Malay parents voiced fears that 
vernacular education was a 'no through road', leaving their children 
without adequate career prospects. There were insufficient places for 
children anxious to enter Government F glish schools; hence some parents 
were obliged to pay fees to mission schools in order to secure a further 
eduoation for their offspring* 
120 
in an attempt to alleviate this prob- 
loam to some extent, it was announoed in late January 1958 that Government 
seoondary sohools were to be expanded and soholarships allotted for pupils 
118. Padmorep loo. oit., p 29. 
119. On 20 July 1957, for example, the Borneo Bulletin referred to "gross 
overorowding" in two Chinese sohools, one in Kuala Belait, the other in 
8eria. MAY potential pupils had to be turned away. 
120. Borneo Bulletin, 15 Xaroh 1958. 
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to attend mission schools. 
121 
Other weaknesses remained. First, the 
children lacked technical training, which discouraged potential investors 
in Brunei. 122 Secondly, ednoation was organized partly on oommunal 
lines, wbioh gave rise to fears that radial tensions might develop in 
the future. Both the Partai Rakyat Brunei (see pp 493ff, below) and the 
Borneo Bulletin argued in favour of a single, national system in whioh all 
ohildren mixed together. 
123 
The British denied any intention to divide 
and role; 
124 
and, oertainly, the English and mission sohools were multi- 
radial. Macy Chinese parents, on the other hand, preferred their ohild- 
ren to have a grounding in their own culture, and this wish was respeoted 
by the administration. In 1955, indeed, when the Education Department 
acquired greater influence in the running of Chinese schools, assurances 
had to be given that the suppression locally of Chinese culture was not 
the goa1.125 Sinoe the (unsatisfied) popular demand was for English 
edaoation, it has been suggested that the PRB seemed to be "rather 
dogmatically nationalistic" in its attitude. 
The Borneo Bulletin, fearing that ohildren were being "saori- 
fioed at the altar of seleotion", 
126 
appealed for a diversification of 
eduoatiou, partioularly in the teohnioal sphere. Mr HJ Padmore, the 
121. Borneo Bulletin, 1 February 1958. 
122. Borneo Bulletin, 4 October 1958. "Brunei people are almost totally 
unskilled", it was olaimed. 
123. Borneo Bulletin, 28 May 19559 25 May 1957 (Editorial) and 1 June 
1957 (Editorial). 
124. Borneo Bulletin, 7 November 1959. On 21 April 1956 Sir Anthony 
Abell was quoted by the Borneo Bulletin as saying that no looal govern- 
ment offioer in Brunei should base any deoision on raoial grounds. 
125. Borneo Bulletin, 5 November 1955- 
126o Borneo Bulletin, 15 March 1958 (Editorial). 
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State Education Offioer (1954-9), replied that Government polioy aimed 
to give all Malay children eeoondary education provided that they had 
the required minimum standard of intelligence. Entrance to secondary 
sohools had to be based on merit. 
127 
Elsewhere it was stated that 
there were not yet enough books in Malay for secondary schooling in 
that language. 128 
The PRB argued that insufficient students were being educated 
overseas and that suoh soholarships as existed were awarded on the basis 
of favouritism. The PRB demanded technical education for farmers, fisher- 
men and Malays engaged in industry. The latter groups, however, were 
notoriously conservative in outlook, as illustrated by their reluotanoe 
to leave Kampong Ayer or to work in the oilfield; and it might appear 
to an impartial observer that there was little real publio demand for 
technical education beyond the PRB and Borneo Bulletin insisting - 
wisely, no doubt - that there should be. 
129 
Finally., the faot remains 
that the professional, managerial and skilled personnel neoessary for 
the maintenanoe of the new development programmes were not yet forth- 
coming in 1959. This is amply demonstrated in the health sphere. 
(o) Health130 The health servioe was not quite so baokward as 
127. Borneo Bulletin, 22 Maroh 1958. 
128. Ibid. ("Education in Brunei" by a "Special Correspondent"). 
129. On 8 October 1955 the Borneo Bulletin itself editorialised that 
Brunei Malay youth did not appear to be willing "to work hard and 
undergo fairly long periods of sustained effort in learning the various 
trades". 
130. See, also, pp 13,192-6,286-92,331,337,344-5 and 360-2 (above) 
and 535 and 553 (below). 
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education had been in 1953, and so, in pertain respeots, major improve- 
meats had been made before the beginning of the Development Plan and 
less speotacular advanoes were added by 1958. The major problem was 
not money, but to find any pool at all of possible looal personnel. 
In the 1953 summary of Proposals the broad goals of the in- 
tended medical programme included the construction of a new Government 
hospital in Kuala Belait, the addition of a travelling dispensary ser- 
vine by road and water to bring medioal attention to those living in 
remote areas, an expansion and intensification of existing anti-malaria 
Work, enlarged training facilities for nurses and dressers, improvement 
of the maternity servioe and the provision of free sohool meals to all 
children attending State primary sohools. 
131 
It was not until October 
1955, however, that a more detailed plan, prepared along these lines by 
the State Medical Offioer (Dr EC Vardy), was approved by the State Council. 
A sum of $17.6 million was earmarked for capital expenditure and a further 
%4.9m for annually-recurrent charges over five years (making %22.5m in 
all). Hitherto the Department of Health had concentrated on the care 
of the sick who sought their aid. Now, however, the former system of 
having a well-organized servioe in the two main urban areas, with little 
Provision for rural dwellers, Was to be disoarded and plans made for a 
general curative service covering adequately and fairly, the entire 
00autry. The plan, as a whole, arranged for the "eventual provision of 
modern medical ai d... for all people living in the State"t. 
132 
131. CO 1022/336 Summary of Proposals, pp 5-6 (paragraphs 15-20). 
132. Brunei Annual Report 1 559 p 109. See also, Borneo Bulletin, 12 
November 1955" 
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Plans to replace the badly-designed hospital in the capital 
and to build a new one at Kuala Belait were shelved. The design faults 
in the Brunei Town hospital, opened in 1951, were gradually overoome 
and extensive additions were made to the original buildings during the 
later 19509, inoluding new wards (capacity was doubled to 160 beds by 
19 5$)133 and various specialized departments, such as a training school 
for nurses. The Government dispensary at Kuala Belait, built by 1950, 
was raised to the status of a hospital in November 1953. The initial 
total of 30 beds had been inoreased to a oapaoity of 75 by 1958134 , Mesa 
two hospitals provided faoilities for the diagnosis and treatment of all 
but the most 'difficult' oases. 
135 
The latter patients were referred to 
the BMPC's hospital at Kuala Belait136 or to the General Hospital in 
Singapore. The company's hospital, by 1959, aoald cater for 120 in- 
patients at any one time and was fully-equipped to deal with all but the 
most speoialized oases. Its faoilities inoluded a 22-bed 'tuberoulosis' 
wardv finanoed by the Government. Outpatient olinios and infant welfare 
centres were also financed by the oompany, which was responsible for 
environmental sanitation within the area of its reserve. Good-natured 
rivalry between the company's and the Government's doctors conduced to 
133. CO 824/5 Brunei Annual Report 1958, p 81. 
134. bid. 
135" The word 'difficult' was not defined. Helminthiasis and tuber- 
oulosis replaoed malaria, in 1952, as the oommonest oause for admission 
to hospital. Other conditions receiving treatment included fibrositis, 
arthritis, sinusitis, oatarrh, neuritis, post-poliomelytiso soiatioa and 
injuries to nerves and tendons. 
136. The BMPC was aotually renamed the Brunei Shell Petroleum Company 
(BSPC) at the beginning of 1957. In order to avoid oonfusion, however, 
only the former title is used here. See, also, pp 483-4 (below). 
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the maintenance of high standards. 
Fixed dispensaries existed in the oapital (in assooiation with 
the hospital), Tatoug, Bargar (Temburong) andv from 1959, Labu. In 
addition, a determined effort was made to take medioal oare to isolated 
rural areas. Travelling dispensaries operated along the rivers; but the 
outboard type of engine was unsatisfaotory beoause frequent engine break- 
downs hampered the work. Launches were sometimes out of order for iengtb7 
spells. This, meant that proposed meetings with kam on folk could not 
be kept, and, as there was no means of letting them know, many people, 
having Dome down to the river stopping-plaoes, returned to their villages 
untreated and disappointed. To avoid letting them down in this way in 
future, the State Medioal Offioer (in 1954) Planned the establishment of 
small permanent dispensaries in the ulus. 
137 
Five years later this was 
described as a "popular and useful arrangement". 
l38 
As a new departure 
is the 1950sß dressers were euoouragecl to search for people needing their 
ai dv rather than simply waiting on the river banks for patients to 
appear* 
139 
One of the factors retarding the development of a health service 
in Brunei was the dearth of qualified personnel because of deficiencies 
in the education system (see pp 412-23t above). Although the training 
of staff gathered pane in the 1950sß numbers failed to meet demand. By 
1954, a training scheme for assistant nurses, begun three years earlier, 
137. Brunei Annual Report 19549 P 93. 
138. CO 824/5 Brunei Annual Report 19591 p 84- 
139e Brunei Annual Report 19529 p 61. 
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had beoome established on a permanent basis. At the end of 1955 it was 
reported, perhaps prematurely, that adequate numbers of women were forth- 
oomiug to meet existing needs. By 1957 "a small but regular output" was 
produoed by the training soheme whioh helped to relieve the nursing 
shortage, but the recruitment of looal persons remained "extremely 
diffioult" and "until the results of the expanded education programme 
begin to appear, it will be neoeasary to look to Sarawak and North Borneo 
for some of our reornits". 
140 it was not until 1958 that the first 
Bruneian, a Malay, to have undergone a full training as a nurse and a 
midwife, oompleted her oanrse. 
141 
From 1955 steps were taken to standard- 
ize suoh training in the three British Borneo territories and to work for 
reoognition of the course by the General Nursing Counoil in the United 
Kingdom. 142 This was expeoted to require several gears; and, indeed, 
reoognition had not been seoured at the end of the Residential Era. 
In 1952 the Medioal Department's staff oomprised two dootors, 
two European and two looally-trained nursing sisters, twenty junior nurses 
(five trained) and nineteen dressers* 
143 
By 1959 there were nine dootora, 
two dentists, one matron, 103 nurses of various grades and 44 hospital 
assistants. Reoraitment of further assistant nurses oeased temporarily 
in'that year, but other personnel were sent overseas for training* 
144 
140. CO 824/5 Brunei Annual Report 1957, pp 70-1- 
141* CO 824/5 Brunei Annual Report 1958, p 77. 
142. Brunei Annual Report 190 P 98. 
143. Brunei Annual Report 1952, P 54. In addition, there were six 
senior technicians and 105 subordinate staff. These statistiosp of course, 
take no aooount of the personnel employed by the BMPC in Belait distriot. 
144. CO 824/5 Brunei Annual Report 1959,, p 81. 
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Dootors and senior nurses were all expatriates, mainly (if not entirely) 
Europeans and Australians, whilst junior nurses were local produots 
ooupled with some reoruits from neighbouring territories in British 
Borneo. 
The expansion of hospital faoilities, the amplifioation of the 
travelling dispensary service and the training of assistant nurses, were 
aooompanied by sustained attaoks upon disease. The first such effort was 
the 'malaria eradication Boheme' oondaoted under WHO auspioea in 1952-8. 
In the major centres, malaria - whioh had been endemic in 1945 - was 
quickly brought under control after the oooupati oag though the aotual 
veotor was not disoovered until 1951. in Kuala Belait the situation 
took somewhat longer to control because of "neglect by the Japanese, 
the very rapid enlargement of the oilfield (from 1946) and the lack of 
labour (for anti-malarial work)". 
145 In padi-growing areasp by contrast, 
malaria was the rule rather than the eaoeption. The main feature of the 
WHO soheme, beginning in 1952, was the spraying with diohloro 
diphenyl triohloroethane (DDT) 
146 
of the internal walls of all houses 
in even the most remote rural dietriots. in addition large areas were 
oiled, and, in some plaoes, inseotioide fogging was praotiaed. Careful 
attention was given to the maintenanoe of existing drains and the 
145" CO 824/5 Brunei Annual Report 1946, pp 16-17- 
146* Nowadays, of oourse, the use of DDT is suspeot. It was reported 
in 1960 that there was inoreasing publio resistanoe in Brunei to spray- 
ing because of the virtual disappearance of malaria and partly beoause 
spraying had oaused the death of domestio animals (Brunei Annual Report 
U__ p 81). 
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elimination of stagnant water in low-lying areas by filling. As a result 
of suoh measures the number of oases slumped from 3,076 in 1953 to only 
66 in 1959.147 To all intents and purposes malaria was defeated. 
Closely oonneoted with malaria., and ooastituting one of the 
major lingering health problems of Brunei, was tuberoulosis. Although 
the disease was prevalent among all races just after the ware more Brunei 
Chinese sought hospital treatment than other nationalities. 
1 L 
Before 
the oooupation little had been done to help sufferere. 
149 
During and 
immediately after the Japanese interlude, there was a marked increase 
in the incidence of the killer disease, which, in the 1950s, superseded 
malaria as the prinoipal oause of death. It was reported (in 1946) that 
patients invariably sought treatment only when the disease was too far 
advaaoed to be oured. 
150 
Little improvement was antioipated until over- 
crowding in houses, spitting,, malnutrition and debilitation due to other 
diseases had been oombatted. 
151 In 1950 a WHO expert, Dr Roberts, visited 
Brunei and advised a oampaign of vaooination with the baoillus of Calmette 
and Guerin (BCG), whioh woald help in raising the reaietanoe of the 
population to tuberoulosie. 
152 
Efforts were oonoentrated upon eohool- 
children and new-born babies. A number of hospital wards speoifioall7 
147. The situation may not have been quite so impressive as these stat- 
istios might suggest beoause only new oases were inoluded in the 1958 
figures whereas both old and new oases may have been jumbled together 
in those for 1953 (CO 824/5 Brunei Annual Report 1958, p 94). There were 
96 oases of malaria in 1965,11 in 1970 and 10 (all imported) in 1976. 
148. Brunei Annual Report 19469 p 14. 
149. CO 824/2 Brunei Annual Report 1931 p 4. 
150. Brunei Annual Report 1946! P 14. 
151. Ibid.; and Brunei Annual Report 1947, p 25- 
152o Brunei Annual Report 1950, p 44. 
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to oope with the disease were built in the capital (1951) and at the 
BMPC'a hospital at Kuala Belait (1952), the latter also at Government 
expense. 
153 
A WHO team attempted (in 1951), with the aid of radiograpb. y 
and BC( vaooination, to determine the number of people suffering from 
tuberculosis and to advise on their treatment. Investigation began with 
schoolchildren. The increased focus on the disease produced an apparent 
rise in its inoidenoe. 
154 Most oases referred to Branei Town hospital 
were of old standing. The replacement of temporary post-war shacks with 
proper shophouses helped to oontain the disease, as did the free meal 
servioe provided as part of the sohool feeding scheme-(see below, p 431). 
Although increasing attention had been devoted to tuberculosis 
after the end of the war, it was not until February 1958, just as the 
malaria eradioation programme was approaohing a suooessful conclusion, 
that a dootor was appointed to conduct a soientifio tuberoulosis survey. 
He Planned to establish a unit whioh aimed 
"to determine the size of the tuberculosis problem in the State, to 
deteot and treat all possible oases of the disease, and to proteot with 
BOO vaooination the younger members of the population and those older 
persons exposed to the risk of contracting the disease". 155 
The measures taken inoluded the establishment of a tuberoular register 
(whioh oontained 978 names in 1959); the opening of a cheat olinio; and, 
most importantly, the provision of funds to dependents of tubercular 
patients. The number of new oases disoovered in 1958 totalled 534 and 
153. In 1950 30-50% of all hospital beds were filled with tubercular 
patients and waiting lists were long (ibid. ). 
154. Brunei Annual Report' 1951, P 42. 
155" CO 824/5 Brunei Annual Report 1958, p 89. 
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422 patients with the condition were admitted to the hospital in Brunei 
Town. 
156 
A further 539 new oases, iuoluding 56 from the Limbaug distriot 
of Sarawak., came to light in 1959" -As occurred so often in Brunei at 
that "time, shortages of staff and equipment in the face of a massive 
volume of work delayed progress. Existing efforts had been oonfined to 
the oapital and its environs. 
157 
Whilst tuberculosis was "a severe debilitating disease"p hei- 
minthiasis was "mach more widespread though Durable in a shorter spaoe 
of time". 
158 
In 1952 helminthio infeotions headed the list of complaints 
diagnosed in outpatients; 
159 
but, pending improvements in sanitation and 
hygiene, treatment was ooasidered pointless beoause viotims tended to 
beoome reinfeoted almost immediately upon returning homes16o wing the 
period of the Development Plan sanitation remained primitives as late 
as 1959 plans for water-borne sewage disposal in Brunei Town and else- 
where were yet to be implemented beoause of inadequate water supply* 
161 
An attempt was made by the Government to install modern latrines in 
town and kamponi, but with little result, 
162 
156. I. bid., pp 91-2" 
157. CO 824/5 Brunei Annual Report 1959, pp 88-92. In 1960 "steady pro- 
gress" was made. New oases of tuberculosis numbered 393 in that year, 
354 in 1961,230 in 1962,212 in 1963, but 264 in 1964. In the following 
year, 1965, it was announoed that "as soon as it is more praotioable to 
do sot a campaign will be launobed for the elimination of this scourge" 
Brunei Annual Report 1965). 
158. Brunei Annual Report 1952,9P 63. 
159" Almost one-third of the 10,850 persons examined in Brunei Town 
hospital in 1952 suffered from either hookworm or roundworm. 
160. Brunei Annual Report 1953, p 90. 
161. CO 824/5 Brunei Annual Report 19599 P 95- 
162. A "Build More Latrines' campaign in 1954, for example, failed oom- 
pletely and the experiment does not appear to have been repeated. 
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A far more successful programme of preventive medioine was the 
'Sohool Feeding Soheme'ý launohed in late 1953.163 Praotioally every 
school in the country, including the independent ones, quickly joined 
in with the project. The original idea was to provide each pupil with 
one substantial and balanced meal a day free of charge. In March 1955, 
however, the State Council ruled that the greatest need for the scheme 
was in rural areas and that the full meal should be supplied in oountry 
schools only. In urban areasq henceforth, only a fortified drink - of 
milk, specially-prepared to rectify certain dietary deficiencies - would 
be provided. Two years later a further alteration took places schools 
having a majority of their ohildren living more than one mile away were 
given a full meal, whilst those with the minority of children living more 
than one mile away were given a fortified drink. The value of this soh- 
enure, it was reported in 1959, "oan not be over-estimated" because child- 
ren looked "healthier than heretofore, and they are also very muoh more 
active, both in their work and in their play"* 
164 If so, the oost of the 
scheme - around half a million dollars annually - was money well spent. 
Achievement. During the period of the Development Plan the 
soope of the Brunei health servioe was broadened. Existing servioes 
were greatly expanded, whilst new ones (suoh as dentistry and ophthalm- 
ology) were introdnoed. 
165 
Speoial attention was given to rural dwellers. 
163. Padmore, loo . oit., pp 26-8. Brunei Annual Report 1953, p 
68; 
19549 p 71; ,p 68; pp 67-8; 19589 p 72; and 19 ý pp 75-6" 
164. CO 824/5 Brunei Annual Report 19599 p 76. 
165. An eye olinio was opened on a temporary basis at Brunei Town 
hospital in 1955; there was another at Kuala Belait. An ophthalmologist 
visited the oountry twioe a year, each visit lasting about a month (PTO). 
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Annual State expenditure on health, whioh had been less than %$0.3 million 
in 1950, increased from $1.1m in 1953 to X2.64m in 1959. The number of 
inpatients admitted annually to Government hospitals rose from 1,105 in 
1950 to 3,328 in 1953 and 4,617 in 1958, whilst attendanoes by outpatients 
numbered 50,654 in 1950,111,971 in 1953 and 119,667 in 1958,166 The 
jump from 1953 to 1958 was less marked, it will be noticed, than that 
between 1950 and 1953; but in 1959 a further 2,175 inpatients and 91,610 
outpatients were treated in the oil oompany'a hospital, oompared with 
2,604 and 22,291 respectively during the previous year. 
167 
These 
inoreases are indioative of rising population and greater readiness to 
take advantage of medioal servioea rather than of worsening health. They 
are an index, also, of the unmet need before the oooupation. Despite 
extensions to existing hospitals and dispensaries, aooommodation remained 
inadequate in 19590 when now building programmes were planned. On the 
other hand, even in 1957 there was muoh "prejudioe'" against Western 
medioine to be removed and it was still "far too oommon" far the eiok 
Dentistry was also based at the two Government hospitals, which, by 1957, 
were fully-equipped with modern units. A first dentist had been engaged 
by the Government by 1954 and a seoond arrived not long afterwards. Four 
Brunei students were being trained on Penang in 1957, two as dentists and 
two as dental nurses. Government dentists pursued the departmental policy 
of providing a servioe primarily for sohoolohildren, and gave the remain- 
der of their time to the treatment of hospital patients and emergenoy 
work among adults. in sohools, propaganda was employed to encourage 
pupils to keep their teeth in good oondition. 
166. The pioture is distorted somewhat by the faot that the number of 
outpatients treated in 1953 was exceptionally highs of. 87,963 in 1952 
and 87,799 in 1954" A further 23,107 people were treated by travelling 
dressers in 1950 (of. 17,215 in 1953 and 18,672 in 1958). All these 
statistios have been oompiled by the author from Brunei Annual Reports. 
167. Statistios oompiled from Brunei Annual Reports. 
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to refuse to consult dootors or, having done so, to ignore the advice 
tendered. 
168 
Much further work was also required to modernize water 
supplies and sanitation. 
Under the Development Plan, malaria was effeotively eradicated 
and a major campaign launohed against tuberculosis. Among other serious 
diseases, aoute polio and typhus were entirely eliminated by 1959, 
whilst the annual inoidenoe of typhoid fevers, dysentery and diphtheria 
remained ate or had been reduced toi double figures only. Dietary 
measuresp such as the Sohool Feeding Scheme, assisted the improvement 
of health standards, Overall, the death rate was curbed from nearly 2% 
in 1953 to 1.2% in 1958, whilst the birth rate aooelerated from 5.7% in 
1950 to 8% in 1954, before falling baok to 5.7% in 1958.169 
The prinoipal failure of the Brunei health servioe remained 
the high rate of infant mortality, though some progress had been made 
even in this direotion. 
170 New maternity olinios were built in assoo- 
cation with hospitals and dispensaries. Despite the diffioulty of 
168., CO 824/5 Brunei Annual Report 1957, P 74. 
169. Statistios oompiled by author from Brunei Annual Reports. In later 
reports different figures were given for 1953 and 1954: for example, the 
death rate in 1953 - 2% aooording to the Brunei Annual Report 1953 - was 
later reokoned to have been only 1.5%. 
170. The maternity olinio in the oapital had been destroyed during the 
closing stages of the war. For a time an atap building was in usep but 
in November 1946 a maternity ward with ten beds was opened in the oapitalp 
and there was a seoond olinio in Kuala Belait. The training of looal 
midwives was begun; vigorous propaganda was waged against "old customs 
and superstitions"; and milk coupons were issued to expectant mothers to 
induce them to attend the olinios. In 1947 there were four midwives 
operating in the state,, two in Brunei Town and one each at Kuala Belait 
and Tiitong, Emphasis was plaoed by the Government upon domioiliary 
midwifery and few women were delivered in hospital. The looal bi dan 
remained far from extinct. 
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recruiting staff, this sector was growing more rapidly towards the end 
of the 1950s than any other and there were health sisters in five oentres. 
In aooordanoe with the general polioy of assisting rural dwellers, eaoh 
sister and her staff ran several sub-olinics in oonntry areas and made 
regular visits to the ulus. The welfare measures taken oontributed to 
a perpetuation of the downward trend in the rate of infant mortality 
(from 13.3% in 1947 to 11.3% in 1953 and 9.3% in 1959)171 and to a 
notioeable improvement in the health of mothers and the weight of their 
offspring; but progress might have been even more marked, it was olaimed, 
but for the reluctance of Malays, especially in Kampong Aper, to take 
advantage of modern midxifery. 
172 
(d) Publio Utilities. The extension of treated water supplies was 
seen, in part, as an essential faotor in the improvement of health. Cheap 
power Was neoessary for any form of industrial development in Brunei. 
173 
Provision was made in the Development Plane therefore, for the extension 
Of water and eleotrioity supplies in the main towns and larger 
ksmp cya 174 
A now water treatment and pumping station at Taeek (to serve 
the capital) name into operation on 14 January 1956 and consumption 
doubled within a month (though declining subsequently). Brunei Towu, 
for the first time, was supplied with filtered and ohlorinated water of 
171. Statistios oompiled by the author from Brunei Annual Reports. 
172. CO 824/5 Brunei Annual Report 19578 p 74- 
1739 Bevingt on, 1 oo. oit., p 24. 
174. CO 1022/336 Summary of Proposals (1953), p 4" 
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high quality* 
175 
Investigation of the problem of providing a direot 
water-main to Kampong kyer, begun in 1956, was oompleted during the 
following year and plans were made for the construction of a flexible 
pipeline on the bed of the River Brunei. 
176 
This Boheme had not been 
implemented by the end of 1959, although tenders had been invited and 
aooepted by the Government, 
177 Consumption in the oapital eaoeeded 262 
million gallons annually in 1959 from the Tasek reservoir alone; but sup- 
Ply was restricted during times of drought, e. g. February to June 1958. 
In the oilfield area, a continuing shortage of water caused 
great iuoouveaienoe to the publio. In 1954, therefore, the Government 
proposed to inorease the supply of water purohased from the oil company 
for the towns of Soria and Kuala Belait. The soheme was soheduled to be 
Completed by May 1955 and the anticipated benefits included the lifting 
of severe rationing; the provision of filtered., ohlorinated water for 
the first time; and the oonneotion of man? potential customers who had 
been turned away earlier. 
178 
The initial oontraotor proved unsatisfaotory 
and 809 in 1956, a different firm gras engaged to complete the construction 
of a water-main from Soria to Kuala Belait., By December 1956, when this 
task was oompleted, water beoame available round the olook instead of 
the one hoar daily beforehand. 
179 
In about July of that year it had 
beoome possible to supply Seria in a similar fashion. More than two 
175. Brunei Annual Re port 1956, P 132. 
176. Ind,, pp 135-6v and BAR 1957 p 122. 
177. CO 824/5 Brunei Annual Report 1959, p 151- 178,. Brunei Annual Re port 19-54 ,p 140. 
179. Brunei Annual Re port 1956, p 136 and BAR 1957 p 126. 
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thousand oonneotions were-made between 1956 and 1958, oonsumption in 
Kuala Belait-Seria exceeding half a million gallons daily in 1959" 
Elsewhere in Brunei, water supply was inadequate in Tatong 
Village but satisfaotory in Bangar (Temburong) and Muara. A fair slice 
of development funds was devoted to the improvement of supplies to many 
rural kampongs, 
180 but by 1959 a backlog of appiioatioas had developed 
because the Government lacked sufficient staff to keep up with the 
demand. 181 In 1957 subsidized water rates were introduoed as an 
"expedient way of passing on to the people some of the wealth of the 
oonatryll, 
182 
(Bat higher prices were imtroduoe3 in 1958). 
Bleotrioity. 
183 
A ý9 million development soheme to give Brunei 
a statewide eleotrioal grid network fed from a central power station at 
Kuala Belait, fueled by gas from the Seria field, was shelved in 1954 
in favour of a less ambitious projeot. A big potential industrial oon- 
sumer had dropped oat and Mr Rajarataam, the State Eleotrioa1 Offioery 
feared that village and ulu people were not yet ready to utilise the 
projeoted-servioe to anywhere near the oapaoity of the proposed oentral 
generating piant. 
184 
Instead, an interim scheme was implemented. This 
involved the provision of two 280 kilowatt sets in Brunei Town and two 
similar sets in Kuala Belait. When these sets were installed, power 
180. In 1957 %165,354 was spent on raral water projects compared with 
On13r $749999 in the capital. 
181. CO 824/5 Brunei Annual Report 1959, p 151. 
182. CO 824/5 Brunei Annual Report 1957, p 124. 
183. See above, pp 284-5,355-6 and 396. (For water, see abovev pp 191- 
2,284 and 355). 
184. Borneo Bulletin, 13 November 1954" 
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well in excess of demand was achieved, temporarily at least. In 1956, 
indeed, electricity prices were redaoed slightly, in order to attract 
oustomers. 
165 
A better distribution network, which eliminated overloaded 
mains,, faoilitated the transmission of eleotrioity to the publio. 
186 
A 
scheme for the hire or hire-purchase of domestic appliances by the 
inhabitants was continued. Kuala Belait (from 1949) and Seria were 
Still supplied by the Government with electricity purchased from the 
oil oompany,, although a Government power station was briefly in operation 
is Seria in 1954-5.187 
The growth of eleotrioity generation in Brunei daring the 
period of the Development Plan was rather impressive. Between 1950 and 
1953 the number of units generated annually in the capital doubled from 
just under 0.4 million to just over 0.8m. In 1959, by contrast, nearly 
5.2m units were generated for the benefit of 2,499 oonsumers, compared 
with only 696 consumers in 1953 and 337 in 1950. Generating capacity in 
the capital increased from 322 kilowatts in 1953 to 2,778 kilowatts in 
1959" For the State as a whole, the number of ooasnmers more than 
trebled between 1954 (1,529) and 1959 (4,739) whilst the quantity of 
electricity generated almost quintupled over the same period (1.5m units 
in 1954; 7. Om in 1959)"188 Clearly the use of eleotrioity was spreading 
rapidly. 
185. In 1956-7 eleotrioity prioes were redaoed from their usual level 
of 30 Dents per unit for light and ten oents per unit for power to only 
28 cents and 8 Dents respectively. 
186. Bevington, loo. eit., p 24. 
187. Brunei Annual Report 1954, p 146 and BAR 1955, p 163- 
188* Statistics oompiled from Brunei Annual Reports. 
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(e) Communications. A better network of communications was a major 
goal of the Development Plan and an essential sine qua non for further 
economic, political and social progress. Roads oould open up the 
interior and make its resources more readily aooessible and faoilitate 
the oonstruotion of sohools and visits from medioal staff. Business 
ooul d not funotion properly, without an up-to-date telephone service. 
A national broadcasting station was needed to instill a sense of community 
to people living in soattered villages and to enable the Government to 
OOMMUnioate adequately with them, 
189 
Finally, as improved airport was 
needed to link the ooantry more effeotively with the outside world. 
The oonstruotiou of roads, whioh swallowed up massive expend- 
iture, was a most important feature of the first five-year plate. In 1953 
the network was not saffioient for the proposed internal development of 
the oountrv and it was hoped that by improving existing roads and 
building new ones it would be possible to open up new areas of valuable 
land for forestry operations and agrioulturep as well as making travel 
muoh safer and faster within the State. The new road programme envisaged 
the reoonstruotion of the roads from Brunei Town to Berakas, Muara, Jeru- 
dong and Tutong respeotively. In addition, an inland trunk road was 
proposed. This would be sited so as to fit in with a projected main 
road from North Borneo to Sarawak. The seotion of the route in Brunei 
would be sited so as to open up areas of interior forest land, at the 
189. Bevington., o . oit.,, p 44. Mr Bevington wished the people to be kept fully informed about what was being done and why in order to reduce 
public impatience at any apparent slowness in the implementation of development programmes. 
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time unworkable because of inacoessibility. Finally, a large mileage 
of secondary and logging roads to assist in the internal development 
of the State was proposed in order to conneot interior kampongs to the 
road system. 
Igo 
During 1954 funds were approved by the State Counoil for the 
first three years of the road programme and technical assistants arrived 
from Australia in 1955" A SPeoial 'Roads Seotion' of the Publio Works 
Department was created to supervise the exeoution of the work. In 1954-5 
a new method of oonstruotion oalled soil-Dement stabilization 
191 
was 
pioneered, and., proving its ability to stand up to heavy traffic, was 
extended for use on all new roads., 
192 
Under the Development Plan prior- 
1t7 was given to the new Brunei Town Kuala Belait highway. This involved 
the rebuilding of existing stretches of road (such as that from Brunei 
Town to Tutong) and the oonstruotion of an entirely new seotioa from 
Tutong to Seria. The trunk road, linking the oapital direotly to the 
oilfield for the first time, was oompleted in September 1958. Two major 
bridges were built over the River Tatong, but one major bottleneok 
reneaineds the ferry link between Danaa and Ztitong. Given the shortages 
of essentials, suoh as stone, equipment, meohaniost supervisory staff 
and an experienoed labour foroe, the building of the road was a "fine 
aohievemeat". 
193 
Travel between the oapital and Kuala Belait was greatly 
190. Brunei Annual Report 1954, p 156; and BAR 1955. p 174" 
191. This comprised a4 inch consolidated 'pavement' (foundation) of 
locally-procured sand clay, stabilized with a layer of oement, this coat 
later being surfaced with three inches of bitumen. 
192. Brunei Annual Report 1955, p 175-6. 
193. Borneo Bulletin. 27 September 1958. 
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faoilitated and the exohange of visits, particularly by omnibus, between 
the two towns popularized. The road was well used from the outset by a 
Public, which had been increasingly impatient to see results. 
Meanwhile the oonstruotion of subsidiary roads had been some- 
what neglected. One route ran from the capital to Berakas beaoh, with 
a branch to Muara. Towards the end of 1953 a major reoonstraction was 
started in order to make Berakas Qgarry - the prinoipal souroe of road 
stone in Brunei after its disoovery in about 1950 - more accessible from 
Brunei Town. Resurfacing was completed in 1957, by which time a by-pass 
had been built around the new airport. The branoh to Muara (12 miles 
was originally an earth road of "reasonably wide formation"y exoept on 
hill slopes, where in the past it was neoessarilq left narrow beoause of 
the lack of earth-moving equipment. Gradients were rednoed in the mid- 
1950s. The majority of the available heavy plant in the State was oon- 
oentrated on the Muara Road daring 1959 and the major portion of the 
earthwork oomplet ed by December of that year , 
194 
Work was began on the first stage of the proposed inland coastal 
route to the oilfield. This wo ld follow the Tatong road for a while 
and then branoh off towards Kuala Abang in the interior. In 1954 the 
first mile of the branch road towards Kuala Abang leading to the agri- 
cultural station at Birau was quite good but after that the road 
deteriorated rapidly. Work was slow beoause of the lank of eartbmoving 
equipment, but renewed attention beoame possible after the oompletion of 
194. Brunei Annual Report 1953, p 127; BAR 19549 pp 159-60; BAR 1955 
P 181; BAR 1956 p 168; ' BAR 19579 p 161; and BAR 1959, P 155. 
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the main. highway (i. e, from Brunei Town to Kuala Belait via Tatong). 
195 
An earth road to Limbang from the south side of the River Bra- 
nei was seldom used by vehioular traffic; nor was the Bandar-Pandaruan 
oust though it was popular with oyolists and pedestrians. The oonstraot- 
ion of bridle paths was seen as a neoessary oorollary to the main road 
system and their function gras to provide aooesa to and from cultivated 
areas and to allow farmers to bring their produoe to the market. Although 
the Government itself built some bridle paths, l opal villagers were 
enoouraged to take this task upon themselves because it was believed 
that they would take a pride in any road thus built and be more likely 
to maintain it in a good oondition. 
i96 
Teleoommunioations197 within the State were improved in 1955 by 
the establishment of a VHF telephone oirouit between Brunei Town and Kuala 
Belait and between those main oentres and a number of planes in surrounding 
distriots. The Resident understood that the State oould boast that its 
telephones were more modern than those in many ELropean cities' 
198 
Construotion of a new airfield waa delayed, partly beoause 
priority in the supply of gravel was gives to road oonstraotion and 
partly beoause of unsuitable weather. In November 1956, Brunei's airport 
was opened to Dakota traffio and passengers were enabled to fly to 
Singapore, Kuohing and Jesselton direotly without having to uee the 
small feeder aircraft which previously linked the State with these 
195. Brunei Annual Report 1954, p 161; and BAR 195 p 155- 
196* Bevington, loo. oit. 0 pp 29-30. For further details about roads 
in 
Brunei, see above, PP 4-59 185-7,280-4 and 356-7. 
197. See also, above, pp 191 and 285-6. 
198. CO 824/5 Brunei Annual Report 1957, p vii. 
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trunk routes. The coat was 92.5 million. 
199 
Farther aohievemente in the oommunioations seotor under the 
Development Plan inoluded the establishment of a national radio station 
in 1957, and general improvement of wharves and port facilities. The 
time was judged to be unripe, however, for the ooustruotion, at enormous 
expense, of a major international port at Muara. 
200 
The river-olearing 
sohemep designed to assist small-soale eoonomio aotivity in the alas was 
abandoned beforerit had been oompleted fu11y. 
201 
(f) Misoellaneous. In 1955 a pensions soheme was devised which 
provided for non-oontributory pensions and allowanoesp of X$20 per month, 
without means-test for persons aged over sixty, the blind, the disabled 
and dependents of lepers. Stroh pensions were payable irrespeotive of 
ethnic origins, but sub jest to a . residenoe 
test. This scheme was thought 
to be the first of its kind to be introduoed in a territory where senior 
oitizens were predominantly illiterate. Time it was deoided to use 
approved headmen to distribute the money, taking it direotly to the homes 
Of reoipients when neoessary. A further diffioulty was the determining 
of age, beoause registration of births had oommenoed in Brunei only in 
1922.202 Old age pensions were introdnoed with effect from 1 January 
1955.203 Rehabilitation allowazsoes were paid to disoharged lepers. 
p vii. 199. Brunei Annual Report 1955, p 5; BAR 1956 pv and BAR 19 j, 
200. Borneo Bulletin, 18 Ootober 1958. See., also, Borneo Bulletin, 5 
November 1955" 
201. Borneo Bulletino 5 April 1958- 
202. See above, p 193. 
203. In 1955 2,362 old age pensioaers reoeived %564,430 and in 1959 
39136 reoipients shared=%'764,160. There were 62 blind pensioners 
(in 
1955) and a handful of lepers and lunatios. 
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Hithertop British oolonial servants and indigenous senior Government 
offioials had been the only recipients of State retirement pensions. 
The showpiece of the., first five year plan was the $$9 million 
Sultan Omar Ali Saiftiddin Mosque in the capital. Opened in the same 
week as the Brunei Town-Kuala Belait highway, immense difficulties were 
experienoed in its constraotiOn. It was built on the edge of swamps and 
foundations were said to reaoh down to depths, of more than one hundred 
feet. Taking the normal oommeroial oonsiderations the building was 
wrongly sited, but "aesthetically, religiously, fundamentally and to 
the Malay eye" it was entirely oorreotly plaoed. 
2o4 Designed by British 
by Italian marble outters and Chinese artisans arohiteots and built 
205 
it was "imposing"9 aooording to a oontemporary witness, but gave 
"the feeling of being a suooessful oontraotor's job, not a labour of 
love by the people of Brunei. The only things in it locally-made are a 
silver incense-burner, not a thing of beauty, and a nasty-looking book- 
oase. Perhaps the mosque will look more human when it has been wor- 
shipped in for fifty years". 206 
Buildings were fine, the leader of the nationalist party oommented in 
late 1956, but new industries were an even more urgent priority to 
reduoe the ooantryla dependenoe upon oil. 
207 
EZ and Coaolueion. 
During the years 1953 -to 1958 ßi76.4 million of the allooated 
204. Typesoript of a recording made for the author by oourtesy of Mr 
ER Bevingt on CMO CEng, 10 August 1983p p 35. 
205. Cf. mutatis mutandis, A. Burgess, Devil of a State (London 1961), 
p 231. 
206. Quoted by oourteej of an expatriate Sarawak Government offioer who 
sometimes visited Brunei. 
207. Borneo Bulletin, 20 October 1956. 
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%100 million had been spent on development, and, at the end of 1958, the 
remaining ß23.6m was transferred baok to the General Revenue Balanoe. 
In faot, the so-oalled 'five year' plan was not so meat and ticlp: 
although funds had been voted in mid-1953, the Development Commissioner 
did not arrive until late 1954, and some departmental programmes were 
not devised until 1955 and continued, therefore, beyond 1958. In short, 
the plan laoked a olearly- defined beginning and end. 
Although Brunei was fortunate to have "ample" 
208 
funds - ors 
as Nr Beviugtoa would have it, only a saffioienoy (see above, p 392) - 
this removed. only one of the faotors limiting development. Apart from 
staff shortages, espeoially in the skilled grades (managers, supervisors, 
engineers, teaohersq dootorsg nurses, artisans), the dearth locally of 
suitable atone affeoted adversely both building and road oonstruotion. 
209 
Contraotore experienoed difficulty in ooping with the volume of Korks 
whioh further retarded progress* 
210 
Speed rather than effioienoy often had to be adopted by planners 
an their criterion for political reasons. Although an unprecedented 
208. Brunei Annual Report 1954, p 6. 
209. Ibid. 
210. Soon after the Development Plan was launched all local contractors 
of good repute had their resources fully stretched. The rapid pace of 
development in Brunst led to the employment of foreign oontraotore, since 
local Malay contractors had not yet reached the necessary standard of 
effioienoy, despite Government attempts to assist them. Some Malays made 
the criticism that profits on the development of Brunei were being creamed 
off ti outsiders. The Government preferred this oharge, howevery to the 
alternative one of slow progress, which would undoubtedly follow any 
policy of restricting development (Brunei Annual Report 1955, pp 7-8)" 
AAA 6 
ooastraotional programme was being attempted, the Resident reported (in 
1956) that, to those people living in the State, "progress seems pain- 
fully slow, buildings take ages to rise from the ground, and new works 
oompleted are taken for granted while attention is fooussed always on to 
the future and what remains to be done". 
211 
Similarly, ouoe a road was 
finished it oeased to be a subject of conversation; people talked only 
of those roads not yet oompleted, or not even started. 
212 
The first development plan, Mr Bevington explained, had been 
"in essence the laying of foundations for the State's future. The plan 
has provided electricity and water supplies, roads, airfields, tele- 
communications and other basic services without which industry could 
not hope to be attracted here (Brunei)". 213 
Although "rather a Tory point of view"p it was "absolutely fundamental" 
that commerce should be encouraged to invest in Brunei so that its pro- 
fits could be taxed to pay for the new social services. Commerce would 
not be attraoted to the oountry, on the other hand, unless an infra- 
struoture existed, whilst the people oould not be assisted until business 
created the wealth neoessary to finanoe welfare eervioes. Equally central 
in the Development Commissioner's thinking was the realization that oil 
resources were finite and that 
"unless one oonld leave a viable entity whioh had oreated its own 
industry, oommerce and infrastraoture, then the people would just 
fall right back". 214 
It was essential, therefore, that Brauei Malaya should beoome 
involved in prodnotive enterprises rather than rely upon "a Government 
211. Brunei Annual Report 1956p p v. 
212. I. See also p 439, fn 189 (above). 
213. Borneo Bulletin, 4 October 1958, quoting Kr Bevington. 
214. Mr Bevington, typesoript of reoording, p 32. 
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job whioh depended upon oil". In short, the ohoioe rested between 
whether oil revenue should be used "to hand out State pensions to all 
and sundry" or whether the wealth should be used to provide the people 
with an edaoation so that they ooald maintain themselves when oil revenue 
oeased". 
215 
Upon his departure from Brunei in 1958, Mr Bevington stated 
that there were great opportunities for any Malays willing to work hard. 
216 
Nast Brunei Nala s, however, seemed to lack the neoessary spirit of 
enterprise. 
217 
' 1958 all the basic services were completed or nearing 
oompletion. The major faoility wanting was a good deep sea port. This 
ddfioieaoy was taken an the priaoipal oanse of the lank of new oommeroial 
endeavour designed to reduce the oountry'o eoonomio dependenoe upon 
petroleum. Heavy trans-shipment charges at Singapore and Labuan were 
almost oertain to prioe any Brunei product out of the market. 
218 
Plans 
for a new port at xnara were reoeived. from oonsnitaxits during 1958; but 
it was not until the early 1970s that the port was read7. 
If attempts to diversify the eoonomr had failed, it was 
diffioult enough to preserve existing non-oil industries, such as rubber- 
tapping, rioe-growing and the manufacture of silverware. People took 
little interest in rubber; and the meohanisation of the rice industry 
had not shown an immediate results (although the Development Commissioner 
215. Ibid. 
216. Borneo Bulletin, 18 Ootober 1958, quoting Mr Bevington. 
217. Borneo Bulletin,, 8 Ootober 1955; and Telegraph Sunday XMaziue, 5 
February 1984, P 21. 
218. CO 824/5 Brunei Annual Report 1957, p viii. See, a1sop pp 275-6 
(above). 
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still saw no reason wily Brunei oould not become self-suffioient in rioe). 
219 
The handiorafts were not attraotive vocations to ooatemporary Brunei youth 
and remained in danger of dying ont. 
220 
River olearing was not seen 
through to oompletion. 
221 
The prospeots detailed in the sooial and geo- 
logical surveys were not encouraging. On the other hand, there had been 
real gains in sooial servioes. An infant was much more likely to survive 
thanks to improved maternity servioes and living ooaditions, the child 
was likely to be edaoated to literaoy, to reoeive medioal treatment for 
any ailment, and oould antioipate a non-ooutri'butory retirement pension. 
The expansion of the health and eduoatioa servioes is detailed in the 
table below. 
Table 23. The Expansion of Sooial 3ervioee in Brunei 19a2-59 
Year Annual Expenditures- 
Health Education 
(i Straits/SIalasan)* 
No of Patientes 
In Out 
Sohoolss- 
No Pupils 
1932 17,957 9,118 199 11,060 16 968 
1938 64,051 20,755 614 19,435 28 2,231 
1947 96,564 56,018 995a 40,889a 34a 3,484a 
1950 283,699 201,041 1,105 73,761 38 4,499 
1953 1,101,213 618,120 3,328 129,186 46 5,917 
1959 2,637,052 3054,111 4.617b 138,339b 810 15,006o 
Notes, * The Straits' dollar, renamed Malayan dollar after the 
Seoond World Warp was fixed in value at iX11166. 
a 1948 
b 1958 
o inoluding the BMPC Trades Sohool at Soria (199 pupils). 
8ooroees Compiled by the author from Brunei Annual Reports 1932-59" 
219. Borneo Bulletin, 18 October 1958. 
220. Cf. Telegraph Sunday )lagazinel, 5 February 1984, p 21. 
221. Borneo Bulletin, 5 April 1958. 
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At the end of 1958 much remained to be done and a committee 
was appointed to oonsider further plans for the progress and welfare 
of the State. The new oommittee was faoed. with the task of providing 
employment for the ever-iuoreasing annual output of local sohools and was 
expected to give consideration to training in agriculture and crafts as 
well as to the introduction of seoondary industries* 
222 
The year 1959 saw few new development projects because of 
constitutional changes, but development activities continued with the 
completion. of sohemes delayed under the 1953-8 Development Plan. Work 
oommenoed on a new water supply for the oapital and plans were formulated 
for hospitals in Brunei Town and Kuala Belait, as well as a new lapam and 
an Mailis (Council Chamber). The absence of new large-scale develop- 
meat projeots and the oonsequent deorease in aotivit7 had a marked 
effeot on the oommeroia3 world of the State. 
223 
Retrenohment of staff, 
partioularly in the Publio Works Department, gave rise to oonoern, but 
the situation was not expeoted to improve until a seoond development plan 
was introdaoed. 
224 
Onoe buildings were construoted or servioes introduced deter- 
mined effort was made to ensure that they were run and maintained as 
far as possible by local people. Funds were readily made available for 
the training of local youths or quite senior civil servants and others 
overseas, especially in Australia, New Zealand, Malaya and Sarawak. 
222. CO 824/5 Brunei Annual Rep ort 1958, pp i-ii. 
223. CO 824/5 Brunei Annual Rep ort 1959, p ii. 
224. Brunei Annual Report 19 60, p 1. 
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this oo-operation extended to the sending of advisers to Brunei who also 
undertook the training of local staff whilst in the Sultanate. Brunei 
was indeed "fortunate in its friends"p the Resident enthused; 
225 
but 
the dearth of qualified l ooal personnel was alleviated only slightly. 
Before leaving Brunei in late 1958 Mr Bevington had drafted a 
seoond five year plan along the broad lines that Brunei should be 
developed as the home of light industries, bat it was yet to be approved. 
One of the first requirements for the people of Brunei was the provision 
of teohnioa]. education so that they could take over and ran essential 
State services. At the time more and more people were obtained from 
overseas because Brunei Malays laoked the neoessary expertise to staff 
departments such as telecommunioati ons, broadcasting and publio works. 
226 
In faot, however, the seoond five year plan was not approved until 
April 1962,227 which lies beyond the scope of the present work. Whilst 
the first plan had been in progress (1953-8)p Brunei had also been moving 
towards internal autononyi, a prooess which is desoribed in the following 
Pages. 
225. Branei Annual Report 1956, p viii. 
226, Borneo Bulletin, 18 Ootober 1958. 
227. Brunei Annual Report 1961-2, p 1; and Borneo Bulletin, 7 April 1962. 
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PART IV, AUTONOMY 1959_ 
452 
CHAPTER P 
POLITICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL D] V] LOPMZ&TS 1946-1959 
1. Introduction 
In this ohapter I shall examine the developments whioh ou2- 
minated in the promulgation of Brunei's first written oonstitution 
and the termination of the Residential System in 1959. In the prooess 
it will beoome possible to deoide how far the long tern strategy of the 
Colonial Offioe, drawn up during the Seoond World War, was aotually im- 
plemented. Before the Japanese oooupation, Residents had not been faded 
with a vociferous nationalist movement. As the 1950s progressed, howeverp 
the Brunei people inoreasingly demanded a voice in their own future. 
?. 
__ 
British planning for Poet War Brunei 1943::: l 
During the war RK Government had given its attention to the 
future ooagtitutiouai system in British Borneo as a whole. A long-term 
strategy was devised for the eventual self-government of Brunei, preferably 
in oloser assooiation with its neighbours in British Borneo and with Malaya. 
Closer union of the Borneo territories had been advised in the 
Past$ b7 CP Luoas before the Residential fra, by Sir John Baoknill in 
1916, and by Sir Ceoil Clements in the early 1930a. In 1940 Nr JM Martin 
at the Colonial Offioe referred1 to the nonsense of having four separate 
1. CO 531/29 (File 17) memorandum by ! Gr (later Sir) Jl[ Xartin (b 1904), 
14 February 1940. 
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administrations and tariff systems in British Borneo (viz., Brunei, Lab- 
uan, Sarawak and North Borneo) and pointed to the slow progress of sooial 
servioes in Sarawak and North Borneo and the diffioulty of recruiting 
staff for these two independent servioes. He oontended that the United 
Kingdom's inoreasiug responsibility for Sarawak and North Borneo in inter- 
national forums was not matched try a oorresponding inorease in its exeo- 
utive powers within the two oowitries oonoerned, There were also stra- 
tegio arguments for a oloser union. ihr Martin envisaged "an independent 
Borneo running its own Government". He suggested the return of North 
Borneo and Sarawak to Bruneip but there were two main objeotions to suoh 
a Course. First, the personality of the Sultan of Brunei was "hardly an 
asset" and he awoke-"surprisingly little respeot'or even interest in the 
Sarawak Malay's mind" (see pp 299-302, above). Seoondly, British Borneo 
wag a "hotoh-potoh" of races with little in oommoti. Yet "a great and 
prosperous territory" could one day be built in Borneo, oomparable per- 
hags to Malayap and presenting "a solid bastion against the southward 
thrust of Japan". 
2 
The Seoretary of State thought the memorandum was 
interesting, but did nothing. This'remained the situation until the 
ootbreek of the Paoifio War in Deoember 1941. 
A minute IV Mr MBL Monson at the Colonial Office in Deoember 
19423 indioatee that a oonnooti on between the British Proteotorates in 
Borneo was being oonsidered before the first anniversary of the Japanese 
landing at Kota Eabru. It was envisaged furthers that these territories 
2. Ibid. 
3. Co 531/30 (File 4)9 minute by ßär (later Sir) wma Monson (b 1912), 3 
Deoember 1942. 
454 
would partioipate in "any regional organization or oowbinati on of the 
United Nations whioh may be established for eeourity reasons in the Par 
East n. 4 
In laroh 1943 three options for the future of North Borneo were 
dieoussed, including the possibility that its territory might be returned 
to Brunei. The latter was ruled out, howeverp because the Brunei royal 
house had "shown no qualities which would justify an extension of its 
territories". 5 At the end of 1944, howeverp this idea was revived by 
Hr Maoaski eg who suggested that the restoration of the Sultan' a former 
territories (inoluding the 5th Division of Sarawak)' would gratify the 
monaroh and make him more willing to agree to a new treaty granting direot 
juriediotion to icing George VI on the lines of the treaties proposed for 
Malaya. Emphasis Cu, an indigenous dynasty, he addedt night prove a useful 
counterpoise to local Chinese nationalism and demands for greater political 
power in Borneo. The oil royalties of Brunei would benefit far more people. 
The proposed new State would oompriee "a ooanpaot territorial unit with a 
well-balanoed eoonoeV", whioh might be inoluded in a Kalaran Union. Mr 
Maoaekie reoognized, ort the other handy that it might be '"oontrary to 
aooepted polioy to inorease, even nominally, the authority of the Sultan". 
6 
this timep indeedg alternative plans (as follows had been formalated 
and Mr l[aoaskie's proposals. were deemed to be inopportune. But the 
possibility of a disoueeion of oloser relations in British Borneo after 
4. Ibid., 
5" CO 825/42 (File 55104/3/1943-44, item 11), extraot from a memorandum 
for oonstitutional reoonstraotion in the Far Bast, 20 Xaroh 1943. 
6. Ibid., item 37, Maoaskie to Wodeman, memorandum (seoret), 4 Deoember 
1944. NB: Mr Maoaskie was Head of the Borneo Planning Unit. 
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liberation was not exoluded. 
7 
On 6 January 1944 a oommittee headed by Mr Attlee was appointed 
by the War Cabinet to oonsider "the question of the constitutional pol- 
ioiss to be followed in Malaya and in the British territories in Borneo 
on their liberation and to reoommend a directive on which the anthoritiee 
responsible for planning the oivil administrations of those territories 
after liberation can work". 
8 
The polioy was that whioh had been form- 
elated ahead in the Colonial Offioe. The basso assumption was that 
the restoration of the pre-war ooostitutional and administrative system 
of the four territories in British Borneo would be "undesirable in the 
interests of aeourity and of our purpose of promoting sooialt eooaomio 
and politioal progress in oolonial territories". 
9 These purposes required, 
first, the direot assumption by W1 Government of administration in North 
Borneo (iuoluding Labuan), and, secondly, the oession to King George VI of 
fall jurisdiction in Brunei and Sarawak. The purpose of politioal progress 
required, j furthers that "self-government in Brunei... ehould not merely 
develop towards a system of auf oorat io rule, but should provide for a 
growing partioipation in the government by people of all oommunities". 
A new treaty was to be negotiated at the earliest opportunity with the 
Sultan of Brunei to aooord George VI suoh jurisdiotion as would enable 
him to legislate fully for Brunei under the Foreign Jurisdiction Aot. 
There was no intention, however, to impose a united Borneo ýbeoause the 
7" Ibid., item 38, Mr (later Sir) JJ Paekin (1892-1972) to Maoaekie, 12 
January 1945- 
8* CO 825/43 (File 55104/15, item 22) draft report of war cabinet 
Committee on Malaya and Borneo, 24 April 1944. Of, ibid., item 28. 
9" CO 825/42 (File 55104/3/1943-44, item 35), print of draft directive. 
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territories had "few raoial or other affinities". In short, the direotive 
reoognized that the "basis of oloser unity hardly exists" but "oommunity 
of polioy" oocil. d be assured by the subordination of the three proposed 
administrations to the "authority and direotion" of a Governor-General 
for Malaya and Borneo to be stationed in Singapore. 
In 1946 both Sarawak and North Borneo beoame British oroin 
ooioniee. The emissary despatohed in late 1945 to negotiate the new 
treaties with the Malayan rulers - Bruneip it will be reoalled, was 
counted as a sixth Unfederated Xalay State - was Sir Harold MaoMiohael 
(1882-1969). The treaty with Brunei bad to be delayed until SEAC took 
over from the Australian foroes, whioh did not ooour until January 1946. 
Meanwhile, before Sir Harold ooald reaoh Brunei, he was reoalled and 
sent on another mission, this time to Nalta. 
'0 
The revision of the 
treaty with Brunei was "not oonsidered argent"11 and was deferred 
"until such time as the Governor-General had taken office and oou1d 
advise upon the question and also consider the possibility of the union 
of Brunei with the other British Borneo territories". 12 
The first post-war Resident, Mr WJ' Peel (then a junior, Class 
IV, IHCS offioer), 
13 
was sent out with instraotions to take over from the 
BXA and re-establish civil government. His immediate superior was Mr H 
MacDonald (1901-81), who anted de faoto as High Commissioner for Brunei 
10. WO 203/4471A CO to Sir H MaoMiohael, telegram, 17 December 1945- 
11- WO 203/5535 WO to SACSFA, telegram (top seoret), 11 March 1946- 
12, Co 537/2244 (item 23), memorandum by Secretary of State, 24 December 
1947. Cf. CO 323/1873, minute by Mr AN Galswortby, 7 February 1946; and 
CO 531/31, File 9v minute by Galsworthy, 11 Maroh 1946. 
13. CO 537/1614 minute by Galswortbyy,, 11 Maroh 1946. (Mr Peel had been 
recommended by one Mr Howitt as "in every way fitted for the appointment 
of Resident"g despite his junior status at that time). 
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though he was never issued with a oommission as suoh. 
14 
Mr Peel s 
object was 
"to get on with the job and not keep harking back to the war. In general 
I... reoeived a warm weloome from the people and very wise advioe and 
oo-operation from Inohe Ibrahim, who knew all the pre-war baokground. 
Of oourse it was helpful to know that oil was going to make an 
impoverished State very rich quite quickly". 15 
For the time being the pre-war straoture of administration was restored 
unohanged. Brunei did manage, howeverp to secure the services of a 
European to fill the post of Treasurer for the first time sinne 1919. 
3. "Brunei should be associated with a larger administration" (1947-8). 
In May 1947, at a oonferenoe between Mr MaoDonald, Mr Peel and 
Sir Charles Arden-Clarke (Governor of Sarawak, 1946-9) it was oonoladed16 
that Brunei was "too email a State to transfer a suffioient number of 
good administrative and teohnioal offioers to the higher grades of its 
Public services and therefore cannot by itself achieve a proper standard 
Of Government. It should be assooiated with a larger administrative unit 
which can aid it in these matters! '. Bat Brunei would remain a separate 
State beoause any saggestion of oession to the British king or absorption 
in a colony would be "both impolitic and wrong" because "it woald be 
unlikely to be aooeptable to either the Sultan (and) his State Counoil 
Or his enbjeots". The aeeooiation with a neighbouring territory, 
14" CO 943/1 (File 59 item 3). note for diaouesion with the Governor- 
Generalp paragraph 3; and ibid., item 8. 
15" Dato Sir WJ Peel Kt DSNB DSLJ, letter to the author, 11 August 1982, 
Paragraph 4. See also, above, PP 154,306-7,321-2 and 346- 
16* This aeotion is based upon 00 537/2244 (item 5)t Governor-General 
to 009 seoret, 16 May 19479 paragraph 1 (a) to 1 (e). 
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"should therefore", the Governor General argued, "be on the basis that 
a State under the proteotion of His Majesty is being joined for admin- 
istrative and any other necessary purposes with a neighbouring oolong, 
without any derogation in theory from the former's present oonstitutional 
position. Presumably the Governor of the oolong oonoerned would beoome 
High Commissioner for Brunei... The general polioy would be similar. The 
British Resident (in Brunei) would be under the authority of the Governor, 
who would direot policy in both territories". (16) 
It was reoommended that Brunei should be assooiated with Sarawak, by 
whioh it was "aurrowaded" (eio), rather than with North Borneo. In dne 
oourae the three British Borneo territories would be brought under one 
administration, either on a unitary or federal basis. 
The Colonial Office endorsed these proposals. "We are having 
to retraoe our steps in Malaya in the matter of jurisdiotion" - thus Mr 
G Seel - "and I should have thought it wise to wait and see the final 
outcome of that before embarking on adventures elsewhere". 
17 The 
Permanent Under-Seoretary, Sir T Lloyd, ruled that "on the question of 
jurisdiotion, we ought not to seek to go further in Brunei than is now 
planned for the Proteoted States in Malaya"* 
18 In other words, the aim 
of aoquiring direct jurisdiotion for King George in Brunei was to be 
abandoned, The Governor-General agreed that it was not neoessary to 
raise with the Sultan the question of the King's jurisdiction in Brunei. 
Kr MaoDonald had been advised that "we can achieve in practice all we 
desire under the terms of the existing treaty" and that to raise 
questions involving amendment of the 1905-6 treaty was undesirable 
"aiuoe this might tend to arouse an opposition party to our proposals 
17. Ibid. p minute by Mr (later Sir) G Seel CW1 (b 1895), 24 May 1947" 
18w Ibid., minute by sir TIK Lloyd KCMG KCB (b 1896), 27 May 1947" 
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and"perhaps defeat our proposals altogether". 
19 
In November 1947 "the Sultan agreed to the proposals (oonoern- 
ing links with Sarawak) without exoeption" and at a oonfidential meeting 
of the State Counoil there was no dissentient voice, although all attaohed 
importanoe to the "position and authority" of the Resident in Brunei 
remaining unchanged-20 On 1 May 1948 the Governor of Sarawak would 
become High Commissioner for Brunei and as suoh would exeroise the same 
powers as the Governors of-the straits settlements had exeroised before 
the war (see abovep pp 120-2). The Resident in Brunei would oome under 
the High Commissioner. The heads of teohnioal departments in Sarawak 
would beoome also "effootive heads" of their respeotive departments in 
Brunei, aoting, in theory, "in an advisory oapaoity to... the Sultan". 
21 
Early in 1948"the interim Resident, Mr LBN Davis MCS, organized 
a series of preparatory publio meetings to explain the reasons for the 
new departure and to reassure the people that it was not intended to 
band over Brunei to Sarawak. These meetings were fairly well-attended, 
the most probing questions ooming from the nasoent Malay intelligentsia. 
The presentation of an aooomplished faot was resented by some sohool 
teaohers and Government officials. Mr Davis reported that the annoanoe- 
meat of the 'transfer of the High Commissionership for Brunei to Sarawak 
originally was regarded with ooneiderable suspioion until it Was explained 
emphatioallg that it did not involve politioal or finanoial eubjeotion to 
19. ibid., (item 14), Governor-General to 009 No 358, telegram (seoret), 
23 Ootober 1947, paragraph 2. 
20. Ibid., item 169 Governor-General to CO, No 405 (telegram), 24 
November 1947, paragraphs ly 2 and 4. 
21. CO 943/1 (File 5, item 6) Seoretary-General to CO saving telegram, 
10 January 1948. 
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Sarawak* Mr Davis warnedg howeverf that had the ohange involved any 
closer association with Sarawak, there would have been, real, though 
passive, opposition not only from those of "doctrinaire opinions" but 
also from the "older and more respeotable" members of the oommunity. 
This was due to historio distrust of Sarawak and the deep-rooted 
conservatism of the people of Brunei in the mass* 
22 
On 1 May 1948, the oooasion for the transfer of the High 
Comcaissionership, -large orowds assembled to weloome Sir Charles Arden- 
Clarke from-8nohiug. r "Saoh in the friendliness of the people of Brunei"q 
he enthused, . "that I do not feel a stranger among. yoai". Now that the 
High Commissioner was based in Borneo (rather than Singapore), he added, 
"it will be possible for bim to visit your State more frequently and 
give your affairs the personal studs and attention of the spot. whioh they 
demand", 
23 
The powers and ditties of the High Commissioner remained 
legally undefined; aud-if the change of holder was sapposed to allow him 
to devote more time to Brunei, it in doubtful whether he aotually did so. 
Nr DG Stewartp for example, deolared in 1949 that-he had very little idea 
how"mmoh he was supposed to intervene in the affairs of Bruneig24 whilst 
a subsequent High Commissioner oomplaiued that he lacked sufficient staff 
for the purpose. 
25 
22. CO 943/1 (File 5, item 30) report b? Mr Davie, 9 Maroh 1948. See 
Straits Times, 9 larch 1948 (Editorials "A Bitter Pill for Brunei"). 
23. CO 604/28 Sarawak Gazette, 1 May 1948, p 116. 
24.00 943/1 (File 6), miaute by Mr KG Ashton, 5 Deoember 1949. 
25" Co 943/2 (File 7, item 1), High Commissioner to 00, No 81 (saving), 
11 August 1951, paragraph 5; CO 943/1 (File 5), minute by Mr KG Ashton, 
(30 November 1948), who pointed out that there was only one legal 
adviser in Sarawak to serve both that oountry and Brunei. 
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4. "The Sultan should be advised to grant a oonstitution" (1949-51). 
When Mr Grattan-Bellew (1903-85)p Attorney-General of Sarawak, 
found time to examine the situation in Brunei, he entertained doubts 
about the very validity of its legislation. The Sultan,, teohnioallyp 
was an autocratic sovereign and only he could make lawn. There were "no 
written laws ... before 1906t1.26 After that time the emoting words weres 
"it is hereby enacted by... the Sultan-in-Counoil an follows... ". Each 
enactment was signed at the top Ur the Resident though the wards "I 
assent" were not need. No authority oould be found for the statement 
that the assent of the ooanoil was required for the enactment of legis- 
1ation. It was assumed that this was the arrangement whioh had been made 
by the Resident and the Sultan following the 1905-6 Treaty. Ehaotments 
in this form were law in the state; but some were passed by the State 
Council when the Sultan was absent, and doubt was felt about the validity 
of suoh legislation. The Sultan had not expressly delegated his legis- 
lative power to the Resident, but even if he had, printed oopies of the 
laws did not purport to be passed by the Resident-in-Coaooil. All enaot- 
mente from 1906 to 1930 had been collated and published in book form, "by 
authority", pre®umably of the Sultan. Xr Grattan-Bellew thought suoh law 
would be aooepted by a ooart as valid; but if a party to a prooeediag 
challenged. a poet-1930 statute, a oourt might not be prepared to aooept 
it as valid beoause the Sultan's oonsent was not apparent. Henoe it was 
deoided to print a book of all legislation einoe 1930 and to pass an 
'interpretation and general clauses ordinanoe' in order to make it clear 
26. See pp 140-3 (above). 
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that the Sultan need not be personally present in the State Counoil for 
legislation to be valid. The next step was to pass a 'Revised Edition 
of Laws Enaotment' and-then to revise all the enaotments and rules and 
regulations of the State. ' A Government Printer was to be appointed and 
a Government Gazette published. Onoe these steps had been taken, doubts 
about the validity of individual enaotmenta were permanently removed. 
(The-latter were not printed "by authority" nor did they bear the name of 
a printer). An 'Applioatioa of Laws Enaotment' was also required to 
legitimize the use of English Common Law in Brunei oourts in oases where 
no alternative legislative provision bad been made in the Sultanate. 
Subsequently the monarch would be advised to grant a oonstitution. 
27 
Mr )oPetrie, a legal adviser in the Colonial Offioep pointed 
out that sinoe legislative power was not oonferred upon the Sultan by 
any written law, an interpretation ordinance was not an appropriate law 
by whioh to establish a particular method for the exeroise of suoh power. 
The most suitable way would be to make the neoessary provision in any 
ooustitntion whioh might be granted. But since the drawing np of a 
oonstitution would take time, Mr MoPetrie suggested as an interim measure 
a new interpretation ordinanoe governing the Sultan's legislative powers 
whioh should expressly oonfer upon the Resident-in-Counoil the power to 
legislate if the Sultan should be absent or unable to aot. This law 
oould also give validation to laws enaoted by the Resident in the past. 
27. CO 943/1 (File 6p item 1)9 Mr CW Dawson (aoting High commissioner) 
to CO, No 79 14 Ootober 1949. See also, p 143 (above). 
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Another difficulty aroset did power to grant a oonstitutiou reside with 
the Sultan? If there was no evidenoe to the oontrary, Mr MoPetrie (b 1911) 
argued, the Malayan precedent could be followeds in each Oase there the 
oonstitation had been granted 1; 3r the monaroh. 
28 
Most, if not all, the measures suggested by Mr Grattan-Bellew, 
inoluding an "Interpretation and General Clauses Ehaotment", were 
executed in 1951- 
29 
Progress towards the promulgation, in 1959, of a 
written oonatitntion is treated in due oourse. 
-5s 
The Longer-Term Strategy (Preparation for Self-Government). 
The longer-term strategy of the Colonial Office for poet-Har 
Borneo involveds 
a. greater oo-operation between the three British Borneo territories; 
b. the oreation of a greater sense of national: unity and of oommon 
citizenship among the various raoes; and 
0. preparation for self-government. 
Co-operation between the three Borneo territories took the form 
of Governors' ootiferenoee (held every six months) and the sharing of 
servioes where praotioable in order to avoid duplioation of expenditure. 
A Jditit, labour adviser was appointed in 1947. A oombined judioiarr was 
established in 1951. Progress was made towards a oustoma union (whioh 
was not entirely beneficial for the people of Brunei). 
30 
Co-ordination 
28, Ibid., minute by Mr (later Sir) JC MoPetrie, 24 Jane 1950. 
29" Brunei Annual Report 19519 pp 45-6; CO 985/1-2 Brunei Government 
Gazette (1951-9); and 00 943/2 (Files 1 and 3). 
30. See pp 380 and 388 (above). 
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was attempted in polioe and shipping matters and there were joint health 
and eduoation projeots. Other ventures inoluded a geologioal survey of 
British Borneo$31 a oombined airline and a pooling of resouroes in 
arohaeology and fishing. A tendenoy to treat Brunei de faoto as a sixth 
division of Sarawak was resented and resisted by Brunei Malays. A 
proposal to integrate the Sarawak and Brunei Polioe Foroes, for example, 
had to be abandoned in 1949-50 for this reason. 
32 
Similarly, operations 
on a pan-Bornean basis were not permissible when attempted by a nascent 
Brunei nationalist party. 
33 
In 1946 (one CO clerk reoalled some years later) it had been 
"the definite (though not overtly declared) intention that the two newly- 
oreated oolonies of North Borneo and Sarawak and the State of Brunei, 
31. See above, pp 383 and 398-9. 
32. CO 1022/61 (item 19), memorandum by Mr Higham, 20 January 1953, 
paragraph 6. NB. In 1949 the Police Adviser to the Secretary of State 
for the Colonies, Hr WC Johnson, found grave shortcomings in the Brunei 
Police Force, including insufficient European gazetted officers# the 
urgent necessity for a proper police station to be built in Seria, 
inadequate training of the rank and file, unsuitable service conditions 
which attracted the wrong type of person into the foroe, poor living 
accommodation, and a shortage of uniforms. To complete the catalogue of 
deficiencies, Mr Johnson noted that there was "no clear definition as to 
the responsibility for the Brunei Police Force - whether it is a com- 
pletely independent unit under its own Chief Police Offioer, or whether 
the Commissioner of Police in Sarawak has an overall reeponsibility... I 
suggest that consideration should be given to the amalgamation of the 
Brunei and Sarawak. Foroes or, alternatively, their separate identities 
should be clearly established" (Co 537/4427, item It secret, WC Johnson 
to OAG Sarawak, 28 October 1949)" In August 1950 the Governor, Mr Abe11, 
replied that amalgamation was not a practical proposition for the time 
being for political reasons, but close co-operation between the two 
forces was planned (CO 537/6109, item 3, Abell to CO, No 41, saving, 18 
August 1950). Legislative provision had already been made in Brunei and 
Sarawak, indeed, to enable the Sarawak Constabulary and the Brunei Police 
to operate in certain circumstances on either side of the frontier (CO 
954/6 File 58922/1/1950). See above, pp 23,38,43,85-90,147-52, 
307,313,316,326-7,349-50- 
33. See below, p 494" 
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should in due course be brought under some form of unified administration. 
But it was considered that a public declaration to that effect at the 
time would have had a bad effect on public opinion in Sarawak and would 
have played into the bands of the anti-oessionists (see footnote 34), 
whose campaign was in full swing... Nevertheless, in order to pave the way 
for political union, a policy of close association (and, where suitable, 
combination) between the various departments of Government was embarked 
upon. But in January 1949 the two Governments complained that the pace 
was being forced beyond the capacity of the two administrations and`a 
modified policy of slower progress was agreed upon". 34 
The problem of bringing Brunei into the soheme of things remained 
"intraotable" (beoause of opposition from Malays in the Sultanate)* 
35 
The original oonoeption of the Colonial Offioe had been that, 
on the one hand, Malaya and Singapore would oome together and, on the 
other, the three Borneo territories, and that the two blocks might then 
be merged into "some sort of ooafederatioa". Indioatioae had emerged by 
1953 that a oloser union might have been more aooeptable if it was 
approaohed "on the basis of the territories all ooaing together at the 
same time rather than forming into Malayan and Bornean boos". lair Higham 
at the Colonial Office was not happy, to leave the matter in abeyanoe$ 
Singapore was marohing ahead of Malaya and there was a risk to British 
Borneo from a "potentially-aognisitive Indonesia". He could 580 
"little future for a self-governing oolong of British Borneo, Plus Brunei. 
The Federation and Singapore themselves area in all oonsoienoe, small 
enough in size and population when oompared with their neighbours.. -. i 
think that all possible means should be used to forward the idea of a 
British BE Asia dixoinion". 36 
34. CO 1022/61 (item 24) memorandum (n. d,, unsigned), "The policy as 
re granting self-government to the territories concerned", paragraph 8. 
NB. The anti-oessionists, led by Mr Anthony Brooke, nephew of the third 
Rajah, opposed the transfer ('cession') of Sarawak to the British Crown, 
which had taken place in 1946: See pp 455-6 (above. 
35" 00-1022 /61 (item 19), memorandum by Mr Higham (Head of the SE Asia 
Department), - 20 January 1953, paragraph 6. See also p 497 
(fn), below. 
36. Imo., (Higham memorandum), paragraphs 7-9. 
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Some efforts had already been made towards this goal. In 
Deoember 1951 advantage was taken of the formation in SE Asia of branches 
of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Assooiation to attempt to bring together 
politioians from all these territories and thus to foster the idea of a 
Political association of all 'British' SE Asia in a single group. In 
February 1953 the Commissioner-General (Jtt MaoDonald) and the Governor 
of Sarawak were hopeful of real progress. Their aim was to establish a 
council of British Borneo to meet periodioallr. In the first instanoe 
its purpose was to promote the oo-ordination of polioy and administration 
between the three territories. If and when the 'atmosphere' of the 
disonssi ons on the oonnoil made it p ossiblet the question of federation 
between the three territories might be oonsidered. 
37 
The first suoh oon- 
ferenoe was held in guohing in late April 1953. "A good beginning" 
oommented Mr Parkin at the Colonial Offioe. 
38 
A eeoond meeting ooavened 
at Jeseelton in September 1953 and thereafter gatherings were held twice 
a 9ear. 
39 
The first publio results did not become apparent until February 
1958 when the Governors of Sarawak and North Borneo broadoast simultaneous- 
17 their proposal for a federation of British Borneo. This plan met a 
lukewarm response and was eventually abandoned beoause of Brunei's jeal- 
01187 of its oil wealth and indigenous apprehensions of the Chinese. 
40 
37. CO 1022/63 (item 4)t Commissioner-General (as the offioe of Governor- 
General was renamed in 1948) to Governor of North Borneo, No 54 (saving), 
oontidential, 10 February 1953; repeated to CO, No 32 (saving), paragraph 
2, NB: Mr MacDonald was informing Jesselton and London of the outcome of 
disousaione which he had just held with Sir Anthony Abell. 
38. CO 1022/294 minute by Mr Paskin, 13 June 1953. 
39. Borneo Bulletin, 14 Maroh 1959 (quoting The Times). 
40. Mr (later Sir) JD Boles MBE, writing in about 1960, deolared that 
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Similarly, in 1963, negotiations for Brunei's inclusion in the proposed 
Federation of Malaysia also oollapsed. 
If Brunei rejeoted independenoe in federation with regional 
States, how far was it progressing towards independence in its own 
right? Despite the new administrative link with Sarawak in 1948, the 
Colonial Offioe thought it politio to send Mr E Pretty bank to Brunei for 
a eeoond term aft Resident. A oontemporary oomments that he (Mr Pretty) 
"oonstituted a bridge between the old and the new. He had first Dome 
as Resident to poor little Brunei in the 'twenties and had got to know 
its people, its problems and its attitudes at village level. Twenty 
years later he returned for a post-retirement oontraot as a respeoted 
administrator with thirty years' experienoe of the MCS behind him. But 
in addition he was now invested with the dignity of a patriaroh... leading 
his people into their promised land, flowing with oil and gas. Moses 
himself oould hardly have been more appropriate. Amongst Muslims, with 
whom long acquaintance makes a vital oontribution to trust, his previous 
association with Brunei was highly, significant". 41 
The return to Brunei of so senior an offioer as Mr Pretty is an index, 
indeed., of the rising importanoe of the oonntry. 
"Governors' conferences have been useful, but their organization and 
success stem more from a determined effort to ensure that they shall 
succeed rather than from any genuine growth of common bonds and common 
purposes". Agreement on common polioy was not often reached, but a 
greater understanding was achieved of the problems of other territories. 
Real co-operation was possible, he added, only where joint departments 
had been created (RHO, Mes Pao 8521 JD Boles, "Closer Association 
Between the British Borneo Territories", pp 4-5)" ` RN Turner, who 
had risen to the post of State Seoretary (North Borneo) by 1956, comments 
that Governors' Conferences were "designed primarily (1) to encourage 
oontaots/oo-operation... and (2) to ensure that the three territories did 
not charge off on divergent courses at a time when closer association 
was the aim". The "sharing of services", referred to on p 463 above, 
"usually sprang from discussion at these oonferenoes... (As) conferences 
went, they were quite useful in clearing the grounds triangular oorres- 
pondenoe would have got nowhere" (Datuk RN Turner SPIK CMG, letter to 
the author, 14 August 1983, paragraph 4)- 
41* Mr P Soanlon, letter to the author, 24 August 1983, paragraph 3. 
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After 1951 the type of Resident altered. 
42 
Before the war 
they had usually been junior offioers of the MCS until 1936, when the 
post had been upgraded. in 1946-51 the Residents had been chosen ad 
hominem, although they, too, had ROS baokgrounds. After 1951 Residents 
were likely to be muoh older than their pre-war oounterparts (average 
age on assumption of posts 45) and married; their baokgroand was servioe 
in Brooke Sarawak rather than Malaya; and their tenure of offioe in Bru- 
aei was likely to be the pianaole of their oareers or olose to it. The 
Sultanate, as the largest petroleum prodnoer in the British Commonwealth, 
had by then aohieved oonsiderable importanoe in its own right; oonsequently 
the poet of Resident became increasingly prestigious. The attributes 
required by a British Resident in Brunei, as enumerated by Sir Frederiok 
Weld in 1887 (see p 114, above), were equally necessary at the sunset of 
the Residential fra. Mr Gilbert's citation for the CMG in 1958 stated 
that there were few posts of this kind with greater or more oomplex 
problems "requiring taot, patienoe and firmness to the highest degree". 
Mr Gilbert had displayed all these qualities and his "wide experienoeg 
good judgement and fearless honesty" had provided the Sultan with "not 
only sound advioe but also a oompetent administration which, t ogetherv 
are reapoaßible for the progress we see in Brunei today ". 
43 
To the Assistant Resident in Kuala Belait was added a eeoond, 
stationed in the oapital, from 1949. one suoh offioer reoallss 
"Residents operated on a etratoepherio State ievei: dealing with multi- 
national oil oompanies and oontraotorsy international agreements, State 
42. Theme pursued from pp 111-18 and 298-300 (above). 
43. Borneo Bulletin, 19 July 1958. 
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legislation, development and finanoe. They were 'The Government'... But 
while they were busy being the oentral government, somebody else had to 
be the local government, viz., the two Assistant Residents... These 
gentlemen performed virtually any funotion that in the United Kingdom 
would be performed by a local authority plus a few extras either in 
the magisterial and oonoillation, field or merely as dogsbodies. 
About these areas of life the Residents, on the whole, simply 
did not want to know unless something went wrong. Then they showed a 
talent for homing in pretty swiftly, perhaps too swiftly for comfort". Q. Q. 
Unlike Residents in the 195099 who had baokgrounds in pre-war 
Brooke Sarawak, the Assistant Residents were regular oolonial administrative 
personnel. Although generally seoonded from Sarawak, whioh had beoome 
an offioial British oolony in 1946, many had not joined the oolonial 
service until after the Seooad World War. They were as likely to 
originate from a grammar school/red brick university, background as from 
the traditional publio sohool/Oxbridge training ground, and at least two 
were Australians who oame to Borneo originally as members of the British 
Military Administration in 1945-6. Some such offioers remained in the 
Sultan's servioe after the oanolusioa of the Residential Era in 1959. 
Finally, the last Assistant Resident stationed in the oilfield was a 
Malay, Pe ran Abu Bakar bin Pengiran Omar (d 1906). 
Both regular oolonial servioe personael and the former Rajah's 
servants tended to look down on the other. 
45 
Regulars sneered at their 
Brooke equivalents generally as paroohial, eooentrio and amateurish 
"ooantry squires" (who drank rather too muoh). The former Rajah's 
offioers, by oontraatg, had no doubt that Brooke methods of administration 
44" Mr P Soanlon, letter to the author, 24 August 1983, paragraph 4. 
Theme pursued from pp 113-4,116,155 and 302-4 (above)- 
45-1 Theme pursued from pp 61-39 65 and 73 (above). 
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were infinitely, superior to those praotised by aloof CO types 
46 Rajah's 
servants took pride in their own aooessibility to the governed, the 
self-relianoe of their oivil servioe and the oomparative independenoe of 
Brooke Sarawak 
47 
Suoh divergent attitudes oreated a degree of tension 
after the war when the two sets of administrators were obliged to work 
side by side in Sarawak and Brunei. Both groups tended, however, to 
subscribe to a oommong conservative, politioal outlook. 
Government beoame far more oomplioated in the 1950s. Before 
1941, when revenues were meagre, seven British offioere had sufficed to 
carry out the main administrative duties. In the immediate aftermath 
of war#° change was limited, but in the 1950s there was an influx of ex- 
patriates partioularly to run the new development programmes. The State 
Engineer, for example, was augmented by a State Eleotrical Engineer, two 
assistant engineers, an arohiteot, a chief road engineer (with ten 
oolleagues), an eartbmoving engineer, a projeot engineer and five 
workshop engineers. Similarly, the Chief Polioe Offioer foand himself 
assisted by expatriate commanders of Belait (1950) and Brunei (1951) 
districts, a Head of CID (1950), a Read of Special Branoh (1952), a 
46. Mr JO Gilbert CMG, who gave distinguished service in Brooks Sarawak 
and in Brunei after the war, comments that "the Colonial Office type" 
failed for two reasons. "Firatp they expected the people in their 
charge to meet them in the office and listen to complaints etc through 
an interpreter. They did not know anything about the customs of the 
people they were supposed to be governing. Secondly,, they failed miser- 
ably in following the teaching of the Rajah, which was that he expected 
every DO to take Government to the people and not to expect the people 
to have to come to the Government. (As a result of these two failings) 
the average headman and his followers often ignored him"(letter to the 
author, 16 February 1985, p 1). 
47. Mr AJN Richards, letter to the author, 8 March 1985, p 1. 
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separate Immigration Officer (1954), and an Officer Commanding Field 
Foroe Platoon (1954). In the oomrse of the 1950s Brunei also aoquired 
a Development Commissioner (ex offioi o Controller of Civil Aviation), a 
Deputy Legal Adviser, a Commissioner of Laboar, a Marine Offioer (with 
two assistants), an Anditorp a Direotor of Broadoasting and a separate 
Controller of Customs and Excise (see Appendix 3.9)" For senior Malays 
there were new posts, such as the State Custom, Religion and Welfare 
Office, created in 1954 so that the Pengiran Pemanoha might do something 
useful (see p 495, below), and a district officer for Series. Brunei also 
benefited from the wisdom of a stream of experts from the Colonial Office 
(e. g. P 464, fn 32, above). 
The Brunei judicial system was restructured in 1951. The for- 
mar Court of Appeal and the Court of the Resident Were-replaoed by the 
Supreme Court of British Borneo. The British Resident, but not the 
Assistant Resident, then ceased to exercise judicial funotions. 
48 Below 
the Supreme Court came the High Court, then the Courts of the Magistrate 
(first, second and third class) and the Court of the Kathie The Supreme 
Coarty which had a unified juriediotion over Brunei, Sarawak and North 
Borneo, comprised a "Chief Justice" and as many puisne judges as might 
from time to time be appointed. An uneven number of not less than three 
Supreme Court judges oonetituted the Court of Appeal. One Supreme Court 
judge oonstituted the High Court, whioh had unlimited juriadiotion in all 
48. Mr JO Gilbert CMG, letter to the authorp 4 February 1985, para. 9s 
"In nay time (1953-8) the BR was never involved in magisterial work". 
Theme pursued from pp 142-5 (above). See also Co 954/5 (File 58930/49) 
and Co 954/7 (Files 58930/1950 and 58930/1951)" 
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criminal and civil oases (except certain marriage suits). Legislation 
also proliferated after the wars 24 enaotments in 1953,13 in 1954 and 
21 in 1955 (of. 3 in 1906). 49 
Administration became far more expensive. 
50 The annual cost 
of the Sultan was eight times higher it 1955 (%300,933) than it had been 
in 1941, whereas the amount spent upon the British Resident's Office rose 
Fivefold (to 103,321) during the same period. Expenditure upon police 
and prisons increased from %81,030 in 1947 to %722,598 in 1953 and %2.2 
million by 1959 - and these sums did not inolude the Dost of buildings, 
which was borne by the Public Works Department. The number of policemen 
jumped from 185 is 1950 to 328 is 1959 and, from 1954, there was also a 
Field Force of Sarawak Ibaus stationed in the oountry. Yet, given the 
inorease in population and the greater opportunities because of wealth 
derived from oil, crime remained remarkably, rare. The most oommon 
offenoes, indeed, were breaohes of traffic, regulations. The number of 
people oommitted to prison was only 64 throughout 1947 and 84 in 1957, an 
annual peak of 179 having been reaohed in 1954 (gee Appendix 6, below). 
The many expatriates involved in all branohes of Government in 
Brunei in the 1950s indioates that the objeots of May 1947 (see pp 457- 
8v above) of aohieving proper standards of administration by seooadment 
from, and assooiation with neighbouring oolonies (as well as direot 
49, See above, pp 143-7 and 349-50- 
50. Colonial Office, An Eoonomio Survey of the Colonial Territories, _ 
Vol 5s The Far East (HMSO, Col No 281,1955): p 108. The annual cost 
Of civil administration rose from $112,336 in 1938 to $$603,446 in 1952" 
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recruitment of qualified expatriates) was suooessfult but would also 
suggest that real Bruueian involvement in decision making was negligible, 
particularly before 1950. Indeed, Dato Sir WJ Peel, referring to the 
years 1946-81 commented that the State Council was "not an executive 
body". 
51 
An additional constraint on Brunei involvement in real admin- 
istration was the attitude and dubious character of the then Sultan. 
The influence of Brunei monarchs had been limited in the past by two 
factors. First, during two prolonged royal minorities (1906-18 and 
1924-31) the wazirs acted as Regents. Secondly, Sultans had had 
oharaoter defects which reduced their personal standing. In 1950, how- 
ever, a rather more acceptable monarch emerged. 
Sir Ahmad Tajuddin - the "drunkard and... altogether unworthy"52 
Sultan - died at the age of 36 in mid-1950, to be replaoed by his younger 
brothers Pengiran Muda Omar Ali Saifuddin III. The late Sultan had wished 
to be suooeeded by his only legitimate daughter, Princess Ehsan 
(born 10 
October 1935), and there were reports that he had persuaded the wazirs 
to sign a document to this effect. 
53 
Sir Abmad was entitled to expect 
deference to his wishes beoause, in 1906, Mr MoArthur had assured the 
dying Sultan Hashim that HM Government would ensure the "due succession" 
to the throne "in the line" of his song Pe ran (later Sultan) Muhammad 
51. Dato Sir WJ Peel, letter to the author, 19 January 1985- 
529 CO 943/1 (File 20) Sir C Arden-Clarke, quoted by Mr JD Higham, 2 
June 1949. 
53. Dato Sir WJ Peel insists that "no suoh suooession document was ever 
Produced for me to see even by Sultan Ahmad Tajuddin himself and he never 
mentioned it when he stated that his daughter should be recognized as the 
heir" (letter to the author, 17 Maroh 1985, paragraph 2). 
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Jemalul Alam. 
54 
The latter was Sultan Ahmad'e father. Priaoess Ehsari, 
therefore, had a prior olaim to the throne over Pengiran Ruda Omar Ali 
in 1950 if females were inoluded in ihr MoArthur's pledge. The British 
authorities feared., however, that a Sultana Would not be aooeptable to 
Muslim opinion in Brunei and so the ectooession of the Pengiran Muda was 
endorsed byr EX Government. 
55 
In any oases Sultan Omar Ali was "in the 
line" of 9altan. Jamal, if not immediately 80.56 
Sir Ahmad Tajud. din had died in Singapore on 4 Tune 1950 whilst 
proceeding to the United. Kingdom to discuss a revision of the 1905-6 
UK-imnei Treaty and the oil royalties paid by Shell. 
57 His final years 
had been plagued by ill-health and conflict with the British. He spent 
mnoh time in Sarawak and apparently refused to attend the State Counoil. 
Although an irresponsible oharaoter, His Highness oomplained, with some 
justifioation, that he was not treated in a manner ooancnensnrate, with : his 
dignity or appropriate to the wealth of his Sultanate (ors he might have 
added, in aooordanoe with the assuranoes given to hie grandfather in the 
letter subsidiary to the 1905-6 Treaty). 
58 
Sir Ahmad was espeoially 
inoensed when he oompared his oironmetanoes with those of Malayan Smltans. 
His allowanoe (%39500 a month) was 14m; and he had to live in an old 
54. See above, p 67- 
55- CO 943/1 (File 12); (RHO) Kee Pao e77, AM Grier "Puneral of the Sul- 
tan of Brunei 1950"; and RHW Reeoe, The Name of Brooke (Kuala Lumpur 
1982), pp 35 and 279. 
56. Datuk RN Turner 8P] CMG oomments that "a sort of Salio Law prevailed 
in Brunei and eine the Pengiran Muda (Omar Ali 8aifuddin) was the next 
male heir to his brother, his elevation to the Sultanate in suooession 
to (Sir 1 mad) was fair enough" (letter to the author, 6 February 1985, 
paragraph 2). 
57. Straits Times, 5 June 1950- 
58* See above, p 108, and below, Appendix 1.1 (p 559) " 
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palaoe instead of in a properly-designed modern one like his Malayan 
oounterpaxts. If Sir Ahmad was treated with markedly less liberality 
by the British than his suoaessor, it is equally true that Sir Abmad 
would have presented a stronger case if he had behaved in a manner 
oommensnrate with his exalted rank. 
59 
Mr QTM MaoBryan (1902-51) - "a very strange man indeed", 
60 
the 
somewhat mentally-runstable, erstwhile seoretary to Rajah Vyner Brooke - 
claimed to have been appointed Politioal Adviser to Sultan Ahmad and 
guardian of his daughter. He was also entrusted with the Brunei regalia, 
the golden': }serpent. and cane and seal of State, without which there could 
be no enthronement. 
61 
Mr MaoBryan deolared the Pengiran Muda"e suooession 
illegal , and sent a telegram of protest to Kiug George VI. Mr Abell, the 
long-serving (1950-9) High Commießioaer, desoribed Mr MaoBryan'e inter- 
vention as "a oharaoteristio pieoe of irresponsibility and foolish 
interferenoe in Bornean affairs". 
62 
Whatever the rights and wrongs of this episode, the exolusion 
of Prinoess Ehsan aroused 1ittlep if any, publio protest in Brunei, 
59. CO 943/1 (File 20) and CO 943/8 (File 8). Dr ROW Reece (op. oit., 
p 270) states that Sir Ahmad was irked by the cession of Sarawak to the 
Crown in 1946. Sarawak was "not a kebun getah (rubber garden) to be 
sold off by the Rajah"9 the Sultan complained. "If the Rajah wants to 
give the country aw, y (discrepancy in original), w1 does he not give 
it back to me? ". Readers of this work will have little difficulty in 
providing the answer. 
60. Mr MH Woods, letter to the author, 16 March 1983. Dato Sir WJ Peel 
claims that "anything MaoBryan may have said would have been highly 
suspect" (letter to the authors, 17 March 1985, paragraph 4). 
61. CO 943/2 (File 12, item 2) Mr MaoBryaas, quoted in the Daily Ora. phio, 
8 June 1950; also in News Chroniole, 8 June 1950. 
62. Ibid., item 109 Mr (later Sir) AF Abell to CO, No 141 (telegram, 
confidential), 10 June 1950, paragraph 8. 
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although it appears to have oaused lasting bitterness within the royal 
family itself. 
63 
Apparently a pious Muslime the new monaroh was an 
improvement in some respeots upon his late brothers he esohewed aloohol, 
for example. 
64 
Born in 1914, he had had a limited education at Kuala 
Kangsar in Malaya (see above,, p 297) and took up a post in the Forestry 
Department after his return to Brunei. 'Daring the Kar the Japanese 
oooupying forces employed him on the ooustruotion of an airfield. After 
liberation he was promoted (in 1947) by the Resident, against the wishes 
of the jealous Sultan, to the vaoant post of Pengiran Bendaha a. 
65 
In 
this oapaoity he was "universally popular"66 and "far more respeoted and 
respeotable"67 than his brother, the then Sultan. It is noteworthy that 
Sir Omar owed his appointment, both as Pew Bendahara and as Sultan, 
to the British. Before his reign was completed, he would have a third 
oooasion to be thankful for the support of HN Government. 
63. Professor DE Brown, letter to the author, 5 April 1983, P 2. Lady 
R Peel observed that Princess Ehean, "rather spoilt" because she was 
always being pushed forward by her father, could "play ohequers and 
skip and dance and everything at homes but she's sly with us" 
(Lacy R 
Peel, letters homes 1946-8; typescript courtesy of Lady R Peel). 
64. Some contemporary verdicts were less favoarables "a difficult little 
man, though not Without a wry sense of humour" (historian); "hardly 
ednoated at all,... alweys on the defensive... (bnt) had a sort of peasant 
canning" (expatriate British civil servant); possessed of a "neurotic 
obsession" that everyone with whom he came into contact was "solely 
concerned to get money out of him" (another expatriate). 
65. It was felt, indeed, that the public would not have objected if he 
had been appointed Sultan. But Yr (now Sir) WJ Peel declined to adopt 
the role of kingmaker. At the time Mrs (now Lady) R Peel suggested that, 
but for the British presenoev enmity between the Brunei royal brothers 
and their followers might have erupted into violence (Lady R Peel, 
letters home, 1946-8). 
66. CO 943/1 (File 5, item 30), report by Mr LHM Davis, 9 March 1948, 
Paragraph 1. -- 
67. Lady R Peel, typescript of letters home, 1946-8. 
477 
With regard to the seoond of Hil Government's original longer- 
term objectives, the fostering of a greater eenee of common citizenship 
(cf. p 463, above), the major problem was the separateness of the growing 
Brunei Chinese population who were reluctant to renounce their links with 
their homeland and who were regarded as more progressive than indigenois 
Borneans. As early as 1946 the Governor-General had deteoted "indioati ons 
that young Xalays are beginning to be apprehensive of a polioy in Brunei 
which would result in Chinese influence increasing at the expense at 
themselves", 
68 
This may have contributed to the formation of a youth 
organization, the Bariean Pemuda (Barip) in 1946.69 
For some time after the war the 3(FC was short of labour, esp- 
eoiallr skilled workmen. Possible sources were China or Java; but China, 
in the throes or revolution, was suspeot for politioal reasons whilst 
Indonesia refused to permit Javanese to work in a colonial territory. 
In 1949 it was decided that immigration of Chinese people into British- 
oontrolled SE Asia needed to be etemmeds "present conditions make it 
neoesaary that the politioal and eeonrity aepeote should be the ohief 
consideration in determining the immigration polioy of eaoh territor7". 
70 
There was oonoern that the politioal situation and the high cost of 
passages was eaoonraging a teadenay among immigrants to remain in the 
Nan . The rate of natural inorease among Overseas Chinese, moreover, 
68.00 537/1613 (item 227) Kr M KeoDonald to CO, No 94 (telegram), 18 
July 1946, paragraph 4. 
69. See below, pp 493-4. 
70. CO 954/4 (File 58911/1949, item 2), appendix (oonferenoe disoussion 
paper) to the minutes of the ninth Commissioner-General's meeting held 
at Singapore, 22 & 23 January 1949, paragraph 2" 
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was greater than that of indigenous people; henoe even immigration oon- 
trol would fail to stem a rising proportion of Chinese in the total 
population. This further oomplioatedd, political development and added 
to seourity problems. The promotion of self-government required that 
"the -inhabitants should develop a common loyalty and learn to regard 
the country as their 'true homeland and object of their loyalty'. 
Experience shows how difficult it is for the Chinese to develop this 
sense of loyalty, they tend rather to remain aliens looking to China as 
their homeland and often for gaidancel, and reproducing its political 
faoti ons". 71 
The political and seourity problems oatweighed the advantages of any 
stimulus the Chinese might give to development. The Brunei Government 
decided to restrict immigration to skilled workers recruited from Malaya 
and Singapore, rather than direotly from China or Hong Kong. In 1950, 
however, the shortage of both skilled and unskilled workmen oontinued 
beoause attempts to Malayanise the workf oroe had failed and it was 
impossible to reoruit suffioient numbers from Singapore. 
In Brunei immigration oontrols were tightened and identity 
oards were issued from 1949" A Criminal Investigation Department 
(including Special Branoh) was created in 1950. The oontinued develop- 
ment of the oilfield and the inauguration of the five year plan in 1953 
neoessitated oloser attention to seourity problems. The large sums of 
money spent resulted not only in an inorease in the number of workers 
direotly employed on development, but attraoted to the State wage-seekers 
of all desoriptions. As a result there was a floating heterogenous 
population of about five thousand in the oilfield. Although outward 
71. Ibid., paragraph 14" 
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signs of restlessness were few in the early, 1950sß a olose watoh was 
kept on any tendency towards a change in this state of affairs. 
72 
On the other handv the Chinese were denied oitizenship rights 
in Brunei and were not allowed to own land without the oonsent of the 
moaaroh. In enoh oiroumstanoes it is not easy to appreoiate how they 
oculd have been expeoted to offer their first loyalty to the Su]. tanate. 
73 
Strains did exist beneath the sarfaoe. Finally, a strong Malay national- 
ism'-- 'Brunei for the Bruneie' A developed after the war and was supported, 
72, Xonthly political intelligence reports were prepared and submitted 
to ID[ Government (CO 537= Files 1644,3764,4864,4865,6085 and 7340)- 
73* The British appear to have done nothing to secure Brunei citizenship 
for the Chinese inhabitants of the country. On the contrary, racial 
discrimination was practised. The Immigration Enactment of 1958 denied 
Brunei-born Chinese classification as citizens of the State. If they 
had lived in Brunei for seven years or more between 1948 and 1958 they 
had to apply for residence permits. If they had lived in Brunei for 
lese than seven years during that period they were required to obtain 
visitors' passes to remain in the country. The Sultan-in-Council 
refused a petition from the Brunei Chinese requesting citizenship for 
their kindred born in the Sultanate. The Resident, Mr DC White, 
explained that the law was designed to safeguard the country from the 
entry of undesirable aliens and to facilitate the departure from, and 
re-entry intor the State of bona fide residents. It did not provide for 
the nationality of an individual; this was effected by a nationality or 
citizenship law. Brunei had no existing citizenship legislation, however, 
and the position of persons born in the State who were not included in 
the definition of Bruneis in the Immigration Enactment had been uncertain. 
If the petition had been granted all the locally-born Chinese would have 
had to apply for a re-entry permit on every occasion they wished to leave 
the State. A residence permit gave legal authority for non-indigenous 
residents to live in the State without the necessity to obtain a re- 
entryº permit (Borneo Bulletin, 30 August 1958). 
To this day most Brunei Chinese remain stateless; but the Rev 
DR Rawlins suggests (letter to the author, 10 October 1983, paragraph 4) 
that a visitor to the country would be completely unaware of citizen/non- 
citizen status. The Brunei Chinese enjoy excellent educational and 
economic possibilities; they came to Brunei "not to be citizens but to 
improve their lot" and, in any oases "citizenship provides nothing much 
if one is... 'permitted to reside' and do business, or work, without it". 
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apparently by Sir Anthony AbellT4 in oontravention of the intended 
policy of HM Government. 
The BMPC employed a large proportion of the wage-earning 
population. Management posts were held mainly by expatriate Asians and 
Europeans. Artisans were mainly Chinese, many of whom belonged to the 
Chinese Mechanical Engineering Association. This union, whioh had its 
head offioe in Canton (in 1946), was not recognized by the BMPC. South 
Indians oonstituted. many of the drilling gangs and did most of the 
stevedoring at Kuala Belait. Indigenous people tended at first to 
Darr out the more menial tasks, but Dame to oooapy most of the skilled 
manual labour jobs as the 1950s progressed. 
Relations between BMPC management and labour appear to have 
been reasonably good. The 1946 strike, 
75 
caused by the special circucn- 
stanoes obtaining at the time, was oonfined to the Chinese seotion of 
the work-force. The oooasiou was the worsening of the supplies situation 
and an increase in the Dost of living which pay rises. failed to offset. 
The Malays ohose to supplement their rations with, oheap saQOv but the 
Chinese demanded higher wages. The main oause of the dispute, aooording 
to the mediator (Mr Wolters), was psyohologioals the over-weening olass 
oonsoioasuess of Chinese artisans, resentful of any oonfusion of their 
74. Sir Anthony Abell was reported to have said that Brunei was entitled 
to adopt an anti-Chinese policy. The people there felt that the problems 
of Malaya had arisen from unrestricted Chinese immigration in the past 
and as Brunei was a small and vulnerable territory, they did not want to 
be swamped (Borneo Balloting 6 September 1958). Such a statement hardly 
encouraged "a growing participation in the government by people of all 
communities" (see p 4559 above). 
75" Theme pursed from p 364 (above). 
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status with that of Malay ooolies, had been damaged. They were also 
"profoundly ignorant" of the current world situations all they could 
remember were the better times before the war. Brunei Chinese were much 
better off than their cousins in Singapore; but they did not realize 
this. Although money was no object to the BKPCp the General Manager was 
unwilling to do anything which would justify the use of the strike weapon 
in the eyes of his labour force. Following the mediation of Mr Wolters, 
the artisans accepted revised allowances plus special 'rehabilitation' 
allowances which the company had promised but not paid. Improved salary 
scales were introduced, as well as better promotion prospects, a disputes 
procedure and a works committee designed to forestall future conflict, 
76 
The BNPC had an industrial relations department headed in 1949 
by a Mr RK Harcourt. The Malayan Government's Trade Union Adviser, Mr 
JA Brazier, visited the oilfield in April of that year and reported77 
that there appeared to be "no overall labour relations or welfare polioy, 
neither did anyone ... have a olear idea of what was meant 
by the term 
*industrial relations"'. The oilfield labour organization oomprised an 
Industrial Relations Officer (IRO), an Assistant IRO, and four labour 
supervisors. The functions of the labour supervisors were mainlj oon- 
oerned with the engagement, supervision and control of labour and they 
served as channels for complaints coming from the workers to the IRO. 
Periodic meetings were held between the labour advisers and the IRO and 
76.954/1 (File 58901/1946-7t item 5)9 Wolters' report, October 1946. 
77. Co 954/1 (File 56901/1/1949, item 1), report by IRr JA Brasier, 10 
June 1949" 
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the latter in turn held periodio welfare meetings with seleoted members 
of the laboar foroe. Chinese artisans, who were represented on welfare 
oommitteea, but not as trade unionists as suohv oomplained of nou- 
reoogaition of their union and a "laok of understanding" of their 
partioular problems by the management beoause there were no Chinese- 
speaking Europeans in Brunei. In Mr Brazier's view, the existing welfare 
ooanoils were "window dressing" and "no alternative to proper agreed 
negotiating aiaohinery between the trade union and the management". Mr 
Barltrop at the Colonial Offioe shared the view that "the union should 
be reoognized by the oompany for negotiating purposess they will 
oertainly have to do so one day and better now than later". 
78 
But by 
Jn1y 1951 no progress bad been made. 
79 
Apart from a laok of olass-consoiousnees among indigenoms workers 
(as opposed to Chinese artisans), obstacles to labour combinations included 
the high turnover of personnel and the large number of different raoial 
groups employed by the oil company* In such circumstances unity was 
very diffioult to aohieve. Many immigrants came to work only for a 
speoifio period after whioh they were immediately, repatriated. Deport- 
ation was a weapon used to deal with 'troublemakers" 980 Hence strikes 
were rare. At the beginning of 1957 358 Hong Kong artisans struck 
beoause one of their number had died following a brawl with Brunei Malays 
78, Ibid., minute by Mr Barltrop, 20 Deoember 1949" 
79" CO 954/8 (Pile 58950/1/1951, item 1) report by Mr TK Cowan, 26 July 
1951. Nr Baritrop agreed but saw "no reason to hasten the formation of 
trade unions" in Brunei (minute, 24 August 1951)- 
80o In 1949, for example, 64 Ibans were repatriated. 
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in Seria bazaar. Half the strikers were repatriated for refusing to 
comply with an ultimatum from the company to return to work. Apart 
from this instanoe, Brunei was free from labour disturbanoes daring the 
years 1957-9. 
At the end of 1947 the Governments of British Borneo appointed 
a joint labour adviser. In Brunei this officer performed the duties of 
Controller of Labour and gave 'close attention to all labour questions 
which are assuming an inoreasing importanoe with the expansion of the 
oil oompauy's aotivities at Seria". 
81 
By 1949 it had beoome essential 
that a labour adviser should be stationed permanently in the oilfield; 
82 
but it was not until 1954 that such an officer ooald be found. There- 
after most labour differences were settled by reference to him. 
In 1949 the Labour Code was revised. Later the Workmen's 
Compensation Enaotment required finanoial amends for injuries to workmen 
during the oourae of their employment. A further law, passed in 19579 
increased the amount of compensation payable. An up-to-date labour 
enaotment in 1954 wall passed to give workers proteotion 
"in suoh matters as hours of work, health conditions, the age of 
admission to employment, medical treatment, provision of written oon- 
traots of employment, notice pay and conditions of extra-territorial 
recruitment", 83 
At the end of the war there was no legislative provision for sickness or 
Old age "though provision on a satisfaotory scale is in faot made for 
81, Brunei Annual Report 1947, p 9; and co 954/1 (Vile 58901/1946-7). 
82. Co 954/1 (File 58901/1/1949) Brazier report. (The urgenoy for such 
an appointment was repeated by the British Resident, Mr Baroroft, in 
1951). 
83. CO 824/5 Brunei Annual Report 1957, pp 14-15. 
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the former by large employers". 
84 
A national pensions soheme was intro- 
dnoed under the first five rear plan (see above, pp 443. -4). 
85 
With regard to the third of EM Government's original strategic 
objeotives., preparation for self-government (see above, p 463), Branei 
aotually began to regress relativelj rather than to advanoe beoause of 
the influx of expatriates, partionlarly from 1953" As mentioned before, 
the gap between the standard of personnel required to run the new aervioes 
and the quality of the products of the indigenous eduoation system 
tended to widen. The first essential, therefore, remained the expansion 
of educational facilities. Meanwhile, selected officers were sent 
84. Brunei Annual Report 19471, p 9. 
85. At the beginning of 1957 the British Malayan Petroleum Company (BMPC) 
was re-named the Brunei Shell Petroleum Company (BSPC). The BNPC of 1956 
and BSPC of 1957 were virtually the same oompany, with the same share- 
holders (Royal Datoh-Shell), the same oil mining leases, the same company 
offioes, the same General Manager (Dato RE Hales CBE), and the same 
staff and employees. 
The name-change arose because of the Brunei Companies Ehaotment 
of 1956, which required companies operating in Brunei to be registered 
locally. (The EMPC was registered in London). Mr Bevington comments: 
"I think the first move came from The Hague (Shell HQ) or Whitehall, as 
empires faded and the need was realised to acquire a 'local' image". 
Apparently there were "numerous other examples" from the African 
territories and the Far East" (letter to the author, 3 October 1983, 
paragraph 2). 
Subsequent Development of the BSPC. The Brunei Government 
acquired 25%, equity in the BSPC in 1973,50% in 1975. In 1972 an 
associated company, Brunei Liquefied Natural Gasp was established in 
order to ship gas, in liquefied form, to Japan. The Brunei Government's 
initial 10% stake in this company was increased to one-third in 1977" 
F'inallyg from 1978, Brunei also acquired 50% of Brunei Shell Marketing, 
which undertakes the distribution of petroleum products within Brunei. 
(T Ong Teok Bang, "Modern Brunets Some Important Issues" in Southeast 
Asian Affairs 1984, Singapore 1984, p 78). Phenomenal wealth was 
derived from exports of LNG: 425m Brunei dollars in 1975, and B%685m in 
1976. This compares with ordinary natural gas exports of B#lm in 1970. 
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abroad for training. As late as 1959, however, Brunei oould still not 
boast a single university graduate of its own. It is equally true that, 
in private at least, British offioers who served in Brauei during the 
1950s will deride the abilities of-oontemporary Malay department heads 
(see belowt Appendix 3.9). 
86 
A feature of the 1950s was the rising importanoe of the Sultan 
and State Counoil. Theoretically, 
"the supreme authority in the State is vested in the Sultan-in-Counoil. 
The State Council oonsists of eleven members inoluding the British 
Resident, with the Sultan as president. The assent of the Council is 
neoessary for the enactment of legislation and important questions of 
policy are referred to it. 
The general funotions of administration are carried out by a 
British Resident under the supervision of the Governor of Sarawak as 
High Commissioner". 87 
By June 1957 the position had ohanged sinoe the time of Mr Feel (see 
above, p 473) because Mr Gilbert declared that the State Council 
"oombines the funotions of both a legislative and an exeoutive ooanoil". 
88 
In private oorrespondenoe Mr Gilbert explained that the State Counoil 
remained predominantly a legislature but beoame a "sort of Executive 
Council" also, beoause the Sultan demanded that certain matters on whioh 
Sultan and Resident oouid not agree (in 1957-8) were referred to it for 
deoision. The Resident might have used his power of requiring aooeptanoe 
of advice; but U1 Government were anxious to avoid a direct confrontation 
with the Sultan in 1957-8 beoause they were trying to push through a new 
86. Similarly, a pre-war British offioer, when requested to name and 
comment upon the outstanding Malays of his day, oommented-tersely: 
"there were no outstanding Brunei Malays". 
879 Brunei Annual Report 1954, p 179. 
88. Borneo Bulletin, 8 June 1957. Theme pursued from pp 135-7 (above). 
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oonstitution. 
89 
I 
Coupled with the emergeaoe of a more aooeptable Sultan in 1950, 
another faotor making for oonstitutional ohange is praotioe was the 
growth of business placed before the State Counoil for deoision. Hence 
ooanoil meetings beoame lese infrequent. It has been suggested that 
if epeoifio legislation or some similar aotion was required by the 
State Counoil, "then the Sultan could block it absolutely" if he so 
wished; but if it was an administrative matter, where the Sultan could. 
not reverse deoisione, the British Resident was more likely to achieve 
his ends. 
go In other words 
"The British Resident held the range of administration in his hands, 
and really did everything - and had all the power in giving detailed 
instruotions to staff, The Sultan really oould not, and oertainly did 
not, give instruotions even to Malay Heads of Department. Everything 
went through the British Resident. (But) if the Sultan opposed something 
(more innovative, His Highness) usually had his own way". 91 
On perhaps two oooasions in the 1950sß indeed, a change of Resident 
ooonrred at the Sultane whim. 
92 
89. Mr JO Gilbert, letter to the author, 4 February 1985, paragraph 11- 
90* Typesoript of a tape recording prepared for the author by courtesy 
of Nr ER Bevington 0MG CEng, p 39. After the enlargement of the State 
Council (see below), members of the powerful Brunei Malay Teachers' 
Assooiation, such as Pen ran Thsof and Chegu Ali, were appointed to the 
Council. These people "always had a meeting at the palace with the Sultan 
the night before the official meeting", Mr Gilbert comments, "and anything 
the Sultan did not like, was strongly opposed by these members (on the 
next day). Previously it was generally comparatively easy to get the 
Sultan and his ministers to agree to any reasonable proposal, but it was 
much more difficult to persuade chaps like Chega Ali and Pan ran Yusof. 
I am not trying to may it was a bad thing, it wasn't, but it slowed 
everything down considerably" (letter to the author, 12 November 1983, 
paragraph 4). 
91. Mr Bevington, loo. oit^ 
92. Mrs P Gilbert, letter to the author, 22 February 1984, paragraph 4. 
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The State Counoil also spawned several sub-oommittees. In 
1955, for example, the Government appointed an Education Advisory 
Committee, which had forwarded over forty resolutions to the State 
Council, the majority of which had been implemented, by mid-1958. Mr 
Gilbert, Resident 1953-89 recalls that he conducted business through the 
intermediary of the Sultan's respeoted seoretary, Pehin Dato Ibrahim, so 
that possible points of differenoev partioularly concerning proposed 
ooastitutioaal ohanges and the proposed federation of British Borneo, 
ooald be resolved before reaohiug a direot oonfrontation between Sultan 
and Resident. For political reasons, it was no longer possible, or 
desirable, for the British to insist upon the aooeptanoe of advioe93 
A third-trend in post-war Brunei - apart from the expansion 
of the bureauoraoy (see above, pp 470-1) and the growing influence of 
the Sultan and the State Counoil - was greater departmental oo-ordination. 
Unlike pre-war times, when 'cabinet' meetings were virtually unknown 
"meetings of all heads of department (after 1946), presided over by the 
British Resident, took place from time to time, e. g. to discuss the 
annual financial estimates prepared by each departments or the construct- 
ion of new Government offices to find out how much space each department 
required, or to discuss what to do about the visit of the Secretary of 
State for the Colonies (1955), housing, traffic and general administrative 
matters of that kind affecting all departments". 94 
Former British oivil servants in Brunei are unable to agree 
about the nature of the powers of departmental heads. 
95 
Mr Gilbert 
93. Of. above, pp 473 and 485-6. In addition, Malays were supposed to 
be preparing for self-government. 
94" Mr BE Smythies, letter to the author, 8 February 1985, paragraph 4. 
95" Theme pursued from pp 304-5 (above). 
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states that the latter were "merely advisers and had no executive powers". 
96 
Mr BE Suythies, by contrast, insists that as State Forest Offioer from 
1952 to the end of the Residential Era (and beyond), he 
"was an executive officer, responsible for the day to day running of the 
Forest Department, subject to the Forest Law and to the annual financial 
estimates approved by the Government. 
... 
(The) State Forest Officer was given a free hand under the 
Forest Eaaotment but important matters, such as the recruitment of 
expatriate staff, had to be approved by the State Government, e. g. the 
recruitment of a Forest Botanist on contract from the US". 97 
The solution is that, as far as routine administrative duties were 
oonoerned, departmental heads possessed exeoutive authority, whereas 
in more important matters, involving extraordinary expenditure or a 
change in established policy, they aoted only in an advisory capacity. 
Mr Gilbert oommentss 
"(Mr Smythies) was a very fine Forest Offioer and it would be un- 
likely that the BR would ignore his requests. But, of oourset the BRA 
especially if indigenous customs or rights (were involved), might well 
think it advisable to discuss the matter with the Sultan before approving 
such a request. The Forest Department was administered exactly the same 
way as any other department and was certainly not an exception". 98 
A fourth major theme of the poet-war era was the influenoe of 
the BMPC/BSPC, whioh oontinued to bulk large. 
99 The General Manager of 
the öompany was granted a seat on the State Counoil not later than 1951.100 
Restoring and expanding the servioes provided before 1941, the ooraparlp 
96. Mr JO Gilbert, letter to the author, 4 February 1985, paragraph 10. 
97. Mr BE Sinythies, letter to the author, 8 February 19851, paragraphs 5 
and 3. 
98. Letter to the author, 22 April 1985, paragraph 3. 
99. Theme continued from pp 309-11 (above). 
100. (PRO) Colonial Offioe List 1952. 
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supplied its workers with rent-free housing, 
101 
free land for their 
gardens, medioal Dares free transport to and from works, four sooial 
clubs and a free cinema. Gas, electricity and water were transmitted to 
the publio via the BMPC. 'The oompany established a number of first-aid 
points and operated an ambulanoe service. The BMPC employed its own 
polioe. These anted primarily as watobmen, but traffic offenders on 
their roads were hauled before a Shell tribunal. This was oonsid. ered 
totally out of orders henoe the roads were transferred to the Government 
and only oertain stretobes were retained for Shellts own use. 
Despite what seems ezoessive influenoe exeroised by the oil 
oompanyp Government officials did not entertain this view. The Resident 
and the General Manager of the BMPC seem to have oo-operated closely. 
One post-war Resident recalls that the oil oompany's staff 
"were not unoo-operative but were inolined to press their requirements 
on one. Though the General Manager was a friend, I remember feeling 
somewhat outweighted sitting in his offioe at Kuala Belait to faoe him 
and his divisional heads while I had virtually no one to bat on my side. 
But I would not want to suggest they got away with it". 102 
Another former Resident considered that the BMPC was in nobody'a way in 
Belait distriot, and, sine the oompany provided servioes whioh the 
Government could not (or would not), he was quite content to let them 
bear the oharge. Tat another informant oommented that "Shell did not 
exert undue influence, but of course they could not be ignored because 
101. After the end of the Japanese oooupation the BMPC undertook a 
oraeh programme to provide temporary housing for its employees; sub- 
sequently the entire workforoe was re-housed in permanent buildings. 
102. Mr LEN Davis CI40, letter to the author, 28 February 1983, Part 
I9 paragraph 10. 
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of their size and resoaroes". A former General Manager of the BSPCj, for 
his party assures the present writer that there was never - to quote his 
Amerioaaism - "an- adversary situation" between Shell and the Government 
and oautions that "a thesis whioh reoords a struggle between the colonial- 
fists and big business against the exploited natives will not be in line 
with the facts in Brunei"0103 Dato Linton did not sit on the State 
Council, but he states thaty as a member of the post-1959 Executive - 
Council (a successor to the State Coanoil), he confined himself 
"to business and administrative matters on which,, in some oasesf it might 
be that I had more experience than some of the other Members. In all 
oases, of course, Members' views were merely advisory to His Highness. 
As for membership itself, I... woald have preferred... to remain outside 
such political oiroles. but... the State of Brunei was entitled to call 
upon the services of any resident within the State. That being sog in 
no way could an invitation to serve His Highness be deolined". 104 
Dato Linton adds that in general terms "Shell's polioy the world over is 
to keep oat of politics; we expect to be able to work with any Government 
only finding ourselves very rarely Yoroed to withdraw from a country when 
oonditions bsoome impossible as we did from Indonesia in the I sixties". 
105 
The Brunei 8he11 ooinpany would have found it "unthinkable" to interfere 
with ooaetitutional arrangements. 
6_ Towards a Constitutions I (1953-7! 6) 
The aim of British policy after the Seoond World War was to 
103. Dato PM Linton (General Manager BSPC 1959-63), letter to the 
author, 27 March 1984, paragraph 11. 
104. Ibid., paragraph 3. 
105. Dato PM Lintonp letter to the author, 14 November 1983, paragraph 4. 
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transfer to the people of Brunei the administration of their oountry 
"as soon as praotioable". HM Government oould not oountenanoe the idea 
that any form of Government which denied minority rights would ever 
develop in and dominate any territory of the Commonwealth. 
106 
Progress 
in Brunei was slows reform failed to keep paoe, indeed, with developments 
in neighbouring Sarawak and North Borneo. In short, major advances in 
oertain fields, suoh as welfare provision, were matohed by a stubborn 
oonservatism, at least among the pengiran olass, in matters of politios 
and social status. 
After the preparatory etepaioutlined in 1950 by Mr Grattan- 
Bellew had been implemented (see above, pp 461-3), the Sultan proolaimed 
his wish, early in 1953, that a oonstitution be set up within his 
State. 
107 
An advisory committee of seven eminent Malays deoided that 
the first step should be the formation of Distriot Advisory Councils, 
eleoted by the people of the four diatriote, and each distriot would 
eventually have proportionate representation in the State Caanoil. On 
11 September 1954 the first Distriot Advisory Coanoil was formed, all 
members in the first place being nominated by the monaroh. Eaoh Distriot 
Advisory Counoil was empowered to appoint observers to the State Counoil. 
(They, beoame full members in 1957). The preponderance of Government 
offioers recommended for membership of the advisory oounoils was noted. 
It was appreoiated that they represented a very large body of eduoated 
106. CO 604/30 Sarawak Gazette, 7 June 1950. (Sir AF Abell was 
actually referring to Sarawak but his words were equally applioable to 
Brunei). 
107. Brunei Annual Report 1953, p 2. 
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opinion and for that reason the Sultan was prepared to allow a number of 
them to serve, on the understanding that it was a temporary measure and 
that, where there was any conflict of interest, their clear duty was to 
support the polioy of the Government. 
108 
Chairmen were eleoted for one 
year. The Resident reported that this was the first time that rural 
dwellers had been able to air their oomplaints and views openly and they 
were "not baokward in doing so".. This "kept Heads of Department on their 
toes as their oomplaiuts... are generally direoted towards. . improvements 
of water supplies, oommiiuioationa and other sooial aervioes". 
109 
The 
experiment proved suooessful and it was hoped that the distriot oounoils 
would eventually provide for the establishment of local government in 
Brunei. The intention was to form urban and distriot ooanoils having 
their own budgets and employing their own officials, thereby giving them 
more executive control over local affairs. A special commission of 
eaquir, v disooveredg howeverp that the people rejeoted these proposals, 
for fear that the new councils would result in increased taxation, that 
many of those holding minor posts in the Government and those exeroising 
some oustomary power would find themselves divested of what influenoe 
they retained and, finally, "a laok of understanding of the true funotion 
and meaning of the proposals whioh was due in part to the laok of staff 
to undertake oontinuously the duties oonneoted with the initiation and 
development of 1 ooal government". 
110 
Bat, aoo ording to an other point 
of view, the oounoils had been rejeoted because they were "another 
108. CO 985/1 Brunei Government Gazette, 31 August 1954. 
109, Brunei Annual Report 1955, p 3. 
110. Brunei Annual Report 19569 pp ix-x. 
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symptom of oolonialism" and not truly representative of the people be- 
cause nominated members could not speak freely. The new voice belonged 
to the PRB, the Partai Rskyat Brunei (Brunei People's Party). 
7. The Partai Rakyat Bruneit "Independence is a Fundamental Right". 
The PRB was the first (and remains the only politioal party 
to have won popular support in Brunei. Before the Japanese oocupation 
there had been a few friendly sooieties, but these had made little or no 
political impaot. 
ill 
After the war signs of a 'Brunei for the Bruneis' 
movement were evident. 
112 
Under the British Military Administration 
"there was a desire among the few eduoated Brunei Malays to set up a 
(politioal) party, to bring Brunei to independenoe, as the wave of 
nationalism was burning everywhere in the Malay Arohipelago. But in 
111. Matassim bin Haji Jibah, Political Development in Brunei with 
Reference to the Reign of Sultan Omarali Saifuddin III-(. 1 950-67), MA 
Thesis, Hull, 1983, mentions (pp 25-6) that before the Japanese occupation 
two branches of Sahabat Pena (Penpal Friendship) were set up in Brunei, 
one in 1936 and the second in the following year. The main objective 
was social contact through correspondence. Some of the Brunei Sam 
members sent articles to Malayan newspapers. Following the Japanese 
invasion in 1941 the society ceased to exist. Awang Matassim also refers 
to a second grouping, the Kesatuan Helaiu Brunei (Brunei Malay Union), 
formed in the 1930s. Its formation was "to some extent stimulated by 
Singapore' ä Ketatuaii-, Meiayca (in the 1920s) and, at a later stage, by 
Inohe Ibrahim Yaaoob's Kesatuan Melayu Muda. The RMB, however, had no 
political relations with the other two. Pengiran Muda (later Sultan) 
Omar Ali Saifuddin (see above, pp 473-6) was President of the KMB at one 
time. It was officially de-registered in 1957. (Details quoted by 
courtesy of Awang Matassim, letter to the author, 28 August 1984, Para 2). 
, 
Brunei patriots sent a representative to the second congress 
of Malay Associations held in Singapore in December 1940. The five 
resolutions carried at the meeting all pointed to the "essentially 
conservative nature of the assembly, to its strong western-educated 
elitist bias, and to the absence of anything approaching political 
radicalism" (WR Roff, The Origins of Malay Nationalism - New Haven, Conn., 
1967, pp 245-6). 
112. CO 943/1 (File 2f item 1), AW Frisby report 1946, paragraph 10. 
494 
Brunei we ooaldn't (form one) because the State was under military rule. 
So we tried other means. We set up Barip (see p 477, above) with the 
aim of social and economic advanoement of the Malay community. In faot 
Barip's main objective was in politics (to get independence)". 113 
The British looked with "some mistrust" upon this "tiresome" youth 
association during its brief existence. 
114 It faltered quickly because 
many members were civil servants who were not permitted to be active in 
political organizations. Subscription fees were insufficient to finance 
its aativities. 
115 
There were rumours, also, that the assooiation's 
president, later a prominent member of the PRB, had mis-appropriated 
funds. The society, which olaimed a membership of thousands, became 
dormant before the end of 1947.116 During the public, meetings held by 
Mr Davis in 1948 to explain the reasons behind the transfer of the High 
Commissionership, these people posed the most pertinent questions. 
Generally, they preferred to develop oloser links with their fellows in 
Malaya rather than with neighbouring Borusans. 
Sheikh Aboad Azahari (b 1928), who later foutnded and led the 
Partai Ra1c at, first rose to prominence in late 1952 when he attempted 
to form a film production oompanyq which was banned by the Government 
because it was perceived as a "swindle", a cover for a secret society, 
and a means whereby Sheikh Azahari might "oolleot funds either for 
himself or for politioal purposes". 
117 
After organizing an entirely 
113. One of the founders of the Bariran Pemuda (Bari ), quoted by 
Matassim, op. oit., p 26. 
114. Lady R Peel,, letters home, 1946-8 (typesoript oourtesy of Lady R 
Peel). Barip was a "virus" which needed to be eliminated. 
115. Matassim, op. oit., p 27. 
116. Lady 8 Peel (loo`oit. ) 
117. CO 1022/396 (item 8), Sir AP Abell to CO, No 32 (saving), seoret, 
10 Maroh 1953, paragraph 3. 
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peaceful protest demonstration, Sheikh Azahari was arrested and put on 
trial (along with some of his fellow "ring-leaders") for taking part in 
an "illegal assembly". The "savage senteaoe of one year's imprisonment 
Imposed upon bim by "the learned magistrate" (Mr OAT Shaw) was denounced 
even by the Straits Budgets "Brunei is likely to make headlines again if 
its ooarts and its offioials do not move a little more with the times". 
118 
The sentenoe remained "harsh" even after it had been halved upon appeal. 
119 
A Rustioation Eaaotment was passed hastily to deal with $troublemakers$$ 
but the law remained a dead letter* 
120 
This film company episode occasioned Sir Omar Ali to announce 
an: iutention, in 1953, to make oonstitutional reforms. The High 
Commissioner reported that there were 
"signs of a clash between members of the ruling classy who wish to retain 
a feudalistic State, and the growing and more vocal opposition to nepotism 
from the ordinary people especially the young intelligentsia... 
4. A major source of discontent is the control which is exercised 
by the British Resident and the High Commissioner over the Sultan in the 
internal affairs of the State, particularly in the matter of finance. 
It is widely known that, by the terms of the treaty, the Sultan must 
accept the Resident's advice in all matters exoepting only those of a 
religious nature. This is widely resented. With the abnormally large 
sums of money becoming available to the State many Government officers 
consider that emoluments should be raised in proportion to the revenue, 
irrespective of qualifications and ability of the holders or the 
responsibilities of the duties being disoharged, and they feel that they 
have the Sultan's sympathy. The two senior Ministers are agitating for 
an increase in their salaries. Their basic salary plus allowances and 
various perquisites, are equivalent to those of a Resident. Their duties 
118. Ibid., item 14, extract from Straits Budget, 12 March 1953. 
119. Ibid. 
120. Ibid., items 16,18 and 21. Sir ßC Whiteley minuted on 10 Septem- 
ber 1953 that the Rustication Enactment was very unpopular in Brunei. 
Mr Gilbert, the Resident, "would like if possible to make use of him 
Sheikh Azahari) in the public service, but the Sultan is not at all 
well-disposed towards him (Sheikh Azahari)". NB. The Rustication 
Enactment had been aimed specifically at the nationalist leader. 
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are in the main traditional ands although they are members of the State 
Councils they are of little assistance to the administration of the State 
because they are practically illiterate and it is impossible to give them 
additional duties or responsibilities. The Sultan feels it necessary to 
support their demands, although I believe that he appreciates that if I 
gave way in this instance there would be a general demand for higher wages 
throughout the State. The result is that throughout the Civil Service 
there is general discontent at the control exercised by the British 
Administration. If and when the treaty is revised and greater discretion 
in such matters is allowed to the Sultan in Council, I fear we will see 
very greatly increased emoluments throughout the whole range of Government 
servants. Some control over the Estimates will be required for some years 
if we are to avoid the demoralizing effect of great wealth without 
discipline. 
5. At present the sole aim of most people is to cash in on the 
State's wealth, and any obstruction is put down to British influence. We 
are endeavouring, wherever possible, to use local people in Government 
service but the standard of education in the State is at present so low 
that it will be some years before the better paid posts can be filled by 
suitably qualified Braneis. Both the Government and the oil companies 
(sic) import technicians, artisans and school teachers from Hong Kong, 
Singapore and Malaya, but where possible the Government have given them 
short contracts. We hope that in a few years time suitable local men 
will be found to take their places. This essential process is represented 
by some local people as a deliberate policy of the British to keep local 
people in the subordinate positions". 121 
The sultan had been pressing for a revision of the 1905-6 
treaty so that he might obtain "greater responsibilities for the internal 
affairs of his State"; but Sir AF Abell insisted that "a revision of the 
treaty cannot be oontemplated until His Highness has established a oon- 
stitution on demooratio and aooeptable lines". 
122 In short, the Sultan 
was responding very muoh to British prompting in 1953, whilst pressure 
from the High Commissioner had itself been given urgenoy beoause of the 
gathering strength of Brunei nationalism. Sir Anthony Abell's oommeuts 
reveal, also, a laok of oonfidenoe in looal ministers and oivil servants. 
121. Ibid., item 129 Sir AP Abell to Co, No 54 (saving), 13 Mar 1953, 
Paragraphs 3-5. See also, Brunei Annual Report 1953, P 3; BAR 1954 P 33 
AR 1955, P 3; and BAR 19569 p vi. 
122. Co 1022/396 (item 12), paragraph 7. 
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Before the end of 1953 an alleged oonsplracy was discovered and 
on 6 Ootober three Malays - who had denied the oharges - were sentenoed 
to gaol terms ranging from one to two years on oounts of conspiracy and 
sedition. One of the Malays had been involved in the earlier film 
society debaole. The accused men were allegedly members of a secret 
grouping whioh advooated the overthrow of the Brunei administration. 
123 
There were no publio developments during 1954, but much aotivity 
must have been proceeding behind the scenes. After his release from 
prison Sheikh Azahari began preparations for the foundation of a party. 
The first attempt (January to March 1955) was abandoned because of 
"disagreements among the organizers". 
124 
Later in 1955 Sheikh Azahari 
attended a conference of the Malayan Partai Rak7at, at which it appears 
to have been deoided to form a branch in Brunei. In January 1956 the 
Partai Rakyat Brunei published a manifesto 
125 
and sought registration 
by the Government. A pnblio meeting, attended by 150 Malays, was held on 
Sunday 22 January 1956, the anniversary, of which was celebrated thereafter 
as the day on which the party was founded. Legal reoogaiti on was refused 
by the Government on the ground that the party was affiliated to an 
outside organization. - Registration was refused a second time because 
the party wished to operate on a pan-Bornean basis* 
126 
The FRB was 
123, Straits Times, 7 October and 8 October 1953124. 
Borneo Bulletin, 15 January and 19 March 19; 5- 
125* Borneo Bulletin, 28 January 1956. 
126. Mr JO Gilbert recalls (letter to the author, 12 November 1983, 
Paragraph 3) that the Sultan and Brunei Malays always fought "tooth and 
nail" against closer association with Brunei's neighbours in British 
Borneo and refused to budge an inch on this question. This was the 
reason for the denial of registration to the PRB. 
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obliged to confine its activities to Brunei, therefore., and was 
eventually registered on 15 August 1956. 
The PRB's manifesto stated that the main purpose of the party 
was to "oppose all forms of oolonialism in 'the politioal, eoonomio and 
social sphere". Sheikh Azahari promised to follow constitutional methods 
in pursuit of the party's aims " and claimed to have no hatred for the 
British; but independence was "a fundamental right of any people". 
12T 
He added later that the authorities had to realize that "the PRB is here 
to stay and that it is determined to lead the people peacefully and 
0onstituti orally towards self-government". Many Government offioiale 
supported the party, he claimed, but were unwilling to jeopardize their 
oareers by joining it. 
128 
As early as Jane 1956 - before registration - the party claimed 
10,000 prospective members. Man of the most enthusiastic recruits were 
Bornean employees of the BMPC129 and 2,000 non Malays had expressed 
interest. In October 1956 a rally held in Brunei Town was attended by 
39000 people and ended with seventeen shouts of merdeka and the clenched 
fist salute. The party had olearly demonstrated the need for a politioal 
organization in Brunei and "far from being politically backward, the 
people of Brunei are'awakening to events around them", 
130 
The Government noted that the enrolment of labouring olasses 
in the PRB grew in 1956. There were many "maloontents" among party 
127. Borneo Bulletin, 22 January 1956- 
128, Borneo Bulletin, 29 Deoember 1956. 
129. Cf. Dato Linton's statements on p 490 (above), 
130. Borneo Bulletini 18 February 1956. 
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members, mainly dismissed ex-Government servants, "who saw in the party 
a weans of expressing their disoontent". The following amongst the "more 
eduoated classes" was "very limited". The demand of the party for self- 
governmeut, `L. n the British view, "must neoessarily be a slow prooess 
owing to the very limited number of persons of the requisite calibre 
available". By advocating what the Government claimed already to be 
doing in the sphere of social services, the party displayed "political 
immaturity" and "lank of understanding", perhaps designed "to enable the 
leaders to take credit for the outcome of the Government's development 
polioy, which must inevitably take time to reach fruition". 
131 
In oonsidering the rise of politioal consciousness in Brunei, 
the first point to establish is that the isolation of the country was 
breaking down, Before the Japanese occupation oomiaunioations were very 
diffioult. There were no newspapers, no radio station, no airport, 
inadequate roads. Few people were literate. Before 1930 the steamship 
from Singapore stopped at Labuan. As a result to these elements - 
illiteraoy oombined with isolation, both from the outside world and of 
one part of the country from another - the experienoe of Brunei people 
did not extend far beyond their own village and traditional way of life. 
Women remained in even greater seclusion than men: in the 19508 there 
were still some old women in Kampong Ayer who olaimed never to have set 
foot on dry land. Loyalty was in the first inatanoe to the Sultan, per- 
haps to a territorial ohief, and to the village penghulu and ketuas. 
131. Brunei Annual Report 1956, pp viii-ix. 
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Dr WR Roff oommentsp with reference to Malaya, that for the 
great majority of peasant Malays before the warp "involvement in anything 
Doming under the desoriptiou saisat (politioal aotivity)... was likely to 
be visited with puuishment or at least with severe disapproval. It was 
none of one's business". 
132 
Similarly, "the ordinary Chinese did not 
believe that government could be improved, much less did he believe that 
good government demanded politioal aotivity and a positive oommitment on 
the part of the masses... Traditional Chinese politioal theory held that 
government... should be run by those trained for that purpose"". 
133 
Seooadly, there was "a remarkable persistence of traditional patterns 
of social organization" (as we have just seen$ p 491, above). Thirdly, 
Malay sooiety was shielded from the disruptive effects of the new eoonomio 
order - the oilfield was out of the way in Belait distriot - and the 
Sultan and pengirans, like their Malayan counterparts, were happy enough 
with a status quo whioh ensured them enormous privileges. 
134 
In the 1930s the first students from Brunei to attend the Sultan 
Idris Training College (in Perak) Dame into oontaot with new ideas, 
Particularly from Indonesia. It is surely not coincidental that early 
nationalist leaders of the-Barip and PRB had experienoe of the wider world 
beyond the oomparatively seoluded oonfines of Brunei itself. (Although 
Islam was the majority religion in Brunei, few Muslims possessed sufficient 
wealth to make the pilgrimage to Meooa before the Seoond World War). In 
132. WR Roff, . oit., pp 217-8. 
133. GP Means, Malaysian Politios (London 1970), p 32; R Dawson, 
Confuoius (Oxford 1981), p 66; and The Times, 20 Deoember 1984, p8 
(column 8, paragraph 2). 
134. Roff, o . cit., p 250. 
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schools loyalty to the throne was emphasized. Extra-curricular 
activities, such as the boy scout movement (launched in Brunei in July 
1934), directed energies into approved conservative channels. 
The Japanese occupation destroyed British prestige in Brunei, 
as elsewhere in South-East Asia, but the damage was limited to some 
extent (a) beoause Brunei was reoonquered militarily by Allied Forces 
and the Japanese were olearly seen to have been vanquished; and (b) 
beoause an existing nationalist base was lacking in Brunei and so there 
was no indigenous organization in place which was ready to seize power 
and deolare independenoe in 1945. The British (and alien Chinese) 
preeenoe, whioh had been oomparatively inoonspiouous in Branei before 
the war, beoame muoh more obvioum in the 1950s and aroused oorresponding 
indigenous resentment. 
135 
Further ohangea took plaoe during the later 1940s and early 
1950s. As a te. sult of eduoational expansion more people were literate. 
The BMPC issued two newspapers free of charge each Saturday morning. 
In Ootober 1953 the first English-language oommeroial newspaper (later 
with Malay seotions) - the weekly Borneo Bulletin - was lau. nohed. 
136 
135. If the people of Brunei were better educated than they had been in 
1906, they remained, nevertheless, comparatively at a disadvantage when 
placed next to highly qualified expatriates. Mr W Fish reported in late 
1958 that, because of their (comparative) lack of education, "the average 
Brunei Malay was forced to work as a labourer, while moat of the people 
driving cars... were foreigners. Neither could he fail to notice that 
they despised him. Education was the only answer to the problem and 
this was being tackled by top priority in the Development Plan" (Borneo 
Bulletin, 15 November 1958). 
136. Circulation reached 5,500 by 1954 and topped 10,000 by 1957. A 
separate Malay version was also published. On 15 February 1957 Pelita 
Braueio a free Malay-language newspaper, was launched by the Government 
and had achieved a circulation (fortnightly) of 5,500 by the end of the 
year. 
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Earlier in that year a Government Information Servioe was started. 
Inoreasing numbers, even in the remotest villages, tuned in to broad- 
casts From Singapore, Indonesia and, later, Kuabing. The establishment 
of Radio Brunei, delayed by more urgent priorities of the Development 
Plan, took plaoe on 2 May 1957. The growing popularity of cinema also 
fostered knowledge of the wider world. 
The outoome of more eduoationp growing awareness of life beyond 
the oonfines of Brunei, and the example set by Malaya and other oountries, 
was a heightened politioal oonsoiousness among Bruneis, whioh provided 
the foundation upon whioh the PRB built. A further fact of paramount 
importance - perhaps the most decisive of all - was the evidence of 
oil wealth, in whioh the people wished to obtain their share. A large 
proportion of the publio had remaiued oomparative1y poor, whilst the 
oountry in whioh they lived had beoome fabulously rioh. It was 
suggested that the rapid shift from poverty to prosperity 
"has perhaps been too demoralizing. People so easily take for granted 
the new sohools and hospitals. The workers, proud of their new skills 
and prospeots, resent the Sultan's many relatives, whose undeserved 
influenoe would have been taken for granted in the old days". 137 
This made Brunei "a breeding ground for disoontent". 
138 
A final faotor was Sheikh Azahari himself, who provided 
inspiring leadership and artioulated the aspirations of the people, 
without alienating Europeans. Mr Gilbert, for example, though disturbed 
by evidenoe of the PRB's linke with President Sukarno's Indonesia, "quite 
137.. Borneo Bulletin, 10 March 1956. 
138. Ibid. 
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liked" Sheikh Azahari and did not feel in any way threatened by the PRB. 
Another former colonial servants far less well-disposed to the PRB, 
nevertheless paid the party's leader the following tributes 
"It can be said without oontradiotion ... that 
(Sheikh) Azahari was a 
oharisrnatio personality, a spell-binder of a publio speaker, and he 
had enormous appeal to the general publio". 
To some extent, however, it was a oheap popularity. Mr Bevington, for 
example, suggests that Sheikh dzahari and his supporters had not really 
thought through a coherent programme. The party leader would tell the 
people that all power was in the hands of the British Resident, that 
vast monies were ooming in of whioh the people were not receiving a 
fair share, and that "it was time the people took over and ran the show 
(in order to see) that the monies oame to them. Well, (anyone would) 
subscribe to that". 
139 
The PRB was essentially a Maley Kedayan party, strong in Kam- 
poag Ayer and among Kedayan farmers, but with little or no appeal to 
non-Muslim indigenes, the Chinese, or to the people of Sarawak and North 
Borneo (whose support was sought by the PRB leadership). The PRB"s 
demand that the Chinese "monopoly" of trade should be broken alarmed the 
Brunei Chinese, who were a growing and inoreasiugly important seotion of 
the population. There was talk of forming a separate party, to proteot 
Chinese interests, but nothing came of this; perhaps the Chinese had 
too muoh to lose (of. above, p 479, fn 73). The people of the ulue also 
139. Typescript of a tape reoording prepared for the author by oourtesy 
of Mr ER Bevington CMG CEng, p 41. 
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tended to remain aloof. Nor did Brunei irredentism appeal to citizens 
of neighbouring territories in British Borneo. The Brunei Malay, aooord 
ing to The Times, "thinks little of his fellows, even his fellow Malays 
elsewhere and oorrespondingly the people of neighbouring States fear and 
dislike him". 140 
8. Towards a Constitutions 11 (1957-9) 
In March 1957 the Sultan announced new plane for the reform of 
'the State Council. The ordinary citizens were to elect ten members of 
the State Council but not directlys the ten would be chosen by the monarch 
from twenty two elected candidates. This scheme arose from the failure 
of the looal authorities plan in 1956- Sheikh Azahari, denouncing the 
proposed reform as a "primitive change" and a "mockery of democraoy", 
demanded that three-quarters of the members of the State Council should 
be elected direotly by the people. 
141 
At the end of the month, the first 
annual congress of the PRB drew up a plan of action, including the des- 
patoh of a delegation to London to fix a date for autononW. 
142 
f British 
socialist lawyer, Mr WAL Raeburn, engaged as legal and political adviser 
to the PRB, was to draft a merdeka memorandam for the pasty to submit 
to EX Government. 
143 
The sultan deolined to receive a memorandum from 
the PRB beoause he was "a oonstitutional moaaroh who took no part in 
140. The Times, 1 July 1957. Hon Sir S Runoiman, letter to the author, 
25 March 1983; and Mr AJN Richards, letter to the author, 11 April 1983. 
141, Borneo Bulletin, 9 March 1957 and 16 March 1957. 
142. Borneo Bulletin, 6 April 1957- 
143e Borneo Bulletin, 18 May 1957" 
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politios". 
144 
Sir AF Abell, however, did agree to meet the PRB leaders. 
He warned them that a merdeka mission to the Colonial Offioe woald be a 
waste of money beoause Brunei was governed, not by the British but by 
its own absolute monarch. The British expatriates, Sir AF Abell claimed, 
were not the ruling class, the symbols of oolonialismp but publio ser- 
vants, who were there at the Sultan's pleasure. Their funotione, he 
said, were limited to advising and carrying out the routine of govern- 
went. Hence the PRB would be asking the Colonial Office for something 
whioh it was not theirs to give. 
145 
Despite this warning, the PRB 
delegation prooeeded to London, where they were reoeived at the end of 
September bl the Seoretary of State 
"with the usual courtesy and matters were discussed, but in brief they 
were told that any petition or memorandum to do with the political 
situation in Brunei must be submitted to the Sultan. His Highness would 
no doubt comment and ask the Secretary of State for his advice". 146 
The British and the Sultan between them had the PRB on a 
regular merry-go-round* In Brunei the party leaders were told that 
the Sultan was above politics and oould not reoeive their memorandum; in 
Kuching and London, by oontrasty they were told that HM Government could 
not accept the document either and that any petition concerning the 
political situation in Brunei would have to be submitted to the Sultan. 
The latter, for his part, was at onoe a loonstitutional" and an "absolute" 
monarch. 
147 The PRB leaders must have been exceptionally patient if such 
144. Borneo Bulletin, 8 June 1957. 
145. Borneo Bulletin, 24 August 1957- 
146o CO 824/5 Brunei Annual Report 19579 p iv. 
147. The status of the Sultan was not legally defined. But he was 
oertainly not a "oonstitutional" sovereign beoause Brunei had no oon- 
stitution, whilst the olaim that the monarch "took no part in politics" 
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official games did not provoke intense wrath and sharpen their deter- 
mination to have an end to the colonialist system. (Such antics also 
reflect little credit upon the British authorities). At a rally held 
in mid-October 1957, Inohe Salleh (PRB Vice-President) told the assembled 
crowd of 5,000 in Brunei Town that, despite the failure of the merdeka 
mission, it had nevertheless achieved world publicity for the struggle 
of the Brunei people. The Sultan, he said, had nothing to fear from the 
PRB. The people must remember the spirit of Mat Salleh (presumably of 
North Borneo). Inohe Salleh appeared to suggest that one day the red 
and white flag of Indonesia would fly over the whole of Borneo. High 
officials, he alleged, were tempted by easy living. They were so con- 
cerned with motor oars and electric fans, he said, that they forgot the 
people, to fight for whose rights the FRB had come into existence. 
148 
In July 1957 the Sultan announced slight modifications in his 
local government proposals. By January 1958 urban and rural councils 
patently was nonsense. If His Highness technioally was "an autocratic 
sovereign" (of. p 461, above), no self-respeoting absolute monarch would 
have tolerated being told by a petty foreign High Commissioner that he 
should introduce a constitution on democratic lines or that he should 
aooept the 'advice' of an even more petty foreign Resident. What then 
was. the position of the Sultan? One is tempted to suggest that it was 
anything which it suited His Highness or the British to say it was at 
any given moment. It may be stated without fear of contradiction, 
however, 
that His Highness exercised a power of veto upon any major constitutional 
changes or policy departures whioh the British wished to thrust upon 
him 
(see above, p 486). 
148. Borneo Bulletin, 19 October 1957. (State Counoillors, from May 
1955, were entitled to free oar tax, post and telegraphs, and allowances 
for board and lodging. Borneo Bulletin, 14 May 1955" Sinoe this time 
Inohe Salleh has accepted the title Pehin from the Sultan and has held 
high Government office since 1961. The temptations of easy living are 
rather more difficult to resist, perhaps, than he supposed in 1957. 
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were to be operating as virtually autonomous bodies. Fifty per Dent of 
the membership was to be elected directly by the people, except in the 
case of Brunei Town urban oounoil, whose members were all to be nominated. 
No reason was given for this proposed exception. Government-appointed 
chairmen of ooanoils would have the power to use a casting vote. 
Councillors would be given an opportunity to shoulder real responsibility 
in the handling of their respective oounoil affairs and duties. The 
eleotion of representatives from the sub-distriots to the distriot 
oouuoils was to be oonduoted 1ooa11yr in accordance with "traditional 
methods" (a show of hands) before the end of 1957 to enable the distriot 
councils to function effeotively in acoordance with the original plan. 
The Government was to work out a soheme for dividing the various dis- 
triots into wards, from each of which would be nominated one official 
member who would sit on the distriot council with the elected member 
from the same ward. 
149 
Later in Jul7150 the Sultan published his proposed oonstitution, 
whioh was weighted overwhelmingly in favour of the monaroby. The Sultan 
was to be Head of State and Head of the Mahammadan religion in Brunei. 
He was Head of the executive and all executive authority was to be 
exeroised in his name. The State Counoil was to be replaoed by three 
new oneas Privy, Executive and Legislative. The Exeoutive Council 
might only be summoned by authority of the Sultan. Its members, both 
offioial and unoffioial, were to hold their seats during the Sultan's 
149. Borneo Bulletin, 6 July 1957 
1509 Borneo Bulletin, 27 July 1957" 
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pleasure, but were required to be re-eleoted or re-nominated every three 
years. The Sultan was required to consult the Executive Counoill but 
was empowered to aot ooatrary to the advioe of the majority of its 
memberst provided he reoorded in writing bis reasons for inolusion in 
the minutes. In addition, any member might require his advioe to be 
reoorded therein. Membership of the Legislative Counoil was to be 
oonfined to eubjeots of Brunei or the United Kingdom aged above twenty- 
five years. The eleven members from the distriot ooanoils delegated to 
sit on the Legislative Counoil were to be ohosen by the distriot councils 
themselves, but the appointments were subjeot to the approval of the 
Sultan. The legislature might make laws for the peaoe, order and good 
government of the State. Any member might introdnoe a bill or motion. 
The oounoil might not prooeed, however, upon any bill (a) affeoting the 
currency or finanoes of the State; (b) the provisions of which appeared 
inoonsistent with any treaty or agreement entered into by the Sultan or 
Her Majesty; (o) relating to defence or public security. 
Sheikh Azahari declared that the PRB would boycott the proposed 
new constitution which "encourages dictatorship in Brunei". 
151 
The party 
published a oommentary upon the Sultan's proposals. The "autocratio 
powers" of the monaroh, it was pointed onto would inolude the appointment 
of the principal ministers and eye-offioio members of the Executive Council, 
and so on. The proposals oontained "nothing in the way of a delegation 
to (the people of Brunei) of a share in the government". Nominated 
151. Borneo Bulletin, 24 August 1957" 
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members could not speak their minds freely and there was nothing to 
prevent a Sultan from "packing both Executive and Legislative Councils 
with ayoophants and offioe-seekers". Finally, "a constitution which 
depends entirely for its safeguards for the subjeot on the benevolent 
forbearanoe of the sovereign himself is in effeot no ooastitution at 
all". 
152 
The party repeated its demand for a State Couaoil, tbree- 
quarters of whose members were to be elected directly. It was suggested 
that the Sultan might renounce some of his proposed autooratio powers. 
The FRB did not press for oomplete merdeka; the people would be oontent 
to aohieve "an early realization of a substantial voice in their internal 
government, oonfident that they have amongst themselves enough men of 
sufficient ability and practical understanding to shoulder the necessary 
responsibilities". 
153 
In November 1957 the eleotions (by, show of hands) to the dis- 
triot oounoils were again postponed, this time indefinitely. The Resident 
oommented that, politioallyp this deoision of His Highness oould be 
oonsidered 
"a most unfortunate incident, as the Partai Rakyat_ had decided to boycott 
the elections and of course gained much kudos when they were temporarily 
abandoned. 
... Had this party supported the elections, and 
had these 
elections taken place, they would probably have got certain (represent- 
atives on the) district councils and been able to air their views in 
the constitutional and proper manner. The fact that they had decided 
to boycott the elections would probably have done them more harm than 
good". 154 
152. Borneo Bulletin, 26 Ootober 1957- 
153. Ibid. 
154. CO 824/5 Brunei Annual Report 1957, p v. 
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On 9 November 1957 it was reported that 1,700 to 2,000 people 
had attended a meeting to weloome home from London the empty-handed 
merdeka delegation. Later in the month the Sultan threatened to eorap 
the ooastitution if it was to be boyootted by the PRB. It was essential, 
he deolared, for a solid oonatitutional foundation to be established 
firsts further progress oould follow later. The people must learn to 
walk before they can runs they must travel slowly but safely. It was 
"not for us to be too optimistio, proad or boastful or to think that we 
are strong enough or rioh enough to stand on our own". He suggested 
that the new oonstitution was trying to take a step forward like a pupil 
who was, still under training. It ooald be amended and ohanged later to 
suit new times. He pointed to development programmes as a sign of good 
faith. He was not a puppet of the British. The United Kingdom bad been 
a good friend to Bruneiq a friendship uhioh had resulted in muoh progress 
in the Sultanate. But in time l opal oitizens would take over the posts 
then held by expatriates (he oonoluded). 
155 
Daring 1958 the PRB was comparatively quiet. After the 
disastrous delegation to London in 1957, the party became dormant until 
1960-1.. In February 1958 mobs Zaini bin Haji Abmad (b 1935), a senior 
member of the PRB's Ezeoutive Committees, left the party to go to the 
United Kingdom to pursue his studies in trade union law. The party 
regarded this as "abandoning his responsibilities" in the straggle 
against the British. 
156 Further disasters followed for the PRBs at the 
155. Borneo Bulletin, 30 November 1957- 
156. Borneo Bulletin, 22 February 1958 and. 15 )Rroh 1958. 
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end of April seven party officials were charged with failure to furnish 
particulars of party aooountse157 In early May Sheikh Azahari resigned 
as leader of the PRB "in order to safeguard the good name of the party" 
and beoause he oonsidered himself unsuitable to aot as Presidentit. 
158 
This was Sheikh Azahari"s seoond resignation within five months; on the 
previous oooasion he had oited health reasons. 
At the end of the month the party held its annual congress. 
Sheikh Azahari - apparently baok at his post - was severely oritioized 
over party funds, especially the mission to the United Kingdom. The 
Brunei Government denied entry to Irrohe Boestaman, leader of the Malayan 
Fartai Rakyat. In June 1958 the administration prevented the PRB from 
explaining to Government offioiale in ulu Belait the aims and aspirations 
of the party. 
159 
To oomplets the catalogue of eetbaoke, Inohe Salleb, 
Vioe-President of the PRB, was sentenoed to four months' imprisonment 
(commuted to two) for perjury. He resigned bis post in October 1958.160 
There had been little progress on the new oonstitution during 
19 58 beoaase attention was fooused on the proposal for a federation of 
British Borneof until its final rejeotion by Brunei in Deoember of that 
year. In the previous month Sir AP' Abell attended a meeting of the State 
Counoil at whioh it was deoided that the proposed oonstitutional changes 
would have to be referred to the Colonial Office. At the and of Deoember 
the Sultan annoünoed his objeotive to make the publio servioe an entirely 
157. Borneo Bulletin, 26 April 1958. 
158. Borneo Bulletin, 10 May 1958. 
159. Borneo Bulletin 21 June 1958. 
160. Borneo Bulletin, 12 JulrP 13 September and 4 Ootober 1958. 
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Brauei one. On 15 March 1959 he arrived in Singapore on his way to 
London for the constitutional conference. He told the Straits Times 
that only a few matters remained to be discussed. He was seeking "the 
powers now vested in the British Government for the administration of 
aountrin 
161 
The purpose of the proposed oonstitation was to train 
his people to play a greater role in administration with a view to 
internal self-government later. In the Sultan's estimation the time was 
not yet ripe for merdeka1.62 The oonferenoe at the Colonial Offioe 
lasted from 24 March until 6 April 1959. There were twenty-one topics 
to be considered, such as details of the machinery for the establishment 
of the three new oounoils. Mr Lennox-Boyd (1904-83), the Seoretary of 
State, insisted that the United Kingdom retain control of foreign policy 
and internal seourity. In the modern world it was "impossible to 
separate danger from without and danger from within". 
163 
The Straits 
Times commented that there was "very little danger of Brunei advancing 
oy) ". The p oli oy of HM Government was tO too quickly (towards demoora 
164 
promote in all oolonial territories the greatest praotioal measure of 
self-government within the Commonwealth. Mr Boyd took a firm stand on 
defenoe questions "in view of Brunei's inability to ensure adequate 
safeguards for its population and for the security of the Seria oil- 
fields in the event of external aggression or internal disturbances"- 
165 
161. Straits Times, 16 Maroh 1959. 
162. Ibid. 
163. Straits Times, 25 Maroh 1959. 
164. Straits Times, 8 April 1959- 
165- Borneo Bulletin, 28 March 1959. 
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This grave British responsibility would have to be acknowledged. Brunei 
agreed that general protection must continue. Mr Boyd attached crucial 
importance for the well-being of the State to the staffing of the 
various Government departments. 
Trends in the period April to September 1959 were the ooatinuing 
closer assooiation with Malaya, which was part of the Sultan's design to 
olaim Brunei as a Muslim Malay State. Heaoe it would not be proper for 
the Government to oontinue its support of Christian sohools. Similar 
examples were the partial ban on aloohol; the axing of BBC news from Radio 
Brunei; and a new national flag and anthem. Three hundred Malayans were 
in Government service and a further hundred were employed by the BSPC. A 
aoinoidental feature of 1958-9 was trade depression and unemployment. 
166 
Q. 
_ 
The End of the Residenoy (29 September 1959) 
On 29 September 1959 Brunei's first written constitution, which 
adhered olosely to the blueprint published in July 1957 (see above, pp 
507-8) was pro=lgated and the oountry's new flag hoisted. A new treaty, 
replaoing that of 19054j, was oonoluded between Brunei and the United 
Kingdom. At the same time the 'Brunei and Sarawak Separation Agreement' 
and the 'Overseas Officers Agreement' were signed. 
Following the fresh UK-Brunei Treaty, of 1959, London continued 
to be responsible for Brunei's defence and external affairs. Provision 
166. Annual imports into Brunei fell from %107m in 1957 to only 063m 
in 1959, having reached a peak of ß$123m in 1953. Exports in 1959 were 
valued at $310mf of which oil comprised %293m. See, also, pp 549-50 
(below). 
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was made for the appointment of a British High Commissioner, a member of 
the diplomatic (rather than colonial) servioet who would live in Brunei 
and be available to advise the gal. tan, if required, on all matters other 
than those affeoting the Muhammadan religion and Malay custom. The 
administrative link with Sarawak was severed and Brunei secured 
"complete internal self-government'". 
167 
The post of British Resident was abolished and there was 
instead a Mentri Besar (Chief Minister) appointed by the Sultan, to whom 
he would be responsible for the exercise of executive authority in the 
State. The duty of the Mentri Besar was to oonoern himself only with 
broad polioies, leaving the execution and details of administration 
generally to his lieutenant, the State Seoretaryr. It was ordained that 
both these offioers must be Malays and Shafeite Muslims. British 
officials were -to remain in charge of the Police, the Speciäl Branch, 
the Publio Works Department and the Department of Eduoatioa. 
168 
The 
"Chief Justine" was also a oitizen of the United Kingdom. 
The written oonstitution provided for the replaoement of the 
somewhat disoredited State Counoil by three new institutions: a Privy 
Counoilp169 an Executive Counoil and a Legislative Counoil. 
170 
167. CO 824/5 Brunei Annual Report 1959. p 1. 
168. The Times, 29 September 1959 and Borneo Balletin, 26 September 1959. 
169. Membership of the Privy Counoil oomprised# apart from the Sultan, 
six ex-offioio members, the High Commissioner, and "suoh other members as 
His Highness might appoint". Its funotion was to advise the Sultan in 
oases of (a) his prerogative of meroy; (b) oonstitutional amendments; 
and (o) appointments to Malay customary ranks, honours, titles and 
dignities. 
170. There were also to be a Public Service Committee and a Succession 
and Regency Counoil. 
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The Executive Council was the most important of the new 
institutions beoause most matters of polioy, inoluding the estimates 
(within limits), were referred to it. It could be summoned only by 
the monaroh, it met in private, and considered only matters tabled by 
the Sultan and 1'lentri Besar. Presided over by the Sultan, membership 
comprised the High Commissioner, seven ex-officio members and seven 
unoffioial members (nominated by His Highness). The sovereign was 
required to oonsult this ocx&noil, but was entitled to disregard its 
advioe provided he recorded his reasons in writing. 
Sixteen of the thirty-three seats in the legislature - the 
remainder were nominees of the Sultan - were to be held by direotly- 
eleoted. representatives of the people. Sir Omar Ali pledged to introduoe 
eleotions to this forum within two years, a promise on whioh he reneged. 
(When the ballot was eventually held, in Angust 1962, the PRB swept up 
90% of the poll and all the seats). 
In short, the 1959 oonstitution represented a very oautious 
advance which transferred overwhelming power into the hands of the 
monarohy. But the sixteen elective seats on the Legislative Counoil 
also gave the people a voioe in the running of their ooantry. It was 
hoped, by the British at least, that the people would reoeive a training 
in the prooedures of a parliamentary, demooraoy. Mr Boyd deolared from 
afar that EI Government "will always stand ready to help in any way 
they oan to promote the development of Brunei and the welfare of its 
people". 
171 
Sir Omar Aii noted that the new order, a tangible proof of 
171. Borneo Bulletin, 3 Ootober 1959" 
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UI Government's oommitment to fostering constitutional development, 
brought to an end "an era of direot rule by the British Government over 
the State of Brunei", But there was "no ohange of heart on the part of 
my people towards the United Kingdom". The "happy and oordial" relation- 
ship would continue and be strengthened. British officers would continue 
to uphold the tradition of undivided loyalty and true servioe to the 
Government of Brunei. The suooeaa of the ooustitution, he added, would 
depend "on the loyalty of the people (to it)t a healthy' political think- 
ingy to unstinted servioe of the State, and to a spirit of goodwill, 
oompromise and oo-operation". 
172 
The PBB, by oontraeti, argued that oontrol of their oountry 
remained in British hands. The party had not been oonsulted during the 
drafting of the new arrangements; and no provision had been made for a 
general eleotion beoause "Britain and a few important personages were 
determined to keep power in their own hands". The PRB remained determined 
"to press for reoogultion of the desire for independenoe". The provision 
for eleotions within two years was "insinoere and not binding"; the PRB 
would not be "fobbed off" with saoh "gifts of oandy". The oonstitution 
was anti-demooratio and designed to safeguard the United Kingdom's eoon- 
omio advantages gained from Brunei. It was inspired by "a desire to 
perpetuate oolonial policy" and should be altered, instead, into "an 
instrument more in keeping with present international trends and regard 
for human rights". 
173 
172. Ibid. 
173. Borneo Bulletin. 12 Deoember 1959. 
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10. Summary and Conolusion 
In 1946 the goal of EX Government had been to guide Brunei 
towards inäepeadenoe (preferably in assooiation with its neighbours in 
British Borneo or as part of a wider British dominion in South-East Asia), 
as a free demooratio oountry in whioh all people, irrespeotive of raoe 
or religion,, enjoyed equal rights. The people of Brunei, as expressed 
through the Partai Rakyat Brunei from 1956, favoured complete and early 
independenoe and. an end to all forms of oolonialism. The party also 
demanded the return to Brunei of North Borneo and Sarawak and the 
establishment of the Unitary State of Kalimantan Utara; but perhaps the 
ýý% implioations of this had not been fully appreciated beoause in any such 
new politioal unit "Malays would have been a minority and Brunei Malays 
an oppressed minority", 
174 
The Sultan, for his part, preferred to keep 
a tight rein on the direotion of affairs and to resist British pressure 
for a oonstitution on "demooratio and aooeptable" lines. Despite the 
faot that only 60% of the Brunei population professed Muhammadanism in 
1960, and yet fewer were Malays, he claimed Brunei as a Muslim Malay 
State, 175 depredated any oloser link with 3arawakp and eleoted to 
strengthen bonds with his fellow Sultans and oo-religionists in Malaa a. 
If His Highness sought a free hand internally, British protection 
oontinued to be neoessary to ward off external threats and domestio 
"subversion". Dir M Leifer oommentes 
174. Mr R Nioholl, letter to the author, 31 Deoember 1984. 
175" see Mr A Bnrgessle "embarrassingly aoourate" novel about (and 
banned in) Brunei, Devil of a State (London 1961), p 76. 
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"My feeling is that independenoe was not sought beoause of an underlying 
sense of vulnerability and that the paternal relationship with Britain 
was perfectly satisfaotory to Sir Omar". 176 
Lord Perth, Minister of State at the Colonial Offioe 1957-629 reoallss 
"We (HM Government) kept responsibility for Defenoe and Foreign Poling 
as the Sultan so wished and it equally suited us at the time". 177 
The PRB, supported by Malays and gedayans throughout the 
State, 
178 
who saw that Brunei bad beoome an extremely wealthy oountry 
but felt that they were not receiving their proper share, demanded 
early independeuoeo state Couuoillors, in the PRB"s opinion, were riahq 
privileged and out of toaoh with the people. Eben the Sultan, onoe 
praised as a popalar, temperate and wise monarch devoted to duty, began 
to appropriate an expanding civil list, to build himself bigger and better 
palaoes in Brunei or overseasp and to spend more of his time outside his 
own country. (Compared with present-day Brunei, however, there was 
virtually no royal oorrnption in the 1950sß. Given the PBB's membership 
of 16,000 by 1957 (26,000 by 1962), the Borneo Bulletin suggested that 
State Connoillors, "mostly old prinoes of the land"v might remember that 
they were living in a "demooratio age" and that sovereignty "lies 
176, Letter to the author, 20 August 1982. 
177. Seventeenth Earl of Perth, letter to the author, 31 January 1985- 
178, The PRB fully captured the allegiance of the bumipatras, except 
in uln Belait. "*I don't think it was possible for Government to have 
handled the PRB much differently from (the way) they did"o one oorres- 
pondent comments, "A stronger approaoh, to make the party toe the line, 
is what would have been preferable, but unfortunately the party had been 
allowed to take root too strongly and a tough line later would have 
brought forth charges of colonial oppression. It was a pity that a 
responsible political party did not develop, as in Malaya, when all 
might have gone well. As it was, the best that could be done was to 
allow the PRB enough rope to hang itself, which it did in the rebellion 
of 1962". 
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with the people". 
179 
They should aoquaint themselves with the people's 
problems and aspirations. Although Sheikh Azahari had "strong olaims 
to be the real representative of the people of Brunei rather than the 
Sultaa'', 
180 
he was not granted a seat on the State Council until 1962. 
Sultan Omar Ali was more cautious than either the British or 
the PRB. He emphasized that, as Muslims, Bruneis were "slaves of God" 
and must put their religion above all else. (The 40% of the population 
who were not Dluhammadans did not ooant, apparently). Education needed 
to be extended before Brunei was ready for independenoe. An evolution 
towards merdeka was the most sensible option. 
The British Government adopted a central position. They agreed 
with the PRB that demooraoy was desirable, but felt that the party was 
too impatient for the aohievement of its ends. Whereas Sultan Omar Ali, 
on the other hand, was wise to seek to prooeed stage by stage, he appears 
never to have had any real intention to foster deinooratio reforms, and 
UK Government ooatinually urged him to make greater oonoessioas. 
181 
As 
proved by the events of Deoember 1962, however, Whitehall's oommitmeut 
to democracy in Brunei drew the line at the attempted forcible overthrow 
of the monaroh. 
Brunei olearly was not ready for full independenoe in 1959. 
In the words of a oorrespondent of The Times, the ooantry was too diverse 
179. Borneo Bulletin, 20 April 1957- 
180* The Timesp 10 December 1962, p 10. 
181. A former Head of the SE Asia Department at the Colonial Office, Sir 
John Johnston GCMG KC909 assures the present writer that "oertainly, there 
was a genuine oonoern in the CO to promote demooratic development in 
Brunei" (letter to the author, 5 February 1985, paragraph 2). 
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raoially., exposed geographioallys, defenoeless militarily and inexperienoe d 
politically. 
182 
Without a single university graduate in 19599 Brunei 
lacked the trained personnel essential for a diplomatic service, home 
civil service, army, polices judiciary, hospitals,, schools and so on. 
"It will be many years before he (the Sultan) can find sufficient Brunei 
staff"p one expatriate oommented in 1958, "and in the meantime he would 
be better served by offioers on a permanent footing"* 
183 
Mr Gilbert 
deolared in 1957 that, as yet, self-government was "unthinkable": 
"It can only be brought about by proceeding step by step, which means 
that it cannot be accomplished for some years to come. If we try to go 
too fast and miss one or two steps, this will be felt badly later, as 
each step is a training step". 184 
The Borneo Bulletin suggested that nationalist leaders lacked sufficient 
political maturity to be entrusted with government. 
185 
The Times agreed 
that the PRB seemed to be "trying to leap too many fenoes at a single 
bound". 186 
In retr ospecty the 1959 constitution was a oomplete viotory 
for Sultan Omar Ali, although the issue was not so clear-cut at the time. 
Apart from obtaining autooratio powers within Brunei itself, he aohieved 
two further objeotives in the various agreements signed on 29 September 
1959, First, his own suooession to the throne was regularized; and, 
seoou&ty, the detested link with Sarawak was out. 
182. The Times, 2 July 1957. The oorrespondent was aotually referring 
to British Borneo as a whole. 
183. Quoted by oourtesy of an expatriate Sarawak Government offioer 
who sometimes visited Brunei. 
184. Borneo Bulletin, 11 May 1957. 
185. Borneo Bulle tiny 23 Maroh 1957 (Editorial). 
186. The Times, 14 September 1957" 
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To take the first point, the regularization of his suooession, 
it was established in the ocastitution that only lawfully-begotten male 
patrilineal desoendants of Sultan Hashin may suooeed, thereby effectively 
depriving Princess Ehean of any claim to the throne, Concerning the 
eeoond point, the abrogation of the link with Sarawak, the Governor of 
that oolong oeased to be High Commissioner for Bruneip and Sarawak 
offioers as suoh were no longer seoonded to serve in Brunei. One 
expatriate oommeated ae follows: 
"Brunei strongly dislikes the Sarawak connection. Although so 
many Sarawak officers have served the Brunei Government, the only Sarawak 
people invited to attend the mosque celebrations (1958) were the Governor 
and two Malays. Any officer seconded from Sarawak is suspect. On the 
other hand, any Kaiay from Malaya is welcomed. They would like to sever 
the Sarawak connection and associate themselves more closely with the 
Federation. 
The one thing certain is that the Sultan wishes to have as 
little association with Sarawak as possible. He regards Sarawak and 
North Borneo as territories taken from his predecessors and rightly 
belonging to Brunei; but Allah in his wisdom and compassion saw to it 
that the oil was found in the tiny bit of his territories that remain 
to Brunei. He must use this wealth and the power it gives to the glory 
of Islam and the strengthening of Brunei and the Brunei Malays". 187 
The PRB, for its part, failed to achieve the Unitary State 
of Ealimantaa Utara, but the 1959 constitution at least gave it an 
opportnaitr to oontest for 16 of the 33 seats on the Legislative Coanoil, 
and, if Sheikh Azahari had not resigned his seat so preoipitoaely, the 
party would have actually had a majority thereon after the August 1962 
ballot. If the powere of the Legislative Coanoil were severely oiroam- 
earibed, moreover, a skilful opposition might have used this platform to 
187. Quoted by courtesy of an expatriate Sarawak Government officer 
who sometimes visited Brunei. 
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exert oonsiderable moral pressure upon the Sultan to make further 
concessions to the publio. The propensity of His Highness to pose as a 
oonstitutional monarch and his professed willingness to make changes as 
demanded by the times would have rendered it increasingly difficult. for 
him to retain autooratio powers. In this oontext the rebellion of Deoem- 
bar 1962 was highly unintelligent because the Sultan, foroed to choose 
between his own overthrow or a royal absolutism, naturally ohose the 
latter. 
What, finally, may be said for the British Government? The 
centralized powers of the Resident were transferred overwhelmingly to 
the Sultan rather than to the people of Brunei. The provision of eleotive 
seats in the legislature might be characterized as an initial training 
in parliamentary demooraoy. Citizenship rights had not been obtained 
for the Brunei Chinese. The Federation of British Borneo, or Brunei's 
inolusion within the proposed wider British dcizinion in South-East Asia 
(Malaysia) failed to materialize. In short, British polioy sinne 1944 
had ended in almost total failure. Governmental iueffioienoy following 
the importation of offioers from Malaya to replaoe their British ooanter- 
parts was a contributory faotor to the 1962 revolt, 
188 
which would have 
Dost Sir Omar Ali his throne but for speedy and deoisive British 
intervention. For the third time in fifteen years, His Highness was 
overwhelmingly indebted to HIHI Government for his position. 
188. Borneo Bulletin, 5 January 1963. ("The wrong men were in mans 
jobs. The right men were ignored. There was a mad rash to get rid of 
British expatriates. There was - after 1959 -a running down of what 
was onoe a fairly effioient servioe"). 
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CHAPTER ELEVIIJ 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
1. Introdnotion 
The arrangements made in the UK-Brunei Treaty of 1959 persisted 
until the end of 1983, when uM Government surrendered responsibility for 
Brunei's defenoe and foreign affairs. The Sultanate then besame fully 
independent as a member of the Commonwealth and ASEAN (Assooiation of 
South-East Asian Nations, viz., Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Singapore and Thailand). I do not propose to oover the post-1959 period 
here. 1 Instead, I shall review the Residential Era itselft how was 
Brunei different in 1959 from what it had been in 1906? 
On the eve of the Residential Fra Drunei had been approaohing 
extinotions all but a small remnant of its former territory had been lost; 
the ocuntry was bankrupt; disaffeotion was general in the outdistriots; 
population was deolining; and the powerful Rajah of Sarawak was poised 
to deliver the final blow. In 1959, by oontrast, Brunei had an annual 
revenue of %130 million and reserves to the extent of x$600 million. The 
institution of social measures in the previous few years ensured that 
1. Cfe inter alia Sir T Dalyell, "Propping up the Sultan" in Ven, tue,, 
Vol 23 No 7 0'44-Auguet 1971), pp 8-9. M Leifer, "Deoolonization and 
International Statues The Experience of Brunei" in International Affairs 
(April 1978), pp 240-58. Finally, artioles in the annual publioation 
Southeast Asian Affairs (Heinemann Asia, for Institute of Southeast Asian 
Affairs, Singapore) especially 1976,1978,1981,1982,1983 and 1984. 
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people increasingly received good ednoation and medical care and might 
autioipate a non-oontributory pension when they retired, A road linked 
one and of the State with the other, rednoing to minutes a journey whioh 
in 1906 required data of trekking. A $9 million national mosque adorned 
the oapital where, in 1906, there had been only a wooden straotnre. Even 
during the lagt years of the Residential Era Brunei was an island of 
politioal peaoe and oalm in the oontext of South-East Asia as a whole. 
In late 1958 the Prime Minister of Malaya, Tunku Abdul Rabman (b 1903), 
suggested that Brunei was the ' Shangri-la of the East" t 
"You have no trouble here. Yom have no enemy working from within or 
without ands above all, you have no communist subversive elements 
trying to wreak a demooratioally-governed country". 2 
Erunei remained a ooantry of "order and peaoe" where the people did not 
have "maoh of a burden to bear". 
3 
2. 'Dying Kingdom' to tShaugr i-la" 
First and foremost the installation in 1906 of a British 
Resident in Brunei was solely responsible for the preservation of the 
moribund Sultanate. A Period of oonsolidation ensued during the first 
quarter oentury of the Residential Era. Further territorial losses 
(apart from one unfavoarable border adjustment) were averted. Brooke 
iufluenoe within Brunei was neutralized. At length the Brunei Government 
asserted full sovereignty within its own hause. The prinoipal failure 
in this respect concerned Limbang distriot, Brunei's erstwhile "rice 
2. Borneo Bulletin, 4 Ootober 1958. 
3. Ibid. 
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store and riohest asset" which remains in Sarawak's possession to this 
day; but the loss of this 'river' deolined in oomparative signifioanoe 
as the yearn paseeä, partioularly after the disoovery of petroleum. 
Another feature of Brunei's deoline before 1906 had been a fall 
in population. The poor, shabby and unhealthy oapital lost more than 
half its inhabitants in the second half of the nineteenth century, and 
particularly after the annexation of'Limbaug. Daring the Residential 
Era this trend was reversed, although the estimated mid-nineteenth 
oentary level had still not been regained by 1960. Men who had ventured 
abroad in searoh of a livelihood returned to Brunei Town so that the 
structure of the Malay population there again became more balanoed 
between the sexes. 
4 
Before 1906 disaffeotion had been general in the oatdistriots. 
Approximately half the popmlatioa of Belait and Wong was said to have 
emigrated in the deoade before 1904 beoause of dissatisfaotion with 
traditional Brunei rule. Although -these districts aooounted for a 
comparatively small proportion of the total population at that time, 
Belait was the largest single 'river' in extent; and., of courses it was 
here than the oilfield was found later. By contrast, throughout the 
Residential Brat administration by unarmed British officials proceeded 
4. On 30 April 1900 Consul AL Keyser reported: "Of the families who do 
remain (in Brunei Town), the majority of males are absent for long periods 
in searoh of work and food, and to a visitor the town seems mainly 
populated by women and ohildren" (CO 144/748 item 17694). See also The 
Times, 23 Deoember 19051 letter to the editor from (? the Rajah of) 
"Sarawak". 
The population theme is oovered on pp 5-79 251-3 and 307-9 
(above) and 532-7 (below). See, also, Appendix 6. 
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smoothly without reoourse at any time to sigaifioant military foroe. 
5 
The low number of prisonere, the virtual absenoe of strikes, riots and 
disturbanoes, -and the delayed appearanoe of a popular politioal party 
do not suggest gross oppression by the colonial power. 
Onos the introduction of a Resident guaranteed the survival of 
Brunei, the British set about reforming the oountry. 
6 
The traditional 
system of administration, taxation and land tenure, based on kera aan 
kurivan and tulip rights was swept aside. A natural oonoomitant was the 
abolition of serfdom and the possibility, for the first times of land 
ownership by ordinary people. The British established a new system of 
impersonal bureauoratio neutral government and district administration 
oontrolled by the Resident, whose writ, unlike that of pre-1906 Sultauep 
was effeotive throughout the oonntry. Innovations inoluded a pablio 
treasuryp a publio works department, a police foroe, a hieraroiyr of 
oourtsp a single legal tender and Brunei's first internationally-recognized 
postal service. The Residents, as part of a wider Colonial Servioe, also 
webt an example of inoorrupt administration which their local euooessora 
after 1959 have found diffioult to emulate. 
7 Finally, the British 
Residents, by destroying the territorial power of the pengraus and 
fostering the prestige of the Sultano bolstered the monarohh (whioh had 
5. In May to December 1941, it is true, a battalion of the 2/15th 
Punjab Regiment was stationed in Belait to supervise the oilfield 
destruotion soheme; and in 1954-61 a "Field Foroe" of Than policemen 
was stationed in Brunei. 
6. Theme disoussed on pp 21-45,105-56,298-307,346-50 and 452-521 
(above). 
7. Allegations of oorraption, virtually unknown daring the Residential 
Era, have sinne beoome oommon. 
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been virtually powerless in 1904) and unwittingly paved the way for the 
royal absolutism of post-independenoe Brunei. 
Another important aspeot of the Residents' work was the resoue 
of Brunei's finanoes, 
8 
The pengirans having been relieved of their 
powers of taxation, the British introdnoed the prinoiple that State 
revenue should be used for the polio benefit. Aooonnta were published 
in the Brunei Annual Reports for all to see how Government money was 
expended. Throughout the pre-oil eras however.. Brunei remained heavily 
indebted and rigorous eoonomy was essential. Although cession monies, 
monopolies and tulin revenues whioh had been reokleealy mortgaged by the 
pre-Residential adminiatrationy were redeemed by means of loans from the 
FKS, replaoement inoome was never sufficient to enable Brunei to do muoh 
more than break even. State revenue - in 1906 a mere %28,173,9 of which 
almost half was spent on the allowanoes to the Sultan and wazirs - reaohed 
$165,082 in 1913, then fell bank during the Great War, but climbed again 
to a pre-oil peak of %4409870 in 1927 when the rubber boom was at its 
height and exploration for oil was gathering pane in Belait. A small 
surplus was aohieved for the first time in 1910 and thereafter, apart 
from one or two exoeptionep revenue always ezoeeded expenditure. The 
chief sonroes of income then were customs duties (which had replaced 
'Monopolies'), followed by the Government ohandu monopoly, lioenoe fees, 
8. Theme oovered on pp 18-19,22-3,55-6,157-83,271-2,279-81,311-3, 
376 and 378-81 (above). See, also, Appendix 6 (below). 
9. This figure does not inolude "personal aooount" of %43,941.80, whioh 
would bring total receipts up to x$72,115.58. Government revenue in the 
following year (1907) amounted to x$51,777. 
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land rents and survey charges., interest and postal revenue (particularly 
from the rare issues of new stamps). At the end of 1928 the National 
Debt stood at %413,000 and was being repaid at the rate of only %6,000 
a year; the servioing of the debt, too, proved a major burden. Most 
of the economic hopes of 1906 had failed to oome to fruition and even 
rubber failed to generate a really substantial revenue for the oountry 
before 1932, oertaiuly in oomparison with later prooeeds from oil. 
Alongside the new bureauoraoy, muoh of the traditional order 
persisted so that Brunei came to have both a 'modern' and a 'traditional' 
Government. Referenoe has been made already to the strengthening of the 
Brunei monarob . Professor DE Brown adds an interesting insights 
"I have often imagined Brunei society and polity as a complex balloon- 
like structure.. which collapsed in the period Mr McArthur describes 
(1904), but which only needed to be blown up again to resume its old 
shape". 10 
The survival of the traditional order was assisted by British polioy. 
whioh aimed to interfere as little as possible with Brunei's sooial 
organization beyond reforming the peroeived pre-1906 abases. There was, 
therefore, "a tenaoious pereistenoe of rank" in the Sultanate and many 
traditional offioes were revived, partioularly after 1959= 
"Throughout the (nineteenth) oenturr there most oertainly were tendenoies 
to the dissolution of that system. But, after the turn of the century - 
even after the British overlords envisaged eliminating important 
traditional offioesp and when in faot traditional offioes were to be 
deprived of almost all oontent - appointments to traditional offioes 
began to inorease again. At present (1970) there are more persons 
holding traditional offioe than there were probably at aqy time in the 
10. Professor DE Brown, letter to the author, 15 September 1983, 
paragraph 10. 
529 
last century". 
11 
Some traditional offioes were held by individuals who had already 
aohieved distiaotioa in the modern bureauoraoy. One example is Pehin 
Dato Ibrahim bin Muhammad Jahfar, Sultan Omar Ali's seoretary, who held 
no Government offioe in the 1950sß but the traditional one, from 11 May 
1951,12 of Pehin Dato Perdana Mentri. 
13 
In other words this revival of 
traditional honoars buttressed the monarohys 
"Although the traditional offioes are now (1983) maintained for allegedly 
ceremonial reasons"t Professor Brown explains, "at least three of their 
features are important in a more-than-oeremonial ways 1) Solders of 
higher offices are quite powerful and/or close to the Sultan, and have 
a good likelihood of holding high modern-government office. 2) Receipt 
of traditional office creates a personal bond of loyalty to the Sultan 
and makes disloyalty particularly heinous. 3) A stipend goes with the 
office". 14 
Bestowal of traditional titles has been used as a means to secure the 
allegianoe of former PRB aotivists, suoh as Pehin Salleh (the party's 
former Vioe-President). 
Overall, during the years 1906-32 the demoralization caused 
by the previous prolonged period of deoline - territorial, politioal, 
eoonoinio and demographio - had been halted and the oountry had been 
oonsolidated and foundations laid upon whioh subsequent development 
oould be based. The aohievements of the pre-oil era may appear to be 
unspeotaoular; but they were nonetheless essential for all that. Apart 
11. DE Brown, Brunei# The Structure and History of a Bornean Malay 
Sultanate (Brunei 1970), pp 168-9. 
12. CO 985/1 Brunei Government Gazette, 15 June 1951- 
13o Of. DE Browny o . oit., p 114. 
14. DE Brown, "Brunei on the Eve of Independenoe" (typesoript, 1983: 
oopy oourtesy of Professor Brown), pp 5-6. 
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from the administrative and financial reforms just mentioned, smallpox 
and cholera had been effectively eliminated, yaws contained, Government 
revenue and trade expanded sixfold, and, even in the depression year of 
1931 exports were 166% of their 1904 level. 
The wealth derived fron oil beginning in 1932,. r. has transformed 
the Brunei Sultanate and it is difficult to exaggerate the contrast 
between the modern incarnation of the country and its former self in 
the days before oil. From being a debt-ridden and isolated backwater, 
the country today-boasts a gross national product far higher than Japan's 
and twioe. that of the United Kingdom. 
15 
Quite simply, Brunei is now one 
of the riobest and most rapidly developing oountries in the world. 
If the, export of the first barrel of oil in 1932 marked a 
watershed in the modern history of Brunei, exoeeded in importanoe only 
by the oountr7's salvation in 1906 by virtue of the appointment of a 
Resident# the first-deoade of the oil era (1932-41) fits awkwardly in 
the overall soheme of things. In some respeots it olearly marked a 
departure-from what had gone before. Daring those ten years annual 
Government revenue inoreased fourfold andq instead of being heavily 
indebted, substantial oredit balances were amassed in preparation for 
the day when oil.. ran out. Brunei "aoquired a rapid importance and 
wealth from the disoovery of its oil resouroes" and "the prospeot of a 
new standard of administration and development" improved markedly. 
15. Comparative GNP per capita in 1978: Brunei US$10,640, Japan 
US$7,330, United States US$9,700 and United Singdom U8i5,030. In 1981 
Brunei'a estimated GDP per capita was US$22,000. 
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Greater attention was turned to infrastructure and social services. 
Yet this new impetus initially led nowhere beoanset on 16 December 1941, 
Brunei was invaded by Japanese forces and during the forty-three months 
of occupation even the limited gains of the 1930s went to waste. In the 
light of the rapid advances of the post-war era, moreover, the 1930s 
seem to belong more to the pre-oil past than to the burgeoning develop- 
ment after 1945" 
Daring the latter half of the 1940s the restored Residential 
System had to clear up the chaos inherited from the Japanesel to 
restore decent administration and confidence, to rehabilitate the 
eoononpr, to rebuild the towns, restore and expand educational and 
medical facilities and to extend publio utilities and roads. By 1953 
this phase of reconstruction was declared to be complete and the country 
was ready to embark on its first five year plan "for the development of 
the State and for the improvement of its public services". This plan 
involved the provision of funds totalling X100 million, of which 76. 
E 
had been spent by the end of 1958. In essence the programme aimed to 
guard against the day when oil revenues oeasedq by establishing the 
infrastructure necessary for commercial enterprises and training the 
people to ran their own affairs. The Partei Rakyat Brunei (PRB), founded 
in 1956 and guided by the inspiring leadership of Sheikh Abmad M Azahari 
(b 1928), immediately won overwhelming popular support. The party 
sought independence, greater democracy, and a union of 'Kalimantan Utara'. 
KM Government agreed that these were not unwortiy goals, but argued that 
the PRB was rather impatient and that more time was required to ensure a 
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smooth transition to merdeka. The Sultan preferred to retain autocratio 
powers in his own hands and to, limit democratio oonoessioaa internally, 
whilst sheltering internationally under the British umbrella. 
The polioy of the Colonial Office - as formulated in 1944-59 
re-stated by Sir & Abell in 1953, and apparently still operative in 
1956-7 - ended in failure. MGovernment failed to prevent Brunei 
beooming an autooraoy. it failed to aeoure equal rights for the 
Chinese. It, failed to, ooax Brunei into an association either with its 
neighboars in NW Borneo or as part of a wider federation of Malaysia. 
Instead, the powers of oentral authority oonoentrated in the hands of 
the. Resident were inherited by the monaroh. The 1959 oonatitution was 
Sir Omar Ali Saifuddia'a deolaratiou of internal independenoe from the 
British. In effeot power had. been transferred overwhelmingly to the 
monaroh rather than to the people of Brunei. 
3" The People of Brunei in 1959 
In 1959 the inhabitants of Branei, 
16 
whose numbers had nearly 
quadrupled sine 1911, showed marked diversity in distribution, ethnio 
grouping, religion and oooupatioa. The people were better edaoated, 
more healtbT and leas poor than their anoeatora had been in 1906. 
During the Residential Era the population of Brunei quadrupled 
despite the fact that before 1906 (and perhaps for some time thereafter) 
it had aotualil7 been deolining. Daring the pre-oil era the population 
remained oonoentrated in Brunei-läuara distriot. Brunei Town, with 
16. Theme pursued from p 525 (above). 
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10,453 inhabitants, remained the only signifioant settlement in the 
country in 1931, when more than one in every three people in Brunei 
still lived in the oapital. 
In the first decade of the oil era, 1932-419 growth quickened. 
From 1911 to 1931 total population had increased from 21,718 only to 
30,135; boxt by 1938 the total had advanced to an estimated 37,878 and 
had reached perhaps 40,000 by the end of 1940.17 Immediately before the 
Japanese ocompation the populati one if anything, had begun slightly to 
decline because of the contraction of the BMPC's activities and the oil 
denial Boheme. In 1946, when the Residential System was restored, the 
inhabitants were estimated to number 48,000; but only 40,657 (or 40,670) 
were enumerated in the oensus taken in the following year. These 
figures appear to suggest that little or no population growth took 
plaoe during the years 1940 to 1947 and that in the interval a notional 
seven thousand people were either (a) killed ; or (b)lhad emigrated from 
Brunei; or (o) had not migrated to Brunei as they might have done had 
the population trends of the 1930s been maintained from 1940 to 1947. 
The -laok, of population growth was most probably due to faotor (o) just 
mentioneds i. e. immigration had been muoh reduoed beoause of the war. 
By 1960 the population had more than doubled (to 83,877) sinne 
1947" In other Korde, whereas 36 years (1911-47) had seen an inoreaee 
of 87%, only thirteen years more (1947-60) were required for a further 
inorease of 106%. Or, -whereas the average annual rate of inorease was 
17. CO 537/1628 Dr AGH Smart (1882-1964), "Report on Medical Activities 
and Problems in British Borneo", 15 January 1946, p 6. 
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Table 24. Brunets Distribution of Population by District 1911-60 
Distriot 1911 1931 1960 
Number %age Number %age Number %age 
Brunei-Muara 15,910 73.2 18,281 60.7 37,511 44.7 
Tt ong 3,423 15.8 5,651 18.75 10,710 12.8 
Belait 1,126 5.2 3,897 12.9 31,708 37.8 
Tembarong 1%, 259 5.8 2p306 7.65 39948 4.7 
TOTAL 21,718 100.0 30,135 100.0 83,877 100.0 
Soaroess (a) CO 531/3 (34002) Sir A Young to CO, No l0,28 
September 1911, enolosing is Lee-Warner to Young, 17 May 1911 (Brunei 
Census Report 1911). The figure for Belait may be a slight under- 
estimate. 
(b) JL Noakes MBE, Sarawak and Bruneis A Report on the 
1947 Census (Knohing 1950). 
(o) LW Jones, Report on the Census of Population Taken on 
10 August 1960 (Kuohing 1960), p 23. 
only 1-75 in 1911-47, it was 5.7% in the years 1947-60.18 
In terms of distribution, the balanoe of population had swung 
to Belait district and away from the capital and its environs (see Table 
249 above). Whereas Branei-Mtzara distriot had aooounted for almost 
three quarters of the total population in 1911 this had been redaoed to 
OU17 45% by 1960. By oontrast, Belait, the dietriot with the fewest in- 
habitants in 1911, aoooanted for almost two-fifths of the population by 
19609, a proportion exoeeded only, by Brunei-Hure. A majority of immigrants 
into Belait came originally? from outside the 3ultanate, but there Was 
also a substantial measure of internal migrations subsistence farmers 
18. Today, 1985, Brunei's population is in excess of 200,000. 
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tended to take up temporary work in the oilfield to earn suffioient 
money for a partioular purohase and then returned to their homes. It 
will be noticed that throughout the Residential Era the proportion of 
total population in Tutong and Temburong remained oomparatively stable., 
although the numbers living there more than trebled. 
Faotore, apart from immigration, whioh oontributed to overall 
population growth, included a higher rate of natural increase (partio- 
ularly among immigrant Chinese), itself assisted by the elimination of 
killer epidemics, suoh as oholera and smallpox, the improvement of living 
conditions brought about by better housing and sanitation, and the vast 
improvement and extension of medical faoilities. The advanoe of midwifery 
and infant welfare is refleoted in the fact that, whereas almost one in 
every two infants perished in 1927, by 1959 the ratio, though still 
unaooeptably high, had fallen to less than one in ten. Brunei had an 
extremely youthful population after the Seoond World Wars in 1960 
ohildren aged lese than fifteen years aoooanted for 46% of the whole. 
This demographic fact is of importance in oonneotion with the rise of 
the Partai Rakyat Brunei, because it means that about half, probably 
more, of the population had no personal recollection of the Japanese 
occupation and still more had no direct knowledge of a Brunei without 
oil wealth. Few people were alive to remember pre-Residential Brunei. 
Daring the 1950sß therefore, Residents faced the difficulty of satisfying 
rapidly rising popular expeotations. 
Although the population had nearly quadrupled during the 
Residential Era, a large proportion of people ooutiuued to live in 
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urban areas. Mr McArthur's scheme for the creation of a land capital 
19 
to replaoe Kampong /yer had only been half-fulfilleds building had indeed 
taken plaoe on terra firma but the deoline in the population of the River 
Village, though continuing throughout the pre-oil era, was eventually 
reversed after 1931. Far from disappearing, Kampong Ayer began to 
expand, "oo that by 1960 13,237 lived over the water oompared with only 
9,702 in the land oapital. Conoomitantly, the new wealth generated by 
oil had permitted the embellishment of the State oapitalt typefied by 
the national mosques opened on 26 September 1958. In short, the 
regeneration of the oapital mirrored the regeneration of the oonntry as 
a whole. 
Prom the 1920s Brunei Town, hithert o, the only appreoiable 
settlement, found itself rivalled inoreasingly by the new oilfield 
townships of Seria and Kuala Belait. After the diaoovery of oil the 
population of Kuala Belait inoreased from 1,193 in 1931 to an estimated 
5,000 in 1938: After falling to 3,981 in-1947 it rose again to 89936 by 
1960.20 Soria grew more rapidlys too insignifioant to be reoorded in the 
1931 oensua, it oontained 5,525 inhabitants in 1947 and 16,100 by 1960.21 
19, Theme discussed on pp 187-90,194,69 210-11,226-7,232-3 and 
401-2 (above). 
20. CA Vlielaud, A Report on the 1931 Census and on Certain Problems 
of Vital Statistics (? London 1932), Table 16. CO 824/2 Brunei Annual 
Report 1938, p 5, JL Noakes MBE, Sarawak and Brunei: A Report on the 
1947 Population Census (Kuching 1950), p 249. LW Jonesp Braneit Report 
r-August 1960 (Kuching, on the Housing Census Held in Four Towns, Wa, 
1961), p 2. 
21. Noakes, loo. oit.; and Jones, loo. oit. 
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The head offioes of the BMPC, formerly in Labi' were established in 
Kuala Belait in 1929. In the same year looal government headquarters had 
also been transferred to Kuala Belait (from Kuala Balai). During the 
1950s, Kuala Belait-Panaga-Seria, orderly and pleasant-looking, seemed 
a very model of modern town-planning; but there were uglier aspects, such 
as over-crowding in houses and a notorious slum in Seria at Well 22.22 
The means of travel affeoted settlement patterns and national 
unity. Originally, choioe of dwelling plane was determined by the use 
of rivers as oommanioations (and also as the "water°supply, bath and 
drain")p hamlets and pads farms being established at intervals along 
the banks. Politioal oppression had modified this pattern somewhat 
before 1906 when some people retreated into the jangle in order to 
esoape the attentions of their rapaoioae Brunei overlords. 
23 (This trend 
was repeated during the Japanese oooupation). 
24 From the mid-1920s 
roads became decisive in determining settlement in rural areass villages 
away from highways tended to decline and even to disappear, whereas fresh 
kamponge sprang up in ribbon developments along the new routes. Road 
frontage enhanoed the value of land and swelled the national exohequer'e 
reaeipte from land rents. 
Since communications remained oomparative1y poor in Brunei 
throughout the Residential Eras each district tended to develop in 
isolation from others. The oontrast between Belait and Brunei-1Kuara 
22. Borneo Bulletin, 13 September 1954,18 Deoember 1954, '8 June 1957 
and 21 June 1958. 
23. FO 572/39 MSH MoArthur, "Report on Brunei in 1904", paragraph 28. 
24. (RB0) Meg Pao s71. (File 5) gra Say to CFC Maoaekie, 31 Deoember 1945 
(Report on the first six months of the BMA, paragraph 3). 
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beoame partioularly marked. 
25 
Even before the disoover7 of oil, the 
pagan, low-statue padi-farmers of Belait oontrasted with the Muslim, non- 
agriculturist Malays of the capital. To the isolation of Belait and 
the raoial and religions distinotiveneae of the inhabitants there, 
was added, from the 1920sß the gathering pane of oilfield develop- 
meat, which enhanoed the oontrast between the industrial lifestyle of 
Belait and the subsistenoe lifestyle of Brunei-l4uara distriot, Although 
oommunioationa between the two districts improvedg, the latter remained 
distinot, To all intents and purposes Belait was a private tief of the 
oil ooupany and had more in oommon with the oilfield extension aoross 
the border in Sarawak than with Brunei Town. The BMPC provided all the 
amenities whioh the Brunei Government originally was unable to afford; 
and in the 1950s its servioes were better in some respeots that those 
provided by the administration. Most of the inhabitants were non- 
indigenous; Seria and. Kuala Belait were essentially oil oomPany towns, 
built, iuhabited and servioed mainly by the BMPC and. its staff or by 
enterprises dependent upon the BMPC for their existenoe. In the 1950s 
jealousy arose between the 'spendthrift' capital and the 'wealth-creating' 
oilfields people in the latter oomplained of laok of Government funds 
apportioned to the distriot. 
26 
Mr Bevington, Commissioner for Development 
25. Theme pursued from PP 309-11 and 312 (above). 
26. Borneo Bulletin, 7 June 1958,21 June 1958 and 27 September 1958. 
The Bulletin suggested that its own proposal for the removal of a sand 
bar aoross the mouth of the River Belait was obstructed beoause some 
State Counoillors did not wish to lavish funds upon Belait distriot. 
Mr EB Bevington assures the present writer,, by contrast, that the scheme 
was dropped beoause it was opposed by the BSPC. The removal of the 
Belait bar, by permitting access to Belait of ships with a heavier 
draught, Wrould have out the cost of living in the oilfield by obviating 
the neoessity for transshipment at Labuan. See p 447 (above). 
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1954-8, denies that the capital received favourable treatment. 
27 
Another 
Observer oomments that differenoes between life in the western end of the 
State and that at the eastern and were, and remain, ooneiderables 
"There is a (distance) of about seventy miles between Brunei Town, the 
capital, and Kuala Belait, sufficient to mean that usually people don't 
jump into their oars too often for a spin to the other and of the State. 
The difference is that at Kuala Belait and Soria the great bulk of the 
population are employed by the oil company or are associated with the oil 
company in one way or another and Government interference or connection 
is minimal. Whereas at the other end of the State everything smacks of 
the Government. The contrast was much greater(in former days) when 
travelling between the two ends of the State was very diffioultv there 
was no through road, and most of the travelling had to be done on the 
beach at low tide. Even the telephone hardly ever worked... Life is much 
freer and more westernized in Belait than is true in Brunei Town for 
these reasoas.. But strangely the local people are not too keen on life 
in the oilfield". 28 
In short, the development of the oilfield did not create differenoes 
between Belait and Brunei; but it did greatly e=aoerbate them. Sultan 
Omar Ali met a warm weloomep nonetheless, when he became the first 
monaroh in living memory officially to visit Belait in 1955; 
29 
but it 
was as though he were on a foreign t our. 
IF a geographioal polarization had developed between Belait 
and Brunei distriotep30 there was a further polarization between the 
bumipatras (indigenes) and immigrants (see Table 25Y overleaf). The 
27, Text of tape reoording made for the author by oourtesy of Mr ER 
Bevington CMG CE g, 10 August 1983, P 42. ("I think the money was very 
evenly and reasonably spread on the whole"). 
28. Letter to the author. 
29. Datuk RN Turner, letter to the authors 16 February 1983, remembered 
that Sultan Ahmad Tajuddin had paid a private visit to Belait during his 
(Datuk Turner's) tenure as Assistant Resident (1940-1). 
30. Tutong and Temburong remained in the shadows Khoo Soo Hook Comments 
that the lank of development in Temburong was due to "difficulties of 
terrain and aooessibility". The district had no basis for development, 
suoh as oil in Belait. Khoo Soo Hook, "Agricultural Land Use" in Khoo 
Soo Hook at al. p Brunei in Transition (Kuala Lumpur 1976), pp 87-8. 
540 
Table 25. Brunei: Population by Ethnio Grouping 1911-60 
Group 1911 1947 1960 
Malays 11,554 16,748 45,135 (a) 
Keäayans 4,931 6,723 
Dnanns 1,069 2,759 
Beiaits 1,097 716 
Tat onga 19667 29431 
Ibaus - 1,332 
Mnrut a 563 298 
Chinese 736 8,313 21,795 
Indians 44 436 
Daropeans 20 394 
Others 37 520 16,947 
TOTALS 21,718 40,670 8 3,877 
Notes (a) "Malays and other indigenous" 
Souroess Brunei oeueuees 1911,1947 & 1960. 
* 
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proportion of indigenous people deolined markedly from 96.3% of the total 
in 1911 to only 70.6% in 1960. Distinotions between indigenous Brunei 
groups gradually beoame less well-defined as a result of a tendency to 
masuk Melasu, i. ee to beoome Muslim and therefore to "enter the Malay 
raoe". A similar prooess ooourred in other wagst inhabitants of ulu 
Belaitp for example, tended to beoome Ibanized, espeoially after the 
Paoifio War, whilst some Dusunm adopted the Chinese way of life upon 
intermarriage. 
The largest immigrant grouping was formed by the Chinese, 
31 
insignifioant numerioally in 1906, who oomprised a quarter of all 
inhabitants by 1960. They came "in the manner of immigrants", the men 
first. After a while, they began to settle and their wives oame to join 
them. 32 Intermarriage with the non Muslim indigenous population was not 
unknown; and in suoh oiroumstanoes the wife tended to adopt the Chinese 
way of life. As a result the struoture of the Chinese seotion of the 
population became more balanoed. s in 1931 there were only three women for 
every ten men but by 1960 the proportion was more than eight to tan. At 
the latter date about half the Brunei Chinese had been born there. 
In terms of numbers other immigrants (Ibans, Indians and 
Biropeane) remained oomparatively insignifioant. But the oilfield, with 
800 Europeans in 19539 oontained "one of the largest and most oompaot 
European oommunities in BE Asia". Its influenoe was "immense". 
33 
31. Theme pursued from pp 12-13,40-2,529 159-62,251-29 307-9, 
329-30,336,414-16,454,463 and 477-80 (above). 
32. LW Jones, Report on the Census of Population Taken on 10 August 
1960 (Kuohing 196? ), p 36. 
33. Brunei Annual Report 19539 p 7. 
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The tide of immigration modified the religious oharaoter of 
Brunei. The 1960 census revealed that only 60% of the population 
professed Muhammadanism, the official State religion. The balance 
oonsisted predominantly of Chinese Coafuoians, with an admixture of 
Christians (8%) and non-Confuoian pagans. 
Despite the deolining proportion of Mnhammadans, Islam enjoyed 
qualitatively a revival in Brunei during the Residential Era. 
34 
When 
the Resident was first appointed most Brunei Malays were "Muhammadans of 
a mild type", 
35 
many of whom never attended mosque even oaoe a year. 
36 
In 1906, indeed, there had been only one mosque in the oountr7, a wooden 
structure dating from 1902, whioh itself had been built with British 
assistanoe. 
37 
Considerable mosque building took plaoe daring the 
Residential has four were built in 1911, three in 1928-9 and, of oourse, 
the national mosque was completed in 1958. Immediately after 1906 there 
appears to have been only one imam, Hai ldobidin, desoribed as "one of 
the hardest worked men" in Brunei, administering the oivil Muhammadan 
law dealing with betrothals, marriages and divorces, and settling rights 
to property. 
38 
In 1913, however, the imam, whose ooaduot had been "far 
from satiefaotory", was removed from offioe "on the petition of several 
34. Theme oontinued from above, pp 9-10,11p 13-14,106-7,128,132,136, 
140-1,145-6,251,325,417,444,474,476,500,513,514,517 and 519- 
35- P Blundell, The City of many Waters (London 1923), P 46- 
36. Ibid., p 142. The rite of circumcision was not carried out in 
Brunei in the "wholesale fashion" that obtained in Malaya (CO 824/1 
Brunei Annual Report 1911, p 12). 
37. P0 572/37 p 32; and MoArthur, "Report", paragraph 55- 
38. CO 824/1 Brunei Annual Report 1911, p 12. The reporter added that 
"a larger number than usual" went to Meooa, inoluding the first pilgrims 
from Tembar ong. Women were more keen than men to undertake the haji. 
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kampongs", and was succeeded by Khatib Abdul 8ajak. The latter took the 
title man Katbi and proved "euergetio and straightforward". 
39 
In his 
ooart, Whioh dealt with all religious matters, he had authority, to impose 
fines not exoeeding ten dollars. By 1941 the Resident had established 
a Religious Affairs Department, whioh employed - apart from the kathi - 
a dato imam, tuan imam, four khatibs (preaohers)q five mudims (muezzins), 
ten imams (leaders of prayer), a prooess servers and a bilal (maezzin). 
40 
After the Japanese occupation the Islamic revival became more 
pronoanoedv representing perhaps a searoh for a Bruneian identity and a 
re-affirmation of traditional values. in 1958 Major T Harrisson DSO 
oommented that daring the previous ten years Islam had been 
"regenerated from a oonditioa almost of apatbr, into an aotive, potent 
high level part of the ooantry'a effort and conscious re-orientation, 
regurgitating a version of the past". 41 
The then kathi, who influenoed the Sultan more than anyone, 
42 
imposed 
an increasingly etriot interpretation of Islamic law in the 1950s. This 
tread - oharaoterized by one oritio as "religious fanatioism"43 - is 
indioated by the strengthening of ties with Muslim Sultanates in Malaya 
rather than with Brunei's predominantly non-Muhammadan Bornean neighbours; 
the abolition of Government subsidies to Christian mission sohools; a 
prohibition on pubiio oonsumption of aloohol; the imposition of Muslim 
39" CO 824/1 Brunei Annual Report 1913, p 8. see also, Blundelly 22. 
ii., pp 102-3. 
40.00 717/145 (File 51535) Brunei Estimates 1941, p 32 (item 20). 
41. T Harrisson, "Some Origins and Attitudes eto" in Sarawak Museum 
Journal rnal (rune 1958)v p 315- 
42* Mr JO Gilbert 0MG, letter to the author, 20 February 1983, p 2. 
For a list of Kam, see Appendix 4.10 (below). 
43. Borneo Bulletin, 21 March 1959" 
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taxes, suoh as the zakat and fitrah; and the denial of equal status to 
settlers, particularly those of Chinese origin. In 1954 a State Custom, 
Religion and Welfare Department was established under the Pen ran 
Pemancha. « By, the lagt decade of the Residential Era Islam had become 
"deeply rooted" in the majority of Malay families, all religious festivals 
and observanoes being faithfully kept. 
45 
In the aase of Belaits and Tatongs, Islam remained a "thin 
veneer" for "essential paganism" as late as 1938. Improvements in 
oommanioations and the resultant breakdown of the physical isolation of 
Belait and Tatoag produced a greater sense of belonging to a wider 
Muslim Malay community by the 1950s. But a reading of Pehin Ibrahim"s 
"Brunei Adat" (first published in 1948) 
46 
suggest that, even in the 
case of Malays, belief in superstitions, charms and omen was by no means 
extinot, The Kedayans, too, though "devout Muslims" oontinue to praotise 
auoestor worship. The performanoe of suoh rights, we are assured., is "a 
traditional fanotion inherited from the ancestors, in the context, today, 
44. See pp 471 and 495-6 (above). 
45. CO 824/4 HJ Padmore, Triennial Report on Education 1955-7 (August 
1958), p 48. How far Islamization represented a genuine popular 
movement and how far it was artificially created from above for political 
purposes would make an interesting study in itself. The initial 
manifesto of the Partai Rakyat Brunei, for example, makes absolutely no 
mention of religion (Borneo Bulletin, 28 January 1956). Professor DE 
Brown warns, moreover, that the policy of Islamization may backfire on 
the royal family, many Brunei Muslims., he says, "believe that hereditary 
kingship is anti-Islamic. The rulers of Brunei (in 1983) seem to have 
their eyes on the Saudi Arabian model of Islam, but if there were a free 
expression of Muslim thought in Brunei, alternative models would find 
their adherents" (DE Brown, "Brunei on the Eve of Independence" - 
typescript 1983, pp 9-10. Copy courtesy of Professor Brown). 
46. Reprinted in Brunei Museum Journal 1969, pp 5-9. see, also, 
Blundell, op. cit., p 46. 
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of being a Muslim". 
47 
The purpose of anoeator worship was the mainteaanoe 
of social cohesion. 
Other indigenous peoples - Muruts, Ikzsunsp Ibans, Orang Bukits 
- remained predominantly animists, but those oonverted to Islam would 
have oeased to pall themselves by their former title. As early as 1911 
a number of, Muruts adopted Muhammadanism and the hope was expressed 
that this oonversioa would ooaduoe to the physioal as well as the 
spiritual salvation of a dying rape. (The ranks of Muruts had been 
thinning beoause of their-partiality to to ai. The Koran, on the other 
hand, disootu'ages alcohol oonsumption). The number of those oalling 
themselves Muruts deolined from 563 in 1911 to 298 in 1947. 
Christianity also made its presenoe felt,, but mainly among 
imanigrante. In the early 1930e both Anglican (SPQ) and Roman Catholio 
(Hill Hill) missions established schools in the ooantry, and, after the 
Japanese interlude, there followed a rapid expansion of Christian 
eduoation. In the 1950s many Brunei Chinese embraoed Christianity, but 
the teaohings of Confuoius oontinued to predominate. Finally, it was 
suggested in the 1960s that Christianity was making "more headway than 
Islam in modernizing the DAtsuns and Ibans". 
48 
Divereifioation of religion was aooompanied by diversifioation 
of oooupation. 
49 
The division of labour extended from Chinese traders 
to 8edayan farmers and Malay Government amployeesp fishermen and crafts- 
47. PM Shariffuddiag "Mekkan Tabun - The Annual Feast of the Kedayans" 
in Brunei Museum Journal 1970, p 61. 
48. Zaharah Haji Mabmud, "Spatial Prognosis of the Rural Population", 
in Khoo Soo Hook et al., o . oit., p 10. 
49. Theme pursed from pp 10-13,15,200-2 and 253 (above). 
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men. Those Chinese who remained in Brunei on the eve of the Residential 
Era were few in number, but comprised the ohief traders, shopkeepers, 
money 1enders and revenue farmers. 
50 
Subsequently Chinese provided 
skilled artisans for the oilfield and also made up the general business- 
men of the Sultanate. As jr Tonest the 1960 censor, noted: - 
"The Chinese settle in and near the towns and in the more fertile areas, 
disliking the remoter plaoesp and become smallholders - growing not rice 
but commercial crops - market gardeners and traders. Their industry and 
business acumen make them of value to the'oountry, but they do not 
assimilate, keeping their own oustomsp language and characteristics to 
a marked extent". 51 
Obtaining Brunei oitizenship gras and remains virtually impossible, 
52 
and the Chinese businessman largely gave up hope of aoquiring its so 
long as they were allowed. to pursue their business end. s$ 
He feels that as long as he keeps a low profile, he can lead a pleasant 
and profitable life and this suits him". 53 
There were such good profits to be made in Brunei, in other words, that 
disorimination was tolerated by the Chinese. In the 1950s some Chinese 
"resented" the Sultan's "obvious dislike" of them, but no trouble was 
allowed to eurfaoe (thanke, it in said, to the influenoe of Mr George 
Newn Ah Foott, the Chinese representative on the State Couaoil). 
54 
50. Shopkeepers tended to be Hokkiene, whilst tailors and timber work- 
men were Khehe. 
51. LW Jones, 8R ort on the Census of Population Taken on 10 August 
1960 (Kuohing n. d. ), p 27- 
52* Exoept for those who make "a show of aooeptanoe of the Islamio 
faith" or give "the right presents to the right people" (C Hollingworth, 
"Independenoes Problems of a Brave New Brunei" in Telegraph Sunday 
Magazine, 5 February 1984, p 21). 
53. Letter to the authors 10 May 1983. 
54. "He (Mr Ah Foott) was muoh of an elder statesman and looked very 
old"p one contemporary reoalls. "The Chinese revere age. Mr Foott was 
the father of the community and the Chinese put pressure on any of their 
number who looked like upsetting the apple-Dart. They have devious ways 
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The Brunei Chinese congregated in limited areas. In 1960 
94.6% of them lived in Brunei-Muara and Belait dietriote, where a publio 
ootiIi-d be found to trade or bot produce. People of Chinese race comprised 
44.6% of the inhabitants of Belait. 
Acing the Residential Bra the trend in employment in Brunei 
was towards expansion in the seoondarv and tertiary spheres and a 
diminution of the primary seotor. 
55 
In 1921 agrioaltural oooupations 
a000unted for three-quarters of total emplooment compared with only 
one-third in 1960. Fishing and padi-planting declined in relative 
importanoe as souroes of employment although the number of fishermen 
remained little changed. On the other hand the eeoondt seotor 
enhanoed. its share of total employment, refleoting the expansion of 
building and oonstraotion work after 1945 and the growth and oanplioation 
of administration and the provision of new servioes such as education 
and health. Commeroe also attraoted an inoreasing number of persons 
after 1945; Personal services and entertainment declined in relative 
importanoe, though they made a oonsiderable gain in numbers. 
Slightly more than half (55-5%) of the population were "eoon- 
omioally active, ' in 1960 (86% of men and 20% of women aged over 15). 
The working population included 472 employers, 15,236 employees, 6,308 
"own account workers" and 2,814 family workers. Many wives worked part 
time. In farming households, the extent to which a wife worked on the 
of so doing" (Mr ER Bevington, letter to the author, 2 September 1983, 
paragraph 4). 
55. This matter has been dealt with by Voon Phi. Keong, "Employment 
and Labour" in. Khoo Boo Hook at al. 9o. oit. pp I83-221. 
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farm depended upon the number of children in her care. In 1960 45 of 
the eoonoanioally-aotive population was engaged in agriculture either 
full or part-time. Of the eoonomioally-aotive population engaged in 
the non-agricultural sector, 36% were directly employed in the PWD as 
wage earners of one category or another. 
New orops suoh as rubber did muoh to modify shifting oultivation 
and provided Dash in what otherwise would have been a subsistence house- 
hold. In many agrioultural families., wage-earning had tended to beoone 
the main souroe of inoome. The bulk of the farming aotivities then 
devolved upon the womenfolk. The plantation system even with regard to 
rubber did not make any impaot in Brunei and the oommodity was grown 
predominantly in smallholdings. There was no reoord of an appreoiable 
inoiiienoe of absentee landlordism or of tenanoy. 
Total employment figures oonstitated 35% of the population in 
1947 and 30% in 1960. The decrease in 1960 was possibly due to the higher 
proportion of obildren aged less than fifteen in the total population. 
High wages paid by the oil oompany and Government disoouraged 
inoentives in developing alternative industries in the private seotor 
whioh was probably not in a position, initially, to offer similar wages. 
Hence potentially large employers, suoh as timber-planting and sawmilling, 
and small-soale industries were largely absent. 
The population was also better educated in 1959 than it had 
been at the beginning of the Residential Fla 
56 Literaoyp whioh was 
56.. Theme pursued from pp 13,197-8,292-8,325,350-19 357-60t 412-23 
and 484-5 (above). 
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virtually. non. -existent in Brunei in 1906, had reached about 8-9% in 
1931,26% in 1947 and 48% in 1960. There were differences, however, 
between the literary rates of men and women, young and old, bumipatras 
and non, -indigenes. The percentage of literate men jumped from 42% in 
1947 to 64% in 1960, the percentage of literate women from 8% to 29.5%. 
Similarly, 74% of the 10-14 age group (85% of boys and 63% of girls) 
and 62% of the 15-19 age group were literate in 1960, compared with only 
13% of those aged 55 years or more. Finally, in 1960 only 42% of Malays 
aged over nine years could read and write, compared with 72% of Chinese. 
Many of the latter acquired their learning outside Brunei. 
57 
Apart from being better educated,, the populace was also more 
affluent by 1960, The value of imports - P0.25 million in 1916, 
$1m in 
1925, X2.8m in 1938 - had reaohed 993m in 1955 and 
%107m in 1957, before 
falling baok to %63m in 1959, prinoipally because of a vast deorease in 
imports of manufactured goods, maohinery and transport equipment follow- 
ing the oompletion of many of the development programmes. In the early 
years of the Residential Era imports had comprised principally necessities 
of life, such as foodstuffs. After the Second World War imports of 
oonsumer goods, suoh as watches, furniture, olothingg road vehicles, 
electrical maohinery, oosmetios, cotton fabrics, jewellery, musioal 
57" By 1971 69.4% (78.4% of meng 58.8% of women aged above nine years) 
were literate. Of the 10-14 age group 92.4% were literate. Two-thirds 
of Malays and over 80% of all Chinese were literate. No less than 
239575 people (out of a total population of 136,256) were literate in 
English. People with university degrees - nil in 1959 - numbered 
668 
in 1971 (State of Bruneig Report on the Census of Population 1971, Bandar 
Seri Begawan, ? 1973). 
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instruments, phonographs, and reoords and other manufaotnred artioles 
showed vast increases. Consumption of coffee, tea, alcohol, tobacco and 
meat also rose. Land prices rooketeds $15,000 could be commanded for an 
adre of poor rubber seedlings in the mid-1950s in pertain areas. 
The first oar was introdnoed into Brunei in 1924" BY 1959 
there were 2,036 private oars and 1,607 other vehicles, inoluding taxis, 
land rovers, trunks and buses (of. P 501, fu 135, above). 
The expansion of Brunei's postal service (founded in 1906) is 
another index of development during the Residential Era. The number of 
Postal artioles handled in Brunei totalled 45,887 in 1925; 239,382 in 
1938; 654,389 in 1947; 'and 2,171,900 in 1959. 
Living conditions had also improved, judging from the results 
of a 1960 census of housing in four main urban areass Brunei Town (land 
seotiou onlys i. e. exoludfng Kampong Ayer),, Seria, Kuala Belait and 
Tatong. 
58 
Before the Paoifio War, shophouses in Brunei Town were semi- 
permanent, i. e. built of timber and billian shingle roofing; they had 
baoket latrines, eleotrioity and piped water. Government buildings were 
of the same type, the hospital being the only permanent building in 1931. 
In 1945 temporary ata shophouses sprang up along the river banks and 
olose to the raine of the former town. Government buildings, offices and 
quarters were built similarly. As trade pinked up the temporary shops 
were dismantled and a few rows of permanent shops were oonstruoted in 
1948. The number steadily inoreased thereafter until all the makeshift 
58. This oeotion is based upon LW Jones, Bruneis Report on the Housing 
Census Held in Four Towns, Map August 1960 (Brunei 1961). 
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straotures had disappeared. Almost all the shophouses were built with 
State aid in the form of loans of up to 90 of the Dost with repayment 
over 30-35 Years at 3-0- 
Under the Development Plan, 1953-8, temporary Government build- 
ings were demolished as soon as permanent ones were ready. Many private 
individuals living in the land oapital also improved their style of 
living and built houses of a semi-permanent nature in aooordanoe with 
looal regulations. All shophouses and Government quarters were supplied 
with electricity and piped water. 
Seria bad more permanent buildings in 1960 than any other town 
in British Borneo. The oompany quarters were supplied by the BMPC. In 
Kuala Belait there were sixty oonorete shophouses as well as schools, 
markets and Government buildings and quarters. The town was furnished 
with electricity and water bought by the Government from the BMPC and 
resold to the pablio. In Brunei Town (land seotion) 28% of buildings were 
permanent (inoluding shophouses), with an average of 5.4 persons per 
permanent house. In Kuala Belait, 70% of houses were semi-permanent. 
Half the houses in the land capital were detached. In Seria 
two-thirds of 3,728 dwellings were attaohed. g an unusual pattern for 
Borneo. In all types of house there was an average of 5,3 occupants but 
the figure was higher for shophoases beoauee of the extended family. 
Nearly all dwellings surveyed, 94. %q had the use of piped water; 
and, of this number, eleven out of every twelve had piped water inside 
the house. In Seria 95% of dwellings were supplied with eleotrioity (of. 
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Brunei Towns land seotion, 89%; T. itong 86%; and Kuala Belait 79%). Of 
the 36,253 inhabitants of the four prinoipal land towns, 90% had the use 
of eleotrioity. Most householders (8y% of 8,091) did not own their 
aaoommodatioa. 
59 
What about Kampong Ayrert which was not inoluded in this census? 
"For hundreds of years they (the River Villagers) have been used to 
instant disposal of rubbish or nightsoil through the windows or floors". 
Mr Bevington commented. "Their houses are oool - the wind blows all, 
round, all over and underneath. And they are by no means all slums... 
Some people are building very neat houses (albeit eye sores by dint of 
their oorrugated iron roofs), and have potted plants flowering on the 
verandahs they are as houseproud as any European housewife. The houses 
are oritioized beoause they look dirty and are not painted. But the 
Brunei Malay is no fools he knows that his house is built, in many oases, 
of the finest hardwood and needs no paint. And if he does paint its in 
eighteen months the paint will be mildewed and look shabby and he will 
have to go to the expense of painting it again, and again eto. And an 
unpainted house-, is not necessarily a dirty house; although to European 
eyes it may look shabby, to Malay eyes it does not". 60 
It is difficult to make poor oonditions is Kampong Ayer an accusation 
against the Residential System because the people living there had been 
offered repeatedly the opportunity to take up better aooommodation 
59. By 1980 annual Government revenue was %4,000 million Brunei dollars 
(with which the Malayan dollar had been replaced). In 1978 the country 
had 40,000 automobiles but only 358 miles of road. Education and health 
were free. Eleotrioity, petrol, rice, sugar and rents were heavily 
subsidized and interest-free loans were available for houses, oars and 
television sets (Times The Weekly Newsmagazine, 17 July 1978, p 19). 
Substantial recent infrastruotural developments include a deep water 
port, an international airport, an earth satellite, and 18,000 tele- 
phones (by 1979). A national airline and colour television service 
were introduced in 1975. House servants from abroad are common. The 
proportion of ha is and haj japs in the population has soared (DE Brown, 
"Brunei on the Eve of Independence"p pp 4-5; typescript courtesy of 
Professor Brown). But today there is still "some malnutrition in the 
villages though nowhere near as prevalent as in other countries of the 
region" (Christian Science Monitor, 11 January 1984, p 16). The present 
Sultan of Brunei is the richest man in the world. 
60. ER Bevington, The Economy and Development of the State of Brunei 
(June 1956), pp 46-7. Copy courtesy of Mr Bevington CMG CEng. 
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elsewhere. If they remained in Kampong Ayer, that was their ohoice. 
Government efforts since 1959 to persuade River Villagers to move to 
terra firma have been little more suooessful. 
6l 
4. Bruneis A Sultanate Regenerated 
In retrospeot, the iutroduotion of a Resident in 1906 was vital 
in giving Brunei new life, Indeed, this was the principal reason why a 
British presenoe there was at all tolerable to Brunei Malays. Immediately 
after 1906 the deoline of the pre-Residential Bra was halted and, after 
a period of containment and oonsolidation, substantial development became 
possible beosuse of the vast wealth derived from the petroleum industry. 
Even in the gears 1906-32 the people's standard of living was improved 
bp the elimination of governmental abuses which had obtained before 1906, 
the introduction of rabber,, the eradication of traditional scourges such 
as oholera and smallpox, the oontainment of Yaws62 and malaria, and the 
provision of the first schools, hospitals and roads. The country's 
s7atem of government was reformed on modern bureauoratio lines. Publioation 
of annual reports indioated a reoognition that the government was aooount- 
able publicly for its policies. Appointments to traditional offices were 
61. See above, p 402 (footnote 51)- 
62. Evidently the importance of the elimination of yaws has not been 
sufficiently emphasized by the present writer. Dr OE Fisher, writing 
in the later 1930s, oommenteds "Yaws, formerly oommon, is now rapidly 
disappearing due to extensive treatment campaigns with NAB injections. 
This is rather a pity as nothing did more to advertise and popularize 
western medicine than the cure of yaws by a single injection" (Dr OE 
Fisher, "Brunei" in University of Leeds Medical Society Magazine 1937, 
p 2: my emphasis added. Print by courtesy of Ur Fisher). 
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also revived, though the offices themselves had been "deprived of almost 
all content". Brooke influence was eliminated within Brunei and, although 
the Government failed to recover Limbang, the importance of the lose of 
that district declined with passing years. Brunei ceased to be an 
indeterminate empire and became instead a modern nation-state with 
clearly-defined borders and notions of the division between an indigene 
and an 'alien'. The country's finances were rescued in the pre-oil era; 
then the discovery and exploitation of petroleum brought unprecedented 
wealth and, from the 1930s, opened up "the prospect of a new standard of 
administration and development". Smooth progress towards modern state- 
hood was disrupted, howeveri by the Japanese occupation and the sub- 
sequent need for reconstruction and rehabilitation. 
The post-war improvement of health and ednoation, the extension 
of communioationsv the provision of old age and sickness pensions, the 
elimination of malaria, the sharp reduction of infant mortality, the 
extension of electricity and water supplies, all contributed to a better 
life for the people. The later 1950s also witnessed the introduction of 
broadoastiug, the construction of an airport, the oompletion of a highway 
from the capital to the oilfield, the building of the national mosque, 
and the institution of measures for the preservation, extension and 
meohanization of traditional industries, such as fishing, Kadi-planting 
and rubber tapping. At the same time the public had become awakened 
politically and demanded an inoreased share in the running of their own 
affairs. (Freedom of association was guaranteed daring the Residential 
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Bra; and press oensorsbip was markedly less rigorous than it has sinne 
beoome). Although power was transferred overwhelmingly to the monaroby 
in 1959, some provision (sixteen eleotive seats out of thirty three on 
the proposed Legislative Counoil) had been made for popular participation. 
In short, a oomparieon between the oondition of the country in 1906 
(bankrupt, enfeebled and moribund) and in 1959 (wealtb7p vigorous, 
booming and awakened) leaves little doubt that Brunei was, indeed, a 
Sultanate regenerated. 
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PHOTOGRAPHS 
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1.1 (Above) The palaoe of Sultan Hashim 
(pre-1906) with an 
inset of His Highness (reigned 1885-1906). 
1.2 (Below) Brunei Town in 1908. 
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2.1 (Above, left) Messrs PAB MoKerron (BRB 1928-31), JG Black 
(BRB 1937-40) and EO Bruce (Reside nt of Limbang) in 01930. 
2.2 (Above, right) Mr Cheok Boon Sick (Chinese businessman). 
2.3 (Below, left) Dr Emil Braendliu, t he Swiss geologist 
credited with the discovery of the Seria oilfield. 
2.4 (Below, right) Messrs ER Bevington CMG CEng (b 1914), State 
Commissioner of Development 1954-8 and OT Myles (b 1912), 
State Eagineer 1953-9. 
I 
3.1 (Above, left) The beach road between Zhtong and Seria in 1949. 
3.2 (Above, right) A rural school in 1938. 
3.3 (Below, left) The State Council Chamber in 1938. 
3.4 (Below,, right) Brunei silversmiths just after the occupation. 
r. 
y. 
4.1 (Above, left) Oil wells fired 
by the retreating Japanese, 1945- 
4,2 (Above, right) Training SRD guerrillas, 
1945- 
4.3 (Below, left) One more Japanese surrenders! 
4.4 (Below, right) Mr CFO Maoaskie 
(CCAO 1945-6). 
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5-1 (Above) The State Council 
iu session, 1947" 
5.2 (Below) The transfer of 
the High Commissionership, 1948. 
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6.1 The Exeoutive Committee of the Partai Rakyat Brunei in 
Ootober 1956. Seated from left to right are Inohe Yasin 
Affendy, Inohe Salleh, Sheikh Azahari, and Aaji Zaini. 
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7.1 (Above, left) Mr EEF Pretty (BRB 1923-8 and 1948-51). 
7.2 (Above, right) Sir GE Cator (BRB 1916-21). 
T. 3 (Below) Sir AF Abell (High Commissioner 1950-9). 
8.1 (Above) The visit of the Seoretary of State in 1955" 
8.2 (Below) The opening of the new air terminal at Brunei Town 
in May 19578 from left to right, Mr RH Morris (Controller of 
Civil Aviation), Sultan Sir Omar Ali Saifuddin III9 Mr JO 
Gilbert (BRB 1953-8) and Sir F Pressanges (C-in-Cq Far East). 
9.1 (left) Rajah Sir 
Charles Brooke with 
his sons in about 1888. 
9.2 (below) The British 
Residenoy building in 
Brunei Town (0 1930). 
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Appendix 1.1 The UK-Brunei Treaty of 1905-6 
Supplementary Agreement between Great Britain and Brunei reepeoting 
British Proteotion over the State of Brunei. Signed at Brunei, 3 
Deoember 1905 and 2 Januar? 19061 
3 His Highness Sultan Hashim Jalilul Ahamal-din, son of 
His late Highness Sultan Omar Ali Saifu-al-din, Baler of the State of 
Brunei and all its dependenoies, is desirous of being fully protected 
by the British Government and wishes for the assistance of that 
Government in the better administration of the internal affairs of 
his country, 
AND W R! A His Highness trusts that the British Government 
will ensure the due suooession to the Sultanate of Brunei, 
NOW THERMRE Eta Highness has represented to His Majesty's 
Government that the Treaty made on the 17th of September 1888 does not 
give him ea. ffioient proteotion, and the Sultan and His Majesty's 
Government have aooordingly entered into the following Supplementary 
Agreements 
1. His Highness will reoeive a British Offioer, to be styled 
Resident, and will provide a suitable residenoe for him. The Resident 
will be the Agent and Representative of His Britannio riajeaty's 
Government under the High Commissioner for the British Proteotoratee in 
Borneo, and his advice must be taken and acted upon on all questions in 
Brunet other than those affeoting the Xnhaamadan religion, in order 
that a similar system may be established to that existing in other 
läalay States now under British Protection. 
2. All existing Agreements made between the British Government 
and the Government of Brunei are hereby oonfirmed and maintained ezoept 
insofar as any of them may oonfliot with the present Agreement. 
(Signed) JOHN ANDERSON 
Signatures and seals of 
HIS HIGHNESS THE MMTAN OP BBCNZI 
THE PJWGIRAN BENDAHARA 
THE PINGIRAN PH[ANCHA 
Soaroes Brunei Annual Report 1946, p 82. 
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(b) Letter of Assuranoes, subsidiary to the 1905-6 Treatys 
Da Campbell and N1SH NoArthur to HH the Sultan of Brunei v n. d. 
(03 
Deoember 1905): 
After oomplimentss 
With referenoe to oar friend's expressed intention of entering 
into an agreement with the British Government on the lines of the draft 
agreement whioh our friend has alread7 disoussed, we write to inform our 
friend that we are empowered by His Eroellenoy the High Commissioner to 
give our friend assuranoes on the following points. 
(i) The cession monies hitherto paid by the Governments of Sarawak 
and British North Borneo in respeot of territories oeded to them will be 
left to our friend, to the Pengirans Bendahara and Pemanoha, and to other 
Pens who now reoeive shares, no ohanges being made as regards these 
revenues. 
(ii) All the other revenues of Brunei, euoh as poll tax, payments for 
monopoly rights and the like., will go to the Government of Brunei. 
(iii) The Government will give to our friend a yearly allowance of 
%12,000 or $1,000 a month, and will give to each of the Pengirans 
Be` a and Pemanoha a yearly allowance of $69000 or $500 a month. 
(iv) In the future, as soon as the aotaal expense of the admin- 
istration of Brunei is fully asoertained, the amounts of these allowanoes 
will be liable to revision. 
(v) A suffioient traot of land shall be reserved round the sites 
of the residenoes of our friendq the Pengiran Bendahara and the Pe ran 
Pe manoha free of all rates, charges or rents. 
(vi) No judioial powers may be exercised and no decision on any 
matter may be given in Brunei unless it purports to be with the approval 
of the Sultan and the Resident. 
Souroe: CO 273/312 (691 05-6) Enclosure 'B'. 
* 
(o) Further letter of aesuranoett, supplementary to the 1905-6 Treaty$ 
DG Campbell and MSH MoArthar to HH the Sultan of Brunei, n. d. 
After oomplimentes 
In oontinuation of our previous letter to our friend we write 
again on the subject of the allowances of $6,000 per each to 
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Pengiran Bendahara and Pengiran Pemanoba. These allowances will take 
the place of all their tulip and kurt an receipts; but if in the future 
it is found that their tulin : receipts exceed the amount (%6,000 a year) 
now arranged, the amount will be increased in each case to a sum 
equivalent to the tulip rights taken over. 
Souroet CO 273/312 (691 05/6) Eaolosure 'C'. 
'A 
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APPS IDIX 1.2 
THE WLRA DAMIT NEGOTIATIONS 1920-1924 
1. Introdnoti ai 
In this appendix attention is foonsedýupon the negotiations 
between Brunei and Sarawak in 1920 to 1924 for the reoovery, bb Brunei, 
of the Brooke-held fisoal and land rights in Wuara Distriot (see above, 
PP 679 85-939 96-89 and L-102-3). Mnara Daaitl the scene of the Rajah's 
coal mining operations, is that part of the mainland opposite Muara Besar, 
an island about three miles long at the mouth of the River Brunei. The 
inhabitants of Brooketon, the email eettlemeut whioh had gathered round 
the Rajah's oollieryp oompriaed almost entirely those who sought a live- 
lihood at the mine., pins a nucleus of Chinese shopkeepers. 
2. The Rajah's rights in läuara Damit 
In 1906 to 1907 the eeooad Rajah, Sir Charles Brooke, had been 
obliged to surrender those powere whioh he appeared to be ezeroieing 
without legal authority in Maara Damit, such as the designation of one 
of his offioere as "Administrator of Brooketoa"O the exercise of Sarawak 
jariediotion and the employment of Sarawak police there, and the opening 
of a Sarawak post office in the distriot. 
In 1920 the Brooke fami1 retained the ooal monopo]. T, whioh 
Was not due to lapse until 1962. They also held revenue farms in 
)Irrara Damit and the right to oolleot land rents as oonoeded by Sultan 
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Hashim: in the first two olauses of an agreement wbioh he made with Mr 
Cowie on 12 January 1887, and subsequently assigned to the Rajahs 
Ill, We (Sultan Hashim) have leased to (the Rajah) all the (tax) 
farms of Knara Damit which he is authorised to holde v`iz. v the spirit, 
opium, carry stuff, tobaooo, tea and other ertioles on which we have 
power to farm in the aforesaid district. He may hold them now in the 
Muara Damit from Meogsalut to Pl omp ong Point,, from Pl omp ong Point to 
8apabarasan westward, outting across inland from Mengsalut along the 
sea shore. The said (Rajah)... may sell the above mentioned artioles 
in the district. He mal fix his own prioe on the above artioles. 
2. We authorise the (Rajah) to oolleot, reoeive and demand 
house, garden and quit rent throughout the aforesaid distriotp on any 
people or tribe living on the land in Muara Damit. But (the Rajah has) 
no power over, likewise, the land and the district besides to demand, 
collect and impose rent on land". 1 
In 1907 the Rajah had established that the phrase "and other artioles" 
gave him the right to impose a gambling farm, after this had been 
disputed by the Colemial Offioe. The British Government, for its part, 
had asserted the right of the Brunei Government to levy a duty on coal 
exported from 1lnara Damity although this would not be imposed immediately 
because the mines were being run at a lose. (The Rajah did not oonoede 
the point). PinaLl7, if the Brookes wished "to use land anywhere in 
Kuara Bomar for the purpose of making ooal sheds or hoaxes for ooolies", 
they were entitled "to oooapy one bmadred fathoms of the land, and... 
(also to) put up wharves". 
2 
1.00 144/64 (7548) Translation of an agreement between Sultan Hashim 
and lir WO Cowie, (later sold to the Rajah), dated 18 Rabil Akhir 1304 AR 
(12 January 1887), clause L. In return the Rajah paid $500 annually. 
This sum appears to have been compounded before the beginning of the 
Residential Era. Concerning the ooal monopoly, the Rajah paid #2,000 
for mines in Muara Damit and X19200 for every mine he might open in Brunei 
outside Maara Damit and east of the River Tatong" 
2. CO 144/71 p 98. Translation of an agreement between Sultan Abdul 
Mnmin (r1852-85) and IQr WC Cowie (later assigned to the Rajah), dated 
13 March 1882, clause 13. 
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3. Trial Balloon 
In 1907 the Colonial Office had deoided to await the death of 
Rajah Sir Charles Brooke, who was then seventy-seven yearn of age, 
before attempting to recover his fisoal and land rights in läuara Damit. 
(There was no intention to disturb his ooal monopoly). Sir Charles 
survived until 19179 Immediately after his demise, the High Commissioner 
L+ Sir Arthur Young - was invited by Whitehall to review outstanding 
questions between Brunei and Sarawak. 
Sir Arthur thought that these disputes ooal d be divided into 
two oategoriess (a) the private oommeroial rights inside Brunei aoquired 
from time to time by Sir Charles Brooke; and (b) the rights of admin- 
istration of outlying distriots'of the State whioh he had from time to 
time usurped. 
After oareful oonsideration and referenoe to the Resident (Mr 
GE Cator) and 1r Xo&rthur, Sir Arthur ooaoluded that the latter category 
- eepeoially the reoovery of the Limbang - was the most pressing and 
important issue. The High Commissioner's efforts in this respeot proved 
unavailing. With regard to the first category, Sir Arthur thought 
that the private rights of the family of Sir Charles Brooks were not 
matters of urgenof "now that the State has a settled Government oapable 
of preventing their being used for politioal purposes". The rights were 
an 'annofanoe' and 'hindered the development of the State', he olaimed, 
but they were not of such importance as to demand that az7 special effort 
should be made to arrive at a settlement of them on bloo. Their reoovery 
could wait to be dealt with as separate individaal adjustments, as and 
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when opportnnitiee ooourred. 
3 
The first suoh oooasion arrived within a few years. In 1920 
the third Rajah, Vyuer Brooke, was negotiating with Mr James Hatton 
Hall, a British merohaaty for the sale of the Brooketon miues. Sinoe 
1917 these mines had aotua117 been profitable for the first time in the 
hiatorr of their ownership by the Brooke family, but the post-Great War 
depression oansed the prioe of ooal to slump and other oonsiderations - 
suoh as the inoreasing diffioulty of winning the mineral beoause of 
geological oomplioations - seen to have oontributed to the Rajah's 
decision that the time had-come to sell his property. 
In Janaary 1920 a Xr Mango Park made an inepeotion of the mines 
With a view to making a report abort them for Xr Hall, "Every assistamoe 
was given to Mr Park"j the Resident of Limbang reported, "and all the 
Plans of the oollieries were pat at his disposal". 
4 In the July of 1920 
Xr Hall paid another visit to the Brooketon mines, but by the July 
following the deal had been oanoelled, 
5 for reasons whioh shall now be seen. 
The proposed aale of the sines to Ur Hall - oonsidered br the 
Brunei Resident to be an undesirable oharaoter6 - had alarmed the High 
Commissioner (now Sir Laurence (lailleaard). He thought it was "advisable 
that steps should be taken to safeguard the interests of Brunei, in the 
3. CO 531/11 (10824) Sir A Young to CO (Borneo, Secret) 29 December 
1917, paragraphs 3-4. 
4. CO 604/7 Sarawak Gazette, 1 March 1920, p 63- 
5. -00 604/7 Sarawak Gazette, 1 September 19201 and CO 604/7 Sera 
Gazette. 1 September 1921. Mr Hall complained later that the employment 
of this geologist was very expensive and caused him a great loss, 
partionlarly since the deal fell through (CO 852/76 File 6s Mr Hall to 
00P 7 December 1937). 
6. See above (p 162) and below (Appendix 1.3). 
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event of aar oontemplated alienation of (the fisoal and land) rights to 
a third party". 
7 
With the approval of Rajah Vyner, Sir Laurenoe 
Qaillemard authorized Mr Cator to enter into preliminary negotiations 
with the Sarawak authorities for the resumption of their rights in Nuara 
Damit. The Rajah promisedd meauvbile, that no alienation would be made 
to a third party without the ooasent of R)i Government. 
Mr Cator set out what he oonsidered to be fair terms in a 
letter to Rajah Yyrner dated 31 Augast 1920. With regard to land, he 
suggested that in lien of the present agreement, the Rajah might aooept 
a title under the Brunei Land Code for the area referred to in olauee two 
of the 1887 agreement. Suoh a title would oonfer "a permanent, 
transmissible and transferable estate interest and oooapanoy". 
8 
Alternatively the Brunei Government would, # on payment of demarcation Pees, 
issue each permit holder a separate title and would give to the Rajah a 
title for the balance of the land. The title would oarz7 the same 
conditions as to rent, cultivation and so on an the permits they replaoed. 
mr Cat or suggestedi eeoondly, that the revenue farms and the 
right to create monopolies should be transferred to the Brunei Government. 
All articles imported for the use of the mine or mine employees might 
be admitted duty frees and some other arrangement to proteot the mining 
or the owner of the mining rights, might be reaohed. Aitiee would be 
levied at the rates prevailing in the rest of Brunei. Chandu Would 
become a Government monopoly. In return, Mr Cat or suggested that the 
7. CO 531/15 (21524) Qaillemard to CO, Brunei (confidential), 4 April 
1921, paragraph 3. 
8" I, bid., Cator to Rajah Vyuer Brooke, 31 Angust 1920, paragraph 5 (A). 
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Government of Brunei should pay annually to, the Rajah 
"either a sum equal to the average revenue which Your Highness (the Rajah) 
has derived from the rights... dnring the past five years or the net pro- 
oeeds of the import duties and sales of ohandu, whichever amount is 
the less. It is necessary to insert this last provision because, in view 
of the policy of the Imperial Governmentp revenue from ohandn is a very 
uncertain factor". 9 
Mr Cator did not allude to the gambling farm whioh eiiated at Brooketon 
under the terms of the agreement (of 1887) beoause 
"it is the polioy of the Brunei Government gradually to abolish lioensed 
gambling and when this is effeoted in the rest of Brunei I shall have to 
seek 'roar Highness's assistance to terminate the praotioe at Brooketon". 10 
In other words, the farm was valueless. As we shall see, however, the 
Brunei Government would have oaaee to rue this stipulation in Mr Cator'a 
letter. 
The Rajah did not receive the dooument until his arrival in 
England at the end of 1920. In Karoh 1921 the Sarawak State Advisory 
Council in London requested a meeting with the Permanent Under-Seoretary 
at the Colonial Offioe to discuss the matter. 
ll 
Sinoe the latter had not 
been informed of what was afootp they were baffled about what the Sarawak 
Counoil oould mean, and werep therefore, somewhat annoyed with the new 
High Commissioner. (Ouillemard). 12 After an exohange of correspondence, 
however, the Colonial Offioe obtained the relevant details. 
on 22 April 1921 Mr Harold Beckett (acting first class clerk 
in the Colonial Offioe) met Mr Willes Johnson (legal adviser of the 
un ý 
9. Ibid., paragraph 5 (C). 
10. : Ibid., paragraph 7. 
11" CO 531/15 (11018) Mr Rowlett (seoretary to the SSAC) to CO, 5 
Maroh 1921. 
12. CO 531/15 (14456) miaute by Mr Beokett, 29 March 1921. 
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Sarawak Counoil. Mr Beokett thought that the British Resident's letter 
had been designed to get the Rajah to say what he wanted. Mr Johnson 
now told him that the Rajah did not wish to make a "sordid money trans- 
aoti on of it 
"and after emphasizing the general benevolence and self-sacrificing 
character of the Rajah, he (Mr Johnson) came out with the suggestion 
that the adjustment should be of a territorial character - i. e. he 
wanted the Temburong" (the isolated eastern wing of Brunei). 13 
Mr Cator oharaoterized this proposal as "preposteroas". 
14 
Xr Gent., a junior CO olerk at this time, thought Brunei had 
two cards to play whioh world assist the Rajah in his intention, if any, 
of "drawing in his hand vises Brunei"s (1) the right to impose 
export daties on ooal; and (2) the right to atop the Rajah's gambling 
farm at Brooketon in aooordanoe with the law of the oountr . Mr (lent 
oonsidered that the proposal to permit all artioles for use in the mines 
to be admitted duty-tree would be a questionable oonoession. In the 
hands of an unsornpulons o++ner this privilege 
"might be made to cover a variety of articles never intended by the 
Government of Brunei. It might seem better, perhaps, to undertake 
not to impose any export duty on coal---"- 15 
At a meeting with Mr Beckett at the Colonial Office on 9 May 
1921, Xr Cator was strongly of opinion that Brunei ooald not make any 
territorial oonoeesion as a return for the surrender of the Rajah's 
rights in the Muaras. l[r Hall was an "inveterate pioker-up of bargains 
in Borneo". he added, and if he (Mr Hall) got hold of the farms would 
13. 00 531/15 (18063) minute by Mr R Beokett, 22 April 1921. 
14. CO 531/15 (20892) minute by Mr GLT Gent, 29 April 1921. 
15. Co 531/15 (21524) minute by Mr Cleats 7 May 1921. 
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probably oause the Brunei Government a lot of trouble. 
Although Mr Cator had ceased to be British Resident of Brunei 
two months beforehand, he was authorized by Whitehall in May 1921 to 
negotiate with the Rajah, but direotly and not through the Sarawak Counoilp 
which HYI Government refereed to reo 
16 
agnize. The 3eoretaxy of State (Mr 
WS Churchill), whilst fully appreoiatiag the Rajah"e desire to make the 
settlement of this question of the basis of a friendly adjustment rather 
than a monetary bargainp feared that - apart from the muoh greater value 
of the Temburong (whioh oontained. three. large rubber estates and large 
reserves of timbers Jelutong an) - he oould not agree to any 
oession of Brunei territory in return for the Rajah's rights at Muara 
Damit. 17 
In July 1921 Kr Cator opened negotiations with the Rajah's 
representative, Nr HP Deshon (1857-1924). The latter olaimed that the 
agreements held by the Rajah empowered him to oolleot export duties as 
well as import duties. Mr Cat or demerred, pointing ottt that the original 
doouaents would not support this interpretations and that, whereas the 
Rajah had never exeroised the "right", the Brunei Government had olaimed, 
and was exeroisiag, it. The Rajah, moreover, had raised no objeotion to 
the imposition of the ooal tax from 1 January 1921 an he surely would have 
done had he supposed the sole right to levy export duties lay in his 
hands, 18 Mr Cat or gathered the general impression that the Rajah was not 
16. Co 531/15 (14456) minute by Mr Beckett, 29 March 1921; and Co 531/15 
(21524) minute by Beckett, 10 May 1921. 
17- Co 531/15 (21524) minutes by Meerre Beckett (10 May), Collins (11 
May) and Grindle (13 May 1921). 
18. CO 531/15 (35297) Cator to Co, 14 July 1921, paragraphs 2-3. 
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averse to a settlement on a monetary basis and that agreement ought to 
be possible. 
By late Ootober 1921 a preliminary compaot had been aohieved. 
The Rajah deolined to alter his position oonoerning land, i. e. he did 
not wish to exohange the rights he derived from olause 2 of the 1887 
agreement (see above, p 562) for a title under the Brunei Laud Code. Mr 
Cator thought this was not of maoh importanoe beoause the land in question 
was a peninsula and did not affeot land settlement in the rest of Brunei. 
The Rajah was prepared, however, to transfer "all his trade and farm 
rights" in return for a reduotion from 16,148 to $10,000 in the annual 
oessi on monies paid by Sarawak to the Brunei Government. 
19 
These terms 
were oonfirmed in an exohange of letters between Mr Cator and Mr Rowlett, 
the Secretary of the Sarawak Counoil. The latter agreed that Mr Cator 
had stated oorreotly the terms whioh had been agreed and that "a formal 
deed" would have to be evidenoed "to avoid doubt hereafter". 
20 
The only 
reservation made by Mr Rowlett - which was accepted by Mr Cator - was 
that the Brunei Government should undertake not to disoriminate in any 
taxation between the inhabitants (inolnding the Rajah) of the region in 
question and residents in the rest of Brunei adversely to the former. 
21 
The state of negotiations at the end of 1921, therefore, is 
plain. The Rajah had undertaken to surrender all his trade and farm 
rights in l)iuara Damit in return for a rednotion of 86,148 in the 
19. CO 531/15 (53556) Cator to CO, 26 October 1921, paragraphs 4-5- 
20, Ibid.., Cator to SSAC, 20 Ootober 1921; and SSAC to Cator, 21 
Ootober 1921. 
21. Ibid., SSAC to Cator, 25 October 1921. 
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amount of oession money annually, to be paid to the Brunei Government. 
'he Rajah's land rights in Naar& Damit, on the other hand, remained 
unaffeoted. 
4. The Seoond Stage 
On 9 Xaroh 1922 the High Commissioner reported that the Brunei 
State Comnoil had aooepted the terms negotiated by Mr Catorp inoluding 
the reservation ezpreseed by Mr Rowlett. Sir Laureaoe did not antioipate 
the olosnre of the mine!, so the proposed arrangement would result in 
finanoial gain to the Brunei Government an well ax to the eztinotion 
of the Rajah's rights. Finally, the High Commissioner suggested that 
time would be saved Lf the necessary legal instrument were drawn up and 
executed in Londons the Rajah was expected in the United Kingdom during 
the ooming summer. 
22 
Ir LL Allen, who had euooeeded Xr Cat or an British Resident in 
Brunei, estimated that the annual value of the rights to be given up by 
the Rajah was 12,000. The most important of these was the ohandu 
moaopolyt worth $8,000 at the time, but likely to be ooneiderably rednoed 
in the future beoause of Imperial polioy (see above, pp 172-5). 
23 
By autumn 1922 the Colonial Offioe's legal advieers, Messrs 
&zrohells, had prepared-a draft deed of surrenders whioh they proposed, 
with CO approval, to submit to the Sarawak Counoil. 
24 
22. CO 531/16 (16990) auiiiemard to CO, Brunei (oonfidential), 9 Naroh 
1922, paragraphs 2-5. 
23. Ibid., memorandum by Mr LA Allen, 1 January 1922. 
24. Co 531/16 (47451) Burohells to CO. 22 September 1922, paragraphs 2-4" 
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Mr Beokett pointed out thatt in view-of Whitehall's refusal 
to recognize the Sarawak Counoil, this course of action was impossible. 
25 
Senoe the Colonial Offioe suggested to Messrs Burohells that the same 
end could be obtained and the difficulty avoided if Mr Innee -a member 
of the Malay States Information Agenoy - were to write to Mr Rowlett 
(or Mr Willes Johnson) saying that he had been requested to act for the 
Government of Brunei in the negotiations, enolosing a oopy of the 
draft Agreement and asking if there were any points xhioh required 
further considerations 
26 
Messrs Barohells suggested that it would 
simpliff matters if the Rajah's solicitors - Torr and Compagy - were to 
be asked, whioh would be the ordinary oouree of business, 
27 the 
Colonial Offioe agreed. 
Meanwhile, Mr PS James., the lieutenant High Commissionerp 
reported that the Sarawak Government was inviting tenders (for up to 
six years in advance) for the Brooketon farmst28 and urged that the 
oeaeion ehonld be oonoluded before the end of 1922, when the existing 
tax farms were due to expire.. Cdr James noted that the opium 'farm' - 
held by the Sarawak Farms 5yndioate - was not inoludediin the tender 
notifications it was to be clearly understood that all the olaims of the 
Syndioate up to 31 Deoember 1922 (Prom whioh date, Mr James suggested, 
the ourrent arrangements should terminate) would be settled by the Rajah 
25. Ibid., minute by Beokett, 28 September 1922. 
26. Ibid., CO to Burohellst 4 Ootober 1922. 
27" I, bid., Messrs Burohells to 009 5 Ootober 1922. 
28. CO 531/16 (52516) Mr (later Sir) FS James (1870-1934) to CO, Brauei 
(oonfidential)v 22 September 1922, paragraph 2. 
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and the rights of the Syadioate would oeaee from the date of the oeseioa 
(hopefully 1 January 1923). 
29 
The process of transfer then entered a rough stretoh. The 
Rajah's solioitors olaimed that the gambling farm was not inoluded, 
pointing to the statement, mentioned above, in Mr Cat or's original 
letter to the Rajah, dated 21 August 1920. Mr Deshon olaimed, further, 
that the opium monopoly was not inoluded either and that this had been 
understood both by the British Resident and himself. Hr Deshon stated 
that the opium and gambling farms had never been epeoifioally mentioned 
in: the negotiations and his view was that they were matters apart from 
other monopolies and duties. It was abundantly olear, the solioitors 
olaimed, that this was oorreot beoanse the oompensatioa offered was 
manifestly inadequate to cover the gambling and opium farms. Nor was 
the question of oompensation to the Sarawak Farms Syndioate taken into 
oonsideration as the representatives of the Rajah were not aware, when 
the disoussions took plaoe, that the opium farm was under lease. 
30 In a 
subsequent letter, Torr and Company warned that the Sarawak Government 
oould not undertake to be responsible for any olaim whioh the Sarawak 
Farms Syndioate might have if opium rights were to be inoluded in the 
anrrender. 
31 
The Rajah also gave inatrnotions for new leases for the 
araok, gambling and pawn rights to be granted, terminable at the and of 
1923, "in order to avoid disoontent among the oollier7 labour foroe". 
32 
29. Ibid., paragraphs 2-5. 
30. CO 531/16 (54433) Torr and Company to Messrs Barohells, 31 Ootober 
1922. 
31. CO 531/17 (777) Burohells to C0,3 January 1923- 
32, CO 531/17 (964) Buroheils to CO, 4 January 1923. 
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l(r Catorp on learning that the inoln ion in the transfer 
of the opium and gambling farms was now being disputed by Sarawak, 
reasserted that the negotiations were. for all the trade and farm rights 
at Brooketoee and referred to the exchange of letters between himself and 
Xr Rowlett in Ootober 1921, where confirmation of this view oonld be 
foand. 33 
The High Commissioner endorsed )r Cator's version and suggested 
that] in view of the correspondenoe, the Sarawak claim was "somewhat of 
a surprising nature". 
34 
With regard to Mr Cator's letter to the Rajah 
in August 1920 - in whioh it was said that the gambling farm was to be 
dealt with separately - Sir Laurenoe olaimed that this oommanioation 
was "purely its the nature of a ballon d"essai, inviting negotiations as 
to the possibility of the transfer to Brunei of the Rajah's land and 
trade rights at Broogetoan35 (It might be observed that, in the proposed 
agreement, the Rajah'e land rights - whioh had- been mentioned in Mr 
Cator's letter of 20 August 1920 - were to be ezaluded3 benoe the Rajah 
was olaiming the beet of two-worlds). Sir Laareooe drew Whitehall's 
attention to the fact that the position as regarded gambling its Brunei 
underwent a change between Angnat 1920 and October 1921, when the 
preliminar. r negotiations were brought to a oonolneioa. The Brunei 
Gambling Enactaent, brought into force on-1-January 1920, allowed the 
Resident to exempt oertain houses or l ooalitiee from its provisions. 
33.00 531/17 (11816) minute, n. d., bfr Mr Cator. 
34. CO 531/17 (11816) amillemard to CO, Brunei oonfidential, 4 February 
1923, Paragraph 4. 
35. Ibid., paragraph 9. 
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During 1920 certain gambling rights were issued in the capital and else- 
where, but from the beginning of 1921 all lioeaoes had been abolished, 
with the farm at Brooketoa, and but for the negotiations with Sarawak, 
the Government of Brunei would have approached the Rajah during 1922 
to assist in terminating this anomaly. 
36 (Henoe Mr Allen, the British 
Resident in Brunei, had not inoluded the value of the gambling farm in 
his estimate of the worth of the Brooketoet farms). 
Mr Gent at the Colonial Office argued that the Rajah's Coanoil 
had known Vyner Brooke possessed the right to farm opium revenue and had 
agreed to transfer "all the trade and farm rights without reservation" at 
Brooketon in return for %6,148 annually. With regard to the gambling farm, 
the Sultan an Sovereign retained the right to legislate for the whole 
States henoe the 1887 agreement, under whioh the Rajah held the gambling 
farm., could be overridden though oompensation might have to be paid. 
37 
Mr A Ehrhardt, a legal adviser at the Colonial Offioe, took a 
tougher line, There ooald be no doubt, he said, that all the farms had 
been inoluded in the proposed, transfer and that the Sultan would be unable 
to reoognize any leases or other disposals of any of those rights whioh 
might have been granted or made by the Rajah sinne the agreement was 
arrived at by Messrs Cator and Rowlett or to oonsent to the renewal or 
extension of any lease or lioenoe at present in foroe in oonneotion 
with ate of them and oalled upon them to exeoute the surrender at an 
early, ddate. 
38 
36. Ibid., paragraph 10. 
37. Ibid., minute by Mr Gent, 9 Maroh 1923. 
38. Ibid., minute by Mr Albert Ehrhardt KC (1862-1929), 13 Maroh 1923. 
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)r Beckett requested an opinion oonoerning whether the gambling 
and opium farmers were entitled to oompensatioa. 
39 Mr Ehrhardt believed 
that such monopolies were subjeot to the power of the supreme legis- 
lative authority to regulate their exeroise or to abolish them. Compen- 
sati on should depend on the oiroumstanoes of the partioular oases for 
example, the amount paid for the monopoly, the length of time the mono- 
poly had been enjoyed, the profits reoeived, the oapital expended, and 
so on. The Rajah's lease did not amount to a grant in perpetuity. It 
merely provided for the Dommutation of the annual grant for a lump sum. 
The power of the Brunei legislative authority to deal with the subjeot 
of the leases was speoifioally reoogaizei. 
40 
5. The Final Stage 
On 1 May 1923 a meeting was held between the solicitors of the 
Rajah and the Colonial Office. The Sarawak side contended that Mr 
Rowlett's letter to Mr Cator in Ootober, 1921 had been written under a 
misapprehension and, this being soy it did not bind the Rajah. Messrs 
Burohelis oould not aooept this view, but requested - if it was being 
seriously advanoed - that it should be put in writing. This was done. 
41 
The Colonial Offioe's solicitors were of opinion that the 
oorrespondenoe between Messrs Cator and Rowlett in Ootober 1921 would 
not constitute a contract legally eaioroeable unless it oould be proved 
39. Ibid., minute by Mr Beokett, 14 March 1923. 
40. Ibid., minute by Mr Ehrhardt, 16 Maroh 1923- 
41- CO 531/17 (23716) Messrs Burohells and Company to CO, 10 May 1923, 
paragraphs 3-5; and Messrs Torr and Company to Burohells, May 1923" 
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that Mr Rowiatt was authorized by the Rajah in writing to make suoh a 
oontraot on his behalf. 
' 
the Rajah then expressed his willingness to 
surrender the opium and gambling rights provided he reoeived extra 
oompensation. 
43 
He was prepared to resume negotiations on this basis and 
on the understanding that the Brunei Government would not inorease the 
export duty on coal, ' The Rajah intended also to give up the piece of 
land on Xuara Island granted to him under Article 13 of the coal lease 
of 13 laroh 1882.44 "ý 
Mr Ehrhardt observed that although the Cat or-Rowlatt agreement. 
of 1921 had been provisional it had not been intended that the instrument 
to be drawn up giving effeot to it ehmld differ from the terms whioh had 
been agreed. He oontendedf therefore, that the position now taken up br 
Sarawak was nnteaable. 
45 
The Colonial Office also denied the oontention 
(which had been made bJ the Sarawak solicitors) that the lease of 15 
January 1887 (a) forbade the Government of Brunei placing import duties 
on machinery eta for the Brooketon mines or (b) limited the amount of 
export tax that Government oculd plaoe on ooa1.46 
A new advanoe appeared possible in June 1923. The Rajah wage 
apparently of opinion that if the fisoal rights were to be surrendered 
it ought to be on the footing that no import duties on "maohinery, 
materiale eto" for the Brooketon mines should be imposed and that the 
export duty on coal of 25 cents 'per one should not be inoreased without 
42. Ibid., Burohells to CO, 10 May 1923, paragraph 6. 
43. Ibid., (Tarr to Barohelle). 
44" Ibid,, (Torr to Burohella). 
45. Ibid., minute by Ehrhardt, 19 May 1923. 
46. Ibid., minutes by Brindle (23 and 26 May) and Gent (23 May 1923). 
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his oonsent. 
47 
In an undated memorandum, written by Mr Ehrhardt at the 
Colonial Offioe, probably in Maroh 1924, it was stated that 
"on 23 October 1923 the High Commissioner reported that after protraoted 
negotiations 1ooa11yp it was impossible to arrive at any agreement on 
oonditions whioh Brunei oould aooept". 48 
By February 19249 however, (when the new lease® for the 
gambling, amok and pawn farms would have lapsed - see above, P 572) 
Sarawak was ready to agree to sign the terms settled with Mr Cator but 
wished "to refer to points, as to import duties on maohinery and export 
duties on 00a, "@49 
In a despatch dated 27 Maroh it was reported that agreement 
had been reaohed between the Brunei Government and the Rajah, presumably 
on the basis of the draft deed of surrender drawn up in 1922. The High 
Commissioner remaxked that 
"the signature of this agreement marks the very satisfactory elimination 
of a long-standing oause of friotion between the Brunei Government and 
... the Rajah". 50 
6. Finale 
The Rajah retained his ooal and land rights in Iuara Damit. 
The oolliery remained open until 30 November 1924 when all mining Ceased 
(although winding down operations oontinued until the following April). 
On 31 Deoember the same year the Rajah's monopoly of ooal rights within 
47" CO 531/17 (30224) Burohells to COt 16 June 1923- 
48 . CO 531/17 (59411) memorandum by Mr Ehrhardt, o4 Maroh 1924- 
49. Ibid., minute by Mr Beckett, 25 February 1924. 
50. CO 531/18 (18928) Guillemard to CO, Brunei (confidential), 27 Maroh 
1924, paragraph 3. 
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Brunei lapsed. 51 ( Perhaps the Rajah olosed his mine in a fit of pique). 
Mazy of the inhabitants of Brooketon removed to Miri and Sadong in 
Sarawak, abandoning their houses and gardens. 
52 
The village was 
gradually overran by jangle; and when the Honourable Sir Steven 
Runoimaa visited the site in the late 1950s there was "little to show 
where Brooketon once stood". 
53 
After 1924 the Sarawak Residents of Lirabang oontinued to 
visit Brooketon periodioallf in order to look after the Rajah's land 
rights and to check that his bungalow was maintained in a proper 
state of repair. 
54 
This situation continued until 1931-2. In order to mark the 
oooassion of the termination of the minority of the Sultan of Brunei and 
his assumption of full sovereignty (September 1931) the Rajah announoed 
his intention to surrender his remaining rights in buara retaining 
only an area of approximately 151 aores of land in whioh his house was 
eituated. 
55 
The formal deed of surrender was signed bT the Rajah on 25 
January 1932 and by the Sultan on 10 *aroh of that 7ear. 
56 
The aotion of the Rajah oaneed "the liveliest eatiefaotion 
throughout Brunei" and "enhanoed the friendly relations whioh now exist 
51.00,, 824/1 Brunei Anneal Report 1925, p 6. 
52. CO 604/11 Sarawak Gazette, 1 February 1926, p 44. 
53.8 Runoiman, The White Rajahss A History of Sarawak 1841-1946 
(Cambridge 1960), p 194- 
54. For example, CO 604/13 Sarawak Gaaette, 1 June 1928, p 123. 
55" CO 717/91 (File 92359) Sir C Clementi to C09 UXS (Brunei) 
oonfidential, 3 )! ay 1932, paragraph 3. 
56. Ibid., paragraph 4. 
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between the two Governments". In his aooeptanoe speeoh, the Sultan 
(Ahmad Tajuddin) desoribed the gift as "one of inestimable value" and 
a tangible sign of friendship. 
57 The Colonial Offioe noted the surrender 
of the land with satisfaotion. 
58 
57. Ibid., paragraph 5. 
58. Ibid., CO to Clementi, 20 June 1932. 
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APPENDIEX 1.3 
EB MAUNDRELLs THE BRITISH RESIDENT MURDERED: 
1. Introduction 
In February 1915 Jr FW Douglasl was replaoed as British Resident 
in Brunei by another offioer of the ES (Kalayan Civil Servioe), Ernest 
Barton Kanndrell. Born in 1880, Mr Naundrell joined the MCS in 1903, 
following an ednoatioa at Repton and the University of Cambridge. By 
1907 he had beoome aoting Seoretary to the Resident of Negri Sembilan 
andq before being posted to Brunei, he bad risen to the rank of Seooad 
Assistant Colonial Seoretarl in the Straits Settlements. In this appendix, 
I shall examine the oiroamstanoes of his untimely death in the Sultanate. 
But, first, an aooount of his term of office there. 
2. Baokxround 
At the beginning of 1915 the post of British Resident in 
Brunei was separated from. that of Labnan, with which hitherto it had 
been ooffibined, ihr Doaglae continued, however, to ran both offioes until 
19 February 1915, when Nr Maundrell aeenmed the responsibilities Of 
British Resident in Brunei. At the same time the appointment of an 
1. Francis William Douglas (1874-1953). XCS 1895-1929.1913-151 Aoting 
Resident, Labuan and Brunei. 19221 Acting DO, Klang. 19231 Controller 
of Rubber Exports, Malaya. 1927-9t Acting Resident, Perak. 19291 
Secretary to Sultan of Selangor, who awarded his the title of Datak in 
1937.1942-51 interned by the Japanese in Singapore. Convert to 
Muhammadanism. Died 21 December 1953. Obituary in äalga, (February 1954) 
p 106. 
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Assistant Resident was disoontinued and the Superintendent of Monopolies 
was superseded by a Treasurer and Superintendent of Customs. Mr EG Gold- 
finoh - "a pompous little man"t formerly a polioe offioer2 - who had aoted 
as Superintendent of Monopolies before going on leave in 1914, returned 
in January 1915 to aot as Treasurer and Superintendent of Ccistoms. 
3 
Almost immediately upon arrival in Brunei, Mr Manndrell - like 
nomany of the early Residents - was laid low with aa' attaok of fever 
and had to spend some time in hospital. 
4 Two months later the journalist 
of Sir Charles Brooke's annual visit 'to his outstationst inoluding 
Brooketon, reported: 
"Very few and unimportant events took plane and all seemed recovering in 
trade and prosperity after the last two ? ears of slaokness. Mr Maandrell 
dined on board the Zahora (the Rajah's 'yacht') in Brunei (Town)". 5 
Subsequent visitors included the Auditor-General, Mr H Marriott, for the 
annual andit in June; and the Secretary to the High Commissioner, Mr WG 
Maxwell, who arrived during the following month. 
Apart from its tragio ending, irr Xaundrell' e term of office 
was largely smooth and uneventfuls 
"The year (1915) was one of quiet progress", he commented, "and beyond 
a rise in the cost of commodities, the peaceful life of the kampongs 
was little disturbedby the (Great War)". 6 
2. Dato WH Doughty (1886-1971), interviewed by Professor DE Brown (late 
1960s). Tape reoording, oonrtesy of Professor Brown. 
3. In Her 1919 Mr Goldfinch departed to take np the appointment of Harbour 
Master in Labuan; the Resident assumed his former duties in Brunei. Mr 
Goldfinoh eventually retired in about 1933 and remained on the Brunei 
pension list as late as 1948. His daughter, who appeared in 1916, was 
said to have been the first European obild to be born in Brunei. (TWO 
Eurasians were enumerated in the 1911 oensas; ten in the 1931 census). 
4. Co -604/5 Sarawak Gazette, 1 March 1915, p 53. 
5. CO 604/5 Sarawak Gasetter 1 May 1915 rp 98. 
6" CO 824/1 Brunei Annual Report 1915, p 12. 
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The oleriaal. and subordinate staff,, the Resident added, had worked well. 
Me pads orop of 1914/15 season was almost entirely destroyed 
beoanse of drought from Deoember to Maroh. Planting for the ensuing 
season was "rather more extensive than usual"; but onoe again the orop 
was spoiled, this time by torrential rain at harvest time. As a result 
rioe imports were heavy, only just below $100,000 in 1916 (38.79% of total 
imports). This was more than oonnter-balanoed, however, br the growth 
of rubber exports. The first plantations had reaohed the tapping stage 
during 1914; and a rise in prioe which ooourred in late 1915, led to 
oonsiderable areas being planted ups prinoipally by smallholders. In 
Brunei distriot 62 new land titles oovering 406 aores were registered 
in 19158- these were ohiefly smallholdings in the Kinlap., Kota Bata and 
Baru Barm Island. Ia addition there were 112 applications for land, 
ragging from five to thirty aoree eaoh. A further step was made in the 
settlement of the Kedayan questions the headman of the Kedayans at Kampong 
Yiaroagg, with acme twenty of his followere, aooepted title to land. The 
baoklog in Tatong distriot was olearedp bat the inhabitants of Belait were 
not yet disposed to take out surveyed titles for their ssxo plots. 
There were only two meetings of the State Council during 1915 
(five in 1916); and no legislation of outstanding significance was enacted. 
Police strength stood at 35 (22 Malays and 13 Sikhs) in both 1915 and 1916; 
they were commanded by a European Chief Inepeotor stationed in Labnan. 
Except for a corporal at Huara, all the Sikhs were stationed at Brunei 
Towns the outdistriots being polioed by Malays. Polioe Constable No 27 
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will assume particular importance in this story. There was one murder 
at Rempayoh in 1915.7 At Mutaal where there was a oonsiderable Chinese 
population, several petty thefts and burglaries were reported. A further 
murder ooourreä in Maroh 1916.8 
The Xa1af veraaovlar school, established in the oapital in 1912, 
Uraa attended by about forty papiley inoluding a few of the younger 
Pte; but it had to be olosed for a few weeks in Mar and June beoause 
of the diffioalty, in fiading a suitable enooeeaor to the late sohool 
master, Awang Tahya, whose early death from phthisis was muoh regretted 
because he was a competent Government servant. A start was made,, in 1915, 
with vernaoular ednoation at Nuaraq an aUlowanoe being made to a looal 
Malay, who opened a aohool for about a dozen bola in his own home. 
The general health in most distriote was 9good'9 apart from 
"a oertain amount of diarrhaea and fever in wet weather". In Belait, 
however, a good deal of siokness from fever and beri-beri was prevalent 
during the extensive rains of November and Deoember 1915. In the 
following year there was "an unusual amount of fever and dysentery with 
eporadio outbreak. of ohioken pox in Brunei and lkuara". 
T. The viotim of the marder was a Malay lads aged 14, employed as a 
servant to a 7brak dresser on the oil oonoession. On 18 Ootober 1915 
he was found deoapitated in the dresser*s house. No traoe of the dresser 
or of the missing head was ever founds it was supposed that the dresser - 
a stranger to the distriot - (if he was the perpetrator of the deed), 
mast have lost his way in the jungle and perished. 
8. In Maroh 1916 a Chinese labourer, Mr Joo Chai, was murdered in the 
house of hin employer, Mr Ah Kiew, in ulu Belait. It was alleged that 
the murder was oommitted by paramours of Mr Ah Kiew' s wife and another 
woman (both natives of Belait) but the evidenoe at the trial was 
insuffioient and oontradictory. 
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A la au was built for the sultan; and a sohool hoase with 
teaoher's quarters was reacsp for oooupation by January 1916. A definite 
start was made with a bridle path from the oapital to Tatong and Belait. 
In Temburong district, further bridle path construction was undertaken. 
Looking back upon the whole of the first decade of the 
Residential Era (1906-15)t Kr Maundrell oonoludeds 
"The first half of this period saw the redemption, by means 
of the FMS loan, of nearly all the monopolies and private rights of 
taxation and the settlement of the tulin olaims to land, while the 
revenues of the State gradually roses till at last in 1910 they showed 
a surplus over the annual expenditure. An impetus was meanwhile given 
to industry and agriculture. Revenue peaked in 1913 but there seems 
every justification for the belief that the normal resouroes of the 
States as hitherto exploited., are sufficient to provide for an eoonomioal 
and simple system of administration and for gradual development, while 
the payment of the interest on the loan, by which the early reforms were 
finanoeds, was secured by oession monies payable by the neighbouring 
States and were brought in by the Brunei Government from the oeders or 
their heirs. 
Should the hopes of finding a remunerative oilfield in Brunei 
be realizedv ampler revenues will remove many difficulties and aooeler- 
ate development, but whether progress be gradual, or rapid, I think it 
may be said with oonfidenoe that during these ten years have been laid 
good foundations for the renewed prosperity in Brunei, a prosperity to 
which the r at free to enjoy the fruits of his labours, and the pen- 
ran forgetting in his new interest his regret for lifeless claims, 
may alike contribute". 9 
This report was dated 5 April 1916. Less than two months later.. Mr 
Maundrell was dead. 
3. The Murder (18 May 1916) 
The official report of the events leading up to the murder 
ran as follower 
"2. It appears that on 18 May a Sikh Polioe Constable, Mr 
Vir Singh, attempted abOat 7 p. m. to murder another Sikh oonstable who 
9. CO 824/1 Brunei Annual Report 19169 pp 12-13. 
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was on guard with him. Fortunately, his rifle misfired. He then 
esoaped. The Sergeant and other Polioe searohed for him without suooess 
till about 11 p. m. when the Sergeant informed Mr Maundrell. 
3. Mr Mahndrell, though well aware of the risk he was running 
(he warned the men at the oatoh works to be on their guard) attaohed 
less importanoe to his own safety than to the danger to whioh others 
would be exposed to if a madman with a rifle were left at large all 
night. He therefore deoided to head a final searoh himself. The night 
was dark and it was raining. 
4. The squad of Polioe who aooompanied him oarried only one 
Snider carbine, unloaded on Mr Maundrell's instruotions. They met Mr 
Vir Singh on a path about 600 yards behind the Government Offioes. Mr 
Maundrell oalled on him to surrender and he (Mr Vir Singh) fired two 
shots, the seoond of whioh struok Mr Maundrell in the beady killing him 
instantly". 10 
The Brunei Annual Report 1916 oontaius slight variations, 
possibly following eyidenoe whioh oame to light during the subsequent 
trial of the murderers 
"On the night of 19th May (sio), one of the Sikh constables on 
Treasury guard - Mr Vir Singh - attempte4 possibly under the influence 
of drinkq to shoot one of his fellow constables. His rifle misfired and 
he then ran away carrying his rifle and ten live rounds into the gardens 
at the back of the office. )lr Mahndrell at once went out with a party 
to arrest him. They met Mr Vir Singh at a turn of a narrow path and he 
immediately fired two shots, one of which passed through Mr Maundrell's 
head, killing him instantly". 11 
4. Results 
What happened next? Thanks to the energy of Sultan Muhammad 
Jemalul Alam - who may himself have been murdered in 1924 - PC No 27 
(Mr Vir Singh) surrendered at noon on the following daffy at the Polioe 
Station, 
Meanwhile Mr Maundrell's body had been taken to Labuan. On the 
19th he was buried in the Protestant oemetery on the island "with every 
10. CO 273/441 (31085) report signed by Dato E Roberts from a draft 
by Mr GE Cator (BR Brunei 1916-21), 22 May 1916, paragraphs 2-4. 
11. CO 824/1 Brunei Annual Report-1916, pp 5-6 (my italios). 
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mark of affeotion and respeot from all olasses and nationalities". Not 
less than two hundred people were present at the funeral. 
12 
Mr Cator's report oontinued as follows: 
"9. As Brunei was left temporarily without a European Government officer, 
I decided to go over with the Chief Inspeotor of Police and take charge. 
We arrived about 3 p. m. and I at once visited the Sultan and informed 
hint, that I had come to give what assistance I could. Everything was 
quiet, though evidence was not lacking that there would have been a 
panic had the murderer been at large a second night". 13 
Sir Arthur Young (the High Commissioner) oommented that the 
late Resident was 
"an officer of very high oharaotert he carried out his duties 
thoroughly and oonsoientionsly and never spared himself... 
4. The courage displayed by him on the oooasion of his death 
was of a very high standards and I desire to record how deeply the 
Government Service and myself regret the loss of an officer whose career 
gave every promise". 14 
The obituary in the Straits Times, dated 22 May 1916, disolosad 
that Mr Haundrell had been head oadet of his year (905). The writer 
then degenerated into hagiograpbys 
"(During his stay in Brunei) he (Mr Maundrell) rapidly won the 
oonfidenoe of the pengirans, while his patienoev justioe and generosity 
gained the warm affeotion of the various tribes. Qiietv pure, unswerving 
from the high standard of duty whioh he always kept before him, he was 
a devoted son, a perfeot friends and a valuable oivil servant. His life 
was unassuming, but those who knew him intimately bad the privilege of 
friendship with a nature always ready unstintingly to give, a hand always 
ready to help, and a sympathy ever quiok to oomfort". 15 
"Suoh a nioe man". 9 agreed Ire Kortright, wife of a Sarawak 
offioer in Baram. "These Sikhs are a treaoherous lot"p she olaimed.. 
12. As note 109 paragraphs 5-8. 
13. Ibid. , paragraph 9. 
14. Ibid., Young to CO, No 196 (Straits Settlements), 2 June 1916, 
paragraphs 3-4. 
15. Straits Times, 22 )Iay 1916. 
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"I wish we had not quite so many as polioe in Miri, but I think Frank 
(Mr Kortright) has them pretty well in hand"* 
16 
Rhe murderer, for bis part, was tried before "His Honour" 
Sir John Bmoknill (1873-1926), Chief Justioe of the Straits Settlements, 
and eentenoed to death. After oonfirmation by the State Counoil of this 
penalty, the Sikh was exeouted on 2 September. 
"This was the first oooasiou" - thus Mr Cator in the Brunei 
Annual Report 1916 - "on whioh a judge of the Supreme Court of the 
Colon had sat in Brunei and the solemnity, and dignity of the prooeed- 
ings made a great impression". 17 
The late Resident was survived by a brother and two sisters, 
one of whom was an invalid, 
18 
5. Conolusion 
The foregoing relies only on the offioial version of events. 
In the absenoe of other evidenoe, it is impossible to say how reliable 
this is. It is notioeable, however, that after the murder no armed 
British presenoe was neoessary in Brunei; no warships of the Royal Navy 
16. (RHO) Mss Pao s74s Mrs K Kortright to "Aunt Annie"P 13 June 1916. 
17. Brunei Annual Report 1916, pp 5-6. 
18. The brother was Mr HS Maundrell of The Dingle, Reigate, Surrey. 
Learning of the existence of the handicapped sister, Sir Arthur Young 
"considered the oases in Executive Council... and consulted the unofficial 
members of the Legislative Council resident in Singapore. All are of 
opinion that a grant should be given to the invalid sister on the same 
terms and conditions as laid down in the Royal Warrant for the sister 
of an officer ranking as a captain killed in action". Sir Arthur 
suggested, therefore, that approval should be obtained from the Crown 
Agents for an annual allowance of L50 to the sister so long as she 
shoald remain unmarried (CO 273/442,45480, Young to CO, S3 oonfidentialp 
25 August 1916). This was done (Co 273/443: 56996). 
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appear to have visited the Sultanate; and no repressive legislation was 
enacted in the immediate (or long-term) aftermath of the tragedy. Indeed, 
the 'executive' consisted only, of the Resident and the Treasurer. This 
does not suggest widespread and deeply-rooted antagonism on the part 
of the Brunei people for the Residential System. 
Sikhs ooatiuued to be employed as polioemea`. in Brunei until 
1920,1 when the Straits Settlements' detaohment of Labuan and Brunei 
Polioe Force was withdrawn from Brunei, and a separate, all-Malay 
Brunei Police Force established on 1 January 1921. The murder of Mr 
Manadrell may have added to suspicion of Sikh polioemen; but this 
enapioion was not suffioient to make the withdrawal of the Sikhs an 
immediate priority. 
Some important questions remain. For example, how far did Mr 
Vir Singh reoeive a fair trial? There were no lawyers in Brunei, so 
who acted as defence oounsel? Secondly, wilt was there no appeal? Finally, 
it might be argued that the sentenoe was even more barbarous than the 
original crimes fore whereas Mr Vir Singh presumably shot his victim on 
the spur of the moment, his own judioial murder by the British was oold- 
blooded and pro-meditated. 
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APPENZ X 1.4 
THE HATTON HALL CASE 1903 - 1907 
1. Introdnotion 
In order to relieve his desperate poverty, Sultan Hashim 
(r 1885-1906) raised money for his immediate needs by granting oon- 
oessions, mainly to Chinese merchants, in the most reokiess fashion, and 
nsaally for very inadequate ooneideration. 
l 
in this way he sold either 
monopolies or the right to collect import duties on almost every oon- 
oeivable thing. Sometimes he sold the same oonoession to several differ- 
ent people and left them to settle it among themßelvee. After January 
1906, however, the oonoeseioaaires were oompuleoril7 expropriated by 
the inooming Resident in order to raise a revenue for the new Government. 
Although modest compensation was paid, there was little if any protest 
from the former Chinese aonoessionaires. 
There were two ezoeptions to this general pattern. First, the 
British Rajah of Sarawak, Sir Charles Brooker was permitted to retain his 
monopoly of fisoal rights in lluara Damit; 
2 
and, secoadlyt Mrr James Hatton 
Hall - "a pioneer in Brunei and North Borneo" running "a general merohant 
busineae"3 - who held the sole right to import a oertain kind of 
1. See above, pp 31-2,42-3,52,55-6,160-4,166 and 168-72. 
2. See above, Appendix 1.2 (pp 561-79)- 
3,, His own desoription of himself (Co 852/761 Pile 6). Little is known 
about Kr Halls none of the present writer's oorrespondents oould reoall 
the name. I guess that he was born in o1880. He appears to have first 
arrived in North Borneo in 1903 and was still in business there as late 
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tobacco into Brunei and who did protest - vehemently so - after he had 
been expropriated. This appendix deals with the latter oase. 
2. The Tobaooo Monopoly 
The stor7 beginn, not-in Brunei, but in neighbouring North 
Borneo. At the beginning of this oentury were was a oertain Dusan 
tobaooo known as siAep bilai ("tobaooo in twists") because that was the 
form in whioh it was sold. Governor Eli Biroh of North Borneo (1901-3) 
sought to enoonrage the oultivation of this orop in order to give the 
hill tribes more ooompation and thereby to redmoe disquiet. Hitherto 
the Ihouns had broaght the tobaooo down to the ooastal faire, walking 
for distanoee which took them several days to ooverg and were compelled 
either to part with their prodnoe to Brunei traders at the prioes the 
latter offered or to oarr7 their heavy loads bank to the mountains. Mr 
Biroh pointed out to the ohiefe the advantages of extended and more 
intelligent cultivation; of more perfeot oaring; and of building up 
as 1937, In 1904 he held two ooncessions in Lawas distriott the sole 
right to export (a) birds' nests and guano; and (b) timber (CO 144/79t 
9789). When the Rajah took oontrol of Lawas distriot during the follow- 
ing year, these rights were summarily abolished. Mr Hall founded the 
(umbang Pasang (or Berakas) rubber estate near Brunei Town and the 
limited liability ocmpany whioh he established later to run the property 
(Brunei United Plantations Ltd) survived until 1953. He owned further 
estates in North Borneo; and in 1912 he was involved in projeots to build 
a Power station and ioe plant in Jesselton (CO 144/808 5578; and CO 
874/ 
334). He announoed plans in November 1914 to establish a general shop- 
house at Miri (Co 604/4 Sarawak Gazette, 16 November 19149 p 255)" 
Finally, in 1920-1 and again in 1937 he attempted nnsaooessfully to 
purchase Brooketon oolliery. 
Mr Hall had links with members of the British Establishment, 
such as Sir W Holland NPD first Baron Rotherham (1849-1927). 
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outside markets. The Governor advised the Atsuns to get rid of make- 
weight and to sell their tobaooo by weight. By, agreement with the ohiefs 
and producers, minimum prices were fixed for the three grades of this 
tobaooo at whioh traders had to buy from the produoers. It was also 
agreed that traders should not sell at more than twine the amount they 
paid. These arrangements were then embodied in a speoial law and the 
duty on imported Dntoh tobaooo raised in order to proteot the looal 
indastry in North Borneo. 4 
Mr Hall established in business at Jesselton in January 1903. 
About this time he obtained from the North Borneo Government the sole 
right to purohase and export sigep bilai. This monopoly was oanoelled, 
however, bfr the BNBC's oonrt of direotors. dir Biroh riposted by publishing 
a notifioation forbidding the sale of the tobaooo to anyone not having a 
lioenoe to purohase it; and the only etioh lioenoe was iesaed to Mr Ha11.5 
The latter then attempted to "oorner" the market by obtaining 
the monopoly of import into Brunet, where most of the tobaooo was sold. 
By a oonoeaaion dated 4 April 1903 Sultan Hashim assigned to Mr Hall for 
a period of five years,, the exolusive right to import into Brunei and 
sell sigep bilai, subjeot to the payment of twelve dollars' import duty 
on every pikul. 
6 
In August 1904 this oonoession was extended for a 
further ten years, i. e. until 1 May 1918.7 
4. Co 144/78 (9953) memorandum by Sir EW Biroh, Maroh 1904, paragraphs 
1-18; also in FO 12/127 P 133ff. 
5. FO 12/127 p 15, Mr G Hewett to P0,10 January 1904- 
6. CO 144/80 (40567) petition from Mr Hall to the High Commissioner, 21 
August 1906, paragraph 3. 
7. Ibid., paragraph 4. Mr XoArthur reported that "in 1904 while I was in 
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Mr Hall had paid nothing for his conoession. The 'oonsideration' 
was his guarantee that import duty - which the Sultan had been unable 
to oolleot because of smuggling - would be paid. The Brunei monaroh 
received a sum of about $3,000 - paid partly at the time of the original 
grant and partly at the time of its extension - as an advanoe on aooount 
of the duty whioh would become due in the future. 
8 
Mr Stubbsp at the 
Colonial Offioeq challenged Mr Hall's explanation on the groaud that 
"the monopoly was already farmed out before Mr Hall oame on the soene 
and the monopolist would, of coarse, in his own interests, do his best 
to prevent smuggling. Being a Chinese, he would be better able to do 
so than a stranger like Mr Hall, and indeed it appears that there was a 
great deal more smuggling in Mr Hall's time than before". 9 
The effeots of Mr Hall's double monopoly appears to have oome 
first to the offioial attention of AM Government in January 1904 when 
Consul Hewett reported that complaints had lately been made to him in 
Trusan, Limbang and Brunei oonoerning the high prioe of Javanese and 
Sumatran tobaooos imported into Labnan, whioh was proving "a ooaeider- 
able hardship to the poorer olasses... who are unable to afford the 
better kinds of tobaooo". 
10 
Jr Hall explained to the oonsul that the 
higher import datiee imposed in Deoember 1903 was intended to promote 
his oompany's interest and proteot their monopoly. As regarded the 
notifioatioa of higher import duties, Mr Hewett could 000 
"no objeotion to its applioation as far as British North Borneo is oon- 
Brunei... (the Sultan) frequently stated that he only let the monopoly 
beoause of Mr Hall's importunity" (CO 144/80s 40567). Mr Stubbs agreed 
that this was more-than likelys the Sultan had been living on ee o 
refuse at the time, aooording to Mr McArthur (CO 531/1s 35081). 
8. CO 144/80 (40567) MoArthur to Hall, No 929 2 April 1906, pare' 4. 
9. CO 531/1 (35081) minute by Mr Stubbs, 15 Ootober 1907- 
10* PO 12/127 p 15s Hewett to P0,10 January 1904, paragraph 1. 
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oerned but its publication in Labuan has proved an undoubted hardship 
in that oolonyp and in the Brunei and Sarawak rivers as well, and it 
appears to me that the policy of taxing a Crown Colony and imposing a 
hardship upon the poorer classes in the two neighbouring States in 
order to promote the interest of a single firm in British North Borneo 
is open to objeotion". 11 
Upon being approaohed by RM Governmentp Mr Biroh retorted that 
he had raised the duty to protect an indigenous industry in North Borneo 
and the faot of the monopoly of import into Brunei was also "unobjeotion- 
able" because 
"it secures the Sultan his import duty, prevents smuggling of which the 
Sultan bitterly complained to mein writing, and cannot raise prices 
(because) Brunei is Mr Hankey'a chief market and as a man of business 
he is unlikely to spoil it". 12 
(Mr Hanker was the lieutenant of Mr Hail). 
Mr Stubbs oommented that the Colonial Offioe "may safely 
take up the position that the matter is not of suffioient importance 
for no to worry the (British North Borneo) Company about it"; 
13 
and 
there the matter rested until 1906. 
3. The Canoellatioa of the monopoly (April 1906_)_ 
From January 1906 all monopolies in Brunei were gradually 
canoelled by the inooming Resident. Monopolists were awarded in oompen- 
sation their original pnrohase money less an amount proportionate to 
the number of years their monopoly had been held alrea4. Mr Hall 
reoeived no oompensation, therefore, beoause he had paid nothing for his 
11. Ibid., paragraph 7. 
12. CO 144/78 (9983) memorandum by Mr Biroh, paragraphs 18-20; also in 
PO 12/127. 
13. CO 144/78 (9953) minute by Mr Stubbs, 21 Maroh 1904. 
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oonoession in the first plaoe. 
On 1 March 1906 the Resident officially informed Mr Hall that 
his oonoessiou would be oanoelled with effeot from 10 April forthooming. 
14 
Mr MoArthur hoped "the finanoes of Brunei will admit of reasonable 
compensation besag paid for such cancellation"15 and made several 
attempts to elicit from Mr Hall how much consideration he had given for 
the monopoly. 
On 2 April Mr Hall was repaid the money whioh he had lent to 
the Sultan, less an amaint due on aoooant of the tobaooo already im- 
ported. This totalled %l, 301.64.16 Mr Hall at one stage also olaimed 
interest on the mosey advanoed, but he agreed to waive this demand. 
17 
Even here Mr Hall had been cheating the Saltany beoauee he 
altered the form in whioh the tobaooo was imported so that he paid only 
about one third of the usual duty. The rate was twelve dollars for eaoh 
gikal. But the tobaooo was not aotually weighed. A oertain namber of 
the 'twists' (bilai) in wbioh it was made up was regarded as making a 
jikul and duty was paid aooordingly though, as a matter of faott these 
bilai did not weigh so muoh. Mr Hall abandoned the bilai form in favour 
of flat Oakes and paid duty only on the real weight. Mr Stubbs claimed 
that this was not only sharp practice but had the effect of nullifying 
Mr Halle subsequent olaim for compensations 
"The oonoessjon was for... Otobaooo in twists'. Therefore when he aban- 
14. CO 144/80 (40567) MoArthur to Hall, 1 Marob 1906. 
15. Ibid., MoArthur to Hall, No 16v 16 February 1906, paragraph 2. 
16. Ibid.,, McArthur to Halle No 92p 2 April 1906, paragraph 9. 
17. Ibid., Hall to MoArthur, 10 April 1906. 
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doped the twist form, )r Hall was importing an artiole for whioh he had 
no oonoession. He ceased to exercise the right to import sigep bilai 
and therefore there is the less reason for compensating him for being 
deprived of it", 18 
4. Mr Hall's Appeal to the High Commissioner 
Having failed to obtain satisfaotion from the British Resident 
in. Brunei, Mr Hall submitted a petition (drawn up by Messrs Drew and 
Napier! solioitore, of Singapore) to the High Commissioner in August 
1906.19 Mr Hall olaimed oompensation, not upon the basis of the original 
purchase money, but upon that of anticipated profits during the twelve 
years his lease had yet to ran when it was oanoelled. He said that, 
until the end of 1905, he had imported into Brunei and sold 138 pikuls 
of sigep bilai at prioes ranging from %160 to $190 per pikul, the maximum 
prioe fixed by the coaoession being $$200.20 He olaimed an average gross 
profit per pikul of %125, equivalent to %520 a month. His expenses in 
oonneotion with trading (inoluding import daty) were, he saidp gl00 per 
month. His net profits therefore were olaimed. to be just over 9420 month- 
17. On the basis of a monthly profit of $400 Mr Hall antioipated that in 
the twelve years his oonoession woald have had to ran, he might expeot 
total profits of at least $57V600 (144 X %400). This figure was likely 
18. CO 531A (35081) minute by Mr Stubbs, 15 October 190T- 
19- CO 144/80 (40567) petition drawn up by Messrs Drew and Napier on 
behalf of Mr Hall, 21 August 1906. 
20. It might be pointed out that daring Mr Birch's time it had been 
agreed that the buyer of sigep bilai should not seil it at more than 
twice cost price. Sinne the cost price of the best quality tobacco was 
only sixty dollars per pikul, Mr Hail should not have sold it for more 
than $$120 per RLkul (compared with the 
%160-190 at which he claimed to 
have sold his stock). 
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to be an underestimate, moreover, beoause the oost prioe of tobaooo was 
falling and the reformed administration would put "an end to smuggling, 
whioh was rife, thereby massively inoreasing Mr Halls proper share of 
the market. Mr Hall did not wish to be greedy, however, and was 
prepared to aooept oompeasation -on the basis of 
%400 a month. 
21 
Mr MoArthur was able to demonstrate that Mr Hall had grossly 
exaggerated his profits. ' The Resident" agreed that the quantity of 
tobaooo sold was substantially as olaimed. 
22 
But investigation revealed 
that after obtaining the monopoly Mr Hall had engaged an agent (Mr WW 
Boyd) in Labnan and a ealeeman (Muhammad Yusuf) in Brunei. 
23 
Inch* 
Yusuf was paid X65 a month, Mr Boyd an unknown amount. Mr Hall also 
remunerated two revenue watchers in Brunei at the rate of %48 per month. 
These expenses alone amounted to more than the $100 monthly claimed by 
the petitioner. But the Reiident reportedp further, that on 30 Maroh 
1905 Mr Hall had'entered into an agreement with a Chinese trader. Mr 
Ong Joe Seng who beoame his looal agent until 15 Deoember 1905, when 
Irrahe Tusuf was re-appointed. Mr Ha11 olaimed that he had oanoelled. 
the agreement beoanee he fcand that Mr Ong was oonniying at the smuggling. 
ltr Ong, on the other hand, stated that he himself oaaoelled it beoaase 
Mr Rall$s tobaooo was mouldy and absolutely unsaleable. 
21. CO 144/80 (40567) petition, paragraphs 5-7. 
22. Ibid., memorandum by Mr MoArthur, paragraph 4. 
23. Mr Boyd, the Harbour Master in Labuan, was dismissed in 1904-for 
embezzlement. Inohe Tusuf was subsequently employed on Mr Hall's rubber 
estate at Berakae, where he (Inohe Tusuf) rifled the safe. Later he was 
involved in an attempt to defraud the BNBC. 
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The Resident also produced a document purporting to show that 
Mr Hall sold his stock to Mr Ong at the rate of only X1110 per pikul, 
less 5% commission. Mr Halle therefore, was incorrect in saying that he 
sold his tobaooo during this period at prices ranging from $160 to $190 
and his estimate of profits was,, accordingly, also unreliable. 
24 
What were his profits? The three grades of Dusan tobacco 
cost respectively, sixty, forty and twenty-five dollars per pikul. Mr 
Hall never claimed to sell the first grade, though he endeavoured 
unsuooessfully until March 1905 to sell the lower grade at the price 
of the highest. Supposing Mr Hall bought grade two at $40 per pikul, he 
would incur also export duty of %5 from North Borneo, freight ß$5j and 
import duty into Brunei of $12, making a cost price of $$62. By the 
arrangement with Mr Ong the maximum profit Mr Hall could have made per 
pikul was %48z less than half the amount the petitioner was olaiming. 
(Mr McArthur had failed to take aooount of Mr Ong's 5% commission. Given 
that 5% of $110 is %5.5, Mr Hall's maximum profit per pikul was ¢2.50, 
i. e. 948 less 95.5)" 
But even this lower profit Mr Hall found impossible. Mr Ong 
reported within three months that his stores were musty and unsaleable. 
Mr Ong told the Resident that his arrangement with Mr Hall was modified 
as to price and that by mutual arrangement Mr Ong paid from 15 June to 
15 Deoember 1905 8100 per month to Mr Hall as a fixed oharge for the 
agency and bought tobacco wholesale from him at prices ranging from 
24. CO 144/80 (40567) memorandum by Mr MoArthar, paragraphs 5-6. 
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X60 to ; 80 per pikul. Mr MoArthur ocnoludedt 
"The making of these arrangements, my knowledge of whioh is not suspeoted 
by ihr Hall, shows, I think, oonolusively that Mr ßa11 has given an 
exaggerated statement of his monthly profits prior to 1 January 1906". 25 
As further evidenoe of the mouldiness of Mr Hall's tobaooo, 
there was not only the word of the Sultan and the Resident, but that of 
Mr Halls own agent, who, in a case in ooart, adduced as convincing 
proof that oertain tobaooo was smuggled and note as the defendant said, 
bought from Mr Hall, the faot that it was not mO x1d7. 
Mr MoArthur pointed out, further, that Mr Hall was wrong to 
assume that the Government of Brunei would have taken steps to prevent 
smuggling had the oonoesaion remained in foroe. In letting out a 
monopoly, the Sultan freed the Government from any euoh responsibility. 
26 
Mr Hall drew the attention of the High Commissioner to an offer 
which hei Mr Hall, had received of $300 per month for a lease of the 
rights granted by the concession. This offer was contained in a letter 
dated 15 February 1906 from Mr Swee Cheng of Labuan to Mr Hall. The 
latter submitted that this offer showed the monthly value of the rights 
to be not less than that plaoed there by the petitioner as a basis of 
oompensation sinoe an adequate margin had to be allowed for the lessee's 
profit. 
27 
The Resident replied that Mr Swee Cheag - the Labuan and 
Brunei opium farmer - made his offer probably beoause he expeoted the 
ohange in administration to result in greater prosperity. Further, Mr 
Hall had failed to annex to his petition a copy of correspondence with 
25. Ibid., paragraph 8. 
26. Ibid., paragraph 14. 
27. Ibid., 1(r Hall's petition, paragraph 7. 
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Mr "Moirthar, whioh showed that dir Hall was already aware of the proposed 
canoellation of his monopoly, the only question at issue being the 
amount of oompensation due. Mr Hall had had an interview with Mr 
KoArtbur on the subjeot as early as 28 Deoember 1905. As soon as the 
Resident heard of Mr Sweets offer, he issued a notioe oanoelling Mr 
Hall's monopoly. 
28 
Xrr Hall pointed out, finally, that he had suffered further 
loss because of the stock left on his hands following the oanoellation 
of his oonoession. He would not be able to sell the stook at greater 
than half the'prioe paid and submitted that he should be reimbursed the 
other half (%l, 846.50). Thae Mr Hall sought (a) %57,600 for the lose of 
future profits; and (b) %1,846.50 for loss of stook in hand at the date 
of oanoellation. 
With regard to the seoond part of this olaim, an inoredulous 
Resident failed to see why the petitioner should reoeive anything of the 
kind. Mr Hall, he pointed out, was at liberty like anyone else to sell 
sigep bilai in Brunei subjeot to the payment of import duty; all he had 
lost was the sole right to do no. If his tobaooo was of good quality he 
would be able to stand competition; ifs. on the other hands it was mould 
and unsaleable, this would simply confirm all the complaints levelled 
against him. Indeed, Mr Hall subsequently dropped this seoond part of 
his claim. 
With regard to the prinoipal olaim, i. e. oompensation for load 
of potential profits, the Resident urged that Mr Hall should not be 
28. ! d., KoArthur's memorandumv paragraph 15. 
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compensated on this basis. Mr McArthur claimed that registration of 
oonoessions in the Labuan consulate prior to 1906 had not implied 
Foreign Office recognition of such privileges. There was no difference 
between Mr Hall and other speoulators whose monopolies had been 
abrogated on grounds of pttblio policy: 
"If oompensation is paid to Mr Hatton Hall on the basis of prospeotive 
profits, all the Chinese monopolists who have received payment in aooord- 
anoe with the instruotions given me on assuming my duties in Brunei will 
oonsider themselves aggrieved, while those whose monopolies have not yet 
been paid for, will claim on the same basis as Mr Hatton Hall". 29 
Sir John Anderson, upheld the Resident and rejected Mr Hall's 
petition. When the dooaments were forwarded to Whitehall (enolosed in 
a despatoh dated 10 Ootober 1906), Mr Stubbs had no doubt that the 
sapplicaat had been oorreotly treated and the Colonial Offioe oould wait 
until he protested. 
30 
Mr (i0 Fiddes, a more senior offioial, agreed, but 
warned that it ooald be "the beginning of a oup of troables... It seems 
to me arguable that the oonoession was given for valuable oonsideration 
- the regular reoeipt of import duty - and that Mr Hall has a olaim to 
Compensation". 
31 
This point was developed by Mr HB Cox, Legal Under- 
Seoretary, who believed that prima faoie Dir Hall "has a olaim to oompea- 
satioa and that compensation should be settled, not by the Sultan's 
advisers, but by some impartial tribunal". 
32 
Mr OP Luoae, the Assistant 
Under-Seoretary, understood that ooaoessions given by Malay rulers were 
by no means oontinued by their suooessors and that the oonoessionaires 
29. Ibid., paragraph 18. 
30. Ibid., minute by Stubbs, 6 November 1906. 
31. Ibid., minute by Fiddes, 7 November 1906. 
32. Ibid., minute by Cox, 7 November 1906. 
601 
knew the risk they were running. (This prinoiple was not applied to 
the Rajah's fisoal rights in )Iuara Damitp however). Mr Luoas added: 
"I do not want to admit any olaim to compensation on the part of this 
man or to interfere in any way unless we are driven to it. He was 
clearly engaged in something little short of swindling. I would therefore 
say nothing as to a tribunal at present". 33 
Sir FJS Hopwood, the Permanent Under-Seoretary, was not impressed by the 
Resident's handling of the oases 
TM r fear is that Mr MoArthur has not managed the correspondence very 
Well. He refers to compensation for the thing,, and I should have thought 
that the aot of cancellation should have been that of the Sultan". 34 
5. Mr Hall's Appeal to the Seoretary of State 
Meanwhile, Mr Hall had taken his case to Mr H Bowler of the 
Manoheeter Courier. Mr Halle advooate submitted a petition towards the 
end of July 1907 in whioh he argued that there was legal ooaeideratioa 
for the monopoly sinoe Mr Hall undertook to pay the regular import duty 
- in other words, minuted Mr Stubbs, he undertook to do in return for 
the oonoessioa what he was bound to do without its 
"This may be good English law"p Mr Stubbs oontinued, "but I submit that 
it is not good senses and if we are to aot on law, divoroed from sense, 
I submit that the law should not be English law, whioh has no place in 
Brunei (of. pp 143 and 462, above), but Malay law, under which Mr Hall's 
olaim is worthless, beoause a Sultan oannot be sued and also beoause.. e 
no Sultan is bound by oonoessions granted by his predeoessor". 35 
Even if it was admitted that Mr Hall had claims on this ground 
"he would still deserve no oousideration owing to the use he made of his 
33. Ibid., minute by Lucas, 10 November 1906. 
34. CO 531/1 (26519)'minute by Sir F Hopwood KCMG XCB, 1 August 1907. 
35. Ibid., minute bb Stubbs, 27 Ju17 1907. 
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oonoession... (which) he used... to the detriment of the public, trying to 
force upon them mouldy tobacco of a low grade at the price of the beat". 36 
In short, Mr Hall had "not the shred of a moral olaim". Mr Stubbs hoped, 
further., that the suggestion of a tribunal would not be entertained 
seriously., because the effect on Brunei would have been deplorables 
"There were an enormous number of oonoessions... The concessionaires have 
quietly taken what was offered them. If a tribunal were set up they 
would all clamour for the re-opening of their oases in hopes of getting 
more. Whether they got more or not, the enquiries would cost a great 
deal of money which Brunei has not got and has little chance of getting. 
Moreover the prestige of the Resident would be destroyed and he wants 
all the prestige possible; he has a hard enough time as it is owing to 
Sir Charles Brooke's intrigues. Further such a tribunal could only be 
composed of men familiar with Malay custom. These men are only to be 
found in the FMS and Sir John Anderson has, of oourse, acted already on 
the advice of those FMS officers best qualified to deal with such oases". 37 
Yr Fiddes pointed out that the appellant might be ruined by the 
oanoellation and Mr Cox reiterated his opinion that there should be a 
tribunal. 38 Mr Luoas, however, oouaidered that it would be 
"disastrous if we begin giving compensation or setting up a court to 
consider compensation olaims. I think... we bad better have Mr Sowler 
... and Mr McArthur here, and hear Mr McArthur about Mr Sowler's claims. 
... I want to give the appearance of enquiry and to avoid giving 
compensation if possible". 39 
This deoiei oa was taken before the and of July 1907. Cu 1 
August the matter was brought up separately with Mr WS Churoh111, then 
Parliamentary Under-Seoretary, by Sir W Holland MPg40 but this did not 
alter the plan. On 28 August 1907 )r Bowler oame to the Colonial Offioe 
with his father-in-lax Sir H Holland), and disoussed the question with 
36. Ibid. 
37. Ibid. 
38. Ibid., minutes by Fiddes and Cox, 29 July 1907. 
39. Ibid., minute by Luoas, 30 July 1907. 
40. CO 531A(27413) Sir W Holland to Churohill, 31 July 1907. See also 
P 590 (fu)g above. 
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Messrs Luoas, MoArthur (home on leave) and Stubbs. It beoame olear 
that no agreement could be reached so it was arranged that Mr MoArthur 
should write his oomments on Mr Sowler"s memorandums that Mr Bowler 
should rejoin and that the matter should then be put before the 
Seoretary of State, Lord Elgin, for finals deoision. 
At the interview Mr MoArthnr advanced the view that the 
concession was not valid because it bore only the chop of the Sultan 
whereas to be valid it required in addition those of the wazirs. Mr 
Bawler argued that Mr Hall could not be expected to know that anything 
more was needed than the ohop of the Sul. taug whereupon Mr Stubbs oouut- 
eyed that if dir Hall aooepted a oonoession without full enquiry as to 
the formalities needed, he did so at his own rislc. 
4' 
In his seoond memorandum, dated 2 Ootober 1907,, Mr Sowler 
oonoeded the point. He oontended instead that the requirements of the 
oonstitution were ignored and that conoessions with only the Sultan's 
chop were the rule. He adduoed as evidence the case of a grant of 
sovereign rights in the Lawas distriot to the BNBC, under the impression 
that this transferred the territory in full sovereigntys 
"When Lawas was transferred to the Government of Sarawak, the Rajah was 
requested by the British Government to compensate a Mr Brooks-Johnson 
in the sum of £2,000 for certain revenue farm privileges which he had 
obtained, not from the ruling Sultan but from a chief who did not 
possess sovereign rights over the district. Mr Johnson's rights mar 
have differed in nature from that obtained by Mr Hall from the ruling 
sovereign, but the principle of compensation for cancellation on change 
of government stands". 42 
41. CO 531/1 (35081) minute by Stubbs, 15 October 1907. 
42. Ibid., Sowler to Lucas, 2 October 1907, paragraph B. 
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Next Mr Sowler invited attention to the "extremely remarkable 
faot" that only in September 1907, when the question of oompensation had 
been brought to the attention of the Colonial Offioe, was the power of 
the Sultan to grant the oonoession to Mr Hall brought up. 
43 
In a semi-offioial letter to Mr Stubbs, dated 7 Ootober 1907 
Mr NoArtbur oontended that the Lawas analogy, was mis-stateds Mr Brooke 
Johnson was not ooanpensated for trading rightst he was serving the tulip 
Government of Lawas, not of Brunei, under an agreement whioh provided 
that he was to get 10jß of all the revenue oolleoted. The faot that the 
Rajah had to oompensate him "showed that the agreement was between the 
tulip chiefs and not what is meant by the technioal English phrase 
'sovereign rights'. 
44 
With regard to Mr Sowler's seoond point, the 
Resident reiterated that registration by the oonsul before 1906 did not 
imply reoognition. Indeed, the invalidity of all oonoesaioae of mono- 
polies was the basis upon whioh it was deoided to resume them. 
45 
Mr Stubbs oouoluded that Mr Hall had been justly treated: 
"He joined the crowd of concession hunters who were trading on the 
indigence of an aged and unfortunate Sultan and if in this not very 
reputable pursuit he has not gained quite so maoh as he expected, I 
do not think that there is any need to compensate him". 46 
Wr Cox still feared that Mr MoArthur's letter of 16 Febraar7 1906 (in 
which, then unaware that Mr Hall had paid nothing for the monopoly, he 
promised oompensation to the merohant) hampered the Colonial Office 
43. Ibid. 
44. Ibid., MoArthur to Stubbs, 7 Ootober 1907. 
45" Ibid., marginal note by MoArthur on Bowler to Luoas, 2 Ootober 1907. 
See, also, PO 572/39 MoArthur, "Report", paragraph 42. 
46. CO 531/1 (35081) minute by Stubbs, 15 Ootober 1907. 
605 
and that the aase might be taken up by Parliament. But he agreed that 
after a tribunal had been set ups oompensation should be minimal. 
"It is objeoted that if we par Mr Rally we shall have to pay others more 
deserving. This is unfortunate, but does not seem to me to be a valid 
argument - still less one whioh we oould see in Parliament". 47 
Lord Elgin, however, saw little danger on this noores Mr 
Stubbs had shown that the ooaoession was not teohnioally valid (as it 
had not the ohops of the vazir` an well as that of the Sultan) and 
"if we add that no real oonsideration was given, that the oonoession is 
olearl. y not in the pnblio interests and that the oonoessionaire has 
already made a profit out of selling mouldy tobaooop I think we need 
soaroely fear the Hoawof Commons taking up so bad a oase". 48 
)r Sowler, aooordinglyg was informed of this deoision by a letter from 
Mr Cox dated 25 October 1907, and there the matter ended. 
6. Conclusion 
P7 accepting this deotsion, and not taking the case to oourtp 
Mr Hall taoitly oonoeded the Colonial Offioe'e verdiot that he had been 
engaged in "something little short of swindling" and had no olaim to 
oompensation for the lose of his tobaooo monopoly. 
Apart from the light it oaete upon the dubious prooeedings of 
a British businessman in Brunei, the oase of )r Hatton Hall underlines 
the favourable treatment aooorded to Sir Charles Brooke. For, ifs an 
olaimed by 1(r Luoasq ooaoessions given by 1ala7 rulers were by to means 
oontiaued by their saooessor s and that oonoeseionaires knew the risk 
4T. Ibid. # minute by Cox, 16 Ootober 1907- 
48o Ibid., minnte by Elgin, 19 Ootober 1907" 
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they were were running, why was this prinoiple not extended to the 
rights held by the Rajah in Muara Damit? And why did it not extend to 
oommeroial rights (suoh as the Rajah's ooal monopoly or the Island 
Trading Syndioate's outoh oonoession) or even to cessions of territory? 
If Mr Hall had been less obviously a rogue, his case might have raised 
some rather awkward questions for the Brunei Government. 
Finally, the net of papers relating to this oase was one of 
the few to be minuted personally by the Seoretary of State daring the 
Residential Era. 
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Appendix 2.1 United Kingdoms iii' a Prinoipal Seoretary _of 
State for 
Colonies (1906-59) 
1 Jun 1895 - Oct 1903: J Chamberlain (1836-1914) 
2 Oot 1903 - Dec 1905: A Lyttelton (1857-1913) 
3 Dec 1905 - Apr 1908: Earl of Elgin and Binoardine (1849-1917) 
4 Apr 1908 - Nov 1910: Marquess of Crewe (1858-1945) 
5 Nov 1910 - May 1915: L Haroourt (1863-1922) 
6 May 1915 - Dee 1916: A Bonar-Law (1858-1923) 
7 Dec 1916 - Nov 1919: W Long (1854-1924) 
8 Nov 1919 - Feb 1921: Visooaat A Milner (1854-1925) 
9 Feb 1921 - Oot 1922: WS Churchill (1874-1965) 
10 Cot 1922 - Jan 1924: Ninth Duke of Devonshire 
(1868-1938) 
11 Jan 1924 - Nov 1924: JH Thomas (1874-1949) 
12 Nov 1924 - Jun 1929: LS Amery 
(1873-1955) 
13 Jun 1929 - Aug 1931: 3 Webb, Lord Pacsfield 
(1859-1947) 
14 Aug 1931 - Nov 1931: JH Thomas (1874-L949) 
15 Nov 1931 - Jun 1935: Sir P Conliffe-Lister, Lord Swinton (1884-1972) 
16 Jun 1935 - May 1937: M MaoDonald (1901-81) 
17 Mar 1937 - May 1938: W Ormsby-tore 
18 May 1938 - )day 1940: M MaoDonk ld 
(1901-81) 
19 May 1940 - Feb 19411 Lord Lloyd (1879-1941) 
20 Feb 1941 - Feb 1942: Lord Moyne 
(1880-1944) 
21 Nov 1942 - Aug 1945: Hon OF( Stanley (1896-1950) 
22 Aug 1945 - Cot 1946: ßH (Lord) Hall 
(1881-? 1965) 
23 Oct 1946 - Mar 1950: A. Creeoh-Jones 
24 Mar 1950 - Oot 1951: J Griffiths (1890-1975) 
25 400t 1951 - Jul 1954: 0 Lytteltoa, Viscount Chandos (1893-1972) 
26 Jul 1954 - Oot 1959, A Lennox Boyd, Visoount Boyd of Merton 
(1904-83) 
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Appendix 2.2 High Commissioner for Brunei (1888-1959) 
(a) Governors of the Straits Settlements, eye-offioios- 
1 1888-93 Sir Ceoil Smith GCMG (1840-1916) 
2 1893-99 Sir Charles Kitohell GCMG (d 1899) 
3 1901-03 Sir Frank Swettenham GCMG (1850-1946) 
4 1904-11 Sir John Anderson GCMG (1858-1918) 
5 1911-19 Sir Arthur Young GCMG (1854-1938) 
6 1919-27 Sir Laurenoe Guillemard GCMG KCB (1862-1951) 
7 1927-29 Sir Hugh Clifford MCS GCua GBE (1866-1941) 
8 1930-34 Sir Ceoil Clementi GCMG (1875-1951) 
9 1934-41 Sir Shenton Thomas GCMG OBE (1879-1962) 
(b) Governor-General of Mal! a and Borneo, ex%-offioiot- 
10 1946-48 Mr Malcolm MaoDonald OM PC (1901-81) 
(o) Governors of Sarawak, ex-offioios- 
11 1948-49 Sir Charles Ardeu-Clarke (1898-1962) 
12 1949 Mr DG Stewart CMG (ä 1949) 
13 1950-59 Sir Anthony Abell KCK(I IZIP (b 1906) 
* 
Aotiug High Commissioners inoluded the followings- 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
1889 & 1890 
1895,1898 & 
1899-1901 
1903-4 & 1906 
1911 
1914 
1919-20 
1925 
1934 
1936 
1940 
1949 & 1950 
1954 
Sir F Dickson KCMG (? 1838-1891) 
Sir A Swettenham KCMG (1846-1933) 
Sir W Taylor KCMG (1848-1931) 
Sir E Brookman KCMG (1865-1943) 
Mr RJ Wilkinson CMG (1867-1941) 
Sir FS James KCMG (1870-1934) 
Mr ES Hose 
Sir A Caldioott KCMG Kt Baoh CBE (1884-1951) 
Sir AS Small KBE CMG (1887-1944) 
Mr SW Jones CMG (1888-1962) 
Mr CW Dawson CMG (b 1896) 
Mr CJ Thomas (b 1902) 
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Appendix 2.3 Secretary to High Commissioner (1906-41) 
1 Aug 1903 - May 1907: 
2 May 1907 - Jan 1912: 
3 Jan 1912 - Apr 19141 
? 1916 - ?` 1916, 
4 ?' . 1915- ? 1915: ? 1917 -? Aug 1919: 
5 Aug 1919 - Apr 19201 
6 Apr 1920 - Mar 19211 
7 Mar 1921 -? Feb 1923: 
8 Feb 1923 -? May 1926: 
9 ? May 1926 - Jul 1931s 
10 Jun 1928 
-? May 19291 
11 Jun 1931 - Jun 1931: 
12 Jun 1937 -? Feb 1942: 
0 Marks (1866-1940) CMG 1922 
Sir 0 Severn (1869-1933) KBE CMG 
Sir H Marriott (1873-1929) KBE CMG 
Sir Wß Maxwell (1871-1959) KB CM 
H Maokray (1877-19?? ) 
A'S Haynes (1878-1963) CMG OBE 
ME Sherwood (b 1884) MBE 
Sir AP Riohards GCM09 lot Baron Milverton 
(1885-1978) 
JD Hall (1877-1961) CMG 
JV Cowgill (1888-1959) CMG MC 
Dato EEF Pretty SPMB CMG (1891-1967) 
8 Irvine (b 1894) MC 
Notes H Bathurst (1887-1930) was the substantive holder of the post 
in 1929-30v but in faut he never took it ups oontinuing as Direotor of 
Labour. 
* 
Appendix 2,4 British Resident, Brunei (1906-59) 
Transferred to Table 2 on page 112 (above) 
* 
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Appendix 2.5 Assistant Resident, Brunei (1906-14; 1931-591 
(A) Stationed in Brunei Town (1906-14) 
1 May 1906 - May 19071 
2 May 1907 - Jun 19081 
3 Jun 1908 - Feb 1910* 
4 Mar 1910 - May 1911: 
Jan 1913 - Jul 1914: 
5 Mar 1911 - Jan 19131 
FAS McClelland (1873--1947) 
JG Sugars (1875-1918) 
BO stoney (? 1882-1910) 
WE Lee-Warner OBE (1880-19??; retd 1928) 
EA Dickson (1876-1956) 
(B) Stationed in Kuala Belait (1931-41; 1946-9) 
6 Jan 1931 - Sep 1931: 
7 Oot 1931 - Sep 1933, 
8 Aug 1933 - Apr 1935: 
9 Apr 1935 - Ma 1936: 
10 Mar 1936 - May 1938: 
11 May 1938 - Apr 1940: 
12 may 1940 - Deo 1941, 
TF Carey (1903-66) 
RC Gates (b 1906) 
A Glenoross (b 1908) 
DA Somerville (1908-74) 
H Hughes-Hallett (retd 1941; ex-RAF) 
ECG Barrett CMG (b 1909) 
Datuk RN Turner SPiK CMG (b 1912) 
13 Jul 1946 - Jan 1947* Major CJ Brieooe 
14 Jan 1947 - Dec 1947: Mil Wood 
15 Dec 1947 - Mar 1949: DCI Wernham 
16 Mar 1949 - Oct 1949: 1 Harper (b 1918) 
(C) Assistant-Resident, Brunei Town (or 1949) 
Oct 1949 - Jun 1950: 17 Sep 1950 - Oot 1951s 
18 Dot 1951 - Apr 19 52: 
19 Apr 1952 - Apr 1953: 20 Apr 1953 - Oot 1954, 
21 Cot 1954 - Jan 1956: 22 Jan 1956 - Jun 1958: 
23 Aug 1958 - Sep 1959s 
I Harper (o oat d) 
P Soanlon (b 1924) 
RG Keeoh 
PSI MoSporran (b 1926) 
JT Weekes (1922-1964) 
Capt RH Morris OBE (b 1915) 
11L Bruen OBE (b 1922) 
Dato WI Glass (b 1926) 
(D) Seooad Assistant Resident, Kuala Belait (or 1949) 
24 oat 1949 - Mar 1951: 
25 Mar 1951 - NOV 19531 
26 NOV 1953 - Feb 1954= 
27 Feb 1954 - Jul. 19561 
28 Jul 1956 - Deo 1957: 
29 Jan 1958 - Aug 1958: 
30 Aug 1958 - Sep 1959= 
RCS Bell 
GAT Shaw 
HPK Jaoks (b 1913; retd 1960) 
Pehin Dato PA Coates PSNB SPMB DSLJ OBE 
PUBS PJK 
0 Lloyd-Thomas (b 1918) 
TM Ainsworth (b 1920) 
Pen irats Abu Bakar bin Pengiran Omar MBE 
b 1906 
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Appendix 3.1 Brunei: Chief Polios Offioer (1906-59) 
(A) Straits Settlements Police, Labuan and Brunei Detachment (1906-20)s 
1 Wan 1906 - Jul 19171 HG Crummey 
2 Jul 1917 - Deo 1920: GA MoAfee 
(B) Brunei Polioe Force (1921-59) 
Jan 1921 - Nov 1928s GA MoAfee 
3 Nov 
. 
1928 - Sep 1937s TE Murphy 
4 Sep 1937 - Deo 1938s TF Brown 
5 Deo 1938 - (a) s W Dawson 
6 (a) - Deo 1941s W Martin 
7 Jul 1946 - Feb 1948s 
8 Feb 1948 - Mal 1949= 
9 Way 1949 - may 1950= 
10 Jun 1950 - Aug 1950: 
11 Aug 1950 - Mar 1953: 
12 Mar 1953 - Dec 1954: 
13 Jan 1955 - Mar 1956: 
14 Mar 1956 - Sep 1959= 
HJ Spicks 
TH Allen 
H Phillips 
RW Large (1912-o? 1969) MC SC 
Dato PE Turnbull QPM 1957 (1914-83). 
AC Eatrell KPM CPM (b 1910) 
JGC Kirby-Turner 
(b) Dato AN Outram CM 1952 QPM 1962 
(C) Acting Chief Police Officers 
15 Jan 1921 - Sep 1921s" 
16 Feb 1925 - oat 1925: 
Mar 1931 - Feb 1932: 
Apr 1934 - Apr 1935: 
17 Sep 1950 - Sep 1950: 
Deo 1954 - Jan 1955: 
18 Sep 1959 - Dec 1959: 
Chief Inspeotor Mann 
AV Cookie 
EJ Spinks 
TF Brown 
TP 3t one 
BS Leerton-Smith 
(b 1917) 
Notes (a) Mr Martin took over from Mr Dawson not later than Maroh 1940. 
(b) Dato Outram remained in the post as late as 1965. 
Before 1941 the CPO Brunei was seoonded from the Straits 
Settlements Polios Foroe but after 1948 they tended to be 
seoonded from Sarawak instead. 
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Appendix 3.2 Brunei: State 10igineer (1906-59) 
1. Jan 1906 - oot 1921: 
2 Oot 1921 - Sep 1922: 
3 Sep 1922 - ? 1926: 
4 ? 1926 - Jan 1927: 
5 Jan 1927 - ? 1930: 
6 ? 1930 - Apr 1931: 
7 Apr 19 31 - Jun 19 32: 
8 Jun 1932 - Cot 1934: 
9 Oct 1934 - Jan 1936: 
10 Jan 1936 - Tan 1937: 
11 Jan 1937 - APr 1938: 
12 Apr 1938 - ? 1940: 
13 ? Kar 1940 - ? : 
14 ?- Deo 19411 
15 Jul 1946 - ? 19481 
16 1 1948 - Ing 1949: 
17 Aug 1949 - Deo 1949: 
18 Dec 1949 - Mat 1951: 
19 May 1951 - Aug 1952: 20 Aug 1952 - Jan 1953: 
21 Jan 1953 - Apr 1959: 
22 Apr 1959 - Sep 1959: 
E Roberts (? 1866-1948) 
HM3 Haughton (1874-1954) 
Inohe Awang bin Haji Hanafi 
WH Hofland 
CE Tall 
u. a. (supervised by Head of PWD/ (8) 
supervised by Resident. 
P O'Connell 
FAT Pinnook 
RH J'ohnst on 
Eli Houston 
FP Mnrdook 
A Inglis 
AV Paterson 
NA Photiades 
JA McLeod 
8 Natarajan (Acting) 
JJ Howard (b 1922) 
MA' Gurr 
WN Watterson 
GT Myles (b 1912) 
AM Moore 
Notes For a few months beginning in May 1956 L$ $rett was Aoting Head 
of the Publio Works Department. 
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Appendix 3.3 Brunets State Medioal and Health Officer (1906-59) 
S A) Brunei and Labuan 1906-29 
1 Jan 1906 - sep 1907: ]Dr Adamson (d 1912) 2 May 1908 - Jan 1925: Dr TCA Cleverton 
3 ? Jan 1925 -? 19281 Dr HW Farnivall 
4 ? 1928 -? Feb 19291 Dr JR Bowyer 
(BBrunei (1929-59) 
5 Feb 1929 - May 1930: 
6 May 1930 - Deo 19301 
7 Deo 1930 - Nov 1931: 
8 Nov 1931 - May 1934: 
9 May 1934 - Feb 1937: 
10 Jan 1937 - Juxt 1939= 
11 Jan 1940 - Deo 1941: 
Dr KV Veerasingham 
Dr GH Swapp 
Dr JH Winchester 
Dr EW Martindell 
Dr Wig Evans OBE (d 1982) 
Dr OE Fisher MB ChB DTM&H MD (b 1910) 
Dr GM Graham 
12 Aug 1945 - Nov 1946s Major WC Toole 
13 Nov 1946 - ? 1948: Dr GA Mott 
14 ? 1948 - ? 1950: Dr LJ Clapham CBE (1912-85) 
15 ? 1950 - Jul 1951: Dr JP Bennett 
16 Jul 1951 - Oot 1952: Dr EC Dymond 
17 Oct 1952 - Jul 1954: Dr EH Wailaoe (1911-60) 
18 Jul 1954 - Nov 1955: Dr EC Varcly (1902-late 1970: ) 
19 Nov 1955 - Ma 19561 Ihr MA Rozalia (aoting) 
20 May 1956 - Jul 1959, Dr MT Read MBE NO (b 1914) 
Note * see CO 273/337 (20500) 
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Appendix 3.4 Brunei$ State Finanoe Officer (1906-59) 
1 Jan 1906 - Dec 1914: Resident, er-officio 
2 Jan 1915 - May 1919: EG Goldfinch 
3 May 1919 -7s Resident, er-officio 
43- Deo 1941: Liew Thian Thi 
5 Jul 1946 -? Jul 1954, Dato DH Trumble DPMB OBE PJK (b 1902) 
6 ? Jul 1954 - Sep 1959: EW Cousene (b 1918) 
Note For short periods in 1950 and 1952 Mr RJ Henniker-Heaton 
acted in the post. 
* 
Appendix 3.5 Bruneis State Forest Offioer (1933-59) 
1 1933 - ? 1937. Js Smith 
2 1937 -" Jan 19401 CO Flemmioh 
3 Jan 1940 - Jan 1941: AJ Fyfe 
4 Jan 1941 - Deo 1941S 
Jul 1946 - ? 19488 
KH Brvaut 
5 ? 1948 - Jan 1949, ES Erskine 
6 Har 1949 - Feb 1951: J Grant 
7 Feb 1951 - Jan 1952, JH Nelson-Smith 
8 Jan 1952 - Oct 1952. DO Belait and LP Zehnder (Joint Aoting Head) 
9 Oot 1952 - Sep 1959. BE Smythies 
* 
Appendix 3.6 Brunei: State Agricultural Offioer (1937-59) 
1 Feb 19 37 - Oct 19 4O s ODP 01 d. s 
2 Oot 1940 - Dec 1941s J Cook CBE 
3 Aug 1946 - Feb 1949: H Ritohings 
4 Feb 1949 - Sep 1959s Awang (later Dato) Hamidoon bin Awang 
mot. (a) 
Notes (a) Dato Hamidoon remained State Agrioultural Offioer as late as 1965. 
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From September 1951 to April 1952 he was on a course in Ceylon; and from 
September 1954 to August 1955 he undertook a further year's training in 
Devon. From September 1951 to April 1952 W Crocker was Acting State 
Agricultural Officer; from September to November 1954 NW Smith; and 
from November 1954 to August 1955 PJ Harper. Mr Harper was retained in 
Brunei after August 1955 as Deputy Agriculture Adviser, especially 
concerned with the Wet Padi Mechanical Cultivation Scheme at Mulaut. 
* 
Appendix 3.7 Brunei; State Education Offioer (1949-59) 
1 1906-1931: No appointment 
2 1931-1949: Assistant Resident, ex-offioi o 
3 1949-19548 J Pearoe (1892-60) 
4 19 54 1959= HJ Padmore (b 1912; now deoeased). 
Notes From September 1956 to February 1957 PW Spioer was Acting 
State Ednoation Offioer. Likewise, ]fir Pearoe acted in the post from 
July 1959 until Maroh 1960. 
* 
Appendix 3.8 Braneis State Wireless P sneer (later renamed Direotor 
of Teleoommunioatione) 
1 Apr 1921 - Jan 1926: PEP George 
2 Jan 1926 - Jul 19261 JW Maohan 
3 Jul 1926 - Apr 1928: LR Watts 
4 Apr 1928 - Sep 1959: Pe ran (later Pengiran Temeuggong) Haji 
Mohamed bin Pengiran Piut (b 1906; now 
deoeased) MBE 1953. 
Notes Pe ran Mohamed remained in the post until 1967. 
* 
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Appendix 3.9 Misoellaneoas government Officials (1906-59) 
_(a) 
Postmaster (later Superintendent of Posts and Telegraphs) 
1 1908 - 1910: S Murugasn 
2 o1911 - 1929: Leong Ah Ng 
3 1929 - 19502 not available 
4 o195) - 1957: Kong En Choi 
5 01957 - 1959, Inohe Ali Khan bin Abdul Khan 
Lb)- State Auditor 
1 61950 - o1954s Cheong Keong Quee 
2 o1954 -? Aug 1955t Hanafiah bin Abdnilah 
3 Aug 1955 -? Deo 1956: GET Dean 
4 Deo 1956 - ? 1958: M Clegg 
5 ? 1958 -? SOP 1959: S Craiks 
Notes After 1906 Brunei's accounts were inspeoted by the Auditor- 
General of the Straits Settlements. In 1910 that officer reported 
as follows (the relevaaoe of the first paragraph beoomes apparent in 
the seoond)s 
1014. The revenue accounts of Labuan were audited in that 
island in September (1910). The Treasury aooounts are audited regularly 
as they come in, but the difficulty of communication causes great delay. 
Owing to the want of experience in the person of the District Officer 
and the stupidity of his olerki, the accounts were in a very unsatis- 
factory condition altogether... A change in the officer and some 
instructions and explanations at the time of the audit visit in September 
have brought about some improvement. 
"15. The accounts of Bruneip which is not part of this Colony, 
are audited by this office. They are of small amount and cause much 
trouble for the same reason as the Labuan accounts". 
CO 273/359 (37770) Auditor General's report, paragraphs 14-15, enoiosed 
in Sir A Young to C0, No 478 (Straits Settlements), 16 November 1910. 
* 
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(o) State Marine Officer 
I Deo 1951 - Apr 1957: 3K Corrigan 
2 Apr 1957 - Sep 1959: EH Mat on 
Notes In Maroh to August 1954 BD Johnson aoted in the post. 
(d) Deputy Legal Adviser 
1? 1952 - Jan 1958, DB MoGilligan 
2 Jan 1958 - Sep 1959s J Mo? Adams 
Note: GVC Young aoted in this post ist 19555 to June 1956, 
September 1956 to January 1957, and August to November 1958. 
(e) State Supplies Offioer 
1 Apr 1952 - Oct 1956: JS Montgomery 
2 Oat 1956 -? Jan 19581 Si Clark 
3 ? Jan 1958 -? Sep 19591 GCG Prindable 
(f) State survey Offioer (or 1 July 1952) 
1 Jul 1952 - May 19531 AO Stookings 
2 May 1953 -? Jan 1955: RN Baron 
3 Jan 1955 - Sep 1959: NJ Hurley 
Notes From September 1957 to August 1958 R Gwilliam anted in the post. 
(g) State Information Offioer (or 1953) 
1 19531 Assistant Resident, Brunei Town (ex-officio) 
2 1954: Inohe Sehami Haji Amin (reornited from Malaya) 
3 1957-61: Pengiran Muhammad Yusuf bin Pengiran Haji Abdul (b 1923) 
now Tang Amat Mulia Pengiran Setia Negara Tusuf ]C SPMB POAS 
PHBS PJK Hon Dpi, (Van o ouver) . 
(h) Controller of Customs and Eloise (er 1955) 
I Jul 1955 - Sep 1959= RE Chater MBE (b 1911) 
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(i) Commissioner of Development (or 1954) 
1 Oct 1954 - Oct 1958s ER Bevington CMG Me (b 1914) 
2 Mar 1957 - Nov 1957s Capt RH Morris OBE (b 1915) - acting 
(j) Controller of Civil Aviation 
1 Oct 1954 - Oct 1958: ER Bevington 
2 ? Oot 1958 - Sep 1959= Dato WI Glass (b 1926) 
(k) Direotor of Broadcasting 
1 Mar 1957 - Jan 1960: J Duolos (b 1916) 
* 
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AFFENflEX FOURS LISTS OF SENIOR MALAYS (1906-59) 
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Appendix 4.1 Sultans of Brunei (1906-59) 
Transferred to page 125, footnote 58 (above). 
* 
Appendix 4.2 Wazirs (1906-59) 
(a) PeagAran Bendahara 
1 o1883 - Jul 1917: 
2 Feb 1918 - Sep 1943s 
3 Jul 1947 - Jun 19501 
4 Jul 1950 - Nov 1951: 
5 Aug 19 52 -: 
PenAiran Anak Besar bin Pen ran 
Tajudin (01829-1917) 
Pengiran Anak Abdul Rabman ibni Pe ran 
Muda Omar All. Saifuddin (d 1943) 
Pengiran Muda (later Sultan Sir) Omar Ali 
Saifuddin GCVO 1972 KCMG 1953 (b 1914) 
Pengiran Anak Muhammad Yassin bin Pe ran 
Omar Ali OBE 1950 (1878-1951) 
Pengiran Muda Hashim ibni Pengiran Anak 
Abdul Rahman 
Notes This post was vacant between September 1943 and Ju17 1947. 
(b) Pengiran Pemanoha 
1 o1898 - Deo 19121 Pe ran Muhammad Salleh (d 1912) 
2 Jul 1913 - Jul 1950, Pengiran Anale Muhammad Tassin (later Pe ran 
Bendahara - see above, No 4)- 
3 Jul 1950 - Nov 19821 Pengiran Anale Muhammad ibni Pengiran Anait 
Abdul Rahman DEC DPXB POAS OBE (1918-82) 
Notes Professor Brown oommentss "Pengiran muds is the title used for 
sons of the Sultan and Pengiran Bendahara (first vizier) and for the 
eldest son of the Pengiran Di-Gadong (seoond vizier) if their mothers 
are noble (i. e, if the sons are gebare). Pengiran anak is the title of 
non-where sons of Sultans, of Sultans$ daughters, of all children of 
the PenRiran Di-Gadong other than his eldest ahara eon, and at least 
of all remaining Rehara children of viziers... ". Sources DE Brown, 
Brunets The Structure and History of a Bornean Malay Sultanate - Brunei 
1970 -p 24. 
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Appendix 4.3 Pengiran Shahbandar (1906-1959) 
1 1906 - 1912s Pe ran Sahibul bin Ismail (d 1912) 
2 1918 - 1949s Pengiran Anak Hashio bin Pengiran Shahbandar 
3 1958 -s Hon Pengiran Haji Muhammad Salleh bin Pen ran 
Haji Muhammad DPMB POAS 
Notes Standing eabjeot to oorreotion, no appointment appears to have 
been made to this offioe in 1912-18 and 1949-58. 
* 
Appendix 4,4 Seoretary to Resident (or 1935). 
1 1935 - 19418 Inohe (later Pehin Dato) Ibrahim bin Muhammad 
Jahfar IX ]PxB POAS CBE (1902-71) 
2 1946 - 19598 Inohe (later Dato Haji) Muhammad Taib bin Awang 
Besar DSLJ MBE (01910-74) 
* 
Appendix 4.5 District Officer, Brunei and Nuara 
1 1906 - 1921s not available 
2 ? 1921 - 19328 Peagiran Anak Hashim bin Peng ran Shahbandar 
(01864-1949)" See appendix 4.3 (No 2) 
3 1932 - 1935= Iuohe (later Pehin Dato): Ibrahim bin Muhammad 
Jahfar (see Appendix 4.4, No 1) 
4 1935 - 1946: not available 
5 1946 - 19568 Pe ran Abu Bakar bin Pengiran Omar Ali MBE 1952 
(b 1906). 
6 1956 - 19608 Pehin Orang Baia Shahbandar Naji Abmad bin Daud 
MBN 1954 (b 1907; now deoeased) 
Notes In 1954 and 1958 Irrohe Ajmain bin Abdul Razak temporarily 
filled the post. Similar duty was performed by Pengiran Abmad bin 
Pengiran Bendahara Hail Muhammad Yassin in 1955 and by Kr P MoAfee 
(1923-73) in 1957. 
* 
624 
Appendix 4.6 District Offioer, Belait (1907-1959) 
1 Jan 1906 - Sep 1907: 
2 Sep 1907 - ? 1921: 
3 ? 1921 - May 1924: 
4 May 1924 - 91938: 
5 ? 1939 -? Sep 1941: 
6 Sep 1941 -? 1946: 
7 1946 - 1947: 
8 ? 1947 - Jun 1956: 
9 Jun 1956 - Aug 19581 
10 Aug 1958 - Sep 19591 
no appointment 
Pengiran Anak Hashim (see Appendix 4.5 No 2) 
Pengiran Anak Haji Muhammad (d 1926) 
Abang Seruji, Pehin Dato Shahbandar (d 1947) 
Inohe Muhammad Edin 
Inohe Muhammad Taib (see Appendix 4.4 No 2) 
not available 
Pehin Orang Kaya Shahbandar Ahmad (see 
Appendix 4.5, No 6) 
Pe ran Abu Bakar bin Pe ran Omar 
(see Appendioes 2.5 No 30 and 4.5 No 6) 
Pen ran Däomin bin Pen ran Haji Ismail 
* 
Appendix 4.7 Distriot Offioer, Thtong (1906-59) 
1 Jan 1906 - Sep 1908s not available 
2 Sep 1908 - Aug 1911s Irrohe Kohidin (d 1911) 
3 Aug 1911 - ? 1918S Fled Muhammad (or Dato Pati nggi, d 1930) 
4 by 1918 - May 1924, Abang Seruji (or Pehin Dato Shahbandar 
19201 see Appendix 4.6, No 4) 
5 May 1924 - Apr 1926: Pengiran Anak Haji Muhammad (see Appendix 
4.6, No 3) 
6 Apr 1926 - 1942: not available 
7 ? 1942 - Jul 1957: Pengiran Ahmad bin Pengiran Anak Luba (b 1899) 
8 ? Jul 1957 - Nov 1961: Dato Setia Pen ran Abu Bakar bin Pengiran 
Pemanoha Haji Muhammad Salleh 
Note: Irrohe Awang bin Hai Hanafi may have been DO Tutong 1926-35" 
* 
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Appendix 4. $ District Officer, Temburong (1906-1951_ 
1 Jan 1906 - mid 1907: first holder dismissed for malpraotioes 
2 mid 1907 - 1908$ no appointment 
3 ? 1908 -? 1912: Abang Arip 
4 1912 - ? 1918: Abang Seruji (see Appendix 4.7, No 3) 
5 1918 - 1924: not' available 
6 in 1924 - ? 1935: Inohe Abdul Rahim bin Andor 
7 71935 -? 19461 Peu ran Abu Baker bin Pea ran Omar (see 
Appendix 4.6, No 9) 
8 ? 1946 - ? 1947: POIC Shahbandar Abmad 
(see Appendix 4.6, 
No 8) 
9 ? 1947 - Jun 1957: Pe ran Abm Baker bin Pengiran Pemanoha 
(see Appendix 4.79 No 8) 
10 Jun 1957 - Sep 1960: Pen ran Ahmad bin Pengiran Bendahara 
Muhammad Yassin 
Notes From February to August 1955 Irrohe Ajmain bin Abdul Razak 
acted in the post. 
* 
Appendix 4.9 Diatrist Officer, Seria (1954-9) 
1 Mar 1954 - Feb 19551 Inohe Sungy bin Abmat BAS 
Jul 1955 - Apr 1956: 
2 Feb 1955 - Jul 1955: Pea ran Abu Bakar bin Pengiran 
Pemaneha 
(see Appendix 4.8 9 No 9) 
3 ? Apr 1956 -? Deo 1957: Inohe Abdul Ghani 
4 Deo 1957 - Mar 1958, PG McAfee (1923-73) 
5 Mar 1958 - Sep 1959= Inohe Ghani bin Hassan. 
* 
Appendix 4.10 Chief Kathi 
From 1906 to 1913 the imam was Haji Mohidin (dismissed 1913)" The first 
Kathi, appointed in 1913, was Khatib Abdul Rajak, who may have remained 
in offioe until 1940. A ohange of kathis oertainly took plaoe in 1940. 
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Perhaps from 1940, oertainly from 1947, until the end of the Residential 
Era the incumbent was Pe ran Haji Muhammad Salleh SMB. Acting Chief 
Kathi in 1954 was POK Shahbandar Ahmad (see Appendix 4.8, No 8). 
* 
Appendix 4.11 State Custom, Religion and Welfare Officer (or 1954) 
1 1954-19721 Pengiran Pemanoha (see Appendix 4.2bß No 3) 
Notes In 1958 Inohe (later Dato) tarsal bin Mann temporarily filled 
this post. 
* 
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APPENDIX FIVES MISCELLANEOUS PERSONAGES 
628 
Appendix 5.1 General Manager, BMPC/BSPC 
Mr HL Fountain, one of the drillers present when oil was first 
struok at Soria in 1929, writes (letter to the author, 16 September 1983) 
as followss 
"The management of Sarawak Oilfields Limited (SOL) oonsisted 
of (1) the General Manager and (2) the Assistant General Manager (AGM). 
The General Manager of SOL, based in Miri (Sarawak) was 
responsible for all Shell's operations in Sarawak and Brunei but he 
generally delegated the administration of the outposts to his AGM. 
Henoe SOL's AGM was virtually the Manager of the BMPC, although he 
always resided in Miri ". 
Year General Manager SOL AGM 
1929 Hon TG Coohrane FF Marriott 
1932 AH Noble FF Marriott 
o1935 PF Marriott LA Toone 
The latter were still in office in March 1939, when Mr 
Fountain left Brunei. By 1941 a Mr Parry was Manager of the BMPC; he 
became one of the viotims of the massacre perpetrated by the Japanese 
at Long Nawang (see above, P 319). 
After the Seoond World War the General Manager of the BMPC 
(as follows) resided in Branei itself rather than in Sarawaks 
1945-51 GO Higgins 
1951-59 Dato R Hales CBE (b 1904) 
1959-63 Dato PM Linton (b 1910) 
1963- ß Williams (b 1918) 
(In 1957, of ooarse, the BMPC was renamed BSPC). 
* 
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Appendix 5.2 Editor, "Borneo Bulletin" (first published on 7 
November 1953) 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
Nov 1953 - Apr 1958: 
Apr 1958 - Feb 1963: 
Feb 1961 - Oat 19618 
Feb 1963 - ? 1964: 
? 1964 - Oat 1975: 
Oct 1975 - Apr 1979: 
Apr 1979 - s 
WF Runagall 
R Shaw 
C Bryoe (aoting) 
L Carroll 
JR Carver 
H Mabbutt 
L Brindeon 
* 
Appendix 5.3 Resident, Limbang (Sarawak) 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
1890 - 1909: OF Ricketts (o1856-o1943) 
1909 - 1911: K Ivone-Chaldioott 
1911 - 19148 DA Owen (1880-1952) 
1914 - 1920: HSB Johnson. (d 1941) 
1920 - 1927: FF Bcult (1879-1952) 
1928 - 1933: F Kortright 
1933 - 1934: EO Bruce 
1934 : A Macpherson 
1934 - 1935: JR Combe 
1935 - 1936s EO Bruoe 
1936 - 1938: RL Daubeny 
* 
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Appendix 6.1 Bruneis Official Estimates of Population Year By Year 
1906-10 not available 
1911* 21,718 
1912-20 not available 
1921* 25Y454 
1922-6 not available 
1927 37,878 
1928 35,000 
1929 29,000 
1930 31,170 
1931* 30,135 
1932 30,590 
1933 329900 
1934 33,971 
1935 33,732 
1936 34,016 
1937 35,963 
1938 37,868 
1939 not available 
1940 040,000 
1941-5 not available (enemy occupation) 
1946 48,034 
1947* 40,670 
1948 42P537 
1949 45, E - 50,000 
1950 not available 
1951 45,000 
1952 49,624 
1953 54,109 
1954 609330 
1955 65P342 
1956 71,401 
1957 74,646 
1958 80,277 
1959 85v227 
1960* 83,877 
Notes: * census figures. 
It will be noted that there was a tendency rather to over-est- 
imate the number of inhabitantss compare the census years with the year 
immediately preceding. The accuracy of these figures is important 
because it affects other data, such as birth rates, death rates, infant 
mortality rate, school enrolment rates and so on. 
Souroes: Compiled by author from Brunei Annual Reports (except 1940: 
see p 533, above). 
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Appendix 6.2 Bruneis Finanoe 1907-41 (in Straits' dollars) 
Year Inoome Expenditure Repayment of National Debt 
National Debt (total at 
year, s and) 
1907 51,777 93,334 - 200,000 
1908 43,539 75,738 - 220,000 
1909 54,562 76,948 - 300,000 
1910 
. 
77,051 73,513 - 300,000 
1911 109,430 79,318 - 400,000 
1912 140,847 122,762 - 400,000 
1913 ß165,082 138,665 - 433,000 
1914 126,972 163,352 - 439,750(a) 
1915 129,529 114,518 439,750 
1916 1339223 1139317 - 439t750 
1917 134,321 106,011 - 439,750 
1918 136,160 122,958 - 439,750 
1919 170,155 138,844 - 439,750 
1220 206.253 22A. 690 99750 430,000 
1921 165,890 197,469 2,683 427,317 
1922 209,702 188,250 ? 2,817 444,500(b) 
1923 228,272 189,208 4,500 440,000 
1924 2689024 2479614 4,500 435,500 
1925 3459573 245,286 5,500 430,000 
1926 396,834 303094 5,500 424,500 
1927 440,870 426,981 5,500 419,000 
1928 393,875 350,005 6,000 413,000 
1929 345,290 344,092 6,000 407,000 
1930 333,069 373,604 6,000 401,000 
1931 342,011 322,791 6,000 395,000 
1932 362,403 334028 6,000 389,000 
1933 580,750 514,812 6,000 383,000 
1934 645,021 545,021 4,800 378,200 
1935 813,532 786,201 245,200 133,000 
1936 928,689 779,521 133,000 nil 
1937 1,049,293 653,149 - - 
1938 1,179,979 1,476,725 - - 
1939 1,274,644 1,181,325 - - 
1940 195569354 1,462,174 - - 
1941 1,325,912 1,137,219 - - 
Notes$ (a) Loans totalling $500,000 were negotiated from the FKS 
during the years 1906-11p but X601250 of the final instalment was not 
drawn. 
(b) In 1922 20,000 was borrowed from the Straits Settlements. 
Sources: Brunei Annual Reports, CO 531/3 (22583) and CO 531/6 (28412) 
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Appendix 6.3 Bruneis Finance 1946-59 (in Malayan dollars) 
Year Income Expenditure Surplus 
1946(a) 774,145 679,596 94P549 
1947 4089P974 1, -797,597 2P592077 1948 6,586,299 3,740,254 2,846,045 
1949(b) 8,736,148 4,228,489 4,507,659 
1950 17,302,869 7,112,504 10,190,365 
1951(o) 69,390,905 7,488,048 61,902,857 
1952 75,652,619 13,846,239 61,806,380 
1953 98,976,643 22,646,697 76,329,946 
1954 96,035,394 23,360,885 72,674,509 
1955(d) 102,669,423 28,933,959 73,735,464 
1956 118,037,004 29,657,397 88,379,607 
1957 130,954,281 39,401,515 91,552,766 
1958 131,273,257 34,282,740 96,990,517 
1959 129,568,762 30,419,136 99,149,626 
Notes: (a) Second half of 1946 only. 
(b) The pound sterling was devalued in 19499 
(o) Introduction of inoome tax. 
(d) In the Brunei Annual Report 1957 the figures for 1955 
were changed to 104P104,343; 28,768,753 and 75,335,590 respectively. 
Sources Compiled by the author from Brunei Annual Reports 
* 
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Appendix 6.4 Braneis Trade 1906-41 (in % Straits) 
Year Exports Imports Total Trade Trade Balanoe 
(a) Brunei Town only (1906-14)3- 
1906 n. a. 60,878 n. a. u. a" 
1907 n. a. n. a. n. a. n. a. 
1908 78,909 80,029 158,938 - 1,120 
1909 237,112 70,207 307,319 + 166,905 
1910 245,639 81,985 327,624 + 163,654 
1911 n. a. 787,074 n. a. n. a. 
1912 233,676 84,883 318,559 + 148,793 
1913 2160248 88,948 305,196 + 127,300 
1914 216,282 126,743 343,025 + 89,539 
(b) Whole State (1915-41) 
1915 543,707 234,004 777,711 + 309,703 
1916 734,254 254,756 989,010 + 479,498 
1917 952,260 189,451 1,141,711 + 762,809 
1918 1,033,734 362,853 1,396,587 + 670,881 
1919 1,134,864 614,061 1,748,925 + 520,803 
1920 191739252 722v678 198959930 + 4509574 
1921 791,028 410,854 1,201,882 + 380,174 
1922 577,305 391,627 968,932 + 185,678 
1923 900,307 470,463 1,370,770 + 429,844 
1924 867,190 803,242 1,670,432 + 63,948 
1925 1,859,736 1,013,418 2,873,154 + 846,318 
1926 1,651,048 1,434,889 3,085,937 + 216,159 
1927 1,443,703 19359p276 29802t979 + 849427 
1928 1,058,071 1,385,744 2,443,815 - 327,673 
1929 1,251,335 1,484,293 2,735,628 - 2,32 
1930 807,449 2,536,422 3,343,871 -1,728,973 
1931 5019494 2,193,511 2,695,005 -1,692,017 
1932 1,505,738 2,430,247 3,935,985 - 924,509 
1933 2,191,037 2,411,768 4,602,805 - 220,731 
1934 3,439,501 1,751,868 5,191,369 +1,687,633 
1935 3,778,655 1,994,059 5,772,714 +1,784,596 
1936 49205,270 1,869,994 6,075,264 +293359276 
1937 5,595,240 2,516,154 8,111,394 +3,079,086 
1938 6,580,482 29821t799 9,402,281 +397589683 
1939 n. a. n. a. n. a. n. a. 
1940 9,622,973 3,787,160 13,410,133 +5,835,813 
1941 6,624,835 2,725,804 9050.644 +3+899.026_ 
Scuroess Compiled by author from Brunei Annual Reports. 
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Appendix 6.5 Braueis Trade 1946-1959 (in Malayan dollars 
Year Total Trade Imports Exporte 
1946(a) 4,112,408 3p2179962 894,446 
1947 n. a. 16,229,715 n. a. 
1948 84,460,015 35,207,305 49,252,710 
1949 97,897,96]. 35t8359170 62,062,793. 
1950 265,603,555 60,265,034 205,338,521 
1951 330,000,570 50,358,830 279,641,740 
1952 352v 353,171 76,719,967 275,633,204 
1953 405,915,275 123022v162 282,593,113 
1954 3739357P401 99,880,894 273,476,507 
1955 396,802,916 93,384,093 303,418,823 
1956 444,375,194 114,083,317 330,291,877 
1957 447,448,175 107,463,542 339,984,633 
1958 415043,815 88,665,955 326,877,860 
1959 372,970,577 62,965,731 310,004,846 
Notes (a) Seoond half only of 1946. 
Souroes: Compiled by author from Brunei Annual Reports 
* 
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Appendix 6.6 Abstract of Judicial Statistics 1906-59 
Year Number 
of 
Polioe 
Crime 
Reports 
Court 
Crim- 
inal 
Casess- 
Civil Total 
People 
Daring 
Year 
imprisoneds 
Held at 
Year's End. 
1906 12 70b 10a lia 21a n. a. 6 
1910 31 n. a. 50a 57a 107 no a* no a. 
1915 35 n. a. 104a n. a. n. a. n. a. 7 
1920 39 195 416 445 861 165 no a. 
1925 57 265 283 532 815 65 290 
1930 63 289 255 506 761 44 15 
1935 82 591 460 438 895 30 9 
1938 85 539 511 273 784 18 n. a. 
1947 na. 784 422 46 468 64 no a. 
1950 185 n. a. 692 175 867 60 no a. 
1955 224 2119 d 1728 145 1873 179e n. a. 
1959 328 2211fg 1527 88 165 84h n. a. 
Notes, as 
bs 
os 
ds 
es 
fs 
gs 
hi 
Brunei Town only 
1907 
1926 
inoludes 808 traffio offenoeo 
1954 
1958 
inoludea 1,409 traffio offenoee 
1957 
Souroees Compiled by author from, Brunei Annual Reports 
637 
APPENDIX SEVENs A WHO'S WHO OF PEOPLE CONNECTED WITH THE BRITISH 
RESID 2 CT IN BRUNEI 1906-59 
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Appendix 7s Who's Who 
1 Abang Seruji, Pehin Dato Shahbandar. Distriot Offioer in 
Tutong (by 1918) transferred to Belait in May 1924. Appointed Pehin 
Dato Shahbandar in 1920 with a seat on the State Counoil. Died 1947. 
2 Pe ran Abu Bakar bin Pengiran Omar Ali (b 1906). Distriot 
Offioer in Temburong before the Japanese oooupation. Distriot Offioer 
suooessively of Brunei-Muara and Belait (1946-58). 1958-98 Assistant 
Resident, Kuala Belait. Continued in the Brunei Government's service 
after the Residential Bray e. g. in 1974 he was appointed Speaker of 
the Legislative Counoil. MBE'(1952)" 
3 Sir Anthony Foster Abell (b 1906) 3XLP (1954) KCMG (1952)" 
Ed. Repton and Magdalen College, Oxford. 1929-49t Colonial Servi o e, 
Nigeria. 1950-9: Governor and Commander in Chief, Sarawak, and High 
Commissioner for Brunei. Member MCC. Retd 1959. 
4 Inohe Jasin Affendy (b 01923). 1956: Member Exeoutive Committee 
PBB. April 19571 Seoretary-General PRB. 19621 Military Commander TNKU. 
May 1963, oaptured by British troops. 1963-738 internment without trial. 
1973-dates exile in Malaysia. 
5 Pehin Orang Ba-va Shahbandar Ahmad bin Daud (b o1907) MBE 
(1954)" 1925= umsah-puller for Mr Pretty. 1925: Customs Department. 
1928: Clerk. 1941-5: Controller of Food Rationing (along with eight 
others). District Officer successively in Temburong (1946-7)9 Belait 
(1948-1956), and Branei-Muara (1956-60). 1961: Appointed First 
Resettlement Officer. 19651 one of the seven directors of the National 
Bank. Also a Privy Councillor, Legislative Councillor and a member of 
the Council of Ministers. Father of Hai Zaini Haji Abmad (see below). 
Died: ? 1970s. 
6 HH Sultan Ahmad Tajuddin (1913-50) XBE (1949) 0MG (1940). Son 
of Sultan Muhammad Jemal. Reigned 1924-50 (Regenoy 1924-31). First 
Brunei Sultan, to visit the United Kingdom (1932). Married prinoess 
from Selangor (1934)" Daughter, Princess E can (b 10 Ootober 1935) 
excluded from the succession in 1950. 
7 Sir John Anderson (1858-1918) GCMG (1909) %CB (1913). 18771 MA 
from Aberdeen University. 1892-1904. Colonial Offioe. 1904-lls Governor 
of the Straits Settlements and High Commissioner for Brunei. 1911-161 
Permanent Under-Seoretary of State, CO. 1916-181 Governor, Ceylon. 
8 Sheikh Ahmad Azahari (b 1928/9), RC Mission education. Sent 
to Java by the Japanese for training as a veterinary surgeon. Post-war: 
participated in Indonesian independence straggles. 1953$ imprisoned in 
Brunei. 1956$ Leader Partai Rakyat Brunei. August 1962$ PRB won 90% 
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of the poll in District and Legislative Coanoil elections. Deo 1962: 
Brunei Revolit (which appears to have occurred before Sheikh Azahari was 
ready). 1962-date: exile in Indonesia (Bogor). 
9 Mr CA Bampfylde (1856-1918) SCSI see above, p 69 (fa 33). 
10 Mr ER Bevington (b 1914) CMG (1961) CEng. Eds Cambridge 
University. 1937-63 EM Overseas Service. 1937: served in Gilbert and 
Ellice Islands. 19421 D09 Fiji. 1945-6: Seo., Commission of Enquiry 
into cost of living allowances, Nigeria. 19501 Administrative Offioerq 
Fiji. 1951: Asst. Col. Seo. (Dev't), Fiji. 1954^8: Commissioner of 
Development, Brunei. 1958-611 Finance Secretary, Fiji. 1962-3, Com- 
missioner of Development, Fiji. 1964.7s Senior Project Engineer, Wright 
Rain Ltd. 1967-701 Appeals Inspeotorp Ministry of Housing and Local 
Government. 1970-s Senior Housing and Planning Inspeotor, Department 
of the Environment. 
11 Mr JG Blaok (b 1896). 19201 joined MCS. 19278 Assistant 
Adviser, Trengganu. 1930: Resident, Labuan. 1937-40: Resident, Brunei. 
19401 DO Seremban (Negri Sembilan). 1942-5: interned by the enemy in 
Changi gaol, Singapore. 1946-8: British Adviser, Trengganu. 19481 
British Adviser, Perak. Wow (1985) living in retirement in Edinburgh. 
12 Mr Betrara Brooke (1876-1965). Seoond son of Rajah Sir Charles 
Brooke. 
13 Sir Charles Brooke (1829-1917) GCMG (1888). Rajah of Sarawak 
(1868-1917). Son of Rev. Charles Johnson and Emma Brooke, sister of 
Rajah Sir James Brooke. Ed: Crewkerne Grammar Sohool. 18421 entered 
Royal Navy. 1852: entered SCS. 1852-631 man Muda. 1863-81 Rajah 
Mnda. 1868-1917: Rajah. "Although he oooupied the position of 
untrammelled despot, his sole ambition was the well-being of his sub- 
jeots. For nearly seventy years he laboured on their behalf, and the 
little nation thus built up stands as a remarkable monument to his 
memory" (Deshon). 
14 Sir (Charles) Vyner Brooke (1874-1963) GCMG (1928), third 
Rajah of Sarawak (1917-46). Son of the seoond Rajah, Sir C Brooke (see 
No 13, above). Ed. Cambridge University. 
13 Sir James Brooke (1803-68) KCB DCL, first Rajah of Sarawak 
(1841_68). Unole of Sir 0 Brooke (No 13, above). 
16 Mr Harry Brooke (1879-1926), third son of Sir C Brooke (see 
No 13,, above). 
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17 Mr Frank Nestle Butterworth (1875-1952). Eds University 
College, Nottingham. a1901s Joined Island Trading Syndioate in Brunei. 
1905-138 Manager, cutoh factory. Published The City of Many Waters and 
a series of novels under the pen-name, "Peter Blundell". 
18 Mr Douglas Graham Campbell (1867-1918): see p 106, In. 3 
(above). 
19 major as ("Toby") Carter DSO. New Zealander. 1934r-60s SOL. 
1945-6s SRD. 
20 Sir Geoffrey Edmund Cator (1884-1973). 1907, Joined MCS. 
1916-21, British Resident, Brunei. CMG 1936. KBE 1946. Died 21 
April 1973. 
21 Mr Harvey Chevallier (o1860-1923). 18901 Asst DOS Kuala Pilah 
(Negri Sembilan). 18961 DO Kuala Pilah. 1907: DO Dindings. 1907 (May)s 
Aoting Resident, Labuan and Brunei. 1908 (Jan)s Acting Resident, Pahang. 
1909-131 Acting Resident, Labuan and Brunei. 1915: retd. 1916: temp- 
orarily returned because of wartime shortage of officers. (1913: Class 
II of MCS scale). Originally went out to the east as a member of the 
Eastern Extension Telegraph Company. 
22 Sir Hugh Clifford (1866-1941) MCS GCMG GBE. 1883: Joined MCS. 
1896--91 BR Pahang. 1900-1: Governor of North Borneo. 1901-31 BR Pahang. 
1903-71 Col. Seo. q Trinidad and Tobago. Governor successively of Ceylon 
(1907-12), Gold Coast (1912-19)v Nigeria (1919-25), Ceylon (1925-7) and 
the Straits Settlements (1927-9)" 1902: published artiole "A Dying 
Kingdom. Author of numerous books. 
23 Mr AE Collins (1871-1926) CNG (1911). Ed. s City of London 
Sohool and Cambridge University. 1894, Joined CO. 1898, lot class 
clerk. 1907s Prinoipal Clerk. 1907-91 Head of West Indies Department. 
1909-19, Head, Eastern Department. 1920-6s Head, Far Eastern Department. 
Died 5 February 1926. 
24 Mr William Clarke Cowie (ol847-1910)s see p 429 fn 70 (above). 
25 Datuk Richard John I+roude Curtis PJB (b 1897). 1920, Joined 
MCS. 1928-9s BR Brunei. 19291 BR Labuan. 19318 OAO's ADC. 1948, 
Resident Commissioner, Perlis (to 01951). 19601 Comptroller, Sultan 
of Selangor's Household. Member of the Order of the Crown of Selangor. 
26 Mr Leslie Harold Newsom Davis (b 1909) CMG (1957)" Joined 
MCS (1932). 1938-40, Private Secretary to Governor. 1942-51 interned 
Singapore. 1946-71 DO Seremban. 19481 BR Brunei. 1948-501 Assistant 
Adviser, Muar. 1951-21 Seoretary to Member for Ednoation, Malaya. 
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1952-3, Member for Industrial and Social Relations. 1953-5= Secretary 
for Defenoe and Internal Security, Singapore. 1955-7: Permanent 
Secretary to Ministry of Communications and Works, Singapore. 1958-631 
Special Representative of RGA in Singapore. 
27 Sir George Vandaleur Fiddes (1858-1936) GCMG (1917) CB (1905). 
Ed.: Dulwich and Brasenose, Oxford. 1881: Joined CO. 1896: let ols 
clerk. 1897-19021 Secretary successively to Lord Milner, Lord Roberts 
and the Transvaal Administration. 19021 returned to CO as Principal 
Clerk. 1907: Accounting Officer. 1909: Assistant Under-Secretary of 
State. 1916-181 Chairman West Indies Currency Board. 1916-211 Perm- 
anent Under Secretary of State, CO. Died 22 Deoember 1936. 
28 Dr OE Fisher (b 1910) MBChB (Leeds) 1933, D'ihioH (London) 1935, 
MD (Leeds) 1952.1935-471 Malayan Medical Service. Jan 1937 - June 
1939: Medical Officer and Asst. Controller of Labour, Brunei. 1940-1, 
Medical Officer, Penang General Hospital. 1942-51 Civilian internee 
in Japanese-occupied Singapore. As a result of privations suffered 
during six months' imprisonment by the Kempeitai following the "Double 
Tenth" Raid on Changi in 1943-4, Dr Fisher contracted pulmonary tuber- 
culosis and was eventually to end his Malayan career in 19479 1949= 
started anew as a chest. physician in the United Kingdom until retirement 
ins 1976. (Courtesy of Dr OE Fisher, letter to the author, 8 February 
19859 p 2). 
29 Sir GEJ ("Edward") Gent (1895-48) KCMG (1946) OBE (1935) DS0 
and MC (WWI). Son of Judge. Ed.. King's School Canterbury and Trinity 
College, Orford. 1914^19, Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry. 19201 
Asst Principal Clerk, CO. 19231 Acting Principal. 1927, Principal. 
1930: Seconded temporarily to India Office. 1932: Permanent Under- 
Secretary for Malaya, Hong Kong and Ceylon. 1946-81 Governor of Malayan 
Union (later Federation). Died in air disaster, 4 July 1948- 
30 Mr John Orman Gilbert (b 1907) CMG (1958). SCS 1928-58. 
19403 DO. 1941-2s avoided capture by Japanese. 1942-5= served in India. 
1945-61 BMA/BB. 1946-531 Resident, 4th Division (Sarawak). 19531 
Coronation Medal. 1953-88 BR Brunei, 19591 retd. 
31 Sir Gilbert Edmund Augustine Grindle (1869-1.934) XCMG (1922) 
CB (1919). Soholar of Corpus Christi, Oxford. 1893.2nd ols clerk, CO. 
1898, Aast. Priv. Seo to Mr Chamberlain. 1900. lot ols olk. 1909: 
Principal Clerk. 1916-251 Assistant Under-Secretary of State. 1925-31, 
Deputy to Permanent Under Secretary. 1931, retd. 19341 d. 6 February. 
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32 Sir Laurenoe Nunas Guillemard (1862-1951) GCMG (1927) KCB 
(1910). Ed. s Charterhouse and Trinity College, Cambridge. 1888-19021 
Treasury. 1902-81 Deputy Chairman, Board of Inland Revenue. 1909-191 
Governor, Straits Settlements. 1937: Trivial Pond Reoords. 1951: d 
13 Deoember. 
33 Professor Major Dato Tom Harrisson (1911-76) DSO OBE DSLJ. 
Ed. s Harrow and Pembroke College, Cambridge. 1930s: Oxford Expeditions 
to Lapland and Borneo. 19361 Mass Observation. 1941-4s Radio Critio, 
The Observer. 1945-6: SRD. 1947-66s Curator, Sarawak Museum. 1967-76: 
Professor,, University of Sussex. 
34 Pengiran Anak Ra. sbim (o1864-1949). Son of Pengiran Shahbandar 
of 'Shahbandar War' fame (1889-90). 1907-32s DO first in Belait and 
then in Brunei-Mnara. 1918-49: Pengiran Shahbandar and State Counoillor. 
35 HH Sultan Hashim (b o1820/5; d 1906), son of HH Sultan Omar 
Ali Saifuddin II (r 01824-52). PenEiran Temenggoag (1855-85). Sultan 
(1885-1906). 
36 Mr Godfrey Hewett (1859-1932). Late 1880s to late 1890as 
BNBC servioe. 1900-4: British Consul for Borneo territories. 1904-14s 
consular service at Rio Grande (1904.8)p Pernambuoo (1908-9)p Anto- 
fagasta (1909-11)v Paramaribo (1911-14). Retd 1914. 
37 Dr RH Hiokling (b 1920) CMG (1968) QC PhD. 1950-51 Assistant 
Attorney General, Sarawak. 1976-dates Leoturerp Sohool of Oriental and 
Afrioan Studies, University of London. 
38 Pehin Dato Ibrahim bin Muhammad Jahfar (1902-71). 1932-5= DO 
Brunei-Muara. 1935-411 Seoretary to Resident. 1941-5s State Seoretary. 
1946: retd from BAS. 1950s: Secretary to Sultan Omar Ali Saifuddin III. 
1959-62, Mentri Besar. Later Speaker of the Legislative Counoil. "A 
faithful friend and ally" (Mr Jß Black, letter to the author, 12 April 
1983, Paragraph 7). 
390 Mr Arthur Louis Keyser (1856-1924). 1884, PS to 00v., Fiji. 
1888-97, FMS service. 1898-1900: Acting Consul, Brunei. 1900-18: 
consular service, successively at Berbera, Qaila, Cadiz, Seville, and 
Qaito. Retd 1920. Published People and Places (1922) and Trifles and 
Travels (1923). 1924: died, 7 March. 
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40 Irrohe AA Hapidz Laxamana. 1956: Treasurer PRB. (19561 member 
of the Steering Committee set up to secure Government Registration of 
the Party. "Perhaps the most dangerous (of the PRB leaders)" but now 
(1985) a prosperous businessman in Bandar Seri Begawan. Managing 
Proprietor of the Malay Trading Company, a general 'import and export' 
firm.. Captured in December 1962 during the revolt and given "rehabil- 
itation training" (Borneo Bulletin, 25 May 1963). Freed in late May 
1963 (Borneo Bulletin, 1 June 1963). 
41 Mr William Hamilton Lee-Warner (b 1880) OBE (1928). Son of 
Sir William Lee-Warner GCSI LLD of the Indian and Home Civil Servioes. 
Ed.: Rugby and University College, Oxford. 1903: Cadet MOS. 1907: Ag. 
Asst. DO, Bata Gajah. 19091 May to Febs Ag 2nd Asst to Rea-Gen and PS 
to Res-Gen FMS. 1910 (Feb) - 1911 (Feb) and Oot 1912 to July 19148 
Assistant Resident, Brunei. Feb to Oot 1912: temp 2nd ols olk, Co. 
1914-221 miscellaneous posts. 1922-81 Director of Politioal Intelligenoep 
Malaya. Ret d in 1928. 
42 Alan Lennox-Boyd, Visooant Boyd of Merton PC CH (1904-83). 
1951--2* Minister of State for Colonial Affairs. 1954-91 Seoretary of 
State for the Colonies. 
43 Dato PM Linton (b 1912). General Manager BSPC 1959-63" Also 
served in Brunei, 1935-7. 
44. Sir Charles Prestwood Lucas (1853-1931). Ed at Winohester and 
Balliol College, Oxford. 18771 first in the Civil Servioe List and was 
appointed to the CO, eventually beooming an Assistant Under Seoretary of 
State in 1897.1907, first head of the Dominions Department. KCB (1912), 
KCMG (1907). Called to the Bar (1885). Author of "numerous valuable 
books about the British Empire". Principal of the Working Men's College 
in (treat Ormond Street (1912). 
45" Mr Maloolm Stewart MoArthur (1872-1934). Son of a General. 
1895s Cadet MCS. 1896-19221 MCS. 1896-1904: various posts in 
Penang, Selangor, Singapore. April to November 1904; and Oot-Deo 19051 
Acting British Consul in Brunei. 1906-19081 British Resident, Labuan 
and Brunei. April 1908: Acting Federal Seoretary, FMS. Jan 19091 Ag 
Seo to BRA Selangor. Oot 19091 Ag Asst Col Seop SS. (19111 promoted 
to Class III MCS). April 1915: Ag Under-Seoretaryp FMS. Feb 1916$ 
Under-Secretary, FMS. Jul 1919 to Oot 1922$ Ag British Adviser, Kedah. 
Retd in Oct 1922. Died in February 1934. 
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46 Mr Charles Frederick Cunningham Maoaskie (1888-1969) CMG 
(1946). Barrister at Law; FRGS. 1910-411 BNBC Service. 1913: lot 
class magistrate. 1916-19: military service (mentioned in despatches). 
1930 and 19371 OAG, North Borneo. 1932-4: seconded to Sarawak. 1934- 
41s Chief Justice and Deputy Governor of North Borneo. 1943-5= Head of 
the Borneo Planning Unit. 1945-6:, Chief Civil Affairs Officer, British 
Military Administration/British Borneo. 1947-51: Commissioner for War 
DDamagep British Borneo. 1955-9= Judge, New Hebrides and West Pacific. 
1969= died in self-imposed exile in Australia, 28 November. 
47 Rt Hon M MacDonald PC OM (1901-81). Son of Mr J Ramsay Mao- 
Donald (1866-1937), Prime Minister of the United Singdom, 1924 and 1929- 
35" Educated at Oxford. 1929-45= Conservative Member of Parliament. 
1935 and 1938-40t Seoretary of State for the Colonies. 1940-11 Minister 
of Health. 1941-6s British High Commissioner in Canada. 1946-8: Governor- 
General of Malaya, Singapore and British Borneo, 1948-55: Commissioner 
General for the United Kingdom in South-East Asia. 1955-60: British 
High Commissioner in India. Governor (1963), Governor-General (1963-4) 
and High Commissioner (1964-5) in Kenya. 1966-71 British Special 
Representative in East and Central Africa. 
48 General Maeda (1885-1942): see above, p 323 (fn 32). 
49 HH Sultan Sir Omar Ali Saifuddin III (b 1914) GCVO (1972) 
KONG (1953). Son of HH Sultan Sir Muhammad Jemalul Alam (26th Sultan, 
r 1906-24)t brother of HH Sultan Sir Ahmad Tajuddin KBE CMG (27th 
Stiltang r 1924x. 50) and father of the current,, 29th, Saltanv Sir Hassanel 
Bolkiah II GCXG (b 1946; r 1967-date). 
1934-7: educated at Kuala Kangear. 19371 served in the 
Forestry Department at Kuala Belait. September 19418 married Pen ran 
Anak Damit (1924, -79)t daughter of the then Pengiran Bendahara. Ten 
children. (Married, seoond, a sister of his first wife in 1983). During 
the Japanese Occupation Sir Omar Ali lived at Burong Pingai but when 
the Allied bombing commenced in early 1945 he moved out to Dampan. The 
end of Japanese rule was "like heaven on earth"t he claimed (Borneo 
Bulletin 29 September 1972). 19471 appointed Pengiran Bendahara. 
1950, appointed Sultan (after the exclusion of the late Sultan's chosen 
heir, Princess Thean). 1962, Brunei Revolt. 19671 abdicated; appointed 
Seri Begawan Sultan, a post he holds to date. 19701 Brunei Town renamed 
"Bandar Seri Begawan" in his honour. 19848 Minister of Defence. 
50 Dato Sir WJ Peel (b 1912) Kt DSLJ DSNB. Son of Sir W Peel 
KCMG KBE (d 1945), formerly of the ES and a Governor of Hong gong. 
1933-51: Colonial Administrative Servioe. 1942-51 Prisoner of War 
(Singapore and Burman-Thailand railway). 1946-8* BR Brunei. 1949-51, 
Resident Commissioner, Gilbert and Ellioe Islands. 1957-741 MP 
(Conservative) for Leioester SE. 1958-64: various Ministerial posts, 
inoluding (1961-4) Lord Commissioner of the Treasury. 
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51 Dato Eric Ernest Falk Pretty (1891-1967) SPMB CMG (1950- 
1914-48s MCS. 1923-8 and 1948-511 BR Brunei. 1931-7 Secretary to the 
High Commissioner. 1940-21 Under-Secretary to Government, FMS. 1946-81 
Resident Commissioner, Johore. 19481 BA Johore. 1957-67: Agent for the 
Brunei Government in the United Kingdom. 19671 died, 15 July. "A 
competent but not outstanding civil servant" (Sheppard); "legendary" 
(Lady R Peel); "a real gentleman who often got into tempers" (POK 
Shahbandar Ahmad, of. No 5 on p 638, quoted by the Borneo Bulletin, 
22 January 1972). 
52 Pehin Salleh bin Haji Maori (b 1919) DPMB SLJ PJK. Ed. at 
SITC. 1934, Probationary Malay Teacher. 1938-401 headmaster. 1946-78 
President of Barisan Pemuda Brunei (Barip). 1954-51 Supervisor, School 
Feeding Scheme. 19561 Vice-President, PRB. 19581 convicted (July) of 
perjury and sentenced to four months' imprisonment. 1958 (Oot): 
resigned as Vioe-Presidents PRB, "to safeguard the good name of the 
party and to prevent any linking of party activities with his own 
private affairs". 1961-741 Commissioner of Social Welfare. In 1979: 
Chief Information Offioer, Brunei State Government. 
53 Sir (Reginald) Edward Stubbs (1876-1947) GCMG (1928). Radley 
and Corpus Christi. Son of a Bishop. 19001 entered CO. 19131 Col. 
Seo., Ceylon. Governor successively of Hong Kong (1919-25), Jamaica 
(1926-32), Cyprus (1932-3) and Ceylon (1933-7)" 1947: died, 7 December, 
of heart failure. A man with a "lack of illusions, caustic tongue and 
disinclination to suffer fools gladly". 
54 Sir Frank Athelstane Swettenham (1850-1946) GCMG (1909) CH. 
18721 Joined SS service. 1882: BR Selangor. 1884-96 (except 1888-92)1 
BR Perak. 1896-19011 Resident-General FMS. 1901-31 Governor SS. 
19041 retd. 19091 Chr., Royal Commission on Mauritius. 
55 Sir Harold Augustin Tempany (1881-1955) Kt (1946), CMG (1941) 
CBE (1933) DSo FIC FCS. Ed. s privately and Univ. Coil., London. 1910- 
1929: served in Antigua, Mauritius. 1929-361 Director of Agriculture, 
SS and FMS. 1936: Asst. Agri. Adv. to SoS, CO. 1940-61 Agri. Adv. to 
SbS, CO. Author of Principles of Tropical Agriculture and numerous 
reports. 
56 Sir Thomas Shenton Whitelegge Thomas ('1879-1962) GCMG (1937) 
OBE (1919). 19271 Col. Sec., Gold Coast. Governor successively of 
Nyasaland (1929-32), Gold Coast (1932-4) and the Straits Settlements 
(1934-42). 1942-51 interned by enemy Japanese in Singapore. 19461 
retd. 1962: died, 15 January. 
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57 Sir William Hood Preacher (1849-1919) KONG (1904). 1871-81, 
Labuan service. 1881-7, Governor of North Borneo and, in 1884-5, 
simultaneously acting British Consul in Brunei. 1888-? 92 & 1896-1901, 
BR Perak. 1892-6, BR Selangor. 1901-5, Resident General FMS. 1910s: 
Chairman, inter alias of Brunei Estates Limited and the British Borneo 
Petroleum Syndicate. 1919, died, 3 May. 
58 Datuk 8N Tamer SPDg CMG (b 1912). Ed. Dover College and 
Wadham College, Oxford. 1935, Cadet, MOS. 1940-1, Assistant Resident, 
Brunei. 1941-5, interned by enemy Japanese in Batu Lintang. 1946-50, 
various posts in Malaya and Sarawak. Chief Secretary successively 
of Barbados (1950-6) and British North Borneo (1957-63)" 1963-4, State 
Secretary, Sabah (Federation of Malaysia). 1964, retired. 
59 General Nasataka Yamawakis see p 324, fn 38 (above). 
60 Haji Zaini bin Haji Abmad (b 1935)- Son of POK Shahbandar 
Abmad (see No 5 on p 638). 1956: Founder member of the PRB. August 
1956, Member of PRB's interim executive committee,, responsible for 
Political Affairs and Organization. 1958, After an apparent disagree- 
ment with his colleagues, he left Brunei to spend two years at the 
London School of Eoonomios, returning to prominence in December 1961, 
when he announced the formation of his own party, the Brunei United 
National Organization, whose aims included the liquidation of colonialism, 
the establishment of a truly democratic constitutional monarchy, and the 
eradication of poverty. By February 1962, however, he had abandoned 
this project, subsequently rejoining the PRB as prospective Minister of 
Economics in the Revolutionary Cabinet. After the failure of the 1962 
uprising, Haji Zaini was imprisoned (without trial) for ten years, 
before escaping to Malaysia, where he has since remained. Author of 
Brunei Kearah gemerdekaan 1984 (1984) - copy courtesy of Hai Zaini - 
and various articles. 
In early February 1957 Ha A Zaini was reported as saying that 
"feudalism and monarchism" were "out of date" and that all men were 
equal, to be treated alike, and given equal opportunities. (Borneo 
Bal letin. 2 February 1957). 
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* 
1.7 Interviews 
Mrs M Daubeny Friday 29 April 1982 (London) 
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Awang Eussoff Agaki Aoademio. 
Mr E Banks Curator of the Sarawak Museum before the 
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Fisheries Offioer. 
Mr ER Bevington CMG CEng 
Mr JG Black MCS 
Professor DE Brown 
Mrs Carrie C Brown 
Major GS Carter DSO 
Datuk RJF Curtis PJK 
Mrs M Daubeuy 
Brunei Commissioner of Development 1954-8- 
BR Brunei 1937-40; BR Labuan 1930. 
Academio. 
Academic. 
SOL 1934-60; SRD 1945-6. 
BR Brunei 1928-9. 
British expatriate in Limbang, 1936-8. 
Mr LBN : Davis CMG BR Brunei 1948. 
Dr OE Fisher Brunei State Medical Officer 1937-9" 
Mr HL Fountain SOL 1928-37. 
Mr JO Gilbert CMG BR Brunei 1953-8- 
Mrs P Gilbert POAS British expatriate in Brunei, 1953-8. 
Mr A Gilmour CMG BR Labuan 1928-9. 
Professor R Heussler Aoademio (now deoeased). 
Tan Sri Datuk AHP Humphrey BR Labuan 1940-2 
PMN CMG OBE 
Mr WM Johnson SOL 1929-33 
Sir John Johnston GCMG KCVO Head, SE Asia Department CO, 1956-7- 
Dato PM Linton SOL 1935 and 1957-63. General Manager 
BSPC 1959-63. 
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Mr JO Gilbert CMG 14 Deoember 1983. 
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Brunei in 1946-8,2 parts. Seen by 
oourtesy of Lady R Peel. 
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oopy oourtes3r of Fr P de Wit). 
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London, 1975 and 1976 reapeotively). 
* 
i 
2.5 Other Sources 
AH Fisher Album of 31 photographs, 1909 (in Royal common- 
wealth Sooiety Library, Northumberland Avenue). 
PL de Wit "Miasionaria in de Peterolie" in Maanblad Van 
Kill Hill (Roosendaal, January 1949), pp 138-9. 
"Van Sultans en Sultans Doohters" in Maanblad 
Van Kill Hill (Roosendaal, November 1951), pp 
162-4; and (Deoember 1951), PP 185-7" 
Notes The last two items were translated for the author from Ditoh to 
English by Miss Town Aelbers. 
